POLITICAL  ETHICS, 


DESIGNED    CHIEFLY 


FOR  THE  USE  OF  COLLEGES  AND  STUDENTS  AT  LAW. 


Lex,  communis  reipublicae  sponsio. — SENECA. 


BY 

FRANCIS  LIEBER,  LL.D., 

CORRESPONDING   MEMBER  OF  THE  INSTITUTE   OF  FRANCE,  ETC.; 

AUTHOR   OF   "ON  CIVIL   LIBERTY  AND   SELF-GOVERNMENT,"    "PRINCIPLES  OP   LEGAL  AND 
POLITICAL  INTERPRETATION,"  ETC.,  ETC. 


VOL.    II. 


SECOND     EDITION,     REVISED. 


EDITED   BY  THEODORE   D.  WOOLSEY. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J.   B.    LIPPINCOTT    &    CO. 

LONDON :  TRUBNER  &  CO. 
1876. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1874,  by 

MATILDA    LIEBER, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


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^'A.'l::!:  :  r.H.. i!;iO:/U\  v:',O  i' 


X* 


CONTENTS. 


.     BOOK  III. 

CHAPTER    IV. 

PAGH 

Ambition. — Its  various  Manifestations. — Is  it  radically  bad? — Political 
Apathy  a  great  Evil. — Politics!  Ingratitude. — Jealousy. — Political  Mod- 
esty.— Self-Esteem. — Vanity. — Titles  without  Office,  and  External  Dis- 
tinctions, such  as  Ribbons.  —  The  Chinese.  —  De  Ruiter.  —  Personal 
Affection. —  Friendship:  in  ancient  Times;  in  modern. — Its  high  Value. 
— Epaminondas. — Abuse  of  Friendship  and  of  the  Word. — Favoritism  : 
in  Monarchies;  in  Ministers  and  all  other  Citizens. — Its  ruinous  Effects. 
— Washington  and  Pym. — Family  Affection. — Providing  for  Members 
of  the  Family. — Papal  Nepotism. — Its  Character  when  highest  .  .  9 

CHAPTER    V. 

Gratitude  fully  discussed. — Ingratitude. — Excess  of  Gratitude  aids  Usurp- 
ers.— Cassar,  Napoleon. — Distinction  between  Gratitude  and  Popularity. 
— Popularity. — Sudden  and  Passing  Popularity;  Lasting  Popularity. — 
We  have  no  Right  to  seek  Popularity,  but  must  suffer  it  to  seek  us. — 
Power  of  spontaneous  Popularity ;  peculiar  Power  of  spontaneously  re- 
turned Popularity. — Slavery  of  Popularity. — Danger  of  Popularity,  in 
Free  Countries,  to  ihe  Individual. — Crowds  to  receive  distinguished 
Men. — Great  Danger  of  Personal  Popularity  for  Liberty. — Pericles. — 
Demagogues. — Athenian  Demagogism. — Monuments. — The  Duty  of 
Attention. — Observation  of  Primary  Agents  and  Elements. — Truth  and 
Justice  connected  with  it. — Obligation  to  study  the  History  of  our 
Country,  its  Institutions  and  their  Classical  Periods. — It  is  necessary  in 
modern  Times  to  read  Newspapers  .......  35 

CHAPTER    VI. 

Continency. — Political  Evils  of  Incontinency  ;  of  Prostitution. — The  pri- 
mary Foundation  of  Society,  the  Family,  is  undermined  by  it. — Evils  of 
general  Incontinency  in  the  highest  Classes,  and  the  lowest. — Religion. 
— Its  Universality. — Its  importance  for  Morality;  for  Society;  for  the 
State. — Fanaticism. — Fanaticism  of  any  kind. — Religious  Fanaticism. — 
The  Bible. — Revelation. — Both  exclusively  religious. — Persecution. — 

3 


CONTENTS. 
4 

PAGB 

Direct  and  indirect  Persecution.— Political  and  social  Persecution.— 
Hypocrisy  and  Desecration  of  Religion.— Regulation  of  political  or 
social  actions  by  Tenets * 

CHAPTER    VII. 

Patriotism.— The  Patriotism  of  the  Ancients;  of  the  Moderns.— Some 
have  rejected  Patriotism.— National  Conceit,  Pride.— Narrowness  of 
Feeling  a  Counterfeit  of  Patriotism. — What  is  true  Patriotism? — It  is 
noble  and  necessary  for  Liberty.— Loyalty.— Public  Spirit.— What  it 
consists  in.— Calamitous  Consequences  of  a  Want  of  Public  Spirit.— 
Veneration  for  the  Old;  Forefathers.— How  far  just,  necessary.— When 
injurious.— The  Age  of  Action  under  Forty;  of  Conservatism  over 
Forty ._Do  Times  grow  worse? — When  are  we  more  experienced 
than  our  Forefathers  ? — Stagnation  and  Heedlessness  .  .  .  .  80 


BOOK  IV. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Education. — What  it  is. — Strong  and  universal  Tendency  to  form  Habits 
and  continue  them. — Great  Importance  of  Education  in  Politics,  not 
only  of  elementary  and  general  School  Systems,  but  also  of  superior 
Education  and  literary  Institutions. — Expeditions,  Libraries,  Museums. 
— Industrial  Education. — The  Rich  as  well  as  the  Poor  ought  to  be 
actively  engaged  in  some  Pursuit,  whether  purely  mental,  or  industrial. — 
Law  of  Solon. — Connection  of  Crime  with  want  of  regular  industrial 
Education  in  modern  Times. — Statistics. — Habits  of  Industry,  of  Obe- 
dience, of  Independence,  of  Reverence,  and  of  Honesty. — Ancient  His- 
tory for  Children. — Concentric  Instruction. — Gymnastics. — Sexes. —  The 
Woman. — Difference  of  physical  Organization,  Temperament,  and 
Powers  in  Woman  and  Man. — The  Family  (and  through  it  the  Society 
of  Comity  and  the  Country)  is  the  sacred  Sphere  of  Woman's  chief 
Activity. — The  Connection  of  Woman's  Activity  with  the  State. — 
Woman  is  excluded  from  Politics. — She  is  connected  with  the  State 
by  Patriotism. — Lady  Croke. — The  Petitioning  of  Women. — Lady  Rus- 
sell a  Model. — History  of  Woman. — Is  the  Woman  represented  though 
she  cannot  vote  at  the  Poll  ? 108 

CHAPTER    II. 

Obedience  to  the  Laws. — How  highly  the  Greeks  esteemed  it. — Obedi- 
ence to  Laws  one  of  Man's  Prerogatives. — Absolute  Obedience  impos- 
sible.— Ad  Impossibilia  Nemo  obligatur. — Ad  Turpia  Nemo  obligatur. 

— Viscount  Orthes. — Unlawful  Demands  made  by  lawful  Authority. 

High  Importance  of  the  Judiciary  with  reference  to  Obedience  to  the 


CONTENTS.  5 

PACK 

Law. — Not  all  that  is  not  prohibited  may  be  done  by  the  Citizen,  any 
more  than  all  that  is  positively  permitted. — Penalties  are  not  equiva- 
lents of  Crime. — Malum  in  se,  Malum  prohibitum :  Is  the  distinction 
essential,  and  can  we  found  any  Rule  of  Action  upon  it? — The  Ques- 
tion of  Obedience  to  Laws  a  Question  of  Conflict. — Obedience  in  the 
Army  and  Navy. — Articles  of  War. — Obedience  in  the  Civil  Service. 
— How  far  is  the  Citizen  bound  to  obey  the  Laws  ? — Justifiable  Dis- 
obedience.— Necessary  and  morally  demanded  Disobedience. — Non- 
compliance  with  the  Laws,  or  passive  Resistance. — Active  Resistance. 
— Armed  Resistance. — Insurrection. — Revolution. — Resistance  formerly 
considered  lawful  and  received  in  the  Charters. — Mobs  and  Mob-law, 
so  called. — Duty  of  Informing:  in  the  Officer;  in  the  Citizen  at  large. 
— Professional  Informers  for  Rewards. — Secret  Police. — Delatores  and 
Mouchards. — The  Obligation  of  Informing  against  intended  or  com- 
mitted Offences  .....  .  .  '  .  .  .  .  .  139 

CHAPTER     III. 

Associations. — Associated  Means,  Endeavors. — Associations  for  the  Pro- 
motion of  Morals. — Pledges. — Trades-Unions. — Ancient  Guilds. — Un- 
lawful Combinations  for  Purposes  lawful  if  pursued  by  the  Individual. 
— Evil  Effects  of  Trades-Unions. — Disclosures  respecting  them  in  Scot- 
land and  England  .  .  .  . 194 

CHAPTER    IV. 

Liberty  of  the  Press. — Primordial  Right  of  Communion. — Journalism. — 
High  moral  Obligations  of  Editors. — Temptations  in  the  Way  of  Editors. 
— Power  of -Leaders,  good  or  bad,  rests  upon  their  seizing  upon  that 
Principle  which  is  the  moving  Agent  of  the  Mass. — In  what  the  Power 
of  leading  Papers  consists. — Conditions  which  give  great  Power  to 
single  Papers. — Populous  Capitals  in  Connection  with  the  Influence  of 
Papers. — Obligation  of  Veracity  peculiarly  strong  for  Editors. — Political 
Importance  of  gentlemanlike  Tone. — Publishing  private  Letters. — Dan- 
gers of  Newspaper  Flippancy. — The  Political  Position  of  the  Clergy- 
man.— Opinion  of  ancient  Theologians. — How  far  the  Clergyman  ought 
to  share  in  the  Politics  of  his  Country  .......  205 


BOOK  V. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Voting. — Principle  of  Unanimity;  of  Majority  and  Minority. — Deliberative 

Procedures. — All  who  have  a  Right  to  vote  ought  to  vote. — Accord- 

'  ing  to  what  Rules. — (Election  Statistics.) — Voting  for  Officers. — When 

we  ought  to  abstain  from  Voting. — Influencing  Elections. — Canvassing. 


6  CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

—Intimidation,  individual  and  official.— Bribery.— Severe  Laws  against 
it  at  Athens. — Mutual  Insurance  Companies  for  Bribing  at  Athens. — 
Bribes  of  common  Voters.— Bribing  Judges ;  Legislators.— Bribes  by  a 
Government  of  its  own  Citizens.— Bribes  by  foreign  Powers.— Betting 
on  Elections. — Election  Riots  and  Disturbance  around  the  Poll.— 
Various  other  Election  Malpractices 226 

CHAPTER    II. 

Parties. — Has  any  free  Country  existed  without  Parties  ?  —  Can  a  free 
Country  possibly  exist  without  Parties?— Is  it  desirable  that  a  free 
Country  should  exist  without  Parties? — Historical  Parties  and  passing 
ones. — Conservative  and  Movement  Parties. — Characteristics  of  a  sound 
Party. — Dangers  of  Party  Zeal  and  factious  Passion.— Party  Signs. — 
Misunderstanding  of  Language  in  high  Party  Spirit. — Ought  a  conscien- 
tious Citizen  to  attach  himself  to  a  Party  ? — The  Law  of  Solon. — 
Independents. — Trimmers 252 

CHAPTER    III. 

Opposition. — Government. — Administration. — What  is  a  lawful  Opposi- 
tion.— A  well-understood  Opposition  the  essential  Safeguard  of  Liberty. 
— The  Opposition  a  great  Institution  of  Modern  Times. — As  such  it 
dates  more  especially  from  the  Times  of  Walpole  and  Pulteney. — It  is 
lawful  to  oppose  the  Majority,  which  is  not  always  right. — (Order  of 
Sitting  in  Legislative  Assemblies.) — Public  Opinion  and  General  Opin- 
ion.— Ethical  Rules  relating  to  Opposition  and  to  Parties  in  general. — 
How  far  ought  a  Citizen  to  go  in  his  Opposition,  especially  in  times 
of  War? — Coalitions. — Parties  formed  on  the  Ground  of  foreign  National 
Extraction 268 

CHAPTER    IV. 

Public  Men. — Leaders. — Self-examination  before  a  Citizen  embarks  in 
Public  Life. — Physical,  Moral,  and  Mental  Qualities  desirable  in  a 
Public  Man. — Necessary  Knowledge  for  a  Public  Man. — Caution  in 
entering  upon  Public  Life  .........  284 


BOOK   VI. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Extra-constitutional  Meetings. — Their  Necessity. — The  Representative. — 
Summary  of  his  Duties. — He  is  the  Guardian  of  the  public  Treasures. 
—When  ought  he  to  vote  liberally  ?— The  Framing  of  Laws.— Legis- 
lation upon  the  Principle  of  mutual  Accommodation. — Importance  of  a 


CONTENTS.  7 

PACK 

gentlemanly  Character  for  the  Representative. — Instruction. — History 
and  the  various  Constitutions  show  that  the  Right  of  Instruction  has 
been  claimed  and  disclaimed  as  promoting  and  as  injurious  to  Liberty, 
according  to  the  Circumstances  of  the  Times. — The  Representative  Gov- 
ernment is  not  a  mere  Substitution  for  direct  Democracy. — Essential 
character  of  the  Representative  Government. — The  different  character- 
istic Principles  of  Ancient  States,  the  Middle  Ages,  and  Modern  States. 
— Nationalization  of  States ;  Socialization  of  Population. — National 
Representation  the  great  Feature  of  Modern  Times. — Difference  be- 
tween Deputative  and  Representative  Systems. — Oath  in  New  Jersey 
and  the  Netherlands  to  promote  Public  Welfare. — How  does  the  Repre- 
sentative faithfully  represent? — Advantages  of  Representative  Govern- 
ment.— Objections  to  the  doctrine  of  Instruction. — Instruction  belongs 
to  the  Deputative  System  .........  295 

CHAPTER    II. 

The  Subject  of  Instruction  with  particular  Reference  to  the  United  States. 
— The  ancient  Articles  of  Confederation  founded  upon  the  Deputative 
System. — The  Articles  of  Confederation  compared  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  former  United  Provinces  of  the  Netherlands,  the  Swiss  Act  of 
Mediation,  the  present  Constitution  of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  the 
Germanic  Confederacy. — The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  boldly 
changed  the  former  cleputative  character  of  the  Confederacy  into  a  repre- 
sentative one. — Senators  are  not  Ambassadors. — In  Leagues  the  strongest 
Member  of  those  on  terms  of  parity  according  to  the  letter  must  sway. 
— Hegemony  in  Greece,  Phoenicia,  the  Low  Countries,  etc. — Relation 
of  the  State  Legislatures  to  the  respective  Senators  elected  by  them. — 
The  History  of  Instruction  in  modern  times,  as  connected  with  the 
Representative  System 339 

CHAPTER    III. 

Responsibility  of  the  Representative. — Pledges. — Implied  and  positive, 
general  and  specific  Pledges. — Are  Pledges  moral,  and  consistent  with 
general  Liberty  and  Justice  ? — When  are  they  so  ? — Pledges  originated 
with  the  Court  Party  and  Aristocracy. — Strong  Power  of  Implied 
Pledges. — Breaking  Implied  Pledges,  and  throwing  one's  self  upon 
the  Constituents  by  Resignation. — Duties  of  Presiding  Officers  of  de- 
liberative Assemblies;  Speakers 363 


CONTENTS. 

BOOK  VII. 

CHAPTER    I. 


FAGB 


Executive  Officers.— Difficulty  of  controlling  them.— Their  Interference 
with  Elections :  in  Athens,  Rome,  France,  England,  the  United  States. 
—Plato's  Opinion  of  the  Duties  of  Officers.— Post-Office.— The  Chief 
Executive  Officer.— Confidential  Officers.— Official  Interpretation  of  Con- 
stitutions and  Laws.— The  Veto.— Ancient  and  Modern  Veto.— Absolute, 
suspensive,  and  conditional  Vetoes.— Privilege  of  Pardoning  in  Mon- 
archies ;  in  Republics.— Danger  and  Difficulty  in  Republics.— For  what 
Purpose  is  it  granted  ? — Rules  which  ought  to  be  observed  in  making 
use  of  the  Power  of  Pardoning 373 

CHAPTER    II. 

Judge,  Juror,  Advocate,  and  Witness. — Official,  external  and  moral  Inde- 
pendence of  the  Judge. — Sanctissimus  Judex  of  the  Romans. — The 
Judge,  where  there  is  doubt,  must  interpret  in  Mercy,  in  Penal  Cases ;  in 
Favor  of  civil  Liberty,  in  all. — The  Institution  of  the  Jury. — The  sacred 
Office  of  the  Juryman. — What  is  he  to  do  when  the  Law  is  contrary  to 
the  universal  Conscience? — The  Institution  of  the  Advocate. — Moral 
Obligation  of  the  Advocate. — Political  Relations  of  Lawyers  in  Free 
Countries. — Duties  of  the  Witness  .......  401 

CHAPTER    III. 

War. — Definitions. — Present  Exaggerations  against  War. — Christian  Re- 
ligion does  not  prohibit  just  War;  neither  the  Bible,  nor  the  early 
Writers  of  the  Church. — Objections  against  War  on  the  Score  of  Moral- 
ity; of  Reason;  of  Political  Economy. — Just  and  Patriotic  Wars  have 
morally  raised  Nations. — Eternal  Peace. — Arbitration  by  a  Congress  of 
Nations. — Just  Wars. — National  Debasing  Effect  of  suffering  national 
insult  and  Injustice  without  Resistance. — The  Age  of  Louis  XIV. — 
Wars  do  not  absolve  from  Obligations  to  the  Enemy. — Who  is  the 
Enemy  ?— Are  Citizens  of  the  hostile  State  Enemies  ?— What  Means  of-- 
injuring  the  Enemy  are  admissible  ? — Treaties  containing  Provisions  for 
the  Case  of  War  between  the  Contracting  Powers.— Shall  Confidence 
be  abused  in  War  ?— Does  War  allow  Deception  ?— Capitulations  are 
sacred.— Destruction  in  War.— Carrying  off  Works  of  Art,  Archives,  etc. 
Duties  of  the  individual  Soldier 426 


POLITICAL   ETHICS. 


BOOK    III. 

(Continued.} 
CHAPTER    IV. 

Ambition. — Its  various  Manifestations. — Is  it  radically  bad  ? — Political  Apathy  a 
great  Evil.  —  Political  Ingratitude.  —  Jealousy. —  Political  Modesty.  —  Self- 
Esteem.  —  Vanity.  —  Titles  without  Office,  and  External  Distinctions,  such  as 
Ribbons.  —  The  Chinese. —  De  Ruiter. —  Personal  Affection. —  Friendship:  in 
ancient  Times;  in  modern.  —  Its  high  Value. —  Epaminondas.  —  Abuse  of 
Friendship  and  of  the  Word. — Favoritism:  in  Monarchies;  in  Ministers  and 
all  other  Citizens.  —  Its  ruinous  Effects.  —  Washington  and  Pym.  —  Family 
Affection.  —  Providing  for  Members  of  the  Family.  —  Papal  Nepotism.  —  Its 
Character  when  highest. 

XXXVI.  THE  English  word  ambition  is  used  for  very  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  the  same  affection  of  the  human  soul,  from 
its  laudable  original  principle  to  its  immoral  or  criminal  excess, 
for  which  some  other  languages  have  different  words.  This 
want  of  terms  has  not  unfrequently  exercised  an  unfavorable 
influence  upon  the  views  which  have  been  taken  of  the  sub- 
ject. By  ambition  we  designate  a  desire  of  distinction  or 
superiority,  whether  it  only  prompts  to  legitimate  emulation, 
increases  to  a  longing  for  distinction,  or  degenerates  into  a 
craving  and  ultimately  into  an  ungovernable  passion  for  it. 
If  we  comprehend  all  these  gradations  under  one  term,  namely 
that  of  desire  of  distinction,  I  believe  that  we  do  no  violence 
to  language.  Of  course  we  must  waive  the  Latin  etymology 
of  the  word  ambition,  since  the  meaning  originally  attached 
to  it  in  that  language  has  entirely  faded  away  in  our  own 

9 


10  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

idiom.  The  question  is,  Is  ambition  a  legitimate  desire,  laud- 
'able,  beneficial,  or  must  a  conscientious  citizen  extinguish  it, 
and  can  he  do  it,  or  is  it  an  original,  elementary,  and  there- 
fore necessary  principle  in  our  soul,  so  that  we  ought  to 
cultivate  and  moderate  rather  than  eradicate  it  ? 

We  have  seen  that  men  are  ordained  to  exist  as  individuals, 
not  only  physically  so,  like  the  animals,  not  only  each  with 
his  own  moral  value,  but  also  with  an  infinite  variety  in  the 
combination  of  mental   faculties  and   ethical  inclinations,  a 
variety  far  greater  and  more  surprising  than  that  which  we 
observe  in  the  combination  of  matter  around  us.     Diversity, 
taken  in  its  deepest  meaning,  and  not  sameness,  is  the  law  of 
everything  that  lives ;  the  propelling  agent,  most  especially, 
of  society.     Closely  connected  with,  and  indeed  directly  re- 
sulting from  it,  are  emulation  and  competition.    Without  them 
little  energy  would  be  roused,  and  it  is  not  only  justifiable  in, 
but  it  is  demanded  of  us,  that  in  whatever  line  we  are  conscious 
of  possessing  peculiar  powers  we  should  strive  to  emulate 
those  who  are  before  or  above  us,  to  rise,  if  possible,  superior 
to  them,  since  we  have  enjoyed  already  the  advantage  of  their 
example  and  acquisitions.     Desiring,  then,  to  distinguish  our- 
selves is  far  from  necessarily  implying  vanity,  but  it  may,  and 
indeed  ought  to,  be  a  desire  to  develop  our  individual  nature, 
stamped  upon  us  as  our  peculiar  intellectual  compound  char- 
acter, to  the  utmost  extent,  so  that  we  may  be  all  that  which 
our  Maker  destined  us  to  be,  and  distinguish  ourselves  by 
perfection,  if  he  has  given  us  peculiar  faculties.     In  this  view 
ambition,  or  a  desire  of  distinction,  is  not  only  legitimate,  but 
it  is  one  of  our  great  duties.     Skill,  knowledge,  wisdom,  and 
virtue  may  thus  become  in  a  variety  of  spheres,  humble  or 
high,  the  object  of  laudable  ambition,  the  vis  motrix  of  society 
and  civilization.   Without  it  there  would  be  stagnation,  inanity 
-listless  barbarity.     But  it  has  been  asked,  How  is  this  am- 
bition compatible  with  that   modesty  which  all  systems  of 
morals  must  hold  up  as  a  virtue,  that  humility  of  mind  which 
the  Christian   religion  especially  demands?      I    believe   the 
question  would  never  have  been  asked,  had  not  an  erroneous 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  II 

view  respecting  men  and  society  been  taken,  according  to 
which  a  state  of  perfection,  towards  which  we  were  bound  to 
strive,  was  believed  necessarily  to  consist  in  a  state  of  same- 
ness ;  but  we  have  already  seen  that  where  there  is  individu- 
ality there  is  diversity,  and  this  diversity  of  combination  seems 
to  be  one  of  our  Maker's  greatest  laws  of  life,  by  which  his 
greatness,  inconceivable  by  man,  appears  nevertheless  the 
more  holy  the  longer  and  deeper  man  contemplates  it  and 
follows  it  out  as  far  as  his  limited  faculties  will  sustain  him. 
If  we  take  the  opposite  view,  that  perfection  of  life  does  not 
consist  in  infinite  combinations  of  character  and  infinite  mu- 
tual relations,  necessary  in  order  to  keep  society  joined  to- 
gether, but  also  necessarily  founded  upon  variety  and  contrast, 
because  without  it  society  would  dissolve  into  equal  and 
equally  inert  atoms,  we  must  ultimately  arrive,  if  we  consist- 
ently reason,  at  that  state  held  up  by  the  wisest  Hindoos  as 
the  state  of  perfection,  in  which  we  are  "  indifferent  to  all 
pairs  of  opposite  things,  as  honor  or  dishonor,  and  the  like, 
remaining  absorbed  in  the  Divine  Essence."1 

XXXVII.  Desire  of  distinction  is  just  and  all  depends 
upon  these  points,  that  we  desire  to  excel  or  distinguish  our- 
selves in  something  laudable,  that  after  calm  examination  this 
appears  to  be  within  the  reach  of  our  faculties,  endowments, 
and  position,  so  that  we  mistake  not  the  aim  pointed  out  to 
us  by  our  individual  combination,  that  the  desire  do  not  be- 
come excessive,  or  a  diseased  function  of  the  soul,  and  that 
consequently  we  do  not  desire  distinction  because  it  is  such 
but  because  it  is  in  a  good  cause  and  our  duty  calls  us  to 
excel  in  it  as  we  have  the  endowments  for  it,  and  therefore 
do  not  envy  or  hate  those  who  excel  in  the  same  paths,  but, 
on  the  contrary  cherish,  them  as  striving  for  the  same  good 
and  noble  end.2  Many  persons  have  entirely  missed  their 


1  Ordinances  of  M  nu,  translated  by  Sir  William  Jones,  London,  1799,  vol. 
iii.  p.  237. 

2  *  The  very  ruinous  effect  of  small  v  inity,  which  is  highly  dangerous  in  all  truly 
free  governments,  is  strikingly  illustrate.:!  in  the  following  extract  from  Sir  Samuel 


I2  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

aim  by  striving  to  excel  in  poetry  while  they  were  made  per- 
haps to  be  sound  practical  men  ;  many  have  ruined  the  use- 
fulness of  their  life  and  their  happiness  by  not  proportioning 
their  ambition  to  their  faculties  or  other  means;  many,  by 
placing  it  upon  worthless  subjects;  many,  again, by  crimihally 
placing  it  upon  subjects  legitimate  in  themselves.  And  in  this 
latter  point  of  view,  in  which  it  becomes  especially  important 
in  politics,  we  must  not  forget  that  it  is  closely  coupled  in 
gifted  minds  with  that  urgency  to  action  which  we  find  always 
to  exist  in  proportion  to  a  man's  faculties,  and  from  which  rises 
the  love  of  power,  not  wrong  in  its  principle,  but  often  carried 
to  such  insatiate  excess  that  it  bewilders  the  mind,  deranges 
all  other  functions  of  the  soul,  and  ends  in  a  monomania. 
Yet,  though  ambition  has  frequently  intoxicated  superior 
minds  and  led  less  gifted  ones  to  many  follies,  we  can  in 
politics  as  little  dispense  with  ambition  as  in  the  arts,  sciences, 
or  literature,  in  the  school,  the  house,  or  the  various  avoca- 
tions of  practical  life.  For  if  ambition  in  those  gifted  citizens 
who  by  their  peculiar  mental  organization  are  fitted  for  offi- 
cers or  as  leaders  is  extinguished,  either  by  disgust  at  a  de- 

Romilly's  Narrative  of  his  own  life,  in  Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  Sir  Samue 
Romilly,  2d  edit.,  London,  1840,  vol.  i.  p.  107.  He  had  paid  a  visit  to  Paris  at 
the  beginning  of  the  revolution,  and  says,  "What  struck  me  as  most  remarkable 
in  the  dispositions  of  the  people. that  I  saw,  was  the  great  desire  that  everybody 
had  to  act  a  great  part,  and  the  jealousy,  which  in  consequence  of  this  was  enter- 
tained of  those  who  were  really  eminent.  It  seemed  as  if  all  persons,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  whether  deputies  themselves,  declaimers  in  the  Palais 
Royal,  orators  in  the  coffee-houses,  spectators  in  the  gallery,  or  the  populace 
about  the  door,  looked  upon  themselves  individually  as  of  great  consequence  in 
the  revolution.  The  man  who  kept  the  hotel  at  which  I  lodged  at  Paris,  a  cer- 
tain M.  Villars,  was  a  private  in  the  National  Guard.  Upon  my  returning 
home  on  the  day  of  the  benediction  of  their  colors  at  Notre  Dame,  and  telling 
him  that  I  had  been  present  at  the  ceremony,  he  said, 'You  saw  me,  sir?'  I 
was  obliged  to  say  that  I  really  had  not.  He  said,  '  Is  that  possible,  sir?  You 
did  not  see  me !  Why,  I  was  in  one  of  the  first  ranks — all  Paris  saw  me  !'  I 
have  often  since  thought  of  my  host's  childish  vanity.  What  he  s  -oke  was  felt 
by  thousands.  The  most  important  transactions  were  as  nothing  but  as  they 
had  relation  to  the  figure  which  each  little  self-conceited  hero  acted  in  them.  To 
attract  the  attention  of  all  Paris,  or  of  all  France,  was  often  the  motive  of  con- 
duct  in  matters  which  were  attended  with  most  momentous  consequences." 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  13 

generate  state  of  things  or  their  own  haughtiness,  and  if  it 
be  not  properly  kindled  in  the  rising  generations  by  directing 
their  attention  to  the  noblest  examples  of  civic  worth  in  the 
history  of  their  country  or  that  of  other  great  nations,  one  of 
the  greatest  and  most  ruinous  evils  of  a  state  must  unavoid- 
ably befall  it,  that  of  political  apathy  or  indifferentism,  which 
always  fo/nents  political  demoralization,  as  it  partly  arises 
from  it;  until  it  finally  extinguishes  all  public  spirit  and 
patriotism. 

If  the  best,  the  well-informed,  the  honest,  do  not  strive  for 
the  honors  of  the  commonwealth,  the  wicked,  ignorant,  or 
dishonest  will ;  if  all  matters  of  political  distinction,  be  it  in 
the  way  of  parliamentary  honor,  distinction  of  high  office,  on 
the  bench,  or  in  whatever  other  manner,  be  disregarded  or 
derided,  matters  of  justice  and  politics  themselves  soon  will  be 
treated  so  too.  If  the  substantial  citizens  become  indifferent- 
ists  and  do  not  vote,  perhaps  because  they  are  too  proud  to 
mingle  in  the  crowd,  or  unwilling  to  exercise  so  high  a  privi- 
lege of  liberty  at  the  expense  of  some  personal  inconvenience, 
they  ought  to  know  that  others  will  not  do  the  same,  and  that 
the  "  faex  infima  populi,"  where  such  have  a  right  of  voting, 
will  infallibly  be  at  the  poll.  Indifferentism  in  politics  leads 
to  what  was  called  in  a  previous  passage  political  atony,  a 
dissolution  of  the  political  ties,  and  of  course  to  the  death 
of  justice  and  liberty,  an  awful  state  of  things,  out  of  which 
convulsive  revolutions  alone,  accompanied  with  suffering  and 
violence,  can  develop  a  new  order  of  things. 

XXXVIII.  We  ought  not  to  forget  that  distinction  in 
sciences  or  other  branches  may  be  acquired  not  indeed  with- 
out sacrifices,  for  there  is  no  good  to  be  acquired  without 
proportionate  exertion  and  sacrifice,  but  without  those  sacri- 
fices from  which  nobler  minds  would  shrink.  The  move- 
ments of  liberty,  however,  are  in  their  nature  not  unfrequently 
of  a  rough  character,  because  they  are  the  affairs  of  masses,  in 
which  we  cannot  always  expect  delicacy  of  relations.  With- 
out ambition,  without  love  of  distinction,  there  would  then  not 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 
14 

exist  sufficient  incentive  for  those  who  have  the  mind  and 
mould  of  soul  to  become  great  citizens. 

For  this  reason,  however,  it  is  also  necessary  not  to  with- 
hold from  the  excellent  or  great  the  just  reward  of  their  am- 
bition, not  to  instil  into  them  by  unworthy  ingratitude  the 
poison  of  jealousy,  or  contempt  of  popular  acknowledgment, 
not  to  permit  that  honorable  ambition,  which  respects  and 
obeys  the  public  voice,  to  degenerate  into  the  love  of  power  for 
its  own  sake,  the  most  reckless  and  unscrupulous  of  passions. 
Habitual  ingratitude  produces  one  of  two  things :  either  it 
leads  those  who  long  for  power  to  use  the  people  while  they 
despise  it,  or  it  drives  the  best  minds  from  the  stage  of  poli- 
tics.    Niebuhr,  in  his  History  of  Rome,  says,  "  M.  Manlius, 
the  preserver  of  the  capitol,  of  whom  the  chronicles   relate 
that  in  birth  and  valor  he  was  second  to  none,  and  in  personal 
beauty,  exploits,  eloquence,  vigor,  and  daring  superior  to  all, 
found  himself  bitterly  disappointed  in  his  claims  to  gratitude 
and   honor.     Camillus,  his  enemy,  to  whom   he  felt  himself 
at  least  equal,   who  had   not  shared   in  the  distress  of  the 
siege,  who  had    imprecated  curses  on  his  country,  was   re- 
peatedly raised  by  the  houses  to  the  dictatorship,  and  by  the 
comitia,  which  were  under  the  influence  of  the   aristocracy, 
to  the  military  tribunate  :  while  he,  though  a  consular,  found 
himself  excluded  from  all  dignities.     This  insulting  neglect 
in  return  for  an  action  standing  foremost  but  not  alone  in  a 
heroic  life,  the  energy  of  which  was  still  unexhausted,  poi- 
soned his  heart  with  virulent  rancor.     He  was  one  of  those 
powerful-minded  men  who  have  received  a  calling  to  be  the 
first  among  their  countrymen,  and  feel  an  unconquerable  long- 
ing to  fulfil  it,  while  low  minds,  envying  and  disliking  them, 
are  resolved  to  keep  them  back  from  the  place  which  is  their 
due ;  one  of  those,  the  superhuman  vehemence  of  whose  char- 
acter, when  drawn  forth  by  such  a  conflict,  makes  even  hon- 
est but  timid  natures  shrink.     For  indeed  it  is  their  doom  to 
be  haunted  by  a  spirit  against  the  snares  of  which  nothing 
can  protect  them  but  the  confidence  and  esteem  of  honorable 
minds.     God  will  require  their  souls  from  those  who  have 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  15 

driven  them  into  fatal  courses  :  their  faults  he  will  judge  more 
mercifully  than  the  faults  of  those  who  ruined  his  noblest 
work.  These  mighty  characters  have  always  an  intense  in- 
born feeling  in  behalf  of  justice,  truth,  and  whatever  is  glo- 
rious ;  they  are  animated  by  love  and  pity,  by  hatred  and 
indignation  of  the  right  sort :  these  become  subservient  to 
their  fierce  passions,  but  do  not  die  away :  it  is  glaringly 
unjust,  even  when  they  have  gone  irretrievably  astray,  to  re- 
gard actions,  which  in  a  man  of  blameless  life  would  be  ex- 
tolled as  noble  and  praiseworthy,  in  any  other  light  in  them, 
although  vulgar  souls  may  do  the  same  things  from  selfish 
motives."  x  So  far  the  historian  of  Rome.  We  shall  return 
to  the  subject  of  gratitude  and  popularity  in  politics. 

XXXIX.  If  excessive  or  unfounded  jealousy  towards  great 
and  honorable  citizens  is  blamable,  it  marks  .no  less  an  evil 
disposition  if  thie  ambitious  show  it  towards  one  another,  and 
allow  themselves  to  be  carried  away  so  far  as  to  sacrifice  their 
country,  or  even  its  partial  welfare,  to  these  animosities  which 
are  below  a  truly  great  mind. 

The  danger  when  a  man's  ambition  is  greater  than  the  re- 
sources within  him,  has  been  already  alluded  to.  If  his  posi- 
tion is  such  that  he  cannot  effect  much  except  by  the  power 
which  he  could  only  acquire  by  a  superior  mind,  the  injury 
is  not  only  on  his  side ;  he  will  earn  disgrace ;  but  it  is  also 
greatly  owing  to  this  disproportion  in  the  endowments  of 
many  men  that  we  meet  with  so  many  restless,  turbulent,  and 
noisy  politicians  in  their  limited  spheres,  men  who  have  too 
much  ambition  to  remain  quiet,  and  too  limited  a  mind  to 
comprehend  what  is  truly  noble,  great,  or  good,  and  whose 
petty  pride  makes  them  jealous  of  all  true  distinction  and 
influence  in  others.  They  are  very  troublesome  members  of 
the  community,  and  become  sometimes  highly  injurious.  It 
is  the  duty  of  every  true  citizen  to  keep  within  his  proper 
sphere.  This  disproportion  between  the  impulse  and  the 


Eng.  trans.,  Amer.  ed.,  ii.  451. 


jg  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

faculties  is  of  immense  danger  in  disturbed  times,  when 
rapid  changes  are  unavoidable,  and  in  persons  who  by  their 
position,  acquired  by  adventitious  circumstances,  have  for  a 
time  at  least  power  or  influence.  How  easily  may  not  a 
country  be  ruined  by  the  ambition  of  a  weak-minded  man, 
whether  monarch  or  demagogue,  in  such  times  of  danger! 
The  duke  of  Norfolk,  who  conspired  against  Elizabeth,  in 
order  to  marry  Mary  of  Scots,  queen  of  England,  is  repre- 
sented by  Hallam1  to  have  been  such,  and  therefore  to  have 
fallen  by  "a  sentence  amply  merited,  the  execution  of  which 
was  indispensable."  The  French  revolution  shows  many 
examples  of  this  species  of  character  in  a  most  glaring  and 
appalling  light. 

XL.  Ambition,  as  first  limited,  is  not  incompatible  in  any 
way  with  modesty,  a  virtue  which  is  indeed  no  less  amiable  in 
private  life  than  in  public.  Nor  is  modesty  incompatible  with 
self-esteem.2  Anaxagoras,  when  exiled  in  Lampsacus,  was 
pitied  because  he  now  was  deprived  of  Athens :  "  Rather 
Athens  of  me,"  he  replied.3  Whether  this  proud  answer  was 
well  founded  in  the  case  of  Anaxagoras,  is  not  the  place  here 
to  investigate ;  but  certain  it  is  that  there  are  great  men  who 
are  as  valuable  to  their  country  as  that  is  to  them,  who,  be- 
cause they  are  of  a  great  and  comprehensive  intellect,  cannot 
but  see  clearly  their  position,  and  surely  would  not  act  morally 
if  they  should  attempt  to  hide  the  consciousness  of  their  own 

1  Constitutional  History  of  England,  vol.  i.'pp.  181,  182. 

a  *  Pitt  (afterwards  Lord  Chatham)  is  said  to  have  expressed,  in  1757,  these 
words  to  the  duke  of  Devonshire :  "  My  lord,  I  am  sure  I  can  save  this  country, 
and  nobody  else  can."  Walpole's  Memoirs,  vol.  ii.  p.  271. 

So  did  his  son  William  Pitt,  at  a  very  early  period,  "  prefer  the  profession  of 
the  law  to  any  official  connection  with  an  administration  of  which  he  did  not 
form  a  part."  Soon  after  he  declared  publicly  that  he  had* determined  "never 
to  accept  any  subordinate  office,— meaning  an  office  which  did  not  entitle  him 
to  a  sea  in  the  cabinet."  (Tomline's  Memoir  of  William  Pitt,  2d  ed.,  vol.  i.  p. 
66.)  The  consciousness  of  his  talents  entitled  him  to  do  this.  Cases  of  great 
emergency  would  of  course  make  an  exception.  The  delicate  hand  of  a  Phidias 
would  be  justly  placed  to  the  rope  in  cases  of  impending  shipwreck. 

3  Diog.  Laert.,  ii.  10. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  17 

importance  by  hypocrisy,  one  of  the  great  evils  in  politics. 
Yet,  as  in  all  morals  so  in  politics,  we  must  beware  of  ex- 
tremes, and  political  arrogance  is  as  dangerous  a  rock  in 
politics  as  hypocrisy  is  undermining.  Theodatus  Gozon,  as 
we  learn  from  the  chronicle  of  the  Rhodian  Knights,  in  ad- 
dressing the  conclave  which  had  convened  for  the  purpose 
of  electing  a  grand  master  of  that  heroic  order,  after  making 
a  review  of  all  the  qualities  and  virtues  necessary  for  a 
commander  of  the  illustrious  order  in  its  dangerous  duty  of 
warding  off  the  Mohammedans  and  of  preventing  them  from 
overflooding  western  Europe,  and  mentioning  the  solemn  oath 
he  had  taken  to  propose  the  proper  person,  uttered  these 
closing  words :  "  Thus,  I  find  no  one  fitter  to  rule  the  order 
than  myself."  He  was  almost  unanimously  elected,  and  the 
order  found  no  reason  to  rue  the  election.1  These  are  extraor- 


1  Having  mentioned  the  Order  of  the  Knights  of  St.  John  on  account  of  this 
instance  of  political  self-esteem,  I  cannot  forbear  mentioning  it  on  account  of  the 
glorious  and  almost  superhuman  perseverance  of  the  Knights  in  resisting  the 
gigantic  power  of  Mahomet  II.,  who  intended  to  conquer  the  West  of  Europe, 
and,  though  death  prevented  him  from  carrying  his  cherished  plan  into  execution, 
had  it  engraven  on  his  tomb-stone,  "  I  meant  to  conquer  Rhodes  and  fair  Italy." 
If  we  thus  see  in  the  resistance  of  the  Order  under  Villiers  a  noble  instance  of 
fortitude  and  calm  perseverance,  coupled  with  the  greatest  heroism,  we  find  in 
that  same  siege  an  instance  of  the  infamous  guilt  to  which  jealousy  may  lead, 
in  the  case  of  Amaral,  who,  forgetting  duty,  religion,  humanity,  was  bent  on  de- 
livering Rhodes  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks  and  thus  laying  open  to  them  a 
farther  progress  towards  the  West.  The  siege  of  Rhodes  is  an  instance  of  some 
political  virtues  so  nobly  displayed,  and  its  history  is  every  way  of  so  thrilling  an 
interest,  that  it  cannot  fail  to  sink  deeply  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  especially 
of  the  young,  whence  it  may  rise  again  as  a  supporting  and  encouraging  example 
in  a  time  of  need.  Vertot,  History  of  the  Knights  Hospitallers,  5  vols.,  Edin- 
burgh, 1770. 

In  appending  this  note  I  am  reminded  of  two  striking  instances  of  self-esteem 
or  consciousness  of  worth,  though  not  of  a  political  kind.  Most  of  my  readers 
will  remember  the  clause  in  Lord  Bacon's  Testament,  "  My  name  and  memory  I 
leave  to  foreign  nations;  and  to  mine  own  countrymen,  after  some  time  be  passed 
over."  In  Eckermann's  Conversations  with  Goethe  during  the  Last  Years  of  his 
Life,  2  vols.,  Leipsic,  1836  (in  German),  we  are  informed  (vol.  i.  p.  143)  of  the 
following  and,  in  my  judgment,  just  opinion  which  Goethe  had  of  himself: 
"  Tieck  [a  distinguished  German  poet]  is  a  star  of  superior  order,  and  no  one 
can  appreciate  his  merits  more  than  myself,  but  when  they  attempt  to  elevate  him 
VOL.  II.  2 


Ig  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

dinary  cases,  and  in  general  it  may  be  given  as  a  sign  of  po- 
litical modesty  if  a  citizen  betrays  no  eagerness  for  place  or 
honor,  but  dutifully  accepts  whatever  place  he  is  called  to  and 
for  which  he  feels  himself  capable,  always  keeping  strictly  the 
public  benefit  in  view.  There  is  perhaps  no  more  striking 
trait  in  the  whole  life  of  Washington  than  that  on  no  occasion 
during  his  whole  political  career  did  he  seek  or  solicit  a  single 
place  or  appointment,  still  less,  of  course,  did  he  intrigue  for 
one.  Yet  in  paying  this  just  and  great  tribute  to  that  illus- 
trious citizen  let  us  not  be  unjust  towards  others,  and  not 
forget  that  this  abstinence  from  striving  higher  is  not  always 
possible  and  would  not  be  right  for  every  citizen.  The  Amer- 
ican revolution  was  no  internal  revolution;  it  was  the  severing 
of  colonies  from  their  mother  country.  When  intestine  wars 
devastate  a  country,  when  the  horrors  of  civil  war  demand  a 
remedy  at  the  moment,  a  citizen  who  is  conscious  of  resources 
within  and  power  without  would  certainly  neglect  his  duty 
were  he  not  boldly  to  strive  for  that  position  in  which  alone 
he  could  be  of  service.  Would  Spain,  in  her  bleeding  state> 
not  bless  such  a  citizen,  if  there  were  one  sufficiently  great 
for  the  task  ? 

XLI.  True  ambition  is  incapable  of  vanity,  a  vice  by  which 
rulers  but  too  often  have  found  it  possible  to  attach  to  a  bad 
cause  numerous  men  who  without  it  might  have  well  deserved 
of  their  country.  Ambition  seeks  distinction  in  reality;  vanity 
is  satisfied  with  outward  distinction,  or  its  form,  without  sub- 
stantial basis,  and  if  common  and  habitual  in  a  nation  it 
deprives  it  of  the  proper  manliness  indispensable  for  civil 
liberty.  Marks  of  distinction  seem  not  only  to  be  wise  but 
just,  because  by  it  the  opinion  which  is  invisible  and  may  be 
evanescent  is  embodied  and  condensed  in  a  permanent  sign ; 

above  himself,  and  to  raise  him  on  a  level  with  me,  they  err.  I  may  say  this  as  a 
plain  matter  of  fact,  for  what  is  it  to  me  ?  I  have  not  made  myself.  It  would 
be  the  same  if  I  were  to  compare  myself  to  Shakspeare,  who  neither  made  him- 
self, and  yet  is  a  being  of  a  superior  kind,  to  whom  I  look  up,  and  whom  I 
must  venerate."  Eckermann -was  the  daily  and  domestic  companion  of  Goethe. 


POLITICAL   ETHICS.  \ g 

it  is  gratitude  made  visible  and  symbolically  expressed;  the 
person  who  receives  it  is  by  the  feeling  of  acknowledgment 
and  gratitude  in  turn  more  closely  connected  to  those  who 
thus  palpably  show  their  feeling  towards  him,  his  friends  feel 
cheered  in  the  acknowledgment  of  merit  in  him,  and  the  com- 
munity at  large  have  in  their  act  a  representation  of  the  virtue 
or  merit  which  dwells  among  them,  and  the  encouragement  it 
meets  with  at  their  hands.  It  is  the  same  principle  which 
prompts  the  passengers  of  a  wrecked  vessel  to  present  a  silver 
tankard  to  the  pilot  who  may  have  saved  their  lives.  Among 
these  public  marks  I  count  the  thanks  of  Congress  or  Parlia- 
ment, swords  voted  to  deserving  officers,  the  bestowing  boun- 
ties upon  meritorious  citizens — for  instance  the  land  granted 
to  Lafayette — the  civic  crown  of  the  Romans,  the  sword  of 
honor  bestowed  by  Napoleon  upon  the  brave,  or,  where  there 
exist  different  privileges  in  the  civil  fabric  of  a  nation,  the 
bestowing  of  these  upon  the  most  meritorious.  If  France 
believes  that  peers  for  life  are  necessary  or  salutary  in  the 
organization  of  her  government,  I  consider  it  as  a  very  noble 
trait,  and  am  bold  enough  to  claim  it  as  a  general  good  sign 
of  the  times,  that  she  raises  to  this  political  dignity  and  influ- 
ence, among  others,  men  who  have  evinced  the  influence 
which  they  exercise  by  no  other  power  than  that  which  the 
gifted  always  must  exercise  over  the  less  gifted  minds  —  in 
short,  to  literary  and  scientific  men.  There  are  now  above 
sixteen  peers  in  France  who  had  no  other  claim  to  the  peerage 
than  that  of  thought.  He  who  denies  that  such  examples  are 
not  inciting  to  others  has  in  my  opinion  no  correct  view  of 
mankind.  Britain,  though  formerly  far  in  advance  of  France 
by  admitting  commoners  to  the  high  peerages,  has  now  re- 
mained behind  her;  and  all  the  distinction  that  science  can 
aspire  to  in  England  byway  of  political  honor  is  knighthood, 
once  so  degraded  under  James  I.  that  people  would  pay  fines 
rather  than  accept  it.  Strange  that  no  minister  has  sought 
additional  strength  by  boldly  bestowing  the  peerage  on  scien- 
tific men ;  while  mere  riches  in  many  cases  have  obtained 
the  peerage.  Yet,  if  the  French  have  thus  nobly  broken  the 


20  POLITICAL   ETHICS. 

path — it  was  Napoleon  who  first  saw  how  wise  it  was — they 
stand  in  another  respect  much  behind  the  English,  namely, 
by  promoting  petty  vanity  in  the  citizens  through  the  profuse 
bestowment  of  those  outward  signs — ribbons — which  appear 
to  the  national  taste  of  the  Anglican  race  beneath  a  manly 
spirit.  A  friend  of  liberty  could  not  read,  without  a  degree 
of  mortification,  the  many  debates  on  the  "cross  of  July" 
which  began  almost  as  soon  as  the  smoke  of  the  guns  at  the 
barricades  had  vanished.  Ribbons,  and  titles  unless  they 
serve  for  an  expression  of  something  substantial,  for  instance 
as  that  of  peer  of  France,  which  in  fact  is  no  title,  but  merely 
the  name  of  a  station,  are  mere  play  of  vanity,  and  cannot 
possibly  be  conducive  to  a  lastingly  healthy  state  of  the  pub- 
lic. The  world  has  done  without  mere  titles,  and  it  will  do  so 
again.  Already  is  no  title  of  nobility  conferred  upon  a  French 
commoner  when  made  peer.  Canova,  the  great  sculptor,  was 
made  marquis  of  Ischia.  Who  knows  it?  He  himself  never 
used  the  title.  But  when  Frederic  the  Great  ordered  the 
number  66  to  be  placed  in  the  coat  of  arms  of  Major  Chazat, 
whose  regiment  had  taken  sixty-six  standards  in  the  battle  of 
Hohenfriedberg,  there  was  more  substance  in  the  token.  The 
whole  continent  of  Europe  has  greatly  suffered  in  consequence 
of  the  trifling  and  unworthy  spirit  manifesting  itself  in  empty 
titles,  that  is,  titles  of  offices  without  office,  or  of  rank  with- 
out privilege.  These  and  crosses  and  orders  came  into  vogue 
when  popular  liberty  and  substantial  civism  gave  way  more 
and  more  to  court  politics  and  court  government;  and  in  the 
same  degree  as  civil  liberty  shall  return  to  those  countries 
where  the  abuse  exists  now,  empty  titles  and  unmeaning  rib- 
bons will  give  way,  because  in  popular  and  national  politics 
the  question  is  respecting  the  real  character  which  a  citizen 
has  been  able  to  found  for  himself.  The  Chinese  government 
is  also  in  this  respect  of  much  interest  to  us,  because  similar 
causes  have  produced  similar  effects.  We  find  there,  as  in 
some  European  continental  states,  a  court  government  with  a 
thoroughly  organized  and  vast  hierarchy  of  officers,  and  we 
find  there  likewise  a  variety  of  merely  honorary  titles,  pro- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  21 

motions  of  rank  independent  of  promotion  of  offices,  and  signs 
of  court  favor  and  official  distinction,  such  as  the  peacock 
feather,  together  with  presents  which  seem  to  correspond  to 
the  snuff-boxes  with  brilliants  frequently  given  by  continental 
monarchs  to  favored  persons.1  These  marks  of  distinction, 
essentially  belonging  to  the  epoch  of  court  politics,  have  al- 
ready, it  would  seem,  begun  to  diminish,  both  in  frequency 
and  the  estimation  in  which  they  are  held. 

Filippo  Strozzi,  the  distinguished  Florentine  and  opponent 
of  the  Medici's,  though  connected  with  them  by  marriage, 
said,  when  his  fellow-citizens  would  give  him  the  title  of 
Messire  (Mr.),  "  My  name  is  Filippo  Strozzi ;  I  am  a  Floren- 
tine merchant,  and  whoever  gives  me  a  title  offends  me." 
Orders  bestowed  by  the  executive  alone  should  always  be 
considered  as  injurious  to  true  liberty;  for  they  give  a  con- 
siderable power  founded  upon  a  paltry  motive,  and  may  be 
entirely  independent  of  all  that  which  ought  to  confer  real  dis- 
tinction. The  grants  of  the  order  of  the  Legion  of  Honor 
by  Louis  XVIII.  furnish  a  striking  instance. 

In  matters  of  morality  examples  are  cheering  and  reas- 
suring. I  may  be  permitted,  therefore,  to  conclude  these  ob- 
servations with  mentioning  the  great  admiral  de  Ruiter,  as  an 
example  of  great  modesty  united  to  undaunted  courage  and 
valor,  in  which  Lord  Collingwood  was  not  unlike  him.  That 
great  naval  hero  of  the  United  Provinces  often  said,  "  I  will- 
ingly dispense  with  all  praises  if  I  only  satisfy  my  conscience 
and  follow  the  commands  sent  me."  He  would  never  grant 


1  *  Yet  it  is  very  curious  that  distinction  not  only  by  title,  but  actually  by  rib- 
bons, crosses,  and  stars,  seems  to  have  had  a  very  decided  effect  upon  the  whole 
career  of  Nelson,  and  he  owed  his  death  to  the  wearing  of  his  orders  in  the 
battle  at  Trafalgar.  See  A  Narrative  of  the  Battle  of  St.  Vincent,  with  Anec- 
dotes of  Nelson  before  and  after  that  Battle,  by  Col.  Drinkwater  Bethune,  F.S.A., 
author  of  the  History  of  the  Siege  of  Gibraltar,  zd  edit.,  8vo,  pp.  97,  London, 
1840.  Colonel  Bethune  was  present  and  reports  a  curious  conversation  with 
Nelson  after  the  battle  of  St.  Vincent,  showing  how  eagerly  Nelson  coveted  the 
order  of  the  Bath.  Extracts  from  the  above  book  are  to  be  found  in  the  London 
Literary  Gazette  of  August  8,  1840.  See  likewise  the  extract  from  the  London 
Literary  Gazette  of  May  2,  1840. 


22  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

permission  to  publish  from  his  log-books  the  most  important 
acts  of  his  eventful  life.  His  repeated  answer  was,  "  Not  I, 
God  has  done  it."  Frequently,  when  relating  some  of  his 
remarkable  exploits,  he  would  suddenly  stop  when  his  son- 
in-law  asked  for  the  date  of  an  event,  because  he  was  afraid 
it  would  be  used  for  a  biography.  The  king  of  Spain  made 
him  a  duke,  but  the  patent  arrived  after  his  death;  his  son 
requested  the  king  to  grant  him  a  more  modest  title.1 

XLII.  Personal  affection  between  particular  individuals, 
whether  it  grows  out  of  relations  of  consanguinity,  out  of  the 
difference  of  sexes,  out  of  a  proportional  coincidence  and 
disagreement  of  dispositions,  gifts,  and  acquisitions,  or  out  of 
mutual  service,  belongs  to  the  primary  agents  of  all  human 
society.  Let  us  consider  the  last-mentioned  affection,  friend- 
ship, first.  The  ancient  philosophers  held  friendship  to  be  a 
subject  worthy  of  their  fullest  attention.  Aristotle  treats  of 
it  in  two  books,  the  eighth  and  ninth,  of  his  Ethics ;  Plato, 
Pythagoras,  and  after  them  Cicero,  speak  of  it  as  one  of  the 
most  sacred  means  of  cultivating  virtue.  The  poets  celebrate 
this  union  of  souls  no  less,  from  Homer,  who  ends  his  eighth 
song  with  the  words,  "  Not  less  indeed  than  even  a  brother  of 
the  same  blood  is  an  honest  friend,  kind  and  judicious  in 
m  nd,"  down  to  the  latest.  The  ancients  indeed  considered 
friendship  a  wedding  of  the  souls,  and  not  unfrequently  the 
act  of  concluding  friendship  was  accompanied  by  religious 
consecration.  The  same  intensity  and  specific  character 
of  friendship,  perhaps,  no  longer  exist ;  the  causes  of  this 
fact  may  be  various.  Our  practical  life  is  more  movable, 
our  social  intercourse  and  hence  our  personal  acquaintance 
vaster  and  more  changeable,  our  mind  is  occupied  with  a 
much  larger  variety  of  subjects  in  science  as  well  as  litera- 
ture, our  states  are  wider,  and  our  religion  points  at  a  morally 
perfect  being  towards  whom  all  minds  are  directed  as  their 


1  Brandt,  De  Ruiter.      Van   Kampen,  History  of  the   Netherlands,  Ham- 
burg, 1833. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  23 

great  example,  so  that  necessarily,  it  would  seem,  the  atten- 
tion to  a  specific  personal  relation  must  be  lessened,  unless 
very  extraordinary  causes  are  added.  The  same  perhaps 
would  be  applicable  to  our  matrimonial  relations,  which 
nevertheless  are  certainly  stronger  and  intenser,  generally 
speaking,  than  in  ancient  times;  but  the  reason  of  this  appar- 
ent inconsistency  seems  to  lie  in  the  circumstance  that  the 
position  of  woman  has  risen  in  the  course  of  civilization ;  and 
the  greater  importance  of  the  family  with  us  is  of  itself  one 
of  the  causes  to  account  for  the  phenomenon  of  which  we 
speak. 

Yet,  although  friendship  may  not  any  longer  be  so  often  as 
in  antiquity  of  that  fervor  and  religious  intensity  with  which 
the  ancients  considered  it,  it  remains  an  important  element 
of  society,  and,  like  every  moral  good,  ought  to  be  carefully 
cultivated;  the  nobler  the  souls  the  greater  the  blessing  of 
friendship.  Friendship  is  a  mutual  affection,  or  intensity  of 
feeling  towards  another,  arising  from  an  inmost  pleasure  in 
the  soul  of  a  good  man,  which  it  feels  in  honoring,  admiring, 
and  cherishing  what  is  good,  pure,  or  great,  and  in  being 
honored  and  cherished  by  the  good  and  pure,  together  with 
the  feeling  of  delight  which  the  soul  enjoys  at  being  fully  and 
wholly  understood  in  this  world  of  general  misunderstanding 
or  necessary  difficulty  of  mutual  comprehension, — the  thrill- 
ing delight  of  confidence,  of  mutual  repose.  There  is  an 
essential  approach  of  souls  in  friendship  as  in  love  of  the  high- 
est sort,  or  a  finding  out  of  one  another's  essence,  stripped 
of  all  adhesion,  accident  or  what  may  arise  from  different 
position,  nay,  even  sometimes  stripped  of  the  difference  of 
opinion ;  and  as  we  fervently  believe  that  the  Creator  will 
develop  in  another  world  that  which  was  goo  1  and  pure  in 
each  man  here  beneath,  though  single  and  separate,  and 
which  led  the  different  individuals  in  this  nether  world  to  dif- 
ferent or  even  opposite  opinions,  and  separated  the  republican 
from  the  monarchist,  the  rationalist  from  the  enthusiast,  the 
cautious  from  the  bold,  and  will  thus  expand  and  mature 
what  He  laid  in  each  individual,  and  unite  them  all  in  greater 


24  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

perfection,  so  does  He  allow  men  in  this  world  faintly  to  fore- 
taste in  friendship  the  bliss  of  a  future  world,  where  no  acci- 
dent of  difference  can  any  longer  exist. 

As  the  love  of  Romeo  and  Juliet  elevated  their  souls  above 
the  strife  of  their  houses,  so  can  friendship  elevate  two  hearts 
above  the  struggles  of  their  time,  though  the  individuals  be 
even  engaged  in  it ;  while  those  friends  who  happily  walk  the 
same  path  cheer  and  strengthen  each  other  by  their  mutual 
example ;  and,  since  essential  confidence  can  exist  between 
good  men  only,  they  propel  each  other  in  the  path  of  virtue : 
for  it  is  a  primary  law  of  all  intercourse,  that  if  two  or  more 
of  the  same  inclination,  pursuit,  or  character — good,  frivolous, 
or  wicked — are  brought  into  close  contact  with  one  another, 
in  that  same  direction  they  will  propel  one  another  still  more 
rapidly.  Friendship  must  rest  on  mutuality;  it  is  one  of  its 
essential  qualities ;  for  one  of  its  requisites  and  blessings  is 
the  enjoyment  of  confidence — a  luxury  to  good  men ;  and 
^Eschylus  is  right  when  he  says  that  kings  suffer  one  evil, 
they  do  not  know  how  to  confide  in  friends ;  while  the  reason 
that  was  given  of  Trajan's  having  friends,  is  that  he  was  a 
friend  himself. * 

Friendship  thus  cultivates  disinterestedness,  forbearance, 
liberality,  kindness,  and  generosity ;  it  improves  our  judgment 
by  admitting  the  counsel  of  the  friend  in  whom  we  confide, 
and  who  views  our  case,  though  interesting,  yet  less  personal 
to  him,  as  a  physician  prescribes  for  a  brother  of  his  profession 
in  his  illness ;  it  makes  the  cultivation  and  practice  of  that 
primary  virtue,  justice,  easier  to  us,  because  it  accustoms  the 
mind  to  view  occurrences  not  solely  with  reference  to  our- 
selves ;  and  since  friendship  is  partly  founded  upon  the  pecu- 
liar personalities  of  men,  and  these  personalities  may  on 


1  "  Habes  amicos  quia  amicus  ipse  es."  (Plin.,  Panegyr.)  Christ,  to  prove 
to  the  apostles  that  they  are  what  he  calls  them,  his  friends,  mentions  confidence, 
the  fact  that  he  trusted  the  highest  truth  to  them  :  "  Henceforth  I  call  you  not 
servants;  for  the  servant  knoweth  not  what  his  lord  doeth;  but  I  have  called 
you  friends ;  for  all  things  that  I  have  heard  of  my  Father  I  have  made  known 
unto  you."  John  xv.  15. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  2$ 

account  of  some  prominent  feature  lead  to  the  friendship  with 
one  person,  and  on  account  of  some  other  prominent  feature 
to  the  same  or  a  similar  relation  with  another,  it  unites  medi- 
ately more  than  two  individuals.  Friendship  thus  becomes  a 
ramified  bond  of  society,  a  tie  of  good  will  between  individuals 
who  otherwise  might  remain  insulated. 

XLIII.  It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  remarks  how  very 
important  an  element  friendship  is  in  the  social  order,  and 
how  carefully  we  ought  to  cultivate  it  wherever  it  is  offered 
by  the  circumstances  of  our  life;  for  being  an  affection  it 
cannot  be  forced.  Yet  although  a  man  may  be  more  or  less 
successful  in  meeting  with  that  individual  whose  nature  is  so 
happily  conformed  to  his  own  that  the  relation  of  friendship 
follows  as  a  matter  of  course,  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that 
in  a  community  in  which  free  and  various  action  is  not  sup- 
pressed, and  in  which,  especially,  public  life  exists,  a  man  who 
has  never  succeeded  in  forming  some  strong  friendship  or 
other  must,  if  not  unusually  unfortunate,  look  for  the  causes 
of  this  great  privation  within  himself — to  his  egotism. 

That  friendship,  as  designated  above,  in  its  highest  degree, 
cannot  be  obtained  by  every  one  is  clear,  and,  as  is  the  case 
with  all  other  relations,  it  necessarily  exists  in  a  variety  of 
gradations ;  but  it  is  an  abuse  of  terms,  too  common  at 
present,  to  apply  this  sacred  word  to  the  relation  subsisting 
upon  mere  acquaintance,  to  persons  perhaps  known  to  us 
only  by  a  chain  of  intermediate  recommendations,  or  among 
those  who  but  temporarily  are  united  for  some  selfish  or  evil 
ends.  Those  are  companions  or  followers,  but  not  friends,  of 
whom  the  Bible  gives  so  severe  a  test.  (John  xv.  13.) 

As  a  rule  for  a  life  in  general  as  well  as  in  politics  in  par- 
ticular, it  is  far  more  important,  in  order  to  secure  all  the 
advantages  of  friendship,  moral  or  practical,  to  make  one  or 
a  few  close  friends  who  will  "stick  closer  than  a  brother" 
(Prov.  xviii.  24),  than  many  whose  friendship  consists  rather 
in  the  negative  character  of  an  absence  of  ill  will,  or  merely 
in  a  general  and  undefined  but  not  very  active  good  will,  not 


26  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

in  a  positive  affection  of  the  inmost  soul,  which  rejoices  at  the 
success  of  the  friend  and  grieves  at  his  grief.  "  It  is  of  far 
greater  importance  to  a  statesman"  (it  is  so  to  every  man)  "to 
make  one  friend  who  will  hold  out  with  him  for  twenty  years, 
than  to  find  twenty  followers  in  each  year,  losing  as  many."1 

And  here  a  question  of  importance  offers  itself:  "How  far, 
in  politics,  should  we  carry  our  friendship,  taking  the  term  in 
its  intense  meaning?  Of  course  we  are  not  allowed  to  assist 
in  doing  the  wrong  which  the  friend  may  contemplate  or 
actually  commit,  or  to  do  injustice  to  others,  to  sacrifice  truth 
or  public  welfare  to  this  special  relation ;  but  there  are  cases 
which  are  not  so  easily  decided.  Our  friend  may  have  com- 
mitted an  error  which  we  would  disapprove  of  and  would 
loudly  censure  were  we  his  opponents ;  or  our  friend  may 
commit  a  positive  fault :  how  then  ?  I  would  answer,  The 
more  you  find  that  public  clamor  sets  violently  in  against 
your  friend,  the  more  loudly  his  fault  is  discussed,  and  the 
more  vehement  the  cry  against  him,  the  more  consider  your- 
self in  this  public  trial  his  natural  advocate,  endeavoring,  as 
in  a  trial  of  justice,  to  show  whatever  may  be  favorable  for 
him,  which  no  one  will  do  if  you  do  not,  so  that  whatever  is 
redeeming  in  your  friend  may  not  be  swept  away  in  the  gen- 
eral excitement.  Stand  by  him  so  long  and  so  far  as  your 
conscience  will  permit,  and  as  your  perfect  consciousness  of 
your  own  disinterestedness  supports  you,  and  believe  that  by 
exhibiting  an  example  of  generous  faithfulness,  and  of  trying 
all  in  your  power  even  for  a  fallen  friend,  you  do  a  great  ser- 
vice to  public  morality.  But  of  course  this  allows  of  no 
weakness,  of  which  such  innumerable  instances  are  preserved 
in  history,  of  men  who  disapproved  thoroughly  of  a  measure, 
who  declared  it  criminal,  and  yet,  when  they  found  their 
friend  irresistibly  bent  on  it,  finally  yielded  and  assisted.  It 
is  a  great  thing  to  know  we  have  a  friend  who  will  stand 
by  us ;  it  is  a  great  misfortune  to  have  none  who  will  boldly 
sacrifice  us,  if  unfortunately  bent  on  wrong,  to  justice,  right, 

1  Taylor,  The  Statesman,  London,  1836. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  27 

and  truth.   We  may  firmly  cling  to  Plato,  but  must  cling  more 
firmly  to  Truth. 

The  friendship  of  great  souls,  founded  upon  pure  patriot- 
ism, may  produce  the  greatest  effects.  It  may  shine  on  a 
Thebes  like  a  suddenly  rising  sun.  Whether  the  friendship 
as  it  existed  between  Pelopidas,  the  rich  and  ardent,  and 
Epaminondas,  the  poor  and  far-seeing,  be  the  noblest  and  most 
inspiring  example  of  the  excellence  of  friendship  between  two 
patriotic  souls  and  have  its  equal  in  history  or  not,  I  feel  con- 
vinced that  my  younger  readers  will  do  themselves  a  great 
service  by  reading  the  biography  of  Pelopidas  in  Plutarch. 
No  heart  in  which  there  is  a  generous  spark  can  ponder  it 
without  delight  at  their  nobleness,  patriotism,  mutual  love, 
absence  of  jealousy,  and  disinterestedness,  despite  their  great 
diversity  of  character  and  fortune. 

XLIV.  Quite  different  from  friendship,  and  yet  frequently 
cloaked  with  its  name,  because  the  term  "  friend"  is  abusively 
extended  to  followers,  adherents,  and  adherents'  adherents,  is 
what  we  will  call  favoritism  in  politics,  the  bestowing  of  favors 
without  regard  to  justice,  merit,  and  public  welfare,  or  in 
direct  contradiction  to  it.  Favoritism  is  one  of  the  most  dan- 
gerous vices  of  governments,  because  it  may  steal  in  under 
the  garb  of  that  which  in  itself  is  good  and  right,  of  gratitude 
to  those  who  served  us,  of  liberality,  or,  as  we  have  seen,  of 
friendship.  We  need  not  discuss  that  favoritism  which  sets 
out  from  vice  or  from  an  egregious  affront  to  all  justice,  as 
we  see  it  exemplified  in  the  "  minions"  of  some  of  the  most 
corrupt  periods  of  the  French  court  or  that  of  Spain,  or  in 
the  Dorsets  and  Buckinghams,  Gavestons  and  others  in  Eng- 
land, or  in  the  corruptest  periods  of  some  republics,  since 
it  is  too  glaringly  vicious  to  deserve  especial  notice.  We 
might  with  equal  justice  treat  of  murder  as  a  highly  repre- 
hensible crime  in  rulers.  But  favoritism  is  highly  dangerous 
also  in  other  places,  and  arising  out  of  sources  which  may 
be  originally  pure,  as  more  difficult  to  resist.  Elizabeth,  the 
great  statesman,  as  Richelieu  called  her,  earned  no  substantial 


2g  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

advantages  from  her  partiality  to  Leicester  or  Essex.  Is  it 
not,  then,  a  bitter  condition  of  monarchy  that  rulers  must 
studiously  avoid  allowing  personal  inclinations,  the  friend- 
ships of  private  life,  to  acquire  such  control  that  they  can  no 
longer  be  resisted,  but  have  acquired  a  preponderance  over  the 
interests  of  the  public  welfare  ?  Undoubtedly  it  is  so ;  but 
we  must  not  forget  that  although  monarchy  is  necessary  for 
many  states,  it  is  in  itself  an  expedient  to  avoid  certain  evils; 
it  is  a  government  which,  not  viewed  with  regard  to  practical 
utility  but  in  the  abstract,  contains  always  this  contradiction, 
that  we  adopt  for  the  highest,  most  important  place  a  princi- 
ple which  civilization  steadily  eliminates  in  wider  and  wider 
circles,  as  injurious  to  society,  respecting  all  other  offices  of 
any  importance, — that  of  inheriting  them  without  reference  to 
capacity.  Even  those  who  do  not  see  in  the  monarch  the 
highest  officer,  but  something  more  and  higher,  must  at  least 
admit  that  among  other  things  he  is  an  officer  or  magistrate 
likewise,  unless  they  claim  a  confused  essence  in  the  monarch, 
according  to  which  he  is  the  mystic  shrine  of  sovereignty,  a 
view  which  I  endeavored  to  refute  in  the  first  volume.  But 
nowhere  can  we  depart  from  strict  principle  and  resort  to  com- 
promising expediency,  however  necessary  or  right,  without 
proportional  sacrifice.  The  monarch  who  does  not  obtain 
his  place  by  his  talent  must  allow  himself  to  be  surrounded 
with  fetters  which  for  the  private  citizen  would  not  be  en- 
durable. 

The  favoritism  of  a  monarch  becomes  still  more  serious  in 
countries  in  which  the  expediency  of  hereditary  government 
is  carried  still  farther  against  abstract  principle,  and  the  crown 
is  suffered  to  descend  upon  that  sex  which  otherwise  is  justly 
excluded  from  all  public  employment.  While  favoritism  has 
with  female  sovereigns  the  additional  incentive  of  difference 
of  sex,  which  by  no  means  needs  on  that  account  to  be 
founded  upon  unlawful  affection,  it  is,  generally  speaking,  for 
them  more  difficult  to  overcome  the  feeling  of  partiality  by 
reason  alone;  since  the  soul  of  the  woman  is  by  nature  more 
active  in  the  spheres  of  affection  and  feeling  than  in  that  of 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


29 


the  reasoning  judgment.  It  is  necessary  therefore  that  ruling 
princesses  and  their  advisers  most  especially  guard  against 
this  dangerous  political  fault.  These  remarks  do  not  hold 
good  against  real  friendship  in  a  monarch.  On  the  contrary  t 
if  he  is  himself  capable  of  friendship,  and  if  he  has  a  friend 
on  terms  which  are  very  different  from  capricious  favoritism 
in  the  one  or  interested  submission  in  the  other,  friendship  is 
one  of  the  greatest  blessings  to  monarchs.  I  do  not  know 
that  anything  in  Henry  IV.  of  France  is  a  truer  sign  oS  great- 
ness of  soul  than  that  he  could  be  so  true  a  friend  as  he  was 
to  Sully,  nor  could  any  event  in  his  reign  be  called  happier 
than  that  he  found  Sully  and  concluded  a  friendship  with 
him.  They  were  united  in  the  great  desire  to  live  for  France, 
in  a  generous,  candid,  manly  friendship.  But  the  narrower 
the  mind  of  the  monarch,  or  of  any  man  of  power,  the  more 
danger  exists  that  favoritism  will  steal  in  under  the  garb  of 
friendship. 

Favoritism  is,  however,  not  only  dangerous  in  monarchies, 
or  there  in  the  monarch  only ;  it  is  equally  dangerous  in  re- 
publics, and  in  every  citizen  according  to  his  sphere.  If  it 
becomes  general,  it  tramples  justice,  the  foundation  of  the 
state,  under  foot;  it  stifles  virtue  and  exertion  of  talent,  be- 
cause they  do  not  avail ;  it  leads  to  party  rancor,  because  it 
bestows  places  of  profit  or  honor  upon  "friends"  alone,  not 
for  past  merit  and  future  benefit  to  the  commonwealth,  but 
for  past  and  future  party  services ;  or  it  substitutes  altogether 
caprice  for  reason,  and  leads  infallibly  to  a  state  of  general 
public  dishonesty,  in  which  public  places  are  considered  as 
berths  of  enrichment,  of  pilfering,  or  of  family  aggrandize- 
ment; it  leads  to  the  appointment  of  incompetent  men  and  to 
general  public  disgrace  and  apathy,  to  servile  adherence  and 
ruinous  flattery.  There  are  letters  of  Washington's  which 
might  show  how  utterly  unjust  and  subversive  of  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  state  he  considered  favoritism.  Pym  is  another 
striking  example  of  perfect  freedom  from  this  vice.  "  He 
knew  neither  brother,  kinsman,  nor  friend,  superior  nor  in- 
ferior, when  they  stood  in  the  way  to  hinder  his  pursuit  of 


,0  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  public  good."  It  was  a  saying  of  his,  "  Such  a  one  is  my 
entire  friend,  to  whom  I  am  much  obliged,  but  I  must  not  pay 
my  private  debts  out  of  the  public  stock."1  "  To  such  a  de- 
gree and  with  such  sincerity  did  he  act  upon  this  principle, 
that  when  his  friends  frequently  put  him  in  mind  of  his  chil- 
dren and  pressed  upon  his  consideration  that  although  he 
regarded  not  himself  yet  he  ought  to  provide  that  it  might  be 
well  with  them,  his  usual  answer  was,  'if  it  were  well  with  the 
public  his  family  was  well  enough.'  " 

XLV.  The  family  is  not  only  important  for  the  stricter 
political  reasons  which  have  been  dwelt  upon  in  previous  pas- 
sages, but  likewise  as  affording  those  relations  out  of  which 
mutual  affections  grow,  feelings  strongly  connected  with  pub- 
lic spirit  and  patriotism.  The  love  of  our  family,  of  our  kins- 
men, is  not  only  innocent,  but  necessary  and  a  powerful  agent 
in  society,  an  incentive  to  exertion  and  a  source  of  public 
spirit.  Yet,  like  all  other  original  agents,  it  must  be  ju- 
diciously watched  lest  it  grow  stronger  than  it  ought  to  be, 
lest  it  transcend  its  legitimate  and  natural  power.  Not  to 
have  greater  forbearance  towards  members  of  our  own  family 
than  to  others,  so  long  as  strict  duty  allows  of  this  forbear- 
ance, would  certainly  be  wanting  in  duty ;  but  to  allow  family 
considerations  to  outweigh  higher  and  the  highest  considera- 
tions is  either  pusillanimous  or  dastardly.  If  William  III. 
saw,  as  I  for  one  believe  that  he  did,  that  England  was  in 
danger  of  being  ruined  and  of  being  forced  into  retrograde 
steps  or  into  a  political  system  similar  to  that  of  France  and 
Spain,  appalling  indeed  to  every  honest  man ;  if  he  felt  con- 
vinced that  James  had  become  a  rebel  against  the  country  and 
constitution,  and  saw  that  he  himself  could  rescue  England> 
when  called  upon  by  circumstances  and  by  many  of  the  en- 
dangered nation,  he  would  have  shown  extreme  weakness  of 

1  These  two  extracts  are  from  Stephen  Marshall's  Sermon  preached  before 
Parliament  at  the  Funeral  of  Mr.  Pym,  410,  1644,  as  quoted  in  the  Westminster 
Review  for  July,  1833,  in  an  article  on  the  life  of  Pym,  from  which  likewise  the 
next  following  quotation  in  the  text  is  taken. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  3! 

mind  in  allowing  family  relations  to  weigh  against  this  sacred 
calling  of  the  welfare  of  Britain  and  of  Europe. 

Yet  as  the  undue  attachment  to  friends  or  favorites  assumes 
the  dangerous  form  of  favoritism,  so  does  the  excessive  attach- 
ment to  the  members  of  one's  family  become  nepotism.  The 
name  of  this  political  vice  comes  from  the  government  of  the 
papal  hierarchy,  and  has  been  chiefly  restricted  to  it ;  but  the 
evil  principle  is  visible  elsewhere  too,  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  not  use  the  term  in  a  general  sense.  Ne- 
potism, or  the  showering  of  riches,  power,  and  honors  upon 
the  nephews  (nepoti)  of  the  pope  (hence  the  name),  became 
actually  a  state  institution,  not  unlike  to  the  keeping  of  royal 
mistresses  in  France,  until,  finally,  endowed  and  powerful  re- 
lations of  the  pope  were  considered  necessary  for  the  honor 
of  the  pope  and  despatch  of  business,  even  by  some  of  the 
highest  clergy  in  Rome,  who  do  not  always  seem  to  have 
had  flattery  in  view.1  Indeed,  the  government  was  so  badly 
contrived,  the  cardinals  so  divided  and  subservient  to  foreign 
courts,  and  the  state  of  Italy  so  utterly  demoralized,  that  the 
pope  was  not  expected  to  trust  all  his  secrets  to  any  stranger 
out  of  his  family ;  yet  the  business  required  some  minister 
or  other  who  had  the  confidence  of  the  pope.  Who  then 
could  be  this  person  except  a  relation  of  his  ? 

There  is  indeed  no  danger  at  present  that  nepotism,  as  it 
existed  towards  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  beginning  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  can  reappear  there  or  in  any  other 
state ;  yet  it  is  one  of  our  duties  to  weigh  attentively  any  in- 
stitution or  fact  in  which  we  find  a  general  principle,  good  or 
bad,  developed  distinctly  and  in  all  its  consistency,  in  all  its 
beauty  or  hideousness.  We  shall  then  better  understand  the 


1  I  believe  that  papal  nepotism,  in  its  various  historical  phases,  has  nowhere 
been  so  thoroughly  and  amply  represented  as  by  Ranke,  History  of  the  Popes, 
Eng.  trans,  (in  the  Amer.  ed.  of  1841.  See  especially  vol.  i.  pp.  46,  51,  99, 
274,  275,  301).  See  also  the  remarks  of  Macchiavelli  on  this  subject  in  the  first 
book  of  his  History  of  Florence.  That  not  only  nephews  were  promoted  by  th's 
nepotism,  but,  under  the  name  of  nepoti,  the  natural  sons  also  of  popes,  as  for 
instance  under  Alexander  VI.,  is  a  well-known  fact. 


3 2  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

less  distinct  manifestations  of  the  same  principle  at  other 
periods  or  in  other  spheres.  The  crime  and  plunder  which 
were  connected  with  nepotism  were  appalling :  state  property 
was  alienated  and  changed  into  hereditary  principalities  for 
the  nepoti,  until  at  last  these  treasonable  procedures  were 
prohibited  by  the  pope  and  cardinals  themselves ;  the  nepoti 
obtained  money  for  selling  justice,  or,  what  is  perhaps  most 
curious  and  strikes  a  professional  politician  as  a  choice  rarity, 
— as  the  naturalist  is  interested  by  some  peculiar  monstrosity, 
— the  "  cardinal  nepote"  gave  (and  of  course  sold)  "  non  grave- 
turs,"  which  were  immunities  against  all  future  procedures  by 
way  of  justice,  amounting  to  more  than  an  anticipation  of 
pardon  of  a  general  kind,  as  the  English  kings  formerly  gave 
them  in  cases  of  impeachment.1  Lorenzo  de  Medici  writes  to 
Pope  Innocent  VIII.  that  other  popes  had  not  waited  so  long 
in  bestowing  property  upon  their  family,  and  that  should  he 
hesitate  longer,  other  reasons  would  be  suspected.  "  Zeal  and 
duty,"  he  continues,  "  oblige  me  to  remind  your  holiness  that 
no  man  is  immortal;  that  a  pope  signifies  as  much  as  he 
chooses  to  signify ;  his  office  cannot  be  made  hereditary ; 
only  the  honor  and  benefices  which  he  bestows  upon  his 
family  he  can  call  his  own." 2  The  very  theory  followed  by 
some  prime  ministers !  Washington,  in  a  letter,  dated  Feb- 
ruary 20,  1797,  to  John  Adams,  when  president,  expresses  his 
hope  that  promotion  will  not  be  withheld  from  Mr.  John 
Quincy  Adams  "because  he  is  your  son."3  Equally  strik- 
ing are  letters  written  by  that  pure  and  single-hearted  man, 


1  Under  Urban  VIII.,  for  instance.  See  Ranke,  as  above,  vol.  i.  (also  vol.  ii., 
i.e.,  vol.  iv.  of  Princes  and  Nations  of  Southern  Europe),  p.  442,  extract  from 
MS.  l>v  Cardinal  Cecchini. 

3  In  Fabroni  Vita  Laurentii,  ii.  390. 

3  This  letler  happens  to  be  preserved  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  Correspondence 
between  the  Hon.  John  Adams  and  William  Cunningham,  Boston,  1823,  pub- 
lished by  the  son  of  the  latter.  Washington  adds  that  if  he  were  now  to  be 
brought  into  the  diplomatic  line  he  would  not  disapprove  of  the  caution  hinted 
at  in  Mr.  Adams's  letter,  "upon  the  principle  which  has  regulated  my  own  con- 
duct," but  he  says  that  the  case  differs.  The  question  is  only  promotion  of  a 
valuable  public  servant. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  33 

when  president,  to  relatives  who  solicited  offices.1  It  is  uni- 
versally considered  odious  to  see  the  relatives  of  a  minister, 
distant  or  near,  like  so  many  birds  feasting  upon  the  carcass 
of  the  public  revenue,  and  mere  decency  ought  to  prevent  an 
undue -favor  towards  relations;2  though  it  is  true,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  would  look  much  like  political  prudery  if  relationship 
should  actually  impede.  It  is  advisable  on  the  score  of  mere 
prudence  that  a  high  officer  should  never  appoint  a  near  rela- 
tive to  another  high  office  near  him,  for  the  public  feel  in- 
secure and  naturally  uneasy  at  it.  Very  many  constitutions 
prohibit  such  appointments.  Brothers  and  sons  of  the  doge 
of  Venice  were  excluded  from  high  appointments.  The  con- 
stitution of  Geneva  prohibits  more  than  two  persons  of  the 
same  name  and  family  from  sitting  in  the  council  of  state, 


1  Washington's  Writings;  such  letters  as  those  to  Bushrod  Washington,  New 
York,  July  27,  1789,  and  to  Benjamin  Lincoln,  Mount  Vernon,  March  n,  1789. 
Mr.  Sparks  gives  part  of  a  letter  in  a  note  to  page  478,  vol.  ix.,  which  contains 
the  following  passage :  "  Among  all  these  anxieties,  I  will  not  conceal  from 
you,  I  anticipated  none  greater  than  those  that  were  likely  to  be  produced  by 
applications  for  appointments  to  the  different  offices  which  would  be  created 
under  the  new  government.     Nor  will  I  conceal  that  my  apprehensions  have 
already  been  but  too  well  justified.     Scarcely  a  day  passes  in  which  applications 
of  one  kind  or  another  do  not  arrive;  insomuch  that  had  I  not  early  adopted 
some  general  principles  I  should  before  this  time  have  been  wholly  occupied  in 
this  business.     As  it  is,  I  have  found  the  number  of  answers  which  I  have  been 
necessitated  to  give  in  my  own  hand  an  almost  insupportable  burden  to  me. 

"  The  points  in  which  all  these  answers  have  agreed  in  substance  are,  that, 
should  it  be  my  lot  to  go  again  into  public  office,  I  would  go  without  being  under 
any  possible  engagements  of  any  nature  whatsoever ;  that,  so  far  as  I  knew  my 
own  heart,  I  would  not  be  in  the  remotest  degree  influenced,  in  making  nomi- 
nations, by  motives  arising  from  the  ties  of  family  or  blood ;  and  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  three  things,  in  my  opinion,  ought  principally  to  be  regarded, 
namely,  the  fitness  of  characters  to  fill  offices,  the  comparative  claims  from  the 
former  merits  and  sufferings  in  service  of  the  different  candidates,  and  the  dis- 
tribution of  appointments  in  as  equal  a  proportion  as  might  be  to  persons  belong- 
ing to  the  different  States  in  the  Union." 

2  Earl  Grey,  universally  esteemed,  even  by  the  opposition,  probably  suffered 
no  severer  attacks  than  those  founded  upon  the  reproach  that  he  provided  too 
anxiously  for  his  extensive  family  relation-.     It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was 
favoritism  and  nepotism  which  furnished  Junius  with  the  materials  for  some  of 
his  most  caustic  sarcasms. 

VOL.  II.  3 


34 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


composed  of  twenty-four  members,  and  more  than  five  indi- 
viduals of  the  same  name  and  family  in  the  representative 
council,  composed  of  two  hundred  and  seventy-four  mem- 
bers.1 In  so  small  a  state,  where  frequent  intermarriages  pro- 
duce powerful  family  affiliations,  this  may  be  a  serviceable 
law;  but  since  the  powerful  agency  of  the  public  press  has 
become  a  vital  political  agent,  such  matters  are  in  most  cases 
better  left  to  public  opinion,  until  it  shall  be  found  insuf- 
ficient.' Besides,  laws  of  this  sort  rarely  prevent  the  evil,  if 
there  is  a  disposition  to  engender  it,  except  that  it  is  well 
enough  thus  decidedly  to  express  by  a  law  the  opinion  which 
society  entertains  of  the  subject. 


1  Constitution  du  Canton  de  Geneve,  tit.  iv.  89,  and  tit.  iii.  42. 


CHAPTER    V. 

Gratitude  fully  discussed. — Ingratitude. — Excess  of  Gratitude  aids  Usurpers. — 
Csesar,  Napoleon. — Distinction  between  Gratitude  and  Popularity.  —  Popu- 
larity.—  Sudden  and  Passing  Popularity;  Lasting  Popularity.  —  We  have  no 
Right  to  seek  Popularity,  but  must  suffer  it  to  seek  us. — Power  of  spontaneous 
Popularity;  peculiar  Power  of  spontaneously  returned  Popularity. — Slavery  of 
Popularity.  —  Danger  of  Popularity,  in  Free  Countries,  to  the  Individual. — 
Crowds  to  receive  distinguished  Men. — Great  Danger  of  Personal  Popularity 
for  Liberty.  —  Pericles.  —  Demagogues.  —  Athenian  Demagogism.  —  Monu- 
ments.—  The  Duty  of  Attention. — Observation  of  Primary  Agents  and  Ele- 
ments.— Truth  and  Justice  connected  with  it. — Obligation  to  study  the  History 
of  our  Country,  its  Institutions  and  their  Classical  Periods. — It  is  necessary  in 
modern  Times  to  read  Newspapers. 

XLVI.  INGRATITUDE  has  at  all  times  been  held  one  of  the 
worst  of  vices ;  it  proceeds  from  meanness  of  soul,  and  anni- 
hilates one  of  the  indispensable  and  most  genial  ties  among 
men.  To  requite  good  with  evil,  or  to  remain  untouched  by 
the  good  conferred  upon  us,  shows  a  callous  heart ;  and  of 
whatever  changes  the  human  heart  is  capable,  the  change 
from  meanness  or  callousness  to  nobleness  or  warmth  is  the 
rarest  of  all,  because  a  whole  deep-rooted  disposition  and 
turn  of  feeling  and  thought  is  to  be  changed,  which  can  be 
effected  by  a  long  training  only  ;  but  this  requires  in  the 
commencement  a  degree  of  nobleness  of  purpose.  Gratitude, 
in  all  its  manifestations,  towards  the  living  and  the  dead, 
who  directly  or  indirectly  have  conferred  good  upon  us,  even 
though  it  be  in  no  other  way  than  by  leaving  us  an  encour- 
aging, cheering,  or  inspiring  example,  ought  to  be  cultivated 
from  the  earliest  period  in  education.  Public  ingratitude, 
wanton  disregard  of  the  best  men  and  the  best  exertions  and 
purest  sacrifices,  is  no  less  vicious  and  injurious  to  public  wel- 
fare than  private  ingratitude  is  in  its  own  sphere.  It  proceeds 
from  sordidness  and  promotes  it.  Noble  souls  find  a  pleasure 
and  deep  enjoyment  in  warmly  acknowledging  real  benefits 

35 


36  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

and  genuine  kindness,  and  in  reverencing  what  is  good  and 
great ;  it  is  the  little-minded  and  narrow-hearted,  or  the  evil- 
disposed,  who  are  troubled  and  haunted  by  fretting  jealousy, 
who  see  in  all  greatness  of  action  or  elevation  of  thought, 
and  in  the  acknowledgment  by  the  public  of  the  virtues  of 
others,  a  reflection  on  themselves,  as  well  as  a  danger  to  the 
public.  They,  judging  from  their  own  selfishness,  believe  that 
no  greatness  can  exist  without  injury  to  the  common  liberty, 
and  have  at  times  even  publicly  proclaimed  the  "  danger  of 
talent,"  thus  becoming  rebels  against  God's  own  order  of 
things  and  the  fairest  works  of  his  hands  ;  but  "  there  is  a  con- 
geniality between  vast  powers  of  thought  and  dignity  of  pur- 
pose. None  are  so  capable  of  sacrificing  themselves  as  those 
who  have  most  to  sacrifice,  who  in  offering  themselves  make 
the  greatest  offerings  to  humanity."1  The  wicked  and  the 
little-minded  are  ever  leagued  against  grateful  reverence  of 
high-minded  patriotism  ;  and  he  that  cannot  be  grateful  or 
feel  esteem  deserves  neither  love  nor  esteem.  His  soul  is 
void  of  some  of  the  best  impulses. 

Why  do  we  love  liberty?  Why  does  mankind  eternally 
struggle  for  it?  If  liberty  necessarily  required  the  sacrifice 
of  the  noblest  traits  and  imprints  of  humanity,  if  the  same- 
ness of  mediocrity  were  its  condition,  it  ought  to  be  shunned 
as  the  most  unfortunate  state  in  which  society  can  be  placed. 
We  love  liberty,  we  sacrifice  everything  to  her,  as  the  last 
and  highest  good,  because  it  is  that  state  of  things  which 
most  corresponds  to  God's  order  of  things,  which  promotes 
the  freest  development  of  thought  and  action  ;  because  man, 
made  for  thought  and  action,  is  most  really  man  if  protected 
by  her.  Were  it  otherwise,  liberty  would  be  the  most  un- 
natural state,  opposed  to  the  highest  calling  of  humanity.  Let 
a  nation  for  any  length  of  time  systematically  cast  aside  its 
best  and  loftiest  characters,  those  of  which  it  ought  to  be 
proud  as  finding  its  spirit  and  endeavors  nobly  represented 
and  concentrated  in  them ;  let  a  community  for  a  series  of 


1  Rev.  Dr.  Channing. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


37 


years  reward  its  purest  and  most  gifted  citizens  with  ungrate- 
ful neglect,  and  with  unworthy  partiality  for  servile  flatterers ; 
let  a  monarchy  adopt  the  policy  of  overlooking  those  upon 
whom  public  opinion  bestows  grateful  honor,  or  a  republic 
requite  faithful  and  generous  patriotism,  civic  wisdom,  and 
stanch  justice  with  petty  jealousy  or  chill  disrespect,  and  they 
will  soon  lose  public  dignity,  morality,  and  elevation,  and  sink 
into  sordid  and  corroding  egotism  —  the  most  unfailing  of 
national  dissolvents. 

XL.VII.  Yet  is  it  not  true  that  nations  have  as  often  sinned 
by  way  of  gratitude  as  of  ingratitude  ?  Have  not  free  nations, 
in  far  the  greater  number  of  cases,  lost  their  liberty  because 
they  were  intoxicated  with  gratitude  or  admiration  of  real 
or  imagined  benefits  received  at  the  hands  of  the  usurper? 
Is  not  the  willingness  with  which  the  mass  give  up  their 
liberties,  with  which  they  sometimes  press  upon  the  usurper 
the  surrender  of  freedom  on  their  part,  frequently  due  to  this 
cause  ?  By  what  indeed  are  in  most  cases  usurpers  supported 
and  emboldened,  if  not  by  the  acclamation  of  the  people  ? 
To  destroy  the  rights  or  liberties  of  one  part  they  must  neces- 
sarily have  the  support  of  the  other,  if  the  question  is  of 
intestine  revolutions  and  not  of  conquests  by  foreigners. 

In  order  to  answer  these  questions  correctly  and  see  the 
subject  in  all  its  bearings,  it  is  necessary  to  make  careful 
distinctions. 

In  some  cases  the  act  of  the  usurper  is  but  the  final  accom- 
plishment and  ratification  of  a  radical  change  prepared  and 
effected  throughout  a  social  system  from  a  period  long  ante- 
cedent to  that  of  the  usurpation ;  and  the  existing  system, 
bestowing  franchises  upon  some,  once  salutary,  has,  by  the 
change  of  circumstances  and  of  the  people's  spirit,  become 
galling  or  ruinous  to  the  mass,  or  the  people  have  become 
unable  any  longer  to  uphold  the  institutions  of  former  liberty. 
Such  was  the  case  when  Csesar  grasped  the  reins.  Rome  was 
no  longer  Rome.  It  is  indeed  no  subject  fit  for  the  present 
occasion  to  inquire  whether  Caesar  belonged  in  mind  to  the 


3g  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

class  of  mean  usurpers,  who  prefer  the  purple  and  an  elevated 
throne  in  the  hall  of  audience  to  a  lofty  place  in  history,  and 
are  willing  to  exchange  for  a  regal  title,  which  has  graced  the 
worst  as  well  as  the  best,  the  proud  name  of  a  great  citizen ; 
but  certain  it  is  that  even  if  Caesar  had  been  one  of  the  best, 
full  of  calmness  of  soul  and  love  of  justice  like  Washington, 
placed  as  he  and  the  Roman  commonwealth  were,  rotten  as 
the  whole  framework  of  government  and  demoralized  as  the 
public  spirit  were,  he  would  have  been  bound,  with  his  power 
and  insight,  to  consummate  the  fall  of  the  old  order  of  things 
and  establish  a  new  one.  The  constitution  of  Rome,  grown 
out  of  a  totally  different  state  of  things  and  calculated  for  it, 
had  become  a  nuisance.  Civil  war  and  fermentation  were  the 
order  of  the  day ;  the  aristocracy  factious,  the  democracy  law- 
less and  indolent,  while  both  were  rapacious.  In  a  crisis  of 
this  serious  import  it  is  very  natural  that  the  people  should 
willingly  throw  more  power  than  he  before  had  into  the  hands 
of  a  powerful  man,  and  should  even  rejoice,  by  a  natural  in- 
stinct, if  he  assumed  more  and  more,  because  they  first  of  all 
desired  protection  against  bloodshed  and  extortion.  Whether 
we  admire  Napoleon  or  not,  whether  we  consider  his  saying 
to  Las  Cases,  "  If  I  had  aped  Washington  I  should  have  been 
guilty  of  a  mere  silliness ;  all  that  I  could  strive  for  was  to  be 
a  crowned  Washington,"  as  empty  words  or  not,  whether  we 
believe  that  he  criminally  abused  his  power  and  neglected 
every  opportunity  of  developing  a  civic  spirit  or  of  sowing  its 
seeds,  as  the  only  means  of  strengthening,  restoring,  and  per- 
manently healing  France,  there  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt 
that,  had  he  been  as  pure  as  Doria,1  he  still  would  have  been 

1  Andrew  Doria,  whose  name,  the  historian  Rotteck  says,  calls  up  the  name 
of  Timoleon,  was  born  at  Genoa,  in  1466,  a  period  when  his  republic  was  rent 
by  factions  and  northern  Italy  was  the  unceasing  battle-field  of  the  European 
continental  powers.  Genoa  had  lost  her  fairest  dominions.  Galeazzo  Sforza, 
duke  of  Milan,  ruled  likewise  over  Genoa,  once  fr§e  and  powerful.  He  had 
ordered  to  draw  ropes  where  walls  should  be  erected  from  the  castle  to  the  sea, 
as  an  additional  means  of  security  against  the  Genoese.  The  assembled  multi- 
tude was  gaping  at  this  token  of  subjugation,  when  a  bold  man,  Lazzaro  Doria, 
stepped  forward  and  severed  the  ropes  in  presence  of  Galeazzo's  servants.  The 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


39 


called  upon  to  break  up  the  ill-jointed  and  injuriously-work- 
ing machine  of  government  that  then  existed,  and  popular 
applause  would  have  been  justly  bestowed  upon  him. 

XLVIII.  Secondly,  we  must  not  mistake  popularity,  of 
whatever  sort,  for  the  expression  of  public  gratitude,  which 
was  designated  above  as  a  virtue  of  high  importance  in  poli- 
tics. Popularity  is  a  subject  of  magnitude,  and  it  behoves  us 
to  examine  it  well. 

What  is  popularity  ?  To  speak  plainly,  it  is  the  being  liked 
and  cherished  by  many ;  being  acceptable  to  the  people.  A 
man,  a  measure,  a  tune,  a  color,  may  thus  be  popular.  The 
power  of  popularity,  therefore,  rests  essentially  on  sympathy, 


people  were  roused  ;  but  their  excitement  vanished  ;  the  best  citizens  emigrated, 
to  avoid  servitude.  Columbus  left  Genoa  at  this  time,  and  Andrew  Doria,  having 
served  against  the  Turks,  went  to  Urbino.  Genoa  revolted  against  Mantua,  and 
acknowledged  France.  Doria  took  service  under  the  king,  Louis  XII.,  but  he 
never  forgot  his  country.  When  Francis  I.  had  succeeded  Louis,  had  broken 
his  oath  taken  to  Charles  V.,  and  suddenly  fallen  upon  Italy,  and  the  troops  of 
Charles  fled  to  Naples,  and  everything  seemed  to  indicate  the  ascendency  of 
Francis,  feared  by  all  Europe,  and  Italy  especially.  Doria  hoisted  the  imperial 
flag  and  turned  the  scale.  He  acted  very  differently  from  the  Constable  Bour- 
bon ;  Doria  was  not  subject  to  France,  and  Francis  tyrannized  over  Genoa.  She 
hoped  for  deliverance  at  the  hands  of  this  hero.  He  entered  the  city  victoriously, 
and  expelled  the  foreigners;  the  people,  carried  away  by  gratitude,  greeted  him 
as  their  prince.  Doria  might  undoubtedly  have  established  a  dynasty,  nor  did  he 
need  to  found  it  with  blood.  His  fellow-citizens  urged  a  crown  upon  him ;  but 
he  was  greater :  he  declined,  although  his  family  had  been  for  centuries  allied 
with  emperors  and  kings.  He  exhorted  his  fellow-citizens  to  be  united  and  vir- 
tuous, that  they  might  be  free,  in  a  speech  which  ended,  "  With  pride  and  emo- 
tion I  call  myself  a  free  citizen  of  Genoa.  This  and  your  friend  I  desire  to  be, 
not  your  ruler;  and  may  it  never  be  said  of  Doria  that  when  he  served  his 
country  he  had  selfish  ends  in  view."  He  used  the  favorable  spirit  of  the  people 
to  establish  with  their  co-operation  a  new  constitution,  by  which  the  tyranny  of 
the  aristocracy  and  the  lawlessness  of  the  people,  which  had  so  often  distracted 
Genoa,  were  avoided — a  constitution  which  lasted  three  hundred  years,  until  the 
great  revolutions  of  Europe  hurried  away  this  with  so  many  others,  in  their 
sweeping  course.  Doria  died  ninety-four  years  old,  honored  and  loved  as  a  very 
father  by  his  republic.  His  tomb  bears  this  inscription  :  "  Andreas  Aurise,  civi 
optimo,  felicissimoque  Vindici  atque  Authori  publicoe  Libertatis,  Senatus  Popu- 
lusque  Genuensis  posuit." 


40  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  adaptation,  assimilation,  or  prominent  development  of  the 
feelings  and  likings  of  the  community,  or  the  set  of  people 
with  whom  we  are  popular.  This  leads  us  at  once  to  two  dis- 
tinctions. The  feelings  from  which  this  sympathy  arises  may 
be  good  or  bad  ;  a  leader  of  robbers  may  be  popular  with  his 
band  by  humoring  or  satisfying  their  bad  feelings  and  pro- 
pensities, as  Doria  was  popular  with  the  good  by  good  meas- 
ures ;  and  popularity  may  be  passing  or  lasting,  suddenly 
excited  by  suddenly  humoring  a  feeling  strongly  excited  at 
the  moment,  or  well  founded  upon  the  esteem  of  some  promi- 
nent quality  which  is  valued  as  an  important  one  by  the 
people,  and  which  they  have  reason  to  believe  exists  in  an 
eminent  degree  in  the  popular  person. 

The  good  citizen  can  of  course  cherish  the  popularity  of 
the  good  only,  as  a  welcome  cheering  on  the  path  of  duty  and 
a  power  to  do  good.  But  how  must  he  obtain  it?  Popu- 
larity is  not.  an  ultimate  object;  the  ultimate  object  is  to  do 
right.  We  are  not  allowed,  therefore,  to  obtain  popularity  by 
sacrificing  right  or  duty.  We  must  not  seek  popularity  as  an 
end,  which  may  ultimately  determine  our  actions,  because 
thereby  we  should  establish  an  arbitrary  and  extra-ethical 
standard  for  our  actions.  We  must  allow  popularity  to  come 
to  us;  if  it  comes  in  consequence  of  our  acting  right,  and 
gaining  the  sympathy  of  fellow-citizens  because  we  feel  in 
common  with  them  and  for  them,  well  and  good;  if  it  does 
not,  we  have  not  to  answer  for  it.  No  moral  code  makes 
the  demand,  Thou  shalt  be  popular.  The  moral  code  says, 
Try  to  obtain  the  esteem  of  the  good,  but  before  all  act 
right,  although  all  should  abandon  you.  It  is  a  happy  fact, 
however,  that,  with  very  few  exceptions,  no  surer  means 
exists  to  obtain  lasting  popularity,  a  popularity  which,  though 
it  may  be  lost  for  a  time,  will  return,  and,  if  so,  with  re- 
doubled strength,  than  that  which  is  founded  upon  the  esteem 
of  our  fellow-men.  Esteem  does  not  necessarily  constitute 
popularity,  which,  we  have  seen,  rests  on  sympathy,  and 
there  are  many  reasons  which  thus  may  withhold  it  from  an 
honorable  man.  He  may  not  share  the  feelings  of  the  public ; 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  41 

all  his  chief  endeavors  may  be  directed  to  a  point  uninterest- 
ing to  the  community ;  his  manners  may  not  be  pleasing. 
Nor  is  popularity  the  infallible  reward  of  the  good  for  good 
and  pure  endeavors.  The  best  may  be  misunderstood,  the  more 
easily  so  the  farther  they  are  in  advance  of  their  age,  while  less 
elevated  endeavors,  perhaps  mediocrity,  for  the  very  reason 
that  it  can  be  understood  by  the  many,  may  meet  with  gen- 
eral popularity,  if  it  happens  successfully  to  strike  common 
sympathy.  How  many  instances  are  recorded  in  history  of 
overwhelming  popularity  of  contemporaries,  which  vanished 
like  clouds  with  posterity,  and  of  neglect  by  contemporaries 
of  men  whose  names  posterity  has  placed  highest  on  the  list 
of  great  and  wise  men !  Popularity,  therefore,  is  as  little  an 
ultimate  criterion  as  it  is  an  ultimate  moral  object.  But  this 
remains  certain,  that  esteem  forms  necessarily  an  essential  in- 
gredient of  lasting  political  popularity  with  the  good;  and 
such  alone  we  ought  to  value. 

XLIX.  Popularity  is  pleasing,  it  delights  the  heart,  not 
only  in  politics,  but  in  all  spheres.  How  could  it  be  other- 
wise for  man,  a  being  created  for  society  ?  This  is  only  a 
stronger  reason  why  we  ought  not  to  make  it  the  standard  of 
our  actions.  So  soon  as  a  man  does  this,  he  submits  to  the 
worst  species  of  slavery — that  of  mind  and  heart.  He  throws 
away  his  own  standard  within,  and  seeks  for  one  without,  a 
changeable  one  withal ;  he  loses  self-esteem  and  strict  recti- 
tude, and  in  short  is  a  mental  slave.  There  is  no  institution 
in  this  nether  world  which  has  not  together  with  its  advan- 
tages its  dangers,  and  the  danger  of  civil  liberty  and  publicity 
of  politics — the  one  cannot  exist  Without  the  other — is  the 
danger  of  popularity.  The  power  of  public  opinion,  the  just 
principle  that  we  ought  in  many  cases — not  indeed  in  all — 
ultimately  to  submit  to  it,  and  in  part  to  regulate  our  conduct 
by  it,  are  so  many  inducements  which  will  lead  the  faint- 
hearted to  yield  to  this  servitude.  The  dread  of  unpopu- 
larity has  ruined  many  statesmen,  led  authors  to  abjure  truth, 
seduced  citizens  to  crooked  paths,  and  shows  its  unfortunate 


42  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

effect  with  the  young  in  the  schools  and  colleges  of  free  coun- 
tries. There  is  no  teacher,  I  suppose,  who  has  not  seen  or  felt 
the  evil  influence  which  a  positive  desire  of  popularity  or  fear 
of  unpopularity  exercises  upon  many  young  men  in  institu- 
tions for  education,  seducing  not  a  few  even  to  vice  and  final 
ruin.  It  is,  therefore,  one  of  the  first  duties  of  the  young,  early 
to  learn  manfully  and  unequivocally  to  do  right  for  its  own 
sake;  and  for  their  teachers  to  imbue  their  souls  early  and 
deeply  with  this  element  of  rectitude.  It  will  be  one  of  the 
best  preparations  for  future  and  public  life,  for  the  support  of 
the  commonwealth  and  genuine  patriotism.  Once  more,  the 
danger  of  free  countries  is  morbid  desire  of  popularity. 

L.  The  ingredients  of  sound  popularity  are  esteem  at  home 
and  the  sympathy  of  the  people.  This  popularity  in  truly 
free  countries  begins  generally  at  home,  a  circumstance  of 
still  greater  importance  in  vast  Countries,  in  which  the  people 
at  a  distance  cannot  judge  of  the  private  character  of  a  citizen 
except  by  the  name  and  standing  he  enjoys  at  home.  Popu- 
larity begins  in  the  house  and  family,  extends  to  village, 
county,  state,  and  moves  in  concentric  circles  over  the 
country.  Keep,  therefore,  your  house  and  affairs  in  good 
order,  treat  your  wife  well,  and  educate  your  children  care- 
fully ;  be  a  benevolent  neighbor  and  public-spirited  member 
of  the  community  ;  and  you  will  generally  lay  a  firm  founda- 
tion for  popularity.  Or  if  degenerate  times  despise  these  ele- 
ments, if  the  people  banish  even  an  Aristides,  all  you  have  to 
remember  is  that  popularity  is  no  duty,  but  only  a  welcome 
effect  of  duty  if  it  comes  of  itself.1  On  the  other  hand,  as 
popularity  is  a. power,  and,  if  just,  a  lawful  power,  as  in  many 
cases  the  leading  citizen  cannot  act  without  it,  and  as  it  de- 
pends at  the  same  time  upon  sympathy,  it  is  clear  that  he 

1  Mirabeau  frequently  exclaimed,  "  J'expie  bien  cruellement  les  erreurs  de 
ma  jeunesse,"  and  Dumont  says  lie  knew  that  Mirabeau  would  have  gone 
through  fire  to  clear  himself,  not,  certainly,  on  account  of  morality  itself,  but  on 
account  of  the  injury  his  popularity  continued  to  suffer  from  his  former  reputa- 
tion.—  Dumont,  Souvenir  sur  Mirabeau,  etc.,  chap.  xiv. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


43 


must  not  slight  it.  There  are  national  feelings,  and  even 
prejudices,  unimportant  in  themselves  yet  strong  on  account 
of  extensive  and  historical  or  other  associations,  which  it 
would  be  wanton  unnecessarily  to  offend  ;  and  by  "  unneces- 
sarily" I  mean  if  they  do  not  stand  in  the  way  in  the  obtain- 
ing of  a  laudable  object,  or  actually  produce  evil.  In  the 
latter  case  it  may  not  be  your  duty  to  attack  them,  either  be- 
cause you  are  not  quite  certain  regarding  them,  or  because 
you  have  no  adequate  power  to  overcome  them  and  by  an 
attack  upon  them  would  fritter  away  the  influence  and  means 
you  might  use  for  other  purposes.  One  man  cannot  do 
everything.  A  citizen  engaged  in  reforming  the  penal  laws 
of  his  country  may  observe  great  and  even  injurious  errors  in 
the  literary  taste  of  his  countrymen.  He  is  not  bound  on 
that  account  to  engage  in  a  contest  against  perverse  taste. 
Very  many  citizens  have  deprived  themselves  of  all  power  to 
do  good  by  attacks  which  did  not  come  from  an  intention  to 
overcome  and  extirpate  an  error,  but  rather  from  a  weakness 
which  deprived  of  the  power  of  silence — a  power  as  great  as 
that  of  speech.  But  in  no  case  ought  one  to  favor  directly  or 
indirectly  what  he  believes  to  be  absolutely  wrong,  or  sacrifice 
to  it;  in  no  case  ought  he  to  give  way  to  national  follies;  he 
should  make  due  allowance  for  prejudices,  and  not  ruin  the 
best  cause  by  throwing  away  the  whole  because  he  can  only 
obtain  part,  or  by  presumptuously  setting  up  a  standard  of 
perfection ;  but  in  no  case  should  he  administer  to  passion, 
wickedness,  or  crime,  either  by  remaining  silent  when  silence 
must  be  construed  into  approval  or  by  giving  in  a  cowardly 
manner  a  qualified  approval.1 


1  Within  sixty  years  there  were  executed  in  Geneva  one  hundred  and  fifty 
witches;  yet  Calvin  does  not  once  express  his  dissatisfaction  with  this  error  in  his 
many  writings  and  innumerable  letters.  We  are  justified,  therefore,  in  concluding 
that  he  shared  the  general  error  of  the  times,  although  he  does  not  speak  in 
favor  of  the  trials,  because  we  must  expect  that  he  would  otherwise  have  felt 
himself  bound  to  pronounce  his  opinion;  his  silence  necessarily  appears  as 
qualified  assent.  That  Calvin  does  not  pronounce  dissent,  I  mention  on  the 
authority  of  Mr.  Henry,  Life  of  John  Calvin,  in  German,  page  489. 


44  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

The  citizen  who  is  to  act  must  be  understood  by  the 
community;  but  we  are  not  understood  byword  of  mouth 
only;  we  must  have  the  sympathy  of  the  hearer, — this  con- 
stant interpreter  of  human  words,  which  are  but  broken  ac- 
cents without  it.  "  How  difficult  is  it,"  exclaimed  Cato  when 
the  last  time  before  judges,  "to  defend  one's  self  before  men 
with  whom  one  has  not  lived !" 

LI.  There  is  a  subject  not  unconnected  with  that  of  popu- 
larity, which  deserves  a  moment's  attention  —  the  crowds 
which  at  times  receive  distinguished  citizens.  As  a  faithful 
and  distinguished  citizen  must  be  scrupulously  on  his  guard 
against  the  full  tide  of  popularity  in  general,  since  it  is  but 
too  apt  to  throw  him  off  his  guard,  under  most  pleasing,  stir- 
ring, or  even  inspiring  forms ;  so  he  must  not  mistake  the 
meaning  of  crowds.  It  may  be  well  imagined  that  it  must 
be  animating  to  a  citizen  or  general  to  see  thus  visibly  and 
strikingly  the  feeling  of  his  country  towards  him  represented 
by  thousands  of  eyes  turned  upon  him,  as  perhaps  the  sole 
cherished  object  of  the  attention  of  all.  Who  would  envy 
him  the  enjoyment  of  so  elating  and  electrifying  a  moment  if 
he  deserves  it  ?  But  he  must  remember  that  of  itself  it  shows 
little, — proves  nothing;  for,  though  thousands  maybe  pres- 
ent, many  more  thousands  may  not  be.  When  Charles  II. 
made  his  entry  into  London  after  the  death  of  Cromwell,  and 
saw  the  many  people  rejoicing  at  his  return,  he  exclaimed, 
"  Where  are  my  enemies ?"  There  were  enough,  but  they  were 
not  present,  or,  if  so,  could  of  course  not  be  discerned.  Who, 
that  ever  has  seen  it,  can  forget  how  multitudes  and  crowds 
were  never  wanting  to  stare  at  enemy  after  enemy  that  made 
his  entry  into  a  populous  city,  during  the  many  changes  in 
the  times  of  the  wars  of  Napoleon?  When  Riego  entered 
Madrid,  he  was  greeted  by  crowds ;  when  Ferdinand  followed, 
he  was  greeted  likewise.  It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that 
these  crowds  were  entirely  composed  of  the  same  persons  ; 
but  it  shows  that  crowds  in  large  cities  prove  little,  unless  the 
mere  excitement  itself  may,  as  in  fact  sometimes  it  does, 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  45 

prove  something ;  as  when  a  citizen  not  high  in  official  sta- 
tion is  received  by  thousands.  There  are  always  very  many 
who  go  to  see  a  sight — no  matter  of  what  kind — because 
others  go,  and  very  many  people  to  whom  huzzaing  of  itself 
seems  to  be  an  enjoyment.  There  are  persons  who,  when  the 
bells  begin  to  toll  in  indication  of  fire,  will  suddenly  break 
forth  in  a  lusty  shout,  as  if  an  opportunity  only  had  been 
wanting  for  their  shouts  to  go  off.  The  same  persons  will 
throw  their  hats  and  hurrah  loudly  for  any  one,  whoever  he 
be.  Yet  princes  are  very  frequently  deceived  by  assembled 
crowds  and  their  huzzas.  I  do  not  speak  of  those  crowds 
which  the  police  at  times  have  paid  for  hurrahing ;  but  bona 
fide  crowds  with  bona  fide  shouts  amount  to  little,  and  are 
rarely  faithful  indexes  of  anything  which  might  be  of  impor- 
tance, except  they  are  overwhelmingly  strong,  or  are  silent, 
for  "the  silence  of  the  people  is  the  censure  of  kings." 
Princes,  instead  of  allowing  flatterers  to  pay  them  compli- 
ments upon  the  assembled  multitudes,  would  feel  rather  hum- 
bled, if  they  considered  that  it  is  the  show  which  brings  the 
greater  number  together.  They  can  serve  as  no  foundation 
for  any  political  satisfaction.  The  coronation  of  few  monarchs 
was  attended  more  numerously  than  that  of  Charles  X.,  yet 
his  crown  was  not  for  all  that  the  faster  on  his  head. 

LII.  Popularity,  if  sought  as  an  object  worth  obtaining  for 
itself,  is  not  more  dangerous  to  individuals  seeking  it  than  it 
is  to  the  people,  who  do  not  grant  it  for  virtue  and  talent  but 
on  personal  or  capricious  grounds  and  in  spite  of  the  law. 
Nothing  indeed  is  more  dangerous  to  liberty  than  the  per- 
mitting a  citizen  to  lead  or  rule  on  account  of  great  popu- 
larity, and  the  greater  the  popularity  and  the  longer  the  sway, 
the  more  ruinous  will  be  the  effect;  because  the  political 
energy  of  the  state  concentrates  in  him,  and  receives  from 
him  its  impulse,  the  institutions  lose  their  energy,  the  law  as 
law  loses  its  vigor,  and  the  community  becomes  unfit  for  civil 
liberty.  If  the  leader,  thus  placed  beyond  the  line  which 
no  citizen  ever  should  be  allowed  to  overstep,  is  restless  and 


4g  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

nuprincipled,  he  may  become  a  usurper ;  but  even  if  he  be 
naturally  of  a  most  generous  mind,  and  have  the  general  wel- 
fare alone  before  his  eyes,  the  effect  is  always  disastrous.  If 
the  people  are  willing  to  confide  the  government  into  the 
hands  of  even  so  glorious  a  leader  as  Pericles,  on  account  of 
his  personal  popularity,  and  allow  him  momentous  influence 
besides  and  beyond  the  law,  because  he  is  great  and  glorious, 
if  they  confide  in  him,  the  individual,  because  they  are 
charmed  by  him  and  not  because  he  acts  out  their  institu- 
tions, they  must  be  content  to-  follow,  when  the  mortal  lot 
befalls  this  glorious  leader,  so  low  and  puffed-up  a  demagogue 
as  Cleon.  So  no  monarch  properly  provides  for  his  state 
who  does  not  powerfully  promote  institutions,  but  makes  the 
government  essentially  dependent  upon  his  personality,  how- 
ever brilliant  this  may  be.  The  most  gifted  monarchs  are 
frequently  those  who  are  most  easily  betrayed  into  this 
political  error. 

LIII.  Free  nations  who  value  their  liberty  ought  jealously 
to  frown  down  all  leading  and  ruling  popularity  which  does 
not  strictly  keep  within  the  limits  of  the  law,  and  to  allow  no 
essential  influence  except  within  its  institutions,  none  what- 
soever on  account  of  a  mere  personal,  still  less  a  capricious, 
popularity.  This  does  not  exclude  a  sound  and  healthy  oppo- 
sition, of  which  we  shall  treat  presently.  I  speak  of  that  popu- 
larity which  does  not  merely  oppose  the  administration  but 
infringes  the  laws  and  their  spirit,  and  stands  instead  of  ad- 
ministration. Out  of  this  spirit  arise  demagogues — men  who 
gain  popularity  and  sway  by  unlawful  or  wicked  means  and 
by  flattering  or  pampering  the  evil  dispositions  of  men.  After 
Pericles,  or  through  him,  demagogism  was  raised  in  Athens, 
we  might  almost  say,  to  a  state  institution,  as  we  have  seen 
that  nepotism  was  under  the  popes  of  the  fifteenth  century — 
a  most  melancholy  condition  for  democracies.  For  it  has  this 
peculiarity,  that  while  it  clips  and  stints  more  and  more  the 
lawful  operation  of  established  institutions,  which  demagogues 
never  fail  to  do  in  order  to  flatter  the  crowd,  it  Drives  on  the 

*  o 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


47 


other  hand  more  and  more  essential  power  to  the  undefined 
and  unrestricted  influence  of  the  demagogue,  under  the  de- 
lusive garb  of  giving  power  to  the  people — another  and  sub- 
stantial reason  against  democratic  autarchies,  in  addition  to 
those  which  we  found  in  the  first  volume.  Neither  Pericles, 
the  guardian  of  Alcibiades,  nor  Socrates,  his  teacher,  was  able 
to  regulate  his  ambitious  temper,  because  the  indulgent  love 
of  the  people  spoiled  and  ruined  him.  He  became  a  traitor 
to  his  country.  The  history  of  Athens  after  Pericles  almost 
concentrates  in  a  series  of  demagogues,  Cleon,  Hyperbolus, 
Callias,  Alcibiades,  and  whatever  their  names  were.  Opposite 
to  the  demagogue  rose  the  oligarchist,  dealing  in  treachery, 
and  a  vile  tribe  of  sycophants  prospered  in  the  struggle,  while 
the  people  were  carried  madly  to  their  ruin.1 

LIV.  Before  we  dismiss  the  subject  of  national  gratitude  I 
desire  to  add  a  few  words  on  statues  and  other  monuments 
erected  in  honor  of  events  or  persons  by  authority  or  the 
community  at  large.  Ought  we  to  erect  such  ?  It  has  been 
often  said,  "  Much  better  that  the  memory  of  a  person  or  event 
live  in  the  hearts  of  the  people  than  that  it  be  perpetuated  in 
stone."  No  doubt  it  is ;  so  it  is  better  that  knowledge  be  in 
the  head  than 'in  books,  but  still  books  are  not  only  useful 
but  necessary.  I  for  my  part  am  decidedly  in  favor  of  judicious 


1  Frederic  the  Great  has  a  whole  chapter  on  flatterers  in  his  Anti-Macchiavelli. 

There  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  Memorial  de  Sainte-H61ene,  which  I 
give  because  worthy  of  reflection,  and,  though  we  shall  not  entirely  agree  with 
Napoleon,  that  which  he  advances  respecting  what  people  say  applies  at  least  more 
or  less  to  all  excited  times.  The  emperor,  having  spoken  of  popularity  and  debon- 
nairete,  adds,  "  Thus  we  ought  to  serve  the  people  worthily,  and  not  occupy  our- 
selves with  pleasing  them.  The  best  way  of  gaining  them  is  by  doing  them  good ; 
nothing  more  dangerous  than  to  flatter  them  :  if  after  that  they  do  not  obtain  all 
they  desire,  they  become  irritated  and  believe  that  faith  has  not  been  kept  with 
them ;  and  if  we  resist,  they  hate  so  much  the  more,  as  they  believe  themselves 
duped.  The  first  duty  of  a  prince  is  doubtless  to  do  that  which  the  people  wants ; 
but  that  which  a  people  wants  is  hardly  ever  that  which  it  says  :  its  will,  its 
wants  ought  rather  to  be  in  the  heart  of  the  prince  than  in  his  mouth."  Page 
no,  vol.  ii.,  Paris  ed.,  1824. 


48  •   POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

monuments,  and  my  reasons  are  these.    I  consider  them  moral, 
honorable,  elevating,  and  useful. 

Whatever  has  a  tendency  to  impress  man  with  the  fact  that 
he  is  a  member  of  society,  influenced  and  influencing — of  a 
society  which  is  closely  connected  with  the  past ;  whatever 
leads  man  to  feel  attached  to  mankind  has  a  tendency  to  ele- 
vate him,  to  suppress  or  soften  that  which  is  selfish  or  brutish; 
whatever  tends  to  insulate  man,  to  stifle  the  consciousness  in 
him  that  he  is  an  integrant  part  of  society,  produces  egotism 
and  crime,  because  it  weakens  humanity  in  him,  which  is  in 
a  great  manner  founded  upon  sociality.     Hence  the  great  use 
of  studying  history :  it  makes  us  conscious  that  we  belong  to 
a  great  union   of  beings,  existing  for  important    purposes. 
Sismondi,  in  his  History  of  the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
justly  says,  "The  morality  of  a  nation  is  preserved  by  asso- 
ciating its  sentiments  with  all  that  is  stable  and  permanent  : 
it  is  destroyed  by  whatever  tends  to  concentrate  them  on  the 
present  moment.    So  long  as  our  recollections  are  dear  to  us, 
we  shall  take  care  that  our  hopes  be  worthy  of  them  ;  but  a 
people  who  sacrifice  the  memory  of  their  ancestors  or  the 
welfare  of  their  children  to  the  pleasures  of  a  day  are  but 
sojourners  in  a  country — they  are  not  citizens."     The  study 
of  history  and  every  means  of  commingling  its  reminiscences 
with   our  soul  make    us  modest,  yet  firm  and    persevering; 
history  gives  substance,  earnestness,  and  a  necessity  of  action, 
not  of  talk,  to  the  mind.     All  periods  which  have  been  most 
fruitful  to  a  nation  or  mankind  at  large,  most  active  in  build- 
ing and  sowing,  not  in  destroying  and  uprooting,  have  ever 
distinguished  themselves  by  an  earnest  zeal  to  understand  the 
past  ages,  which  generated  the  present;  all  periods  which 
destroyed  and  ruined  without  developing,  which  are  distin- 
guished for  superficial  clamor  and  theories  without  character, 
substance,  or  sense,  are  distinguished  for  arrogant  disregard 
of  any  knowledge  beyond  the  present  day,  which  is  considered 
as  overflowing  with  wisdom.     Man  never  studies   the    past 
without  earnestly  thinking  of  the  future  ;  but  so  soon  as  man's 
thoughts  dwell  upon  the  past  and  meditate  the  future  destinies 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


49 


of  that  which  surrounds  him,  so  soon  as  his  affections  are 
roused  by  that  which  is  absent,  he  feels  elevated,  and  returns 
to  the  consideration  of  that  which  now  exists  and  is  close  be-, 
fore  him,  to  the  present  moment  and  himself,  with  an  expanded 
heart  and  a  greater  soul ;  and  he  is  only  thus  able  to  consider 
the  present  and  himself  individually  without  selfishness.  So 
soon  as  man,  on  the  other  hand,  dwells  upon  the  present 
without  any  connection  with  the  past  and  the  future,  he  ex- 
poses himself  to  sordid  views  and  arrogant  conceit.  The 
truth  of  this  position  may  be  tested  in  a  proportionate  degree 
by  every  one  in  his  daily  life  and  smallest  transactions,  as  in 
the  actions  and  performances  of  whole  nations.  Since  monu- 
ments, however — be  they  columns,  inscriptions,  entire  fabrics, 
or  whatever  else — are  means  to  connect  our  thoughts  with 
the  past,  and  thus  lead  us  to  dwell  upon  the  possible  future, 
they  are  desirable  for  any  nation  which  feels  that  its  destiny 
is  higher  and  nobler  than  the  mere  care  for  the  present  mo- 
ment could  indicate.  Monuments  are  impressive  tokens  and 
illustrations  of  history,  and  not  merely  for  those  who  do  not 
read,  nor  even  most  so  for  them,  but  the  impressions  received 
through  the  eye  in  shape  and  form  are  strong  and  lasting.  A 
thoughtful  man  will  dwell  upon  a  monument  with  fruitful 
thoughts,  while  the  volatile  are  arrested  for  a  moment,  re- 
minded of  one  that  was  great,  good,  heroic,  and  one  more 
name,  one  more  date,  will  be  stored  up  in  vivid  remembrance. 
The  image  of  a  statue  or  monument,  frequently  passed  by  the 
school-boy,  will  sink  with  many  associations  deeply  into  his 
heart,  so  that  the  busiest  life  of  later  periods  will  not  make  it 
vanish  again.  A  public  monument  honors  those  who  erected 
it.  In  viewing  it  we  feel  that  a  debt  of  gratitude  in  some 
manner  is  paid;  we  feel  that  we  live  in  a  community  sensible 
to  worth,  merit,  nobleness  of  action,  and  willing  to  acknowl- 
edge them.  To  the  active,  monuments  are  incentives:  no 
Boston  school-boy  feels  the  worse  for  having  viewed  Chantrey's 
statue  of  Washington,  and  if  he  could  view  in  his  early  dreams 
another  of  Hancock  it  would  not  harm  him.  A  column  has 
been  erected  to  Walter  Scott  in  Glasgow,  with  the  inscrip- 
VOL.  II.  4 


50  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

tion,  "  that  it  may  record  their  [the  citizens  of  Glasgow]  ad- 
miration of  his  genius,  their  deep  sense  of  the  honor  which  his 
name  reflects  on  his  country,  and  their  gratitude  for  the  delight 
which  they  have  received  from  his  writings."  A  statue  of 
Fulton,  with  some  similarly  appropriate  inscription,  in  some 
conspicuous  landing-place  at  New  York,  would  be  a  just 
tribute,  harm  no  one,  and  do  good  to  many.  The  lion  erected 
at  Thermopylae  in  honor  of  Leonidas  must  have  told  a  preg- 
nant story  to  many  a  Greek.  Monuments  show  and  testify 
palpably  and  strikingly  that  society  is  not  always  occupied 
with  material  interests  alone,  but  allows  the  nobler  sentiments 
their  proper  sphere.  Whoever  can  view  Westminster,  or  the 
Pantheon  in  Paris,  without  stirring  feeling,  must  be  without 
sympathy  for  anything  great ;  whoever  can  believe  that  those 
places  do  not  exercise  their  moral  and  inciting  influence,  not 
only  on  those  who  visit  them  but  on  the  nation  at  large,  can- 
not be  acquainted  with  the  human  heart.  By  monuments  we 
take  the  fine  arts,  one  of  the  choice  flowers  of  civilization,  into 
public  service,  and  in  turn  promote  them  ;  and  society  is 
deeply  interested  in  their  promotion.  They  humanize,  soften, 
and  refine,  and  at  the  same  time  elevate  the  standard  of  taste, 
one  of  the  most  efficient  agents  of  national  industry.1  Bacon 
says,  "  Imo  citra  omnem  controversial!!,  artes  emolliunt  mores, 
teneros  reddunt,  sequaces,  cereos,  et  ad  mandata  imperii  due- 
tiles  :  ignorantia  contra,  contumaces,  refractories,  seditiosos : 
quod  ex  historia  clarissime  potet,  quandoquidem  tempora 
maxime  indocta,  inculta,  barbara,  tumultibus,  seditionibus, 
mutationibusque  maxime  obnoxia  fuerint."  2 

The  expense  of  money  for  monuments  or  other  works  of 
art  is  one  of  the  most  common  objections  against  them.  If 
money  is  spent  in  erecting  them,  and  objects  of  more  press- 


1  On  this  subject  I  have  given  my  views  more  fully  in  the  Report  on  Girard 
College. 

Repeatedly  has  the  vast  usefulness  of  diffused  taste  and  pleasure  in  the  fine 
arts,  with  reference  to  industry,  and  the  duty  of  governments  to  promote  them  as 
far  as  in  them  lies,  been  amply  acknowledged  in  the  British  parliament. 

*  De  Dignitate  et  Augmentis  Scientiarum,  lib.  i. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  51 

ing  necessity  are  neglected,  it  is  of  course  folly,  in  this  as  in 
any  other  case,  to  attend  to  the  less  important  in  preference 
to  the  more  important.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  are  suf- 
ficient means  for  both, — and  judiciously  managed  means  may 
effect  much, — it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  money  laid  out 
in  anything  which  promotes  essential  civilization  promotes 
thereby,  directly  or  indirectly,  harmony  of  thought  and  feel- 
ing, and  peace  among  individuals,  security,  intercommunion, 
and  the  standard  of  social  life  and  comfort ;  and  thus  not  only 
is  the  value  of  exchangeable  articles  enhanced,  but  civilization 
imprints,  with  every  progress,  the  character  of  exchangeable- 
ness  upon  things,  performances,  and  various  species  of  skill 
and  labor,  which  without  it  remain  without  any  exchange- 
able value.  We  have  but  to  look  around  us,  and  every  day 
will  furnish  us  with  numerous  examples.  We  must  never 
forget  that  taste  forms  an  essential  ingredient  of  national  in- 
dustry no  less  than  necessity;  that  the  wants  of  civilization, 
upon  which  all  industry  is  founded,  consist  as  really  in  the 
wants  of  taste  as  of  necessity.  If  the  leading  motives  to  in- 
dustry are  wants  and  security,  both  are  more  or  less  directly 
promoted  in  part  by  the  cultivation  of  the  fine  arts. 

Monuments  promote  —  who  would  seriously  deny  it?  — 
glowing  patriotism.  Whatever  is  good  or  great  it  is  well  to 
impress  symbolically  and  compactly  on  the  mind.  It  is  not 
because  we  are  of  a  gross  nature  that  we  require  this ;  it  is 
because  concentrated  signs  and  forms  make  concentrated  im- 
pressions. The  badge  of  office  makes  a  sudden,  palpable  im- 
pression. No  German  passing  through  Wittenberg  requires  to 
be  reminded  that  this  is  the  place  where  Luther  lived,  fought, 
and  died ;  his  mind  will  be  filled  with  recollections  and  reflec- 
tions. Still,  the  iron  statue  of  the  Reformer  at  that  place  will 
contribute  to  present  still  more  vividly  the  man  and  the  period 
which  affected  his  country  so  deeply  and  lastingly.  Few  men 
who  travel  to  the  battle-field  of  Liitzen  will  stand  in  need  of 
being  reminded  that  there  Gustavus  Adolphus  fell.  Yet  is 
there  a  great  difference  between  this  general  reminiscence  of 
history,  and  the  ideas  which  crowd  upon  the  mind  when  we 


52  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

sit  down  near  the  stone  which  marks  the  spot  where  the  great 
man  fell,  or  when  we  see  the  spot  in  the  town-house  of  Liitzen 
which  to  this  day  exhibits  the  floor  marked  by  the  blood  of 
the  expiring  king.  It  was  a  praiseworthy  custom  of  the 
Romans  to  deposit  the  ashes  of  their  distinguished  men  in 
suitable  tombs  near  the  high-roads.  In  travelling  along  be- 
tween rows  of  sepulchres  a  man  was  reading  the  annals  of  the 
great  state  written  in  deeply  impressive  symbols. 

It  shows  no  grossness  if  we  love  to  admire  the  wisdom  of 
God  in  the  wonderful  construction  of  a  small  insect's  wing 
and  make  it  thus  a  symbol  of  his  vast  power.  So  it  is  not 
gross  when  we  present  great  deeds,  illustrious  men,  or  periods 
to  which  we  owe  what  we  are,  symbolically  in  form  and  shape, 
by  monuments  or  statues,  and  when  the  ingenuity  of  men  is 
employed  to  find  fit  forms  delicately  to  express  complicated 
actions  or  characters,  the  spirit  of  exalted  periods,  or  the 
sentiments  of  the  founders  of  states. 

But  have  not  monuments  been  greatly  abused  ?  Has  not 
repulsive  flattery  often  erected  them  ?  So  has  religion,  so  has 
everything  of  any  general  interest  to  men,  been  abused.  Nor 
is  the  love  of  the  fine  arts  an  infallible  indication  of  elevation 
of  the  soul.  It  is  not  an  unfrequent  phenomenon  that  pecu- 
liarly corrupt  natures,  even  cruel  to  excess,  have  a  strong 
tendency  to  sentimental  emotions,  and  please  themselves  in 
them  ;T  but  would  these  enormities  be  seriously  urged  against 
the  general  influence  of  the  fine  arts,  if,  as  is  always  made  a 
condition,  other  important  objects  are  not  neglected,  and  the 
object  is  the  erection  of  patriotic  monuments  ?  Let  it  be 
adopted  as  a  rule  that  no  statue  shall  ever  be  erected  to  a 
living  person,  but  only  after  the  survivors  or  posterity  have 
pronounced  upon  the  merit,  as  the  censors  used  to  give  their 
judgment  upon  the  doges  of  Venice  after  their  decease.  If, 

1  Several  Roman  emperors  are  striking  instances.  In  1830,  a  woman,  Mar- 
garet Gottfried,  was  executed  for  having  successively  poisoned  more  than  thirty 
people,  and  to  her  last  day  she  liked  sentimental  emotions  and  would  at  times  cry 
at  the  recital  of  poems.  See  her  Biography,  published  by  her  counsel,  Bremen, 
1831. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


53 


however,  monuments  do  exist,  it  is  a  sacred  duty  of  the  citizen 
to  preserve  them  inviolate,  and  to  bring  up  the  young  with  a 
fear  of  falling  into  the  vandalism  of  injuring  public  property 
in  them  or  in  any  other  shape. 

LV.  There  is  a  general  duty  and  consequent  virtue  of  the 
last  importance,  which  for  want  of  a  better  term  we  may  call 
the  virtue  of  attention,  comprehending  therein  observation  and 
reflection  upon  what  has  been  observed.  We  have  seen  that 
the  intellect  forms  an  ingredient  of  man's  ethical  character, 
and  that  the  human  race  constitutes  a  continuous  society,  col- 
lecting and  transmitting  knowledge  and  improving  by  experi- 
ence. The  animals,  "  quae  natura  prona  atque  ventri  obedi- 
entia  finxit,"1  have  but  a  limited  degree  of  observation ;  man's 
erect  posture,  '•'  his  eyes  turned  towards  heaven,"  no  more 
indicate  his  destiny,  as  the  ancients  said,  than  his  duty  of  free 
observation  around  him.  We  cannot  learn  and  reflect  without 
observing  the  phenomena  around  us,  and  our  mind,  like  our 
eyes,  remains  dull  and  unable  to  distinguish,  if  not  trained  by 
practice.  Observation  and  attention  do  not  mean  a  hasty  and 
fretful  curiosity,  undirected  by  a  concentrated  and  composed 
mind  which  glances  at  the  surface  without  receiving  a  lasting 
impression — mere  craving  for  news  and  change ;  but  they 
mean  that  attention  which  is  the  effect  of  a  desire  to  know 
the  elements  of  things  or  principles  of  phenomena,  and  their 
mutual  connection  with  and  bearing  upon  one  another — the 
truth  of  things,  their  essential  character.  Every  experience  or 
observation,  without  it,  is  shallow  and  unsound,  and  propriety, 
judiciousness,  wisdom,  and  even  that  primary  virtue,  justice, 
depend  essentially  upon  this  attention.  If  we  pay  the  slightest 
attention  to  the  subject,  we  shall  find  that  every  man  is  suc- 
cessful in  his  sphere,  from  the  humblest  to  the  most  elevated, 
useful  to  his  neighbors,  and  efficient  in  his  calling,  in  the 
same  degree  as  he  unites  with  a  peculiar  skill  or  talent  for  his 
specific  calling  a  knowledge  of  his  subject  which  is  the  fruit 


Sallust,  Bell.  Catilin.,  i. 


54  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  patient  attention  to  its  primary  elements  and  agents  alone. 
We  receive  no  proper  knowledge  of  a  tree  by  satisfying  our- 
selves with  a  general  view  of  its  outward  size  and  bulk.  To 
know  it  thoroughly  we  must  examine,  among  other  things,  a 
fibre  under  the  microscope.  We  are  cheered  in  our  attention 
when  by  closely  observing  one  fibre  we  gain  the  knowledge 
of  millions  of  fibres  of  the  same  class. 

Those  men  who  may  be  considered  the  leaders  of  mankind, 
the  philosophical  minds, — by  which  I  mean  all  who  with  a 
philosophical,  that  is  accurate,  analyzing,  and  comprehensive, 
mind,  examine  and  grasp  their  subject,  historians,  rulers  or 
statesmen,  poets,  artists,  and  moral  teachers, — will  be  found 
to  have  influenced  society  so  far  as  and  no  farther  than  they 
combined  with  a  native  activity  of  mind  a  penetration  of  reality 
around  them,  a  comprehension  of  the  nature  and  operation  of 
the  elements  or  integrant  parts  of  society  and  all  its  relations 
and  conditions,  and  discarded  wayward  or  arbitrary  fancy.1 
In  this  as  in  so  many  other  respects  the  ancients  ought  to 
serve  us  as  models.  Their  laws  as  well  as  their  literature  show 
in  an  eminent  degree,  which  cannot  be  sufficiently  weighed  by 
us,  their  clear  and  lively  perception  and  keen  penetration  of 
the  real  state  of  things.2  In  this  alone  lies  the  advantage  of 
experience,  in  this  the  power  of  the  school  of  misfortune.  They 


1  [Polybius  has  a  fine  passage  (ix.  22)  in  speaking  of  Hannibal.  Dr.  Lieber 
cites  the  passage  in  his  manuscript  notes.  "  So  truly  great  and  wonderful  is  a 
man  and  a  soul  properly  fitted  according  to  the  original  constitution  of  its  nature 
to  any  human  work  to  which  it  may  bend  its  eiforts."] 

3  I  have  elsewhere  spoken  of  our  obligation  not  to  lose  by  negligence  what 
has  been  gained  at  earlier  periods  and  under  more  fortunate  circumstances  for  a 
particular  subject,  but  perhaps  at  great  expense  to  society  or  under  totally  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  which  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  bring  back,  or  not  right 
for  us  if  we  could.  Christianity  and  modern  civilization  have  very  materially 
changed  the  relation  in  which  the  individual  stands  with  the  world.  We  have  a 
world  within,  with  which  we  strive  to  bring  the  outer  world  in  connection  and 
harmony.  The  real  world  was  the  problem  of  the  ancients.  We  ought  surely 
not  to  return  to  their  view,  but  are  in  duty  bound  to  learn  whatever  good  may 
have  been  produced  by  it  without  paying  the  same  price.  We  theorize  too  easily ; 
we  start  from  ideas  and  carry  them  over  into  the  material  world :  the  ancients 
started  from  ihe/act,  the  object  without. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  55 

force  knowledge  and  penetration  of  reality  upon  us ;  if  they 
do  not  succeed  in  doing  this,  they  have  no  improving  effect, 
as  we  may  frequently  observe  with  persons  of  a  dull  mind. 
The  necessity  of  observation,  which  Bacon  so  urgently  and 
solemnly  presses  upon  the  student  of  nature,1  is  no  greater  for 
him,  not  even  as  great  as  for  the  student  of  men  and  society. 
Many  sufferings  and  misfortunes  have  afflicted  mankind  be- 
cause their  rulers  or  legislators  perceived  the  important  phe- 
nomena of  society  outwardly  only,  and  did  not  penetrate  to  the 
component  parts  and  to  their  principle  of  action  and  mutual 
relation  to  one  another.  Frederic  the  Great  acknowledged 
that  as  an  administrator  of  a  realm  he  had  gained  invaluable 
knowledge  when  his  father  obliged  him  to  act  the  part  of  a 
subaltern  officer  in  one  of  the  administrative  courts  at  Custrin. 
He  there  studied  the  fibres,  the  first  and  last  operation  of  the 
agents  of  society,  those  minute  elements  which  make  up  the 
bulk  of  what  we  call  society  or  state ;  he  became  acquainted 
with  the  action  of  laws,  not  only  with  their  words.  The 
essence  of  a  law  does  not  lie  in  what  its  words  decree,  but  in 
the  effect  which  they  have  upon  the  given  state  of  things. 
Nor  is  it  difficult  to  perceive  by  perusing  the  letters  and  biog- 
raphy of  Niebuhr,  alluded  to  before,  how  that  historian  was 
enabled  shrewdly  to  unravel  some  of  the  most  perplexing 
questions  in  Roman  history,  and  to  penetrate  Roman  and  past 
reality,  by  his  constant  attention  to  present  reality  around  him, 
by  never  sneering  at  any  knowledge,  however  humble  in  ap- 
pearance, provided  it  led  him  to  perceive  the  connection  of 
things.  His  knowledge  of  the  various  relations  of  the  soil  to 
its  owners  in  his  native  country  alone  gave  him  an  important 
key  to  the  corresponding  relations  with  the  Romans.  So 
Gibbon,  in  his  Miscellaneous  Works  (vol.  i.  p.  136,  ed.  1814), 
says  of  himself,  "  My  principal  obligation  to  the  militia  was 
the  making  me  an  Englishman  and  a  soldier.  In  this  peaceful 
service  I  imbibed  the  rudiments  of  the  language  and  science 
of  tactics,  which  opened  a  new  field  of  study  and  observation. 


1  Novum  Organum. 


56  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

The  discipline  and  evolutions  of  a  modern  battalion  gave  me 
a  clearer  notion  of  the  phalanx  and  the  legion ;  and  the  cap- 
tain of  the  Hampshire  grenadiers  (the  reader  may  smile)  has 
not  been  useless  to  the  historian  of  the  Empire." 

It  is  painful  indeed  to  observe  how  many  persons  walk 
through  life  with  an  obtuse  mind  and  dull  eye  and  yet  do  not 
feel  prevented  from  boldly  pronouncing  their  opinion  upon 
all  occasions.  Many  persons  are  not  struck  either  by  the 
characteristic  form  or  even  the  color  of  things,  and  when 
they  have  to  give  an  account  it  is  undefined,  unsatisfactory, 
erroneous,  or  exaggerated,  one  way  or  the  other.  The  most 
delicate  phenomenon  in  nature,  the  surprising  and  admirable 
connection  of  a  chain  of  causes  and  effects,  agents  of  awful 
simplicity  and  magnitude,  can  be  laid  before  them  without 
eliciting  their  inquiry..  Nothing  which  constitutes  the  frame- 
work of  society  and  gives  it  its  peculiar  character  attracts 
them  :  they  do  not  ask  in  what  relation  the  tiller  of  the  ground 
stands  to  the  owner  of  the  soil ;  how  the  taxes  are  decreed, 
assessed,  and  levied  ;  what  are  the  pastimes  of  the  people  ; 
how  often  they  eat  meat  in  a  week ;  what  their  standard  of 
comfort,  their  habits  of  cleanliness  are ;  in  what  relation  their 
religion  stands  to  their  morality  or  practical  life ;  whether  the 
people  read  or  not,  and  what.  Still  less  do  they  inquire  into 
the  most  important  institutions,  and  how  they  became  such. 
They  never  look,  as  Bacon  calls  it,  "  abroad  into  universality." 

Without  this  attention  we  insulate. our  mind,  or  the  things 
which  may  happen  to  interest  us,  and  cannot  see  them  in  their 
connection,  that  is  in  their  truth. 

LVI.  This  duty  of  attention,  enjoined  upon  man  because 
he  has  received  reflective  faculties  and  has  the  general  obli- 
gation of  truth  in  all  its  bearings,  is  of  singular  importance 
in  politics,  for  every  one  who  has  to  act ;  hence  in  free  coun- 
tries for  all  citizens.  The  virtue  of  attention  is  one  of  those 
which  require  most  practice;  it  cannot  begin  too  early.  What- 
ever we  see  or  hear  we  ought  to  try  to  understand,  attempt  at 
least  to  learn  its  connection ;  of  a  word,  term,  thing,  institu- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


57 


tion,  person,  or  event,  its  peculiar  character,  meaning,  his- 
tory, elements,  and  causes.  A  single  set  of  casters  on  our 
dining-table,  if  viewed  in  all  their  connections,  may  teach  a 
vast  lesson  of  political  economy,  geography,  and  civilization. 
We  ought  not  to  read  the  name  of  a  place  without  combining 
the  idea  of  its  situation  with  it,  or  of  a  law  without  that  of  its 
operation.  We  thus  not  only  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the 
thing  itself,  but  our  horizon  expands,  one  species  of  knowledge 
supports  others  in  our  mind,  our  intellect  acquires  the  proper 
classification  of  things — a  fixed  frame-work  for  further  acqui- 
sition ;  it  gains  clearness  and  retentiveness,  and  above  all  we 
learn  to  see  things  more  and  more  in  their  true  light  and 
bearing,  and  as  our  knowledge  becomes  firmer,  truer,  and 
more  substantial,  we  enable  ourselves  to  become  juster,  and 
are  less  exposed  to  be  swayed  by  casualties  or  impulses  which 
originally  may  not  have  been  bad.  The  judgment  of  some 
men  upon  the  whole  English  revolution  has  been  swayed  by 
the  exclamation  of  James  II.  when  he  returned  to  London 
and  found  that  Princess  Anne  had  fled:  "Good  God,  my  child 
too  has  left  me !"  He  who  can  read  this  without  emotion 
must  have  a  hard  heart;  but  so  natural  an  exclamation  of  the 
afflicted  father  will  weigh  very  little  with  him  who  views  the 
infatuated  king  in  his  whole  connection  with  the  country  over 
which  he  so  injudiciously  ruled.  Hardly  had  the  world  ceased 
to  applaud  the  French  for  manfully  resisting  a  criminal  execu- 
tive outrage,  when  many  not  only  lavished  their  sympathy 
upon  the  duchess  of  Berry  for  attempting  to  raise  a  civil 
war,  and  in  their  admiration  of  her  spirited  conduct  forgot 
her  licentious  course  of  life  but  actually  turned  their  feeling 
against  Louis  Philippe.  It  may  be  hard  for  the  duke  of  Bor- 
deaux to  be  deprived  of  a  throne,  but  if  we  view  him  in  his 
whole  connection  we  may  not  find  reason  to  wish  him  back 
in  the  Tuileries. 

LVII.  We  must  gather  experience :  without  it  no  man 
would  be  wiser  at  forty  than  he  was  at  fifteen,  nor  England  be 
safer  after  her  Protestant  settlement,  with  its  various  organic 


5g  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

laws,  than  she  was  under  Charles  II.  But  what  is  experience  ? 
It  is  not  the  mere  witnessing  or  going  through  the  perils  or 
drudgery  of  a  thing,  nor  the  bare  knowledge  that  a  fact  has 
happened.  It  is  the  knowledge  we  derive  by  reflection  upon 
that  which  happens.  Men  may  pass  through  a  variety  of 
scenes  without  gathering  any  experience,  as  an  obstinate 
physician  may  kill  hundreds  by  the  same  physic  in  the  same 
cases,  because  he  refuses  to  reflect  upon  what  he  witnesses. 
Attention,  therefore,  to  what  we  witness,  see,  or  learn,  consti- 
tutes an  ingredient  of  experience,  and  this  experience  may  be 
personal  or  not,  that  is,  we  may  see  with  our  own  eyes  or  not, 
perceive  with  our  own  senses  or  not.  This  distinction,  however, 
is  far  less  definite  than  is  generally  supposed.  For  if  personal 
experience  relates  to  effects  upon  my  own  senses  or  person 
alone,  it  is  necessarily  extremely  limited.  If  we  extend  its 
meaning,  and  would  comprehend  within  it  what  has  happened 
at  our  own  times,  the  distinction  becomes  arbitrary ;  for  we 
may  or  may  not  know  an  event  of  our  own  times  more 
thoroughly  than  one  of  past  periods.  It  is  the  certainty  of 
knowledge  which  is  important,  and  this  may  at  times  be 
much  greater  when  we  were  not  present  at  an  event  than 
when  we  were.  Experience,  true  knowledge,  a  just  view  of 
the  things  and  relations  among  which  we  live,  or  whatever 
we  may  call  it,  demand  of  every  citizen  two  things,  that  he 
know  the  society  he  lives  in  as  thoroughly  as  with  his  means 
he  is  able  to  do,  and,  in  order  to  do  it,  that  he  know  the  his- 
tory of  its  growth  and  of  the  development  of  its  character  (its 
generic  history). 

There  is  an  absolute  duty  of  the  citizen  to  make  himself 
acquainted  with  the  history  of  his  country,  for,  whatever  it  is, 
it  did  not  spring  forth  yesterday,  but  it  became  such  gradu- 
ally, and  the  institutions  which  surround  the  citizen,  which 
form  the  essence  of  his  government,  are  not  known  from  their 
casual  appearance  as  it  may  strike  him  at  first  glance,  but 
from  their  operation,  which  is  but  their  history ;  nor  can  we 
possibly  know  whither  they  tend,  and  whether  they  work 
good  or  evil,  without  knowing  the  causes  from  which  they 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


59 


sprang,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  have  operated.  Besides, 
no  genuine  and  firm  patriotism  is  possible  without  its  re- 
ceiving aliment  from  the  knowledge  of  our  institutions,  the 
history  of  our  country.  Without  it  we  shall  feel  and  act  as 
selfish  insulated  ephemerals — "  sojourners  in  our  country,  not 
citizens,"  as  Sismondi  expressed  it.  Cicero  very  truly  com- 
pares those  who  do  not  know  history  to  children,  because 
they  are  deprived  of  experience.  To  rule  or  legislate  for  one's 
country,  one  must  know  it ;  to  know  it,  one  must  study  it ;  but 
our  country  is  not  these  few  millions  who  happen  to  be  alive  at 
this  precise  moment,  nor  this  land  on  which  they  stand,  which 
they  cultivate — but  our  country,  patria,  is  this  land,  with  all 
the  relations  subsisting  between  it  and  the  dwellers  upon  it, 
their  institutions,  their  growth  and  history.  "  In  it  alone  can 
the  citizen  study  his  obligations  and  rights," x  which  he  really 
enjoys  and  ought  carefully  to  preserve,  and  transmit  inviolate 
to  his  children ;  through  it  alone  he  can  learn  how  to  appre- 
ciate what  is  good  in  it,  and  discover  what  requires  amending, 
and  how  it  ought  to  be  amended. 

A  nation  does  not  live  an  equally  active  and  productive  life 
at  once  in  all  spheres.  A  variety  of  circumstances  must  com- 
bine in  order  to  produce  a  period  in  which,  by  the  united 
activity  of  many,  a  certain  branch,  a  certain  institution,  a  cer- 
tain part  of  the  public  law,  will  be  cultivated  with  peculiar 
felicity  and  effect.  General  attention  is  directed  with  peculiar 
intensity  to  one  or  the  other  subject;  many  of  the  most  gifted 
minds  being  engaged  in  the*  same  pursuit  or  animated  by  the 
same  idea  propel  one  another  in  their  common  or  similar  ca- 
reer; one  discovery  leads  to  another;  while  the  public,  being 
influenced  by  the  same  spirit  and  common  circumstances,  in- 
cite and  reward  by  their  interest  the  peculiar  votaries  of  that 
branch  which  is  the  flourishing  one  of  the  times,  and  at  the 
same  time  public  opinion,  keen  as  to  this  branch,  acquires 
tact  and  taste,  and  modifies  what  may  be  extravagant  or  re- 
tards what  may  be  over-zealous  in  those  who  give  their  whole 


Jovellanos,  Complete  Works,  Madrid,  1830,  vol.  ii.  p.  438. 


5o  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

mind  to  that  particular  subject.  Thus  are  produced  what  I 
have  called  on  another  occasion  the  classical  periods  of  these 
peculiar  branches.1  It  is  thus  in  literature  and  the  arts,  in  law 
and  politics.  If,  then,  we  do  not  study  history,  and  try  faith- 
fully to  learn  in  what  persons  have  excelled,  what  are  the  re- 
sults of  a  specific  branch  in  its  own  classical  age  or  in  the 
period  in  which  it  was  cultivated  with  success,  when  by  for- 
tunate circumstances  the  public  mind  was  rendered  peculiarly 
sensitive  respecting  it,  we  neglect  the  true  fruits  of  civilization 
and  disregard  one  of  the  most  solemn  duties  of  man  as  a  so- 
cial being;  that  is,  as  a  being  who  is  not  only  called  upon  to 
live  in  social  relations  with  the  living,  but  who  owes  his  social, 
his  human  relation  to  the  continuity  of  society  and  is  socially 
connected  with  past  generations — that  he  is  a  social  being  not 
only  within  the  limits  of  his  generation,  but  also  by  a  lineal 
connection  with  the  past  generations,  through  influences 
derived  from  them,  and  with  the  future  generations,  by  influ- 
encing them.  In  order,  therefore,  that  man  may  know  his 
true  position,  he  must  understand  the  past  likewise.  This  is 
the  solemn  and  sacred  character  of  history. 

If  we  do  not  train  our  minds  in  duly  finding  and  appre- 
ciating the  elements  of  phenomena  around  us,  we  shall  be 
unguarded  against  that  fault  in  reasoning  to  which  all  men, 
without  exception,  are  but  too  liable,  namely,  the  mistaking 
of  the  co-existence  of  two  things  for  a  sufficient  proof  that 
they  stand  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect — a  fault  which 
has  produced  very  grave  evils  in  politics.  Nothing  is  more 
common  than  that  public  men  or  an  administration  are 
charged  with  the  evils  under  which  the  country  happens  to 
suffer,  merely  because  those  men  happen  to  be  at  the  helm, 
although  there  may  be  no  more  connection  between  the  two 
than  between  a  general  epidemic  and  the  administration  at 
the  time.  If  we  do  not  learn  to  discover  the  elements  of  the 
phenomena  around  us,  we  shall  continually  fall  into  that 
grave  error  which  has  convulsed  large  nations,  namely,  the 


1 1  have  dwelt  upon  this  subject  at  some  length  in  the  Hermeneutics. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  6 1 

mistaking  of  great  social  evils  for  merely  political  evils ;  for 
a  remedy  of  which  we  seek,  therefore,  in  a  change  of  laws 
or  institutions,  while  the  seat  of  the  disease  is  in  a  totally 
different  region,  and  the  cure  must,  consequently,  come  from 
different  remedies. 

As  to  the  general  duty  of  attention  to  the  present  society 
and  times,  in  and  through  which  we  are  what  we  are,  I  wish 
to  add  only  that,  since  we  do  no  longer  assemble  in  the  mar- 
ket, and  our  states  have  become  extensive  political  societies, 
and  since,  at  the  same  time,  printing  has  become  so  powerful 
and  active  an  agent  of  transmitting  knowledge  and  thoughts, 
it  is  our  duty  not  to  slight  those  vehicles  which  bring  us 
information  of  the  daily  occurrences  of  life,  near  and  far, 
important  and  trivial,  cheering  and  saddening — in  short,  of 
life  such  as  it  is.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  free  citizen  to  read 
attentively  some  newspapers.  Without  it  he  lives  in  the  dark 
as  an  Athenian  would  have  done  who  had  not  visited  the 
agora.  We  seize  with  avidity  upon  the  letters  written  in 
past  periods,  even  the  gossiping  ones,  because  they  bear  the 
imprint  and  breathe  the  spirit  of  the  period  in  which  they  were 
penned.  Newspapers  are  letters.  It  indicates,  in  my  opinion, 
very  little  knowledge  of  our  whole  human  character  and  call- 
ing, if  persons,  as  I  have  actually  found  some,  assert  with 
superciliousness  that  they  never  look  at  a  paper.  Let  the 
newspapers  of  some  countries  differ  ever  so  far  from  what" 
they  ought  to  be,  or  the  feeling  of  hauteur  at  the  society 
around  those  persons  be  ever  so  great,  still  the  papers  are  the 
channel  through  which  alone  a  mass  of  the  most  important 
knowledge  respecting  our  society  can  be  obtained,  and  the 
country  remains  the  society  in  which  we  live  and  to  which 
our  sympathies  ought  to  belong.  The  noblest  and  the  worst 
things  may  happen,  and  to  penetrate  reality  we  ought  to 
know  both.  A  Ross  may  return  from  his  three  years'  expe- 
dition and  be  received  by  the  people  of  Hull  in  a  manner 
which  reminded  the  public  of  the  reception  of  Columbus  after 
his  first  voyage  public  defalcations  may  be  discovered,  im- 
provements of  all  sorts  may  take  place;  crimes  or  noble 


62  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

deeds  may  be  performed,  or  portentous  signs  foreboding  evil 
may  show  themselves,  without  ever  being  noticed  by  so  neg- 
ligent a  citizen.  Only  let  us  read  the  papers  attentively,  and 
not  merely  to  fill  vacant  time.  The  gradual  enlargement  of 
knowledge  by  a  serious  and  regular  newspaper  reading,  with 
the  proper  aid  of  books  of  reference,  is  very  great,  and — it 
ought  to  be  observed,  especially  for  the  young — there  is  much 
knowledge  of  details  irretrievably  lost,  knowledge  perhaps  of 
great  importance  at  some  future  period,  when  unexpectedly  we 
may  greatly  need  to  possess  it,  in  the  sweeping  course  of  the 
news  of  the  European  race,  if  we  do  not  store  it  up  gradually 
as  it  is  offered,  and  endeavor  to  keep  on  a  level  with  facts  and 
events  in  the  political  as  well  as  scientific  life  of  the  civilized 
nations.  This  species  of  acquiring  knowledge  can  be  abused, 
like  everything  else.  As  to  the  importance  and  duties  of 
editors,  they  will  be  touched  upon  farther  below. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

Continency. — Political  Evils  of  Incontinency ;  of  Prostitution. — The  primary 
Foundation  of  Society,  the  Family,  is  undermined  by  it. — Evils  of  general  In- 
continency in  the  highest  Classes,  and  the  lowest. — Religion. — Its  Univer- 
sality.— Its  importance  for  Morality;  for  Society;  for  the  State. — Fanaticism. 
— Fanaticism  of  any  kind. — Religious  Fanaticism. — The  Bible. — Revelation. 
— Both  exclusively  religious. — Persecution. — Direct  and  indirect  Persecution. 
— Political  and  social  Persecution. — Hypocrisy  and  Desecration  of  Religion. 
— Regulation  of  political  or  social  actions  by  Tenets. 

LVIII.  CONTINENCY,  a  virtue  demanded  by  all  moral  sys- 
tems and  purer  religions,  is  a  moral  element  of  great  impor- 
tance in  a  civil  point  of  view.  The  legislators  of  all  times  have 
acknowledged  it,  both  by  the  direct  support  and  countenance 
given  to  lawful  marriage  and  well-constituted  families,  and 
the  serious  discountenance  given  to  prostitution,  from  ancient 
times  to  modern.  Hardly  had  the  attempt  been  made  during 
the  first  French  revolution  to  pronounce  by  law  that  dissolu- 
tion of  some  of  the  most  elementary  ties  of  human  society, 
which  had  been  eating  itself  into  its  vitals  for  upwards  of  two 
centuries,  when,  on  the  simple  ground  of  public  necessity, 
many  of  the  violent  political  fanatics  petitioned  for  legislative 
repression  of  universal  profligacy,  or,  placed  in  authority, 
urgently  recommended  measures  of  the  kind.1  It  is  not  only 


1  Some  of  these  reports  are  contained  in  a  work  of  the  saddest,  indeed,  but 
also  the  deepest  interest  for  every  reflecting  man  who  studies  human  society  with 
that  earnestness  and  truthfulness  which  is  anxious  to  know  the  real  state  of  things 
and  society  in  all  its  elements,  not  shuddering  or  averting  the  face  from  truth 
and  fact,  even  though  it  be  loathsomely  hideous,  as  no  physician  allows  himself 
to  be  repelled  by  the  most  sickening  suffering,  or,  if  he  does,  is  a  worthless 
votary  of  the  healing  art.  I  allude  to  the  work  De  la  Prostitution  dans  la 
Ville  de  Paris,  consideree  sous  le  Rapport  de  1' Hygiene  publique,  de  la  Morale 
et  de  1'Administration,  etc.,  par  A.  I.  B.  Parent-Duchatelet,  Paris,  2d  ed.,  1837, 
2  vols.  8vo.  It  is  a  work  of  the  first  importance  to  the  moralist,  philosopher, 

63 


64  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

because  prostitution  at  large  is  invariably  coupled  with  crime 
that  it  becomes  so  dangerous  to  the  state,  as  the  experience 
of  all  periods  and  all  nations,  ancient  and  modern,  without 
exception,  proves  that  general  incontinency  becomes  a  dan- 
gerous political  vice.  There  is  another  reason,  and,  in  my 
opinion,  of  much  greater  import  still.  We  have  seen  how  in- 
dispensable the  family  is  for  civilization  as  well  as  virtue ;  we 
called  it  the  hearth  of  the  best  traits  of  man,  of  virtue,  of  gen- 
erosity, of  patriotism.  We  have  seen  that  monogamy  is  justly 
considered  as  one  of  the  most  important  elements,  perhaps 
the  most  important  of  all  to  which  Europe  owes  her  early 
and  great  superiority  over  the  Eastern  world,  where  yet  civi- 
lization was  of  much  earlier  date.  If  we  carefully  examine 
Roman  history,  I  believe  no  one  can  fail  to  observe  that  a 
very  great  part  of  all  that  we  feel  ourselves  bound  to  admire 
in  it,  the  great  power  which  the  word  law  acquired  in  that 
city,  and  that  peculiar  trait  in  her  politics  which  we  may  call 
Roman  steadiness,  was  owing  to  the  early  acknowledgment  of 
the  family  in  its  sacredness,  and  the  consequent  esteem  of 
womankind,  especially  of  wives  and  mothers — the  high  char- 
acter which  the  Roman  attributed  to  the  matron,  who  there- 
fore stands  prominent  in  their  history  from  an  early  period, 
some  of  the  traditions  of  which  are  mixed  with  fiction,  but 
which  nevertheless  prove,  even  in  this  shape,  the.  state  of  na- 
tional feeling.  We  shall  return  to  this  subject  when  we  treat 
of  Woman.  In  the  middle  ages,  and  especially  in  that  period 
which  more  particularly  is  designated  as  the  age  of  chivalry, 
few  things  served  to  restrain  the  lawlessness  of  the  times,  in 
some  degree  at  least,  more  effectually  than  the  rising  esteem 
of  woman,  extravagant  and  distorted  as  even  this  feeling  gen- 
erally was,  or  however  extravagant  the  views  of  many  per- 
sons to  this  day  respecting  the  universal  purity  of  this  feeling 
at  those  times  may  be.  It  is  a  fact  that  it  formed  one  of 


politician,  criminalist,  and  statistician,  to  every  one  who  studies  man  considered 
individually  or  socially,  and  gives  a  deep  insight  into  one  of  the  darkest,  lowest 
sinks  of  vice,  avarice,  and  crime. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  65 

the  essential  points  from  which  modern  civilization  started 
anew.1 

LIX.  If  the  family,  however,  is  so  important,  it  is  evident 
that  continency,  its  very  support  and  life-blood,  is  so  likewise. 
The  former  cannot  exist  in  its  purity  and  in  that  solidity  which 
is  necessary  to  make  it  a  substantial  element  of  political  wel- 
fare, without  the  latter,"  without  the  purity  of  woman.  Yet 
this  does  not  exhibit  the  whole  importance  of  continency.  So 
soon  as  continency  is  generally  disregarded  or  slighted,  self- 
ishness will  likewise  become  general,  because  families  are  not 
formed — that  circle  where  disinterestedness  is  fostered  most, 
— and  the  more  lasting  connection  between  the  two  sexes,  if 
formed,  is  founded  upon  selfish  gratification  only;  the  claims 
of  children  upon  their  parents  for  education,  the  pride  of 
parents  in  their  children,  that  they  may  do  honor  to  the 
name,  is  weakened  or  entirely  destroyed ;  and  woman  sinks 
from  the  position  of  a  companion  to  the  father  and  an  honored 
mother  to  the  offspring,  to  a  mere  means  of  gratification.  In 
short,  the  first  principle  from  which  civilization  starts,  and 
that  from  which  at  all  periods  it  draws  the  most  substantial 
support,  is  undermined.  There  are  four  different  impulses 
which,  more  than  any  others,  prompt  man  to  generous  actions, 
elevate  him  above  the  calculation  of  interest,  and  imbue  his 
soul  with  those  motives  without  which  utility  and  expediency 
would  remain  as  the  only  causes  and  prompters  of  action  : 
these  four  are  religion,  love,  patriotism,  and  the  feeling  of 
justice.  Love,  that  peculiar  sympathy  between  men,  and 
which  we  have  considered  in  friendship,  one  of  its  prominent 
manifestations,  is  intensest  and  most  general  in  the  sympathy 
which  exists  between  the  two  sexes,  so  much  so  that  the  poets 
of  all  ages  have  been  naturally  led  to  it,  as  the  surest  means 
to  excite  interest  on  the  largest  scale.  That  disinterested 
spirit  of  love,  which  is  often  called  the  romantic  spirit,  has 


1  Hallam's  History  of  the  Middle  Ages,  mentioned  here,  out  of  so  many  others, 
only  on  account  of  its  greater  accessibility  to  most  readers. 
VOL.  II.  5 


66  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

not  unfrequently  led  to  extravagances,  errors,  sometimes  to 
vices  and  crimes;  yet  this  is  only  because  it  is  so  general, and 
if  it  were  blotted  out  from  the  human  heart  it  would  scarcely 
be  possible  to  keep  human  society  together,  aside  from  the 
extinction  of  many  of  the  noblest  exertions.  But  general 
profligacy  does  extinguish  it,  and  we  find  therefore  that  at  all 
times  those  classes  which  are  not  touched  by  public  opinion, 
and  give  themselves  up  to  libertinism,  which  become  callous 
and  selfish,  disavow  the  obligations  of  continency  and  of  family 
life,  and  in  doing  so  become  dead  to  many  of  the  most  sacred 
calls  of  morality,  are  of  extreme  danger  to  the  whole  com- 
monwealth ;  whether  such  a  class  be  in  the  social  scale  at  the 
head,  as  the  libertine  nobility  in  France,  England,  and  several 
other  countries  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, 
or  at  the  bottom  of  that  scale,  as  the  poorest  classes  are  at 
present,  in  England,  for  instance,  and  several  other  highly- 
peopled  countries.1  Whether  squalid  wretchedness  or  arro- 
gant profligacy  deaden  the  power  of  public  opinion,  the  effect 
and  the  danger,  though  not  the  same,  are  equally  great,  with 
this  difference,  perhaps,  that  the  wretched  may  still  be  coerced 
by  a  strong  government  into  submission  to  the  laws  in  some 
degree,  while  the  others  soon  may  become  daring  rebels 
against  the  most  sacred  interests  of  society,  having  necessarily 
a  considerable  part  of  authority  and  power  in  their  own  hands. 
In  this  respect,  too,  the  history  of  Roman  dissoluteness  fur- 
nishes us  with  admonishing  facts  and  experience.  There  were 
many  reasons  why  France  could  not  remain  without  a  deeply 
penetrating  revolution  but  one  of  them  will  always  be  found 


1  I  refer  here  to  the  various  Reports  of  the  Poor  Laws  Commissions  to  Parlia- 
ment since  the  whigs  have  formed  the  administration.  The  work  I  have  used 
in  particular  is  the  Report  from  the  Commissioners  for  inquiring  into  the  Ad- 
ministration and  practical  Operation  of  the  Poor  Laws,  published  by  Authority, 
London,  1834.  Several  works  of  value  have  been  published  by  private  individ- 
uals on  subjects  connected  with  the  above,  for  instance,  "  The  Manufacturing 
Population  of  England,  its  Moral,  Social,  and  Physical  Conditions,"  etc.,  by  P. 
Gaskill,  London,  1833.  Some  of  the  first  British  political  economists  have  like- 
wise written  on  the  subject ;  nor  can  Mai  thus  on  Population  be  forgotten  here 
where  we  speak  of  the  effect  of  general  unchastity  in  a  political  point  of  view. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  67 

to  have  consisted  in  the  profligacy  and  shamelessness  of  a 
very  large  part  of  the  higher  classes,  which  made  even  Burke 
give  so  sad  and  contemptible  a  picture  of  the  French  nobility 
before  the  revolution,  so  much  more  dangerous,  though  prob- 
ably not  in  itself  greater,  than  that  of  the  court  of  Charles  II. 
and  James  II.,  because  it  had  lasted  longer  and  settled  down 
far  more  into  a  certain  code  and  system.1 

LX.  Society  is  deeply  interested  in  religion.  If  we  com- 
prehend within  this  term  all  belief,  true  or  erroneous,  in  an 
agent  or  agents  overruling  the  actions  and  destinies  of  men, 
possessed  of  a  power  surpassing  human  power,  which  extends 
to  the  changes  in  the  physical  world,  we  shall  find  that  men 
have  never  existed  without  some  religion,  whether  it  be  in  the 
form  of  the  grossest  fetish  religion,  adoring  bodies  which  do 
not  even  represent  real  or  imagined  animate  beings,  or  poly- 
theism, or  monotheism.  The  consciousness  of  our  depend- 
ence and  of  the  great  limitation  of  our  power,  fear  or  hope, 
desire  of  superior  aid,  or  a  longing  for  support  and  comfort 
in  adversity,  which  every  man  feels  that  he  himself  or  his 
fellow-man  are  incapable  of  affording,  has  invariably  led  man 
to  acknowledge  a  superior  agency  of  some  sort  or  other. 
Man  has  always  adored.  If,  therefore,  there  were  no  other 
reason  why  we  should  promote  pure  religion — and  there  are 
many  indeed — this  would  be  a  strong  one,  that  man  will  not 
and  cannot  live  without  some  religion,  of  whatever  character; 
and  if  he  has  not  a  true  one  he  will  embrace  a  false  one  ;  if 
he  has  not  belief  or  a  pure  faith  he  will  resort  to  superstition, 


1  The  historical  memoirs,  a  branch  of  literature  so  peculiar  to  France,  furnish 
most  melancholy  proofs  of  the  enormous  height  to  which  unchastity  as  a  social  and 
political  evil  had  risen  in  that  country.  Quite  lately  a  new  contribution  to  this 
history  of  vice  has  been  made  in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Duchess  of  Nevers  from 
1713  to  1793.  We  can  hardly  trust  our  eyes  when  we  read  the  attending  cir- 
cumstances of  the  well-known  fact  that  Cardinal  Fleury,  prime  minister  of 
France,  was  the  person  who  deliberately  seduced  the  then  young  monarch,  Louis 
XV.,  still  attached  to  his  wife,  to  adopt  the  countess  du  Mailly  as  his  mistress, 
and  thus  began  a  career  of  vice  which  during  a  long  reign  extended  its  fatal 
influence  over  a  country  doomed  to  the  greatest  sufferings. 


68  POLITICAL   ETHICS. 

or  rather  his  heart  will  naturally  engender  it.  But  if  a  religion 
acknowledges  a  God  "  who  is  of  purer  eyes  than  to  behold 
iniquity/'  who  is  love  and  all-pure,  it  needs  no  farthe/  discus- 
sion to  show  how  deeply  the  whole  society  is  interested  in 
maintaining  the  diffusion  of  such  a  faith,  which  affords  the 
two  most  powerful  agents  of  morality,  namely,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  mental  communion  with  a  being  who  is  purity  him- 
self, and,  being  omniscient,  does  not  judge  by  signs  or  out- 
ward actions  but  searches  the  motives  in  the  deepest  recesses 
of  our  heart,  and  who,  being  almighty,  affords  support  to  all 
who  seek  it  in  purity  from  him  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the 
belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  It  extends  at  once  the 
whole  sphere  of  action ;  its  effects  and  tests  go  beyond  the 
mere  calculation  of  expediency,  and  thus  the  belief  must 
needs  become  the  most  powerful  primitive  impulse  to  good 
action,  uprightness,  disinterestedness,  kindness,  love  of  truth, 
and  admiration  of  what  is  truly  good,  beautiful,  noble,  and 
great. 

The  promotion  of  religion  in  a  community  takes  place 
chiefly  by  instruction  in  the  family,  and  by  that  society  which 
is  founded  upon  the  principle  of  religion,  called  the  church. 
It  belongs  to  the  province  of  natural  law  to  inquire  whether 
the  state  as  such,  that  is  the  jural  society  of  men,  has  the 
right,  and,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  duty,  to  sup- 
port that  particular  ecclesiastical  society  or  church  which  is 
founded  upon  the  religion  professed  by  all  members  of  the 
state  or  the  majority,  and  to  exercise  a  supervising  or  regu- 
lating authority  over  all  the  religions  professed  by  the  various 
members  of  the  state.  But  to  the  science  of  politics  proper 
it  belongs  to  discuss  those  means  which  may  be  best  war- 
ranted by  experience  as  well  as  by  principles  of  strict  right  to 
carry  out  that  supervision  or  direct  promotion,  should  it  be 
found  either  that  it  is  necessary  or  right ;  in  short,  to  discuss 
the  important  subject  of  how  far  any  connection  between 
church  and  state  can  or  ought  to  subsist,  for  instance  as  in 
England,  where  the  established  church  has,  in  some  respects, 
a  political  form  and  substance,  or  as  in  France,  where  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  69 

churches  of  the  various  denominations  are  supported  by  the 
state,  but  otherwise  distinctly  separate  from  it,  since  the  revo- 
lution of  1830.  We  have  already  seen,  in  the  first  volume, 
that  in  no  case  whatever  has  the  state  the  right  to  interfere 
with  the  religious  belief  of  the  individual,  that  is  with  his  re- 
lation and  communion  with  his  Maker.  A  few  remarks  on 
religion  will  be  added  when  we  shall  come  to  treat  of  educa- 
tion. In  political  ethics  one  of  the  subjects  connected  with 
religion,  which  claims  especially  our  attention,  appears  to  me 
to  be  fanaticism. 

LXI.  By  a  fanatic  we  understand  an  individual  who  is  actu- 
ated by  a  false  zeal  for  some  general  principle  or  truth,  real 
or  supposed,  so  far  that  he  commits  wrong.  A  bigot  is,  in  the 
attachment  to  what  he  holds  to  be  true,  illiberal  and  narrow- 
minded  to  those  who  think  differently.  Fanaticism  includes 
bigotry,  but  the  bigot  need  not  be  a  fanatic.  The  falseness  of 
the  zeal  in  the  fanatic  may  consist  in  the  excess  of  its  degree, 
or  a  zeal  for  something  wrong  of  itself,  or  in  the  fact  that  the 
zeal  and  fervor  of  the  individual  mislead  him  to  carry  prin- 
ciples and  standards  of  action  into  spheres  which  ought  to 
remain  entirely  foreign  to  them.  It  was  fanatical  when  a  re- 
vived spirit  of  religion,  after  papacy  had  sunk  lowest,  carried 
some  popes  to  the  destruction  of  ancient  works  of  art;  it 
was  fanatical  when  the  admiration  of  the  fine  arts  in  antiquity 
induced  people  to  write  against  Christianity.  I  believe  that 
according  to  common  adaptation  the  word  fanatic  always  im- 
plies action  injurious  to  others,  especially  persecution,  or  to 
ourselves  (as  persons  have  crucified  themselves),  while  the 
word  enthusiast,  perhaps,  denotes  only  the  excess  of  zeal.  So 
long  as  the  two  musical  schools  in  Paris  at  the  time  of  Rous- 
seau carried  their  zeal  only  to  an  excess  of  love  of  music, 
forgetting  in  their  ardor  many  important  duties,  we  would  call 
them  musical  enthusiasts;  but  when  they  began  to  injure  one 
another,  I  believe  we  must  call  them  musical  fanatics.  It  is 
very  clear  that  the  enthusiast  will  in  most  cases  be  ready,  if 
opportunity  offers,  to  become  a  fanatic. 


;o 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


As  the  zeal  with  which  we  are  animated  for  the  prosecution 
of  anything  may  degenerate  into  excess,  so  there  may  be 
fanaticism  in  the  pursuit  of  any  truth  or  principle,  real  or 
pretended.  The  Nominalists  and  Realists  in  the  middle  ages 
became  actual  fanatics  in  their  philosophical  zeal.  So  there 
have  been  frequently  political  fanatics,  who  have  persecuted 
one  another  for  the  sake  of  political  principles  or  truths,  and 
all  party  excitements  are  liable  to  the  danger  of  political 
fanaticism.  Indeed,  whenever  we  forget  the  aim,  and  in  ex- 
cessive zeal  mistake  the  means  to  obtain  the  aim  for  the  aim 
itself — the  very  general  error  of  which  I  have  spoken  already 
— we  are  close  upon  the  limit  where  fanaticism  begins.  Any- 
thing engaging  the  zeal  of  men  may  degenerate,  I  repeat,  into 
enthusiasm,  as  the  innocent  love  of  flowers  did  at  one  time 
degenerate  into  the  actually  disastrous  tulipomania ;  and  so 
soon  as  enthusiasm  acts  injuriously  to  others,  by  blinding  men 
to  their  due  interest  or  inciting  to  injustice  and  persecution,  it 
is  fanaticism.  I  remember  an  instance  when  a  juryman  could 
not  be  persuaded  by  his  eleven  fellows  to  agree  to  a  verdict  of 
guilty,  although  the  evidence  of  theft  left  no  doubt  whatever 
of  the  crime,  and  finally  declared  he  would  not  consent  to  the 
verdict,  because  the  prisoner  belonged  to  his  own  political 
party.  If  this  was  not  on  the  ground  of  some  sordid  interest, 
it  was,  I  believe  every  one  will  agree,  political  fanaticism.  But 
no  species  of  fanaticism  has  been  more  common  or  more  dis- 
astrous than  religious.  The  reasons  are  clear.  Religion,  true 
or  false,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  one  of  the  most  universal  princi- 
ples, and  hence  its  fanaticism  is  likewise  so.  All  feel  interest 
in  some  religion  or  other ;  not  all  in  the  fine  arts  or  in  philo- 
sophical systems.  As  religion  occupies  itself  with  the  relation 
of  man  to  his  supreme  ruler,  men  who  take  a  confined  view 
of  religion  and  of  their  maker,  as  all  fanatics  do,  imagine  that 
religion,  with  reverence  be  it  spoken,  is  the  peculiar  province 
of  God,  and  forget  that  every  truth  and  true  principle,  for  in- 
stance justice  and  its  pure  administration,  is  his  likewise. 
The  religious  fanatic  believes  that  everything  which  does  not 
belong  to  religion  as  he  imagines  it  is  worthless  or  the  evil 


POLITICAL   ETHICS.  *j\ 

production  of  man.  God  willed  the  state  and  the  relations 
of  justice  among  men  as  much  according  to  his  divine  inten- 
tions as  he  willed  the  church.  The  fact  alone  that  he  willed 
it  is  proof  of  the  truth;  for  in  him  everything  is  infinite  and 
eternal,  and  in  his  will  every  principle  is  of  equal  importance. 
The  struggle  of  the  Catholic  church  and  some  other  denomi- 
nations to  supersede  the  state  and  make  it  a  mere  vassal 
of  the  church  was  founded  upon  this  erroneous  view.  The 
religious  fanatic  believes  that  God  is  peculiarly  honored  by 
peculiar  measures,  and  therefore  proportionably  offended  by 
their  omission  or  opposition.  Everything,  therefore,  in  his 
opinion,  ought  to  give  way  to  these  particular  measures,  even 
justice,  which  he  conceives  to  be  of  human  origin.  Crimes 
have  been  at  times  committed  or  palliated  because  it  was  blas- 
phemously believed  that  they  were  for  the  promotion  of  the 
cause  of  God,  as  if  the  purest  being,  and  the  only  all-pure 
and  all-powerful  being,  could  be  served  by  untruth,  or  injus- 
tice, or  impurity ;  as  if  his  honor  could  in  any  way  depend 
upon  the  actions  of  finite  and  impure  beings,  and  as  if  there 
was  any  other  way  of  serving  him  than  that  of  truth  and 
right.  The  enthusiast,  moreover,  has  arrived  at  his  views  by 
processes  which  are  not  deducible  from  reasoning ;  there  is 
therefore  in  him  that  instinctive  and  restless  fear  of  unsound- 
ness  or  of  taking  offence  at  others  not  agreeing  with  him,  as 
if  their  disagreement  cast  reflection  upon  his  belief — senti- 
ments which,  in  default  of  the  power  of  truth,  lead  to  perse- 
cution either  by  way  of  revenge  or  propagation  of  its  tenets. 
Radical  conviction  is  calm;  superficial  conviction  restless, 
heated,  angry.1 

LXII.  These  remarks  apply  to  fanaticism  in  all  religions; 
but  there  are  some  features  peculiar  to  Christian  fanaticism, 
arising  out  of  the  peculiar  character  of  the  Bible,  that  code  on 
which  the  faith  of  the  Christian  is  founded.  The  Bible  is  a 


1  [Enthusiasm  in  a  good  sense  is  a  generous  ardor  for  that  which  is  good,  true, 
humane.  In  a  somewhat  degenerate  sense  it  is  ardor  disproportionate  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  object.  Fanaticism  is  that  one-sided  zeal  united  with  hatred.] 


72  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

book  composed  of  various  parts,  which  have  a  different  char- 
acter; it  contains  inspired  truths  and  revelations,  it  contains 
records  of  facts,  or,  in  other  words,  historical  accounts,  and  the 
political  laws  calculated  for  a  peculiar  government,  a  theocracy 
of  a  particular  nation,  the  Hebrews.  To  what  melancholy 
errors  and  unspeakable  sufferings  the  mistaken  impression 
has  led,  that  those  historical  parts  which  record  facts  con- 
tain, in  addition  to  the  truths  legitimately  drawn  from  their 
aim  and  purpose,  others  applicable  in  totally  different  spheres, 
for  instance  in  science  and  politics, — how  consciences  have 
been  coerced  and  the  purest  religion  has  been  degraded  into 
a  handmaid  of  sordid  passions,  every  one  who  has  but  glanced 
at  history  knows  well.  The  whole  code  of  laws  destined  for 
the  Jews  and  adapted  to  the  specific  state  of  their  civilization 
and  to  the  object  to  be  obtained  by  that  specific  theocracy, 
has  led  to  fearful  fanaticism,  applied,  as  it  has  been,  to  objects 
for  which  it  was  never  intended.  The  Mosaic  law  of  prop- 
erty, of  government,  of  administration  of  justice,  especially 
the  penal  laws,  would  be  subversive  of  the  most  sacred  inter- 
ests of  society  if  put  in  practice  in  our  times,  for  many  of  them 
are  repulsive  to  the  feelings  of  humanity  which  have  become 
developed  by  the  intervening  diffusion  of  Christianity,  in  con- 
sequence of  that  very  civilization  which  those  laws  contributed 
to  bring  about 

The  Bible  has  not  nullified  man's  moral  or  intellectual 
character;  it  contains  absolute  prescriptions  of  principles,  not 
absolute  prescriptions  of  specific  actions,  such  as  the  officer 
for  instance  receives  from  his  commander. 

LXIII.  Respecting  the  inspired  parts  of  the  Bible,  which 
reveal  religious  truths,  I  must  remind  the  reader  of  what  was 
said  in  the  first  part,  of  the  character  of  those  truths  which 
Christ  taught,  namely,  that  he  limited  himself  strictly  to  re- 
ligious truths.  A  similar  remark  applies  to  the  whole  Bible. 
Two  different  views  may  be  taken  of  revelation  through  the 
mouth  of  man.  Either  the  inspired  writer  utters  words  by  way 
of  dictation,  or  he  pronounces  in  human  language  what  reve- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  73 

lation,  a  direct  communication  from  the  divine  to  the  human 
mind,  leads  the  latter  to  pronounce.  The  translations  of  the 
Bible  into  modern  languages  will  somewhat  explain  the  latter 
view.  They  contain  the  full  revelation,  yet  the  words  con- 
veying them  were  not  inspired  dictation.  Whichever  view 
may  be  taken,  it  appears  that  the  inspiring  Spirit  did  not  pur- 
pose to  stop  by  this  act  the  course  of  the  development  of 
mankind,  but  only  to  reveal  so  much  as  was  necessary  for 
religion ;  and  therefore  religious  truths  only.  The  inspired 
men  were  not  made  divinely  omniscient;  their  minds  were 
led  to  promulgate  truths,  and  these  alone  were  inspired. 
As  they  had  to  deliver  their  inspiration  in  human  language, 
so  they  remained  men  of  their  own  times,  in  all  that  had  no 
direct  relation  to  religion,  in  many  of  their  views  respecting 
public  or  domestic  government,  for  instance,  the  arts,  the 
sciences,  or  other  branches;  and  God  has  allowed  other  na- 
tions far  to  exceed  the  Hebrews  in  very  many  branches,  which 
yet  are  of  the  highest  importance  to  mankind.  The  Greeks,  for 
instance,  far  excelled  the  Jews  in  the  fine  arts,  in  composition 
and  criticism,  and  in  all  the  sciences;  and  it  would  be  no 
greater  error  to  seek  for  the  principles  of  architecture,  mathe- 
matics, dramatic  poetry,  or  botany,  in  the  Bible,  than  to  derive 
an  equitable  and  safe  system  of  justice  or  the  organization  of 
government  for  a  civilized  and  free  people  of  our  times  from 
the  laws  of  the  Jews.  The  Bible  was  not  intended  to  make 
men  inert  copyists.  We  are  destined  to  exert  ourselves,  and 
to  pursue  with  those  powers  with  which  the  Creator  has  be- 
nignly endowed  us  the  aims  he  has  prescribed  in  his  wisdom. 
Still  less  are  we  justified  in  accusing  those  of  irreligion  who 
conceive  the  Bible  to  be  a  book  of  religion,  and  I  believe  they 
act  impiously  if  they  take  it  as  a  book  of  science,  politics,  or 
the  arts.  There  are  very  strong  passages  in  the  works  of  some 
of  the  Reformers  against  the  abuse  of  the  Bible  in  using  it 
for  foreign  purposes.  A  modern  writer,  archbishop  Whately, 
speaking  of  the  unhallowed  attacks  which  have  been  made 
upon  political  economy  under  the  cloak  of  religion,  makes 
some  remarks  which  agree  so  well  with  what  I  hold  to  be 


«4  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

true  that  I  shall  be  excused  for  subjoining  an  extract  from 
them.1     Who  would  doubt  but  that  by  the  revelation  of  a  few 

1  "  Till  the  advocates  of  Christianity  shall  have  become  universally  much  bet- 
ter acquainted  with  the  true  character  of  their  religion  than  universally  they  have 
ever  yet  been,  we  must  always  expect  that  every  branch  of  study,  every  scientific 
theory  that  is  brought  into  notice,  will  be  assailed  on  religious  grounds,  by  those 
who  either  have  not  studied  the  subject,  or  who  are  incompetent  judges  of  it ;  or, 
again,  who  are  addressing  themselves  to  such  persons  as  are  so  circumstanced, 
and  wish  to  excite  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  passions  of  the  ignorant.  '  Flec- 
tere  si  nequeo  Superos,  Acheronta  movebo.' 

"  Some  there  are  who  sincerely  believe  that  the  Scriptures  contain  revelations 
of  truths  the  most  distinct  from  religion.  Such  persons  procured  accordingly  a 
formal  condemnation  (very  lately  rescinded)  of  the  theory  of  the  earth's  motion, 
as  at  variance  with  Scripture.  In  Protestant  countries,  and  now,  it  seems,  even 
in  Popish,  this  point  has  been  conceded  ;  but  that  the  erroneous  principle — that  of 
appealing  to  revelation  on  questions  of  physical  science — has  not  yet  been  entirely 
cleared  away  is  evident  from  the  objections,  which  most  of  you  probably  may 
have  heard,  to  the  researches  of  geology.  The  objections  against  astronomy 
have  been  abandoned  rather  perhaps  from  its  having  been  made  to  appear  that 
the  Scripture  accounts  of  the  phenomena  of  the  heavens  may  be  reconciled  with 
the  conclusions  of  science,  than  from  its  being  understood  that  Scripture  is  not 
the  test  by  which  the  conclusions  of  science  are  to  be  tried.  And  accordingly, 
when  attention  was  first  called  to  the  researches  of  geology,  many  who  were 
startled  at  the  novelty  of  some  of  the  conclusions  drawn,  and  yet  were  averse  to 
enter  on  a  new  field  of  study,  or  found  themselves  incapable  of  maintaining  many 
notions  they  had  been  accustomed  to  acquiesce  in,  betook  themselves  at  once  to 
Scripture,  and  reviled  the  students  of  geology  as  hostile  to  revelation ;  in  the 
same  manner  as,  in  pagan  and  Popish  countries,  any  one  who  is  conscious  of 
crime  or  of  debt  flies  at  once  to  the  altar  and  shelters  himself  in  the  sanctuary." 

..."  Historical  or  physical  truths  may  be  established  by  their  own  proper 
evidence  ;  and  this,  therefore,  is  the  course  we  are  bound  to  pursue.  The  Chris- 
tian will  indeed  feel  antecedently  a  strong  persuasion  that  such  conclusions  as  I 
have  been  speaking  of,  or  any  others  which  are  really  inconsistent  with  the  IJible, 
never  will  be  established;  that  any  theory  seemingly  at  variance  with  it  will 
either  be  found  deficient  in  evidence,  or  else  reconcilable  with  the  Scriptures. 
But  it  is  not  a  sign  of  faith — on  the  contrary,  it  indicates  rather  a  want  of  faith, 
or  else  a  culpable  indolence — to  decline  meeting  any  theorist  on  his  own  ground, 
and  to  cut  short  the  controversy  by  an  appeal  to  the  authority  of  Scripture.  For  if 
we  really  are  convinced  of  the  truth  of  Scripture,  and  consequently  of  the  falsity  of 
any  theory  (of  the  earth  for  instance)  which  is  really  at  variance  with  it,  we  must 
needs  believe  that  that  theory  is  also  at  variance  with  observable  phenomena,  and 
we  ought  not  therefore  to  shrink  from  trying  that  question  by  an  appeal  to  these. 
The  success  of  such  an  appeal  will  then  add  to  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  the 
Scriptures,  instead  of  burdening  them  with  the  weight  of  defending  every  point 
which  they  incidentally  imply.  It  is  for  us  to  '  behave  ourselves  valiantly  for  our 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  75 

principles  in  natural  philosophy  for  instance,  or  political 
economy,  many  of  the  gravest  errors  and  much  consequent 
bloodshed  might  have  been  prevented;  yet  he  who  did  not 
choose  to  reveal  these  principles  and  allowed  mankind  in  due 
time  to  find  them  out  must  have  had  his  wise  ends.  Since 
he  has  denied  revelations  except  on  religious  truths,  we  act 
irreligiously  if  we  misapply  his  revelations  for  ends  for  which 
they  were  not  intended. 

The  government  of  the  Hebrews  was  a  theocracy,  and 
everything  in  it  was  subservient  to  this  one  great  object,  the 
protection  of  the  worship  of  a  single  God  against  contamina- 
tion, until  at  length  monotheism  should  cease  to  be  a  national 
religion  and  become  that  of  the  world.  So  soon  as  this  mo- 
ment had  arrived,  the  Hebrew  government,  solely  calculated 
for  that  object,  and  for  the  Jews  in  their  then  state,  lost  its 
meaning,  and  it  is  utterly  unfit  to  be  imitated  by  other 
nations,  who  have  to  solve  totally  different  problems.  It  is 
just,  therefore,  to  say  that  no  book  is  less  fit  to  be  imitated 
in  politics  than  the  Old  Testament,  because  no  system  of 
politics  has  been  calculated  for  so  entirely  peculiar  a  state  of 
things ;  and  yet,  since  Christ  does  not  touch  politics,  we  find 
that  at  all  times  fanatics,  if  they  turn  for  politics  to  the  Bible 
at  all,  will  naturally  be  chiefly  attracted  by  the  Old  Testa- 
ment. I  have  mentioned  elsewhere  already  for  what  opposite 
and  often  awful  political  systems  and  pretensions  the  Bible 
has  been  abused  to  serve  as  a  foundation.  Catholics  and  Prot- 
estants have  equally  erred  on  this  subject,  and  while  some 
denounced  all  force  and  constraint  exercised  by  government, 
and  preached  the  most  revolting  licentiousness,  all  the  time 
pretending  to  rely  for  every  proposition  of  theirs  on  the  Bible, 
Bossuet  could  write  his  Polities  drawn  from  the  proper  words 


country  and  for  the  cities  of  our  God,'  instead  of  bringing  the  ark  of  God  into  the 
field  of  battle  to  fight  for  us.  He  will,  at  all  events,  we  may  be  sure,  defend  his 
own  cause,  and  finally  lay  prostrate  the  Dagon  of  infidelity,  but  we,  his  professed 
defenders,  more  zealous  in  reality  for  our  own  honor  than  for  his,  shall  deserve  to 
be  smitten  before  the  Philistines."  Lect.  ii.,  Introductory  Lectures  on  Political 
Economy,  London,  1831. 


76  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  holy  writ,  almost  entirely  in  biblical  phrases,  and  yet  pro- 
duce a  work  in  the  spirit  of  his  absolute  master,  Louis  XIV., 
and  in  his  own  spirit  of  a  careful  courtier-prelate  to  such  a 
master. 

LXIV.  If  we  call  religious  fanaticism  all  perversion  of  our 
actions  by  undue  application  or  influence  of  religious  doctrines 
in  spheres  which  are  not  strictly  religious,  we  shall  be  led  to 
the  following  truths  and  rules  respecting  political  and  othej 
social  relations : 

Persecution  is  not  only  irreligious,  but  there  is  likewise  no 
earthly  right  of  using  political  power  and  authority  for  re- 
ligious persecution,  because  political  power  is  power  arising 
out  of  the  state,  which  is  the  society  of  right,  and  right  has 
nothing  to  do  with  matters  of  faith. 

Persecution,  however,  though  it  be  not  of  a  political  char- 
acter, may  be  highly  oppressive  and  yet  remain  essentially 
social.  A  man  may  be  deprived  of  his  good  name,  necessary 
intercourse  or  subsistence,  by  social  action,  and  yet  be  unable 
to  use  political  protection  against  it.  It  is  one  of  the  worst 
species  of  persecution,  because  there  is  no  protection  against 
it.  But  lately  a  very  disgraceful  instance  took  place  in  Eng- 
land. The  bishops  of  Durham  and  Norwich,  having  sub- 
scribed for  a  copy  of  a  work  written  by  a  Unitarian,  were  so 
loudly  and  vehemently  clamored  against  by  clergymen  and 
laymen  that  they  believed  themselves  obliged  to  write  what 
cannot  be  termed  other  than  submissive  letters.1  Thus  a 


*  The  letter  of  the  bishop  of  Norwich  bears  date  November  I,  1838.  The 
bishop  of  Durham  had  previously  written  one.  Both  found  it  necessary  to  ex- 
cuse their  subscribing  On  the  ground  that  they  did  it  on  account  of  politeness 
to  Mr.  Turner,  the  Unitarian  author,  according  to  them  a  man  of  unblemished, 
character  and  great  talent.  Requisitions  to  the  archbishop  of  Canterbury,  to 
institute  an  episcopal  commission  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  the  two  bishops 
"  in  having  subscribed  to  a  work  intended  to  promulgate  the  infidel  heresy  of 
Socinianism,"  were  signed  by  the  clergy  of  the  several  dioceses.  The  epithets 
given  to  the  two  prelates  remind  one  of  the  worst  and  bitterest  times  of  contro- 
versy when  the  church  preached  and  supported  the  doctrine  of  divine  right  and 
absolute  obedience.  They  were  called  "  consecrated  culprits,"  "  obscene  and 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


77 


theologian  would  not  even  be  allowed  to  study  all  books  on 
theology.  The  articles  written  and  the  speeches  made  against 
them  showed  sufficiently  the  profane  hypocrisy  and  political 
rancor  against  these  two  prelates,  they  having  been  appointed 
by  the  whig  administration  in  power.  And  this  is  one  of  the 
necessary  consequences  of  all  fanaticism,  that  it  lends  aid  to 
and  promotes  hypocrisy,  and  on  the  other  hand  seeks  for  the 
proof  of  essential  religion  in  specific  acts,  without  considera- 
tion of  their  whole  bearing,  thus  making  of  the  most  spiritual 
and  divine  things  a  gross  matter  of  outward  signs. 

The  same  must  be  said  of  that  indirect  persecution  which 
favors,  in  the  mutual  dependence  of  society,  persons  accord- 
ing to  tenets.  The  danger  is  invariably  that  on  our  own  part 
we  expose  ourselves  to  all  the  dangers  of  fanaticism,  because 
we  are  carrying  by  this  very  means  principles  of  religion  into 
spheres  to  which  they  are  alien ;  for  instance,  if  we  decline  to 
buy  from  an  honest  and  poor  merchant,  because  he  is  not  of 
our  sect.  And  on  the  other  hand  we  promote  hypocrisy  and 
desecrate  religion,  because  we  make  tenets  the  test  of  actions 
and  of  intercourse  which  ought  to  have  nothing  to  do  with 
them.  I  know  of  instances  where  commercial  credit  was  given 
on  a  recommendation  of  a  minister  on  strictly  so-called  reli- 
gious grounds.  Is  not  this  desecration  ?  The  only  safe  rule, 
I  believe,  is  this,  that  we  regulate  our  intercourse  of  mutual 
dependence  solely  by  the  honesty,  purity,  skill,  and  claims  of 

flippant  pamphleteers,"  "  time-serving  remonstrants,"  "  rotten  liberals,"  "  hard- 
ened criminals,"  "men  at  the  thought  of  whom  the  soul  sickens,"  "liberal  and 
Protean  bishops,"  "  loose  and  lowly  priests,"  "  Judases,"  "  perfidious  prelates," 
"  surpliced  traitors,"  '«  white-robed  ministers  of  Satan,"  "  pet  sons  of  the  devil," — 
and  many  more  names  as  disgusting.  All  these  invectives  were  in  articles  of  1017 
papers,  which  sanctimoniously  pretended  to  write  for  the  true  cause  of  Christ, 
and  the  crown  of  England,  frequently  in  strains  of  blasphemous  hypocrisy.  In- 
deed, seeing  at  the  distance,  as  we  did,  those  articles  of  virulence  and  acrimony 
garnished  with  passages  from  the  book  of  peace  and  love,  we  could  hardly  be- 
lieve that  they  belonged  to  our  times.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  well-wisher  of  his 
species  firmly  to  look  truth  in  the  face,  and  fix  upon  evils,  if  dangerous,  without 
fear.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  this  note  has  been  written.  Let  us  all  take  an  ex- 
ample, and  call  scandal  what  is  scandalous,  disgraceful  what  disgraces,  and  gloss 
nothing  over  in  fear  or  sectarian  party  spirit. 


78  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

dependence  in  the  individual  himself.  For,  the  moment  that 
we  direct  our  daily  actions  of  common  intercourse  by  the 
profession  of  religious  tenets,  we  desecrate  religion,  and  pro- 
mote hypocrisy  on  the  one  hand  or  chilling  and  ruinous  irre- 
ligion  on  the  other.  *: 

In  doing  this  we  likewise  fetter  the  mind,  and  prevent  free 
and  conscientious  inquiry,  and  expose  ourselves  to  one  of  the 
most  grievous  errors,  that  of  hiding  the  faults  or  crimes  of 
those  who  profess  the  same  tenets  with  ourselves.  The  Cath- 
olic orders  as  well  as  many  Protestant  sects  have  frequently 
committed  this  grave  fault  of  mistaking  the  means,  the  uniting 
into  a  sect  or  church,  for  the  object,  truth,  religion,  active 
piety.  I  have  mentioned  already  the  just  view  of  Augustine 
on  this  subject,  that  it  is  better  that  scandal  arise. than  that 
truth  and  justice  suffer.  This  false  spirit  is  not  peculiar  to 
religious  societies ;  all  bodies  of  men  have  that  esprit  du 
corps  and  weakness  of  shrinking  from  exposing  their  fellow- 
members  ;  but,  as  fanaticism  always  believes  that  everything 
it  does  or  suffers  is  for  the  honor  of  God,  so  is  religious  fanati- 
cism peculiarly  apt  to  mislead  in  this  particular. 

Of  vast  danger  is  religious  fanaticism  in  politics  if  it  seizes 
upon  free  nations  and  introduces  into  politics  the  test  of  re- 
ligion— which,  if  this  word  is  applied  to  large  masses  and  by 
way  of  distinction,  means  of  course  the  profession  of  certain 
tenets.  The  state  is  the  jural  society,  and  as  conscientious 
citizens  we  have  no  right  to  judge  by  anything  but  relations 
of  right.  We  act  unconscientiously  if,  for  instance,  in  voting 
for  or  against  a  citizen,  we  are  influenced  by  other  tests  than 
his  uprightness,  honesty,  capacity,  and  general  fitness  for  the 
particular  object.  It  is  indirect  persecution  if  we  are  influ- 
enced by  dogmas,  for  he  has  a  right  to  have  his  own,  as  we 
have  ours;  we  turn  the  state  from  its  true  end,  we  promote 
the  mere  profession  of  tenets,  that  is  hypocrisy,  and  may,  for 
aught  we  can  calculate,  pave  the  way  to  open  and  cruel  per- 
secution. The  history  of  the  Western  and  Eastern  Empires 
after  the  conversion  of  Constantino,  when  dogmas  became  the 
most  active  elements  of  politics,  and  led  to  indescribable 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


79 


misery  and  wretchedness,  physical  and  mental,  as  well  as  the 
many  instances  of  the  unfortunate  and  unhallowed  application 
of  dogmas  to  politics  by  both  Protestants  and  Catholics,  arising 
out  of  the  religious  struggle  of  the  times  of  the  Reformation, 
ought  to  be  taken  as  a  lesson  too  grave  ever  to  be  disregarded. 
I  repeat  that  persecution  may  be  violent,  undermining,  and 
ruinous,  without  showing  itself  in  bloodshed.  It  may  be 
strictly  social,  and  thus  may  degrade  that  which  is  the  best  of 
all  things  that  man  can  possess — a  pure  and  true  religion.  The 
more  a  man  values  his  religion  and  the  sacred  communion 
which  the  infinite  Deity  permits  a  finite  individual  to  hold 
with  himself,  the  less  he  will  be  apt  to  desire  its  desecration 
by  making  his  belief  a  test  of  external  intercourse  with  so- 
ciety at  large.  The  more  men  pretend  to  intermix  politics  or 
the  intercourse  arising  out  of  mutual  exchange  with  religion, 
the  surer  we  may  always  be  that  they  are  either  blinded  by 
fanaticism  or  prompted  by  selfish  ends,  or,  as  is  most  common, 
jointly  by  both. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

Patriotism. — The  Patriotism  of  the  Ancients ;  of  the  Moderns. — Some  have  re- 
jected Patriotism. — National  Conceit,  Pride. — Narrowness  of  Feeling  a  Coun- 
terfeit of  Patriotism. — What  is  true  Patriotism  ? — It  is  noble  and  necessary  for 
Liberty. — Loyalty. — Public  Spirit. — What  it  consists  in. — Calamitous  Conse- 
quences of  a  Want  of  Public  Spirit. — Veneration  for  the  Old ;  Forefathers. — 
How  far  just,  necessary. — When  injurious. — The  Age  of  Action  under  Forty; 
of  Conservatism  over  Forty. — Do  Times  grow  worse  ? — When  are  we  more 
experienced  than  our  Forefathers  ? — Stagnation  and  Heedlessness. 

LXV.  WE  have  seen,  in  the  first  volume,  that  with  the 
ancients  the  individual,  as  far  as  rights  were  concerned,  was 
almost  absorbed  by  the  state ;  all  they  were  felt  to  be  they 
were  in  and  through  the  state  ;  and  not  only  was  their  state 
a  political  institution,  but  a  separate  religion,  with  peculiar 
national  deities  and  distinct  national  dogmas,  was  closely 
interwoven  with  it.  The  national  religion  thus  aided  in  sepa- 
rating the  specific  state  or  nation  from  others — a  circumstance 
powerfully  promoted  by  another  fact.  The  Greeks,  and  after 
them  the  Romans,  were  so  far  advanced  in  civilization  beyond 
the  other  tribes  known  to  them  that  they  looked  down  upon 
them  as  benighted  beings  of  an  inferior  kind;  the  stranger 
was  a  barbarian.  In  the  attachment,  therefore,  which  an  an- 
cient felt  for  his  state,  in  his  love  of  country,  his  patriotism, 
were  united  and  amalgamated  nearly  all  the  intensest  affections 
which  animate  the  human  breast — religion,  with  all  the  power- 
ful associations  of  poetry,  legends,  and  mythologic  history;  the 
affection  for  his  kindred  tribe  and  native  land,  its  institutions 
and  history,  its  language  and  literature  ;  and  consciousness 
of  superiority,  disdain  of  foreigners,  and  hatred  when  they 
became  invaders  and  threatened  to  smother  this  superior 
civilization.  When  the  Persian  attacked  the  Greek,  not  only 
were  his  life  and  property  endangered,  but  his  higher  life, 
his  whole  being  as  an  individual,  which  we  believe  will  last 
80 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  8 1 

beyond  this  earthly  existence,  was  in  jeopardy.  Patriotism, 
therefore,  comprehended  the  acme  of  all  virtuous  feelings,  of 
piety,  of  love  of  civilization ;  it  was  the  meridian  of  man's 
most  noble  existence.  Christianity  severed  religion  from  the 
soil,  from  earthly  citizenship.  He  was  told  that  religion  is 
above,  beyond  the  difference  of  language,  color,  kindred, 
descent,  or  country.  Chivalry  arose,  and  became  a  tie  be- 
yond national  affection ;  the  church  with  its  monasteries 
became  a  super-national  society,  which  with  its  common  lan- 
guage, the  Latin,  with  the  monastic  orders  extending  over 
many  political  limits  and  under  one  common  discipline,  th6 
seminaries,  mingling  the  youths  of  various  nations,  the  pil- 
grimages to  distant  lands,1  and  the  frequent  emigrations  of 
priests,  produced  a  common  feeling,  despite  the  many  feuds 
between  parts  and  particles  in  this  European  society.  Vast 
enthusiastic  movements,  such  as  the  crusades,  aided  still 
more,  if  not  in  cementing  nations  (for  the  feudal  systems  pre- 
vented this),  in  extinguishing  that  form  of  patriotism  which 
it  had  naturally  assumed  among  the  ancients.  In  the  course 
of  time,  however,  three  great  historical  processes  took  place 
in  the  European  race :  first,  that  which  we  may  call  the 
nationalization  of  tribes  and  governments;  France  became 
gradually  one  France,  Spain  one  Spain;  then  the  growth  of 
national  languages,  poetry,  and  literature,  in  opposition  to  the 
Latin,  by  the  rise  of  nations  and  great  minds  among  them. 
Dante,  who  dared  to  sing  in  "  vulgar  Italian,"  and  pressed  at 
once  the  seal  of  his  genius  upon  the  idiom  of  the  unlettered, 
felt  still  obliged  to  ask  pardon  that  he  did  not  continue  to 
compose  in  Latin,  as  he  had  begun,  on  so  sacred  a  subject  as 


1  Among  others,  Frederic  Riihs,  in  his  Manual  of  the  History  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  Berlin,  1816,  mentions  the  pilgrims  as  one  of  the  means  by  which  mutual 
knowledge  of  one  another  among  the  nations  of  Europe  was  kept  up,  a  slender 
means,  yet  in  the  absence  of  other  and  powerful  ones  in  the  darkest  periods  not 
undeserving  of  attention.  I  quote  from  memory,  but  believe  I  am  correct  as  to 
the  above  author.  Whether  this  be  so  or  not,  I  consider  it  a  fact  that  the  innumer- 
able pilgrimages,  attended  with  many  evil  consequences,  had  also  the  mentioned 
good  effect  of  aiding  to  keep  alive  sympathy  among  the  Western  Christian 
nations. 

VOL.  II.  6 


82  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

his  was.  Finally,  the  Reformation.  This  event  or  process 
of  civilization  broke  in  many  countries  the  uniting  tie  of  the 
church.  But  a  new  common  bond  had  arisen,  and  was  rapidly 
increasing  in  strength,  a  general  pursuit  of  knowledge,  the  tie 
of  common  European  science,  promoting  in  its  turn  intercom- 
munication, both  mental  and,  owing  to  the  gradual  fusion  of 
the  sciences  and  arts,  physical  also,  which  was  still  more  in- 
creased by  the  greater  security  caused  by  the  gradual  nation- 
alization of  states  and  governments.  Sciences  naturally  lead 
to  general  views ;  they  have,  in  the  main,  a  strongly  cosmo- 
politan character;  and,  above  all,  we  have  seen  that  natural 
law,  that  science  which  treats  of  the  rights  of  men,  flowing 
from  their  nature,  of  justice,  and  not  merely  of  positive  or  his- 
torical law,  arose,  and  was  and  is  cultivated  by  the  moderns, 
while  the  Christian  religion  must  ever  continue  to  exercise  a 
more  and  more  cosmopolitan  character,  the  more  purely  it 
dwells  among  men.  There  was  thus  no  possibility  of  a  return 
of  patriotism  in  its  ancient  manifestation. 

LXVI.  It  was  felt  and  seen  that  ancient  patriotism,  height- 
ened to  national  or  state  egotism,  could  no  longer  exist  or  be 
endured.  "  The  barriers  are  broken  which  severed  states  and 
nations  in  hostile  egotism.  One  cosmopolitan  bond  unites  at 
present  all  thinking  minds,  and  all  the  light  of  this  century 
may  now  freely  fall  upon  a  new  Galileo  or  Erasmus."1  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  observed  how  churlish,  narrow,  unjust, 
or  even  wicked  that  frequently  is  which  is  claimed  as  patriot- 
ism, how  directly  opposed  to  truth,  how  blind  in  its  selfishness. 

I  do  not  speak  here  of  clannishness,  which  is  at  its  height 
and  extreme  perhaps  in  the  Scotchman,  and  which  by  the 
great  painter  of  his  country's  customs  has  been  represented,  no 
doubt  in  strong  yet  in  true  colors,  as  rising  at  times  beyond 
everything,  even  the  fear  of  final  eternal  doom;2  nor  of  the 


1  Schiller,  Inaugural  address  on  :  "  What  is,  and  for  what  purpose  do  we  study, 
universal  history?"  first  delivered  in  1789.     It  is  contained  in  his  works. 

2  Walter  Scott  depicts  this  fearful  feeling  of  attachment  to  the  chief  of  the  clan, 
family,  etc.,  in   Elspeth   in  "The  Antiquary,"  etc.,  especially  in   chap.  xii.  vol. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  83 

petty  and  selfish  feeling,  the  utmost  extent  of  which  is  the 
town  limit;  but  I  speak  of  that  national  egotism  which  is 
blind  to  truth  and  callous  to  justice  beyond  the  nation's  fron- 
tier, and  which  has  been  used  for  various  and  opposite  evil 
ends,  so  much  so  that  men  have  not  been  wanting  who  not 
only  looked  upon  patriotism  as  beneath  a  true  elevation  of 
mind,  but  have  actually  declaimed  against  it.  A  late  writer 
exclaims,  "  What  misery  has  not  already  been  caused  by  the 
love  of  country!  How  much  has  not  this  counterfeit  virtue 
excelled  all  acknowledged  vices  in  wild  fury  !  Is  the  selfish- 
ness of  a  country  less  a  vice  than  that  of  an  individual  ?  Does 
justice  cease  to  be  a  virtue  so  soon  ,as  we  exercise  it  towards 
a  foreign  nation  ?  It  is  a  fine  species  of  honor,  indeed,  which 
prohibits  us  from  declaring  ourselves  against  our  country 
when  justice  no  longer  stands  by  its  side!"1  If  patriotism  is 
founded  upon  selfishness,  and  therefore  cannot  but  lead  to  in- 
justice, if  it  tends  to  blind  us  against  truth,  then  indeed  it  is 
one  of  our  first  and  most  sacred  duties  to  pluck  this  rank 


ii.,  in  colors  which  every  foreigner  would  certainly  consider  beyond  all  possibility, 
did  he  not  know  that  Scott  never,  probably,  gave  a  wrong  account  of  manners, 
national  feelings,  etc.,  except  from  want  of  knowledge,  which  in  the  above  char- 
acter cannot  well  have  been  the  case. 

*  Louis  Borne,  a  late  German  writer  of  much  keenness  and  boldness,  who  was 
obliged  to  leave  Germany  and  take  up  his  abode  at  Paris,  where  he  wrote  many 
a  bitter,  many  a  witty,  many  a  true,  and  many  a  false  thing.  He  belonged  to  a 
party,  if  such  it  can  be  called,  in  Germany,  who  wish  to  unite  their  endeavors 
with  that  which  gives  itself  the  singular  name  of  la  jeune  France,  thus  raising, 
probably  for  the  first  time,  age  into  a  political  party  distinction.  These  parties 
seem  to  think  that  liberty  has  yet  to  be  born,  and  that  this  new  god  will  be 
brought  forth  by  the  union  of  the  two  great  nations  to  whom  all  this  procreation 
of  new  liberty  seems  to  have  been  assigned,  the  French  and  the  Germans.  The 
Anglican  tree  of  liberty,  which  is  an  oak  of  centuries,  is  thus  treated  as  if  its 
mighty  branches  did  not  reach  already  over  many  countries,  and  over  France  and 
Germany  too.  But  I  must  stop,  lest  I  should  make  of  a  note  an  historical  dis- 
cussion. As  to  the  above  passage,  to  which  this  note  is  appended,  I  have  for  the 
present  to  say  only  that  the  author  is  mistaken  as  to  the  degree  of  fanaticism 
which  has  arisen  out  of  patriotism.  I  know  of  no  fanaticism  which  has  so  re- 
peaiedly  affected  mankind  in  so  great  a  degree  as  religious  fanaticism.  His 
whole  argument  would  thus  turn  more  strongly  still  against  religion  were  it  cor- 
rect in  its  conclusion. 


84 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


weed  out  of  our  heart.     Justice  is  above  all ;  truth  is  the  only 
legitimate  sphere  of  the  human  mind  and  soul. 

LXVII.  If  patriotism  consisted  in  national  vanity,  pride,  or 
self-sufficiency,  which  are  its  counterfeits,  and  one  or  the  other 
of  which  we  meet  with  in  all  nations  from  the  Chinese  to  the 
Americans,  it  should  be  avoided  by  every  wise  man.  But  is 
it  so?  does  there  not  exist  a  real  virtue,  compatible  with 
purity  of  heart  and  general  good  will,  and  which  has  pro- 
duced the  best  effects,  which  is  deeply  planted  in  the  human 
breast  and  ought  to  be  most  carefully  awakened  and  culti- 
vated P1 

Reflecting  men  have  frequently  fallen  into  two  serious 
errors,  of  which  the  one  is,  indeed,  a  consequence  of  the 
other.  In  seeking  for  truth,  and  hence  for  distinctness  and 
clearness,  they  have  often  conceived  that  only  to  be  real, 
sound,  or  true  which  can  be  established  by  the  calculating  or 
analyzing  understanding,  of  which  the  plain  end  and  object, 


1  To  give  instances  of  national  vanity  would  be  a  task  difficult  on  account  of 
the  difficulty  of  choice  only.  I  will  merely  mention  that  quite  recently  I  have 
met  with  a  passage  in  a  distinguished  French  work,  which  speaks  of  the  French 
as  being  at  the  head  of  civilization  with  an  assurance  which  resembles  the  man- 
ner in  which  Napoleon  spoke  of  "  the  Great  Nation."  In  another  work,  soon 
after,  I  saw  it  stated  that  Prussia  stands  at  the  head  of  European  civilization. 
In  an  address  of  a  large  sect  to  Queen  Victoria,  the  British  nation  was  called  the 
greatest  on  the  face  of  the  earth ;  and  that  the  Americans  in  their  turn  are  the 
first  in  the  world,  we  may  easily  find  by  turning  to  any  of  their  endless  and  in- 
numerable addresses.  Of  all  the  feelings  connected  with  this  subject  pride  is 
nevertheless  the  least  evil,  while  small  conceiledness,  as  we  find  its  prototype  in 
the  last  stages  of  Athenian  democracy,  is  a  serious  disease  without  any  redeem- 
ing quality.  It  affords  a  handle  to  narrow-minded  demagogues  and  unfits  the 
people  for  any  just  or  enlarged  views  and  elevated  feelings.  There  are  rules  ot 
good  breeding  of  social  intercourse  gradually  settled  by  good  sense  and  mutual 
regard.  Among  these  rules  it  is  now  universally  adopted  that  gross  flattery 
shows  excessive  ill  breeding,  and  is  taken  rather  as  an  insult  than  a  compliment. 
When  shall  we  have  our  rules  of  good  breeding  in  politics?  When  will  flat  and 
gross,  dull  and  cumbrous  flattery  in  a  public  speaker  be  taken  as  an  insult  by  his 
hearers, — as  a  young  lady  would  feel  grossly  offended  were  we  to  address  speeches 
to  her  which  were  given  as  pattern  speeches  to  ladies  in  works  on  politeness  two 
hundred  years  ago  ? 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  85 

the  use  as  well  as  the  origin,  can  be  stated  in  so  many 
words;  forgetting  at  once  that  as  finite  beings  we  must  begin 
to  reason  from  a  finite  beginning,  and  that  the  ultimate  object 
must  be  beyond  utility,  because  utility  expresses  only  a  ser 
viceableness  for  an  object,  so  that  the  ultimate  object  itself 
must  be  good  in  its  own  nature.  We  may  show  how  one 
thing  serves  for  another ;  but  we  must  needs  end  somewhere, 
that  is,  we  must  arrive  at  a  final  object  which  is  its  own 
end.1 

The  second  error  is  that  men  have  been  misled  to  consider 
their  subject  as  totally  separate  and  insulated,  forgetting  that 
everywhere  there  are  gradual  and  connecting  transitions  be- 
tween those  points  where  things  show  themselves  in  their 
fullest  and  most  developed  character — transitions  which  exist 
no  more  between  the  animal  and  the  plant,  for  instance,  than 
between  the  arts,  or  institutions,  or  ideas,  as  the  Useful  and 
the  Ornamental,  the  Just  and  the  Fair,  or  anything  that  is 
mental,  social,  or  human.  It  is  not  only  right  but  necessary, 
in  order  to  obtain  the  clearest  possible  insight  into  any  sub- 
ject, first  to  consider  it  absolutely,  that  is  in  its  essentials,  by 
which  it  wholly  differs  from  all  other  things,  for  which  pur- 
pose we  must  examine  it  when  at  the  highest  degree  of  per- 
fection peculiar  to  itself.  If  we  omit  this,  we  shall  obtain  but 
indistinct  ideas,  leading  to  a  thousand  erroneous  conclusions. 
But  having  done  this  it  is  equally  important  to  view  the  same 
subject  in  all  its  transitions,  through  which  it  is  affiliated  and 
joined,  in  the  various  directions,  to  other  things.  By  doing 
this  we  can  alone  discover  its  position  and  bearing.  As  an 
instance  I  will  take  the  courts  of  justice.  They  have  to  ad- 
minister justice,  they  have  to  do  with  right.  This  is  the 
characteristic  of  this  institution.  The  opposite  extreme  to 
strict  justice  is  self-denying  love.  Between  the  two  stands 


1  I  have  met  with  an  old  German  sermon  in  pamphlet  form,  entitled  "  The 
Utility  of  Eternal  Bliss"  (Ucber  den  Nutzen  eruiger  Gliickseligkeif].  It  was  in 
the  hands  of  a  seller  of  old  books,  and  I  have  often  regretted  that  I  did  not  pur- 
chase it;  but  I  did  not  then  know  how  often  in  my  life  I  should  be  reminded  of 
this  unique  instance  of  extravagant  consistency  in  the  utilitarian  theory. 


86  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

fairness ;  and  we  shall  not  obtain  a  perfect  and  partial  view  of 
courts  of  justice  if  we  do  not  consider,  among  other  things, 
the  very  subtle  transition  from  the  strictly  just  to  that  which 
is  fair,  and  if  we  do  not  consider  that,  although  the  law  is  the 
rule  by  which  the  judge  is  bound  to  decide,  this  very  law, 
being  made  by  man  and  drawn  up  in  human  language,  is  not 
absolute  like  a  mathematical  formula,  but  in  many  cases  must 
be  interpreted  in  its  application.  These  rules,  the  omission 
of  either  of  which  has  misled  many  philosophers,  are  of  great 
importance  in  all  meditations  on  subjects  connected  with  the 
state,  and,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  on  patriotism. 

LXVIII.  One  of  the  strong  impulses  to  action  is  interest, 
but  alone  it  would  altogether  fail  to  effect  many  necessary 
things ;  and  a  stronger  impulse  than  is  afforded  by  interest  is 
that  of  sympathy.  It  gives  in  many  cases  the  first  impulse  to 
action,  and  often  supersedes  interest  or  that  which  is  clearly 
to  be  proved  by  the  understanding.  Men  were  destined,  as 
we  have  seen,  to  establish  families;  from  them  civilization 
proceeds  :  yet  neither  did  men  originally  nor  do  they  gen- 
erally now  unite  in  marriage  after  having  calculated  their 
interest,  nor,  in  most  cases,  after  having  clearly  represented 
to  themselves  the  pleasure  they  may  derive  from  domestic 
happiness.  Sympathy  attracts  them,  and  weds  closer  than 
cither  of  the  other  two  motives  could  do.  Nor  does  a  man 
who  feels  deeply  attached  to  one  woman  among  so  many 
thousand  thereby  declare  that  he  holds  her  to  be  better, 
wiser,  purer  than  all  the  rest.  He  merely  shows  that  sym- 
pathy draws  him  to  her  in  particular.  We  are  commanded 
to  love  our  parents,  which  means  of  course  to  love  and 
cherish  them  in  particular,  but  by  obeying  this  command- 
ment we  do  not  mean  to  express  that  we  consider  them 
better  than  all  the  rest  of  mankind,  nor  that  we  hate  the 
others  because  we  love  these  in  particular.  The  command- 
ment directs  particular  attention  to  the  lawful  effect  of  a  pecu- 
liar sympathy,  and  to  the  callousness  of  a  heart  in  which 
this  primary  sympathy  has  no  effect.  .Yet  it  cannot  be  proved 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  87 

by  the  mere  understanding,  The  parents  in  many  cases  may 
indeed  not  deserve  the  warm  thanks  of  their  offspring ;  they 
may  have  done  no  more  than  what  in  the  common  relations 
of  society  they  could  not  well  help  doing.  The  children  may 
have  many  reasons  for  dissatisfaction,  and  yet  sympathy  is 
not  on  that  account  extinguished.  It  is  the  same  with 
patriotism  :  it  is  not  to  be  calculated  according  to  interest, 
nor  is  it  a  duty  first  established  by  a  train  of  reasoning;  but 
we  reason  upon  the  feeling  already  existing,  and  then  find 
how  great  an  agent  it  is  in  God's  household.  The  immense 
power  of  association,  in  all  its  varieties,  from  the  nursery  song 
to  the  highest  national  epic,  forms,  sounds,  colors,  things  and 
persons,  joys  and  pains,  all  have  seized  upon  us,  and  we  feel 
attached  to  our  country,  we  love  it;  but  we  do  not  hate 
others  on  that  account.  We  may  value  other  countries 
higher,  in  the  abstract  We  might  say,  We  believe  if  we  were 
to  be  born  again,  and  were  to  have  the  choice,  with  present 
knowledge  and  without  present  feelings,  we  would  choose  a 
certain  other,  and  yet  would  love  our  country,  such  as  we 
now  are,  because  our  soul  feels  there  at  home.  We  may  see 
our  country  engaged  in  a  wrong  war,  and  yet  we  shudder  at 
the  bare  idea  of  fighting  against  her.  We  may  reprove  her 
follies  or  vices,  may  strive  to  correct  them  and  justly  acknowl- 
edge that  other  countries  have  no  such  vices,  and  yet  we  feel 
closely  attached  to  her.  We  may  not  be  able  to  arrive  by 
mere  reasoning  at  the  result  that  we  should  labor  for  our 
country  or  sacrifice  ourselves  for  her.  We  might  say,  Is  not 
the  state  that  institution  which  exists  for  the  great  purpose, 
among  others,  of  protecting  my  life?  how  then  is  it  reason- 
able to  expect  that  I  should  expose  it  for  the  state,  or  rush  to 
offer  it  when  not  called  upon  ?  and  yet  would  feel  tJiat  within 
us  which  prompted  Sir  John  Eliot  calmly  to  assign  over 
every  portion  of  his  extensive  estates  to  relatives  in  trust 
for  the  benefit  of  his  family,  make  all  directions  respecting 
the  education  of  his  children,  dearly  beloved  by  him,  and 
then  go  to  the  "great,  warm,  and  ruffling"  parliament  of 
1626,  where  he  expected,  and,  unfortunately,  met  with,  all  the 


38  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

danger  for  which  he  had  prepared  himself.1  We  may  honor 
Eversteen  of  Holland,  whose  father  and  four  brothers  had 
fallen  by  the  enemy,  who  yet  asked  for  re-appointment  in  ser- 
vice, so  that  he  might  likewise  fall  "  on  the  bed  of  honor." 2 
We  honor  Aristides,  whom  injustice  banished,  and  who  still 
loved  Athens.  And  why  ?  Because  we  love  our  country. 

LXIX.  But  it  is  not  sufficient  that  we  see  that  it  is  so. 
The  question  is  whether  it  ought  so  to  be.  Most  assuredly 
it  ought  to  be  so.  For  all  nobler  pursuits  there  must  be  one 
primary  impulse,  beyond  interest,  and  which  binds  us  reli- 
giously to  that  pursuit.  We  ought  to  do  good  even  without 
any  selfish  ends;  why?  Because  the  love  of  the  good  impels 
us  to  acknowledge  it.  It  is  the  religion  of  morals.  The 
scholar  pursues  his  science;  for  interest's  sake?  It  may  be 
directly  against  it.  For  the  promotion  of  ease,  or  quiet  of 
mind  ?  He  may  be  led  to  much  anxiety,  and  yet  not  give 
up  his  career.  It  is  the  religious  love  of  truth  which  impels 
him,  the  yearning  for  action,  for  the  use  of  those  faculties 
with  which  he  is  peculiarly  endowed.  The  artist  produces 
his  works  of  art.  He  might  enjoy  greater  tranquillity,  per- 
haps, in  other  spheres.  His  religious  love  of  the  beautiful 
impels  him.  The  patriotic  citizen  acts  for  the  benefit  of 
others ;  not  for  his  interest,  but  because  that  sympathy  and 
impulse,  patriotism,  impels  him  to  share  dangers,  to  work  out 
liberty  for  those  who  are  not  yet  born,  to  preserve  liberty. 
Patriotism  is  the  religion  of  liberty  and  the  state,  and  at 
all  times  have  tyrants  and  sordid  politicians  been  at  pains 
to  deride  it,  unless  they  expected  to  turn  it  to  their  own 
account. 

Without  patriotism,  we  might  easily  show  that  a  free 
state  could  not  possibly  endure,  for,  extinguish  patriotism  or 
public  spirit,  a  species  of  the  former,  and  all  must  dissolve 
into  dreary,  heartless  egotism.  But  even  to  regret  such  an 


1  Forster's  Life  of  Sir  John  Eliot,  vol.  ii.  p.  38,  of  British  Statesmen. 

2  Van  Campen,  History  of  the  Netherlands,  vol.  ii.  p.  196. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  89 

occurrence  and  strive  to  prevent  it  requires  patriotism  in  all 
cases  when  we  can  gain  nothing  for  ourselves,  or  when  in  all 
probability  we  shall  sacrifice  more  than  we  can  obtain.  We 
can  see  its  necessity  from  those  higher  points  of  view  from 
which  we  perceive  that  society  is  a  continuous  union,  with  the 
great  ends  of  justice  and  civilization;  but  no  man  indeed  can 
prove  by  enlightened  self-interest  what  earthly  interest  I  ought 
to  take  in  future  generations,  or  what  it  matters  to  me  per- 
sonally whether  the  literature  of  my  country  flourishes  or  is 
eradicated  by  a  barbarian  foe. 

LXX.  Patriotism  forms  likewise  the  transition  and  link  be- 
tween the  state  as  the  jural  institution,  and  the  society  as  the 
aggregate  of  living  men,  with  their  associations  arising  out  of 
their  history  and  the  soil — in  short,  the  country ;  it  stands  be- 
tween the  abstract  demand  of  justice  and  love  of  kindred.  It 
is  that  sympathy  which  brings  affection  into  the  state,  and 
without  which  the  state  would  often  be  deprived  of  its  primum 
mobile ;  for  right  is  based,  as  we  have  seen,  on  individuality ; 
interest  may  unite,  but  it  may  also  sever.  Without  patriotic 
spirit,  men  would  separate  into  different  sects,  hostile  parties, 
companies,  schools  of  science ;  and  interest  alone  or  abstract 
right  would  not  be  able  to  supply  the  bond.  Those  Asiatic 
tribes  which  for  centuries  have  passed  from  one  conqueror  to 
another,  and  Rome  ever  since  the  downfall  of  the  republic, 
afford  us  melancholy  instances  of  the  absence  of  patriotism. 
If  then  we  mean  by  patriotism  the  "  whole  body  of  those 
affections  which  unite  men's  hearts  to  the  commonwealth,"1 
it  is  for  any  nation  a  most  indispensable  element  of  civil  suc- 
cess, which  cannot  be  supplanted  by  any  utility;  it  infuses  life 
and  vigor  into  all  parts  of  the  nation,  and  produces  mutual 
support,  magnanimity,  and  elevation  of  public  action ;  it  is  a 
virtue  as  much  as  the  love  of  parents.  Still,  we  do  not  say 
that  it  is  an  affection  to  which  all  others  must  absolutely  give 


1  This  is  the  definition  which  Mackintosh  gave  of  public  spirit  in  Peltier's  trial. 
(State  Trials,  vol.  xxviii.  p.  573.)     But  I  believe  it  designates  patriotism. 


go  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

way.  "  Patria  cara,  carior  libertas."  If  those  elements  which 
make  up  what  we  call  our  country  (patria)  —  the  land,  the 
people,  their  history,  their  institutions,  their  liberty — separate, 
we  must  adhere  to  the  higher  and  highest,  in  preference  to  the 
lower.  If  we  cannot  have  liberty  in  our  native  country,  and 
cannot  aid  in  establishing  it  there,  if  we  are  oppressed,  we 
are  surely  not  bound  to  stay,  although  we  may  feel  pain  at 
the  separation  even  then,  and  often  look  back  with  a  home- 
sick heart. 

Patriotism  is  an  affection  for  our  country,  made  up,  as  are 
all  deep-rooted  affections,  of  a  thousand  associations  and  in- 
fluences. Patriotism  in  modern  times,  when  the  stages  of 
action,  knowledge,  and  our  very  feeling  to  all  men  are  so  much 
enlarged,  in  comparison  with  what  they  were  in  ancient  times, 
requires  a  country,  to  be  deep  and  fruitful.  Our  reminiscences 
and  attachments  must  be  national ;  the  glory  in  which  we 
delight  must  be  that  of  the  country,  the  glory  acquired  by 
our  nation  in  the  fields  of  science  and  the  arts,  of  literature, 
and  of  arms  in  defending  her  institutions  and  liberty  ;  the 
sympathy  and  powerful  associations  must  be  sufficiently  dis- 
tinct from  those  of  the  men  of  other  countries,  to  make  patri- 
otism an  intense  feeling;  but  a  small  community,  for  instance 
a  city,  does  not  supply  a  sufficient  amount  of  affections  to 
seize  upon  the  whole  inner  man,  and  consequently  does  not 
afford  a  marked  line  by  which  to  distinguish  these  strong 
affections  from  those  of  others ;  as  for  instance  the  patriotic 
affections  of  a  German  for  Germany  are  distinguished  from 
those  of  a  Frenchman  for  France.  In  ancient  times  this  was 
different.  Languages,  literature,  historic  reminiscences,  ex- 
tend over  countries.  And  even  in  ancient  times,  when  was  the 
Greek  more  nobly  and  more  admirably  and  truly  Greek  than 
when  he  was  Grecian  in  a  national  sense?  Whether  at  Olym- 
pia  or  at  Marathon,  he  was  greatest  when  he  felt  himself 
wholly  Greek.  Sismondi's  work  on  the  Italian  Republics  in 
the  Middle  Ages  contains  a  passage  in  one  of  the  concluding 
chapters  (end  of  chapter  cxxvi.,  vol.  xvi.,  ed.  of  1818)  which 
illustrates  the  preceding  remarks  in  a  pointed  manner :  "  Italy." 


POLITICAL   ETHICS.  gi 

says  the  celebrated  historian,  "towards  the  end  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  had  always  soldiers,  riches,  a  large  population, 
flourishing  agriculture,  commerce  and  manufactures  which 
presented  still  great  resources,  men  versed  in  the  sciences, 
others  whom  nature  had  made  fit  to  acquire  them  soon;  but 
the  feeling  and  life  were  missing ;  and  when  the  French  revo- 
lution broke  out,  there  was  no  one  in  Europe  who  could  not 
see  that  Italy  had  neither  the  will  nor  the  power  to  defend 
her  independence,  and  that  a  nation  which  had  no  longer 
a  country  (jtatrif)  could  not  resist,  either  to  defend  itself  or  its 
neighbors."  Mr.  Von  Raumer,  speaking,  in  the  sixth  volume 
of  his  History  of  Europe,  of  the  endless  sufferings  to  which 
Germany  was  exposed  by  Louis  XIV.,  says  that  so  it  always 
will  be  when  the  Germans  forget, that  they  have  one  common 
country,  and  that  they  ought  to  have  one  common  national 
feeling,  into  however  many  parts  they  may  be  politically 
divided. 

Patriotism  is  much  connected  with  loyalty,  a  warm  attach- 
ment to  the  institutions  of  our  country,  and  an  upright  desire 
to  act  according  to  the  true  spirit  of  its  laws.  In  monarchies 
loyalty  has  often  been  used  to  designate  a  warm  attachment 
to  the  royal  person,  which  has  not  unfrequently  existed  in- 
deed, but  has  also  often  been  supposed  to  exist  when  the  real 
feeling  was  for  the  country,  and  the  monarch  was  only  its  visi- 
ble sign,  its  standard — a  distinction  which  is  seen  as  soon  as 
the  monarch  ceased  to  represent  the  country.  The  history  of 
all  times,  especially  since  Napoleon,  who  produced  so  many 
changes,  furnishes  many  examples.  The  attachment  is  warmest 
for  the  country,  that  is  for  the  land,  the  people,  and  their  his- 
tory; that  for  a  king,  personally,  must  always  be  comparatively 
weak  in  a  vast  country.  When  Nelson  meant  to  inspire  his 
sailors  before  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  he  told  them  that  Eng- 
land expected  every  man  to  do  his  duty.  It  told  well.  Had 
he  said,  parliament  expects,  it  would  have  been  much  weaker, 
yet  not  without  effect,  for  it  is  a  vast  institution.  Had  he  said, 
the  king  expects,  it  might  have  had  very  little  effect;  and 
surely  it  would  have  sounded  very  odd,  and  stirred  no  soul, 


g2  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

had  he  said,  George  III.,  or  the  regent,  expects,  etc.  The 
name  of  an  institution  is  well  calculated  to  inspire  men  with 
h  feeling  of  duty  by  way  of  obedience.  Congress  have  sent 
orders  to  such  or  such  an  effect,  would  be  a  weighty  expres- 
sion with  an  officer  in  war;  but  if  men  were  expected  to  act 
with  noble  inspiration,  it  would  be  necessary  to  remind  them 
of  "  their  beloved  country." 

LXXI.  It  was  significant  that  with  the  Romans  the  word 
impins  comprehended  at  once  failing  against  the  gods,  the 
country,  and  the  family.  They  felt  that  a  temerity  or  base- 
ness of  heart  subverting  society  in  its  elements  was  requisite 
for  impiety  in  all  three  cases.  Patriotism  is  founded  upon 
what  was  called  in  the  first  volume  national  allegiance,  that 
indestructible  sympathy  and  attachment  which  every  uncor- 
rupted  heart  feels  towards  its  own  country,  not  necessarily 
the  native  land,  but  the  land  of  one's  parents  and  history ; 
that  "allegiance"  which  in  reality  and  not  in  theory  "is  of  a 
greater  extent  and  dimension  than  laws  or  kingdoms,  and 
cannot  consist  by  the  laws  merely,  because  it  began  before 
laws,  it  continueth  after  laws,  and  it  is  in  vigor  when  laws  are 
suspended  and  have  had  their  force,"  x  as  Lord  Bacon  said  of 
personal  allegiance.  This  allegiance  can  consist,  as  we  have 
seen,  with  a  desire  or  duty  of  emigration,  but  it  will  ever  pre- 
vent a  man  of  any  true  feeling  from  fighting  against  his 
country,  except  perhaps  in  cases  of  invasion  of  his  adopted 
country  by  an  army  of  his  native  one.  A  man  who  can  do 
it  has  ever  been  despised  as  a  dastard.  It  is  not  easy  in  some 
cases  to  say  where  or  what  the  country  is.  On  the  one  hand 


1  State  Trials,  vol.  ii.  p.  596.  Bacon  as  well  as  Coke  was  desirous,  as  is  well 
known,  to  prove  in  Calvin's  case  that  the  post-nati,  or  Scots  born  after  the  acces- 
sion of  James  I.  to  the  throne  of  England,  were  natural  subjects  of  the  king  of 
England,  and  they  did  it  by  claiming  personal  against  national  allegiance.  I 
have  spoken  more  fully  of  the  subject  in  the  first  volume.  Every  one  must  now 
admit  how  untenable  a  ground  is  the  principle  advanced  by  Bacon;  for  it  places 
the  king,  and  the  primitive  relation  of  the  subject  to  him,  entirely  beyond  the  law. 
The  whole  famous  case  contains  many  positions  that  are  more  than  doubtful. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


93 


it  is  sufficiently  plain  that  Thrasybulus  did  not  fight  against 
his  country  when  he  returned  to  Athens  with  his  army  to 
deliver  her  from  the  Spartan  yoke ;  on  the  other,  no  one 
fails  to  be  struck  with  the  arrogance  of  the  French  emigrants 
during  the  first  revolution,  who  actually  called  their  assem- 
blage at  Coblentz,  France.  It  is  likewise  plain  enough  that 
calling  in  armed  foreigners  and  fighting  with  them  against 
the  army  or  part  of  the  army  of  our  own  country  is  one  of 
the  greatest  evils.  The  French  have  often  declared  it  to  be, 
under  any  circumstances,  treason  of  the  worst  kind,  and  have 
never  forgiven  Moreau  for  having  joined  the  allied  princes, 
nor  Bernadotte  for  having  commanded  his  Swedes  against 
France.  Of  the  latter  case  we  do  not  speak.  A  king  is  an 
institution,  and  Bernadotte  would  certainly  have  acted  treach- 
erously towards  his  new  country  had  he  consulted  for  one 
moment  his  own  feelings.  Although  he  was  not  then  king 
but  only  crown-prince,  the  crown  was  already  fixed  upon  his 
brow.  Had  he,  in  that  situation,  not  felt  wholly  assimilated  to 
Sweden,  but,  as  Napoleon  demanded,  remained  a  Frenchman, 
because  he  was  so  before  he  entered  into  a  solemn  covenant 
with  Sweden,  and  had  he  allowed  his  actions  to  be  influenced 
by  this  feeling  to  the  injury  of  his  adopted  country,  treason 
would  have  lurked  in  his  heart.  In  the  case  of  Moreau,  our 
decision  must  partly  depend  upon  the  point  whether  he  con- 
sidered Napoleon  and  his  government  national,  or  not.  If  he 
faithfully  believed  that  France  was  irrecoverably  tyrannized 
over  so  long  as  Napoleon  ruled,  and,  besides,  that  a  change 
would  be  produced  long  ere  the  allied  powers  should  enter 
France,  he  certainly  cannot  be  placed  on  a  par  with  Hippias, 
who  infamously  led  the  way  for  the  Persians  to  his  native 
Attica  and  Greece.  Yet,  though  we  do  not  feel  the  execra- 
tion at  Moreau  which  the  baseness  of  Hippias  excites,  does 
not  every  one  feel  the  strongest  repugnance,  and  pause 
with  pleasure,  in  the  account  of  the  same  wars,  at  the  ex- 
ample of  Carnot,  who  had  never  joined  Napoleon,  but  the 
moment  when  foreigners  set  foot  on  French  soil  forgot  the 
government,  thinking  but  of  France,  and  offered  his  services  ? 


94  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

His   gallant   defence   of  Antwerp   showed   how  earnest   he 
was. 

How  careful  we  ought  to  be  in  pronouncing  upon  this  sub- 
ject an  absolute  rule,  declaring,  for  instance,  that  without 
exception  the  bringing  of  foreigners  into  our  country  is  the 
greatest  of  all  calamities,  is  shown  by  the  case  of  William  III. 
Were  not  those  Englishmen  right  who  came  over  with  him 
and  were  ready  to  fight  against  the  established  government 
of  the  country  ?  Would  they  have  deserved  well  had  they 
scrupled  to  go  over  from  Holland  with  a  foreign  army?  The 
circumstances  were  peculiar,  I  own.  The  fact  that  the  re- 
public of  the  United  Provinces  was  comparatively  but  a  small 
power,  so  that  a  conquest  could  not  take  place,  and  the  chief 
work  must  remain  to  be  done  by  the  English  themselves, 
either  by  fighting  for  William  or  by  readily  receiving  him, 
was  of  the  greatest  importance.  This  shows  that  there  are 
exceptions.  On  the  other  hand,  all  that  Demosthenes  said  of 
foreigners  being  called  in  against  Philip  remains  generally 
true,  and  the  consequences  proved  that  the  Athenian  was 
right.  We  do  not  here  speak  of  cases  such  as  that  of  the 
duke  of  Bourbon's  leaving  the  French  army  and  fighting 
against  his  native  country.  He  merited  the  reproach  of  the 
dying  Bayard. 

LXXII.  That  genuine  patriotism  enlarges  instead  of  nar- 
rowing our  views,  should  have  appeared  from  the  previous 
passages.  It  is  therefore  a  poor  counterfeit  of  patriotism  or 
public  spirit  if  foreigners,  though  their  services  should  be 
considered  necessary,  are  excluded  from  this  service.  It  is 
against  the  spirit  of  our  times,  which  acknowledges  a  general 
union  of  civilization  too  much  to  admit  of  so  narrow  a  view. 
In  sciences  and  arts  in  particular,  foreign  scholars  and  artists 
have  for  centuries  received  calls  from  one  country  into  another. 
If  it  is  perhaps  less  so  at  present  in  some  countries  than  in 
the  middle  ages,  it  is  only  because  the  chairs  can  now  be  more 
easily  filled  with  natives.  Spain,  which  rapidly  rose  under 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  owed  her  glorious  rise  in  a  great 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  95 

measure  to  her  rising  universities,  which  no  natives  probably 
contributed  so  much  to  elevate  as  the  foreigners  placed  in 
their  chairs,  as  for  instance  Peter  Martyr.  Erasmus  in  Eng- 
land is  another  striking  instance. 

Among  the  foremost  citizens  in  loyalty  when  times  are 
gloomy,  foreigners  who  are  citizens  by  choice  and  not  by 
chance  will  always  be  found.  The  American  revolution  is 
full  of  such  examples;  nor  should  we  forget  the  names  of 
Columbus,  Vasco  da  Gama,  Cabot,  William  I.  of  Orange, 
William  III.,  all  of  whom  served  in  faith  and  peril  or  brought 
glory  to  their  adopted  countries. 

LXXIII.  The  term  public  spirit  has  often  been  used  for 
patriotism,  the  word  patriot  having  become  somewhat  ob- 
jectionable at  some  periods.  Words  are  unimportant.  By 
patriotism  we  designate  perhaps  more  specifically  that  sacred 
enthusiasm  which  prompts  to  great  exertions  and  has  the 
welfare,  honor,  reputation  of  the  country  at  large  in  view;  by 
public  spirit,  a  practical  disinterestedness  and  cheerful  readiness 
to  serve  the  community  and  promote  its  essential  success  in 
every  way.  A  perfect  stranger  to  a  country  might  still  show 
much  public  spirit. 

Hume  says,  "A  man  who  loves  only  himself,  without  re- 
gard to  friendship  and  desert,  merits  the  severest  blame ;  and 
a  man  who  is  only  susceptible  of  friendship,  without  public 
spirit  or  a  regard  to  the  community,  is  deficient  in  the  most 
material  part  of  virtue."1  The  freer  a  country,  the  more  it 


1  Essay  III.,  on  Politics  a  Science.  —  Self-forgetting,  not  self-denial,  delights 
us  wherever  we  meet  with  it,  so  universal  is  the  admiration  of  disinterested- 
ness, the  dislike  of  selfishness,  although  our  interests  betray  us  continually  into 
it.  If  we  are  attentive,  we  shall  find  in  how  great  a  degree  in  all  branches  the 
principle  exists.  An  author  delights  most  when  we  see  he  has  entirely  forgotten 
himself  and  is  but  the  spokesman  of  his  subject;  we  admire  a  work  of  art  when 
we  see  how  entirely  free  from  vanity  and  selfish  conceit  the  artist  was,  and  that 
he  forgot  himself  entirely  in  his  work.  It  goes  so  far  that  a  sentence  or  a  con- 
ceit never  intended  to  be  heard  or  seen  frequently  gives  pleasure,  although  it  is 
neither  witty  nor  interesting  enough  to  do  so,  so  soon  as  we  know  it  was  not 
intended  to  be  .heard.  Nothing  touches  the  heart  so  deeply  as  to  become  ac- 


t 

96  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

stands  in  need  of  public  spirit  and  the  more  baneful  becomes 
isolating  selfishness.  But  it  may  well  be  asked,  How  far  shall 
public  spirit  prompt  a  man  to  act?  There  are  some  who  ruin 
their  own  affairs  or  who  become  burdensome  in  consequence 
of  mistaken  public  spirit.  A  citizen  who  attends  every  meet- 
ing but  neglects  his  own  affairs,  or  lectures  on  education  and 
brings  up  his  own  sons  as  idlers,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
public  spirit,  for  one  of  those  things  in  which  a  community  is 
primarily  interested  is  that  every  one  keep  his  own  affairs  in 
a  sound  state.  Public  spirit  shows  itself  chiefly  in  substantial 
and  noiseless  ways,  and  prompts  the  citizen  to  perform  those 
elementary  functions  on  which  he  knows  the  existence  of 
society  depends,  even  at  the  price  of  some  inconvenience  or 
loss  of  time,  without  any  hope  of  reward  in  public  acknowl- 
edgment. A  public-spirited  man  will  vote,  though  he  need  take 
no  active  part  in  party  measures  ;  he  will  willingly  serve  on  a 
jury,  and  he  will  aid  in  his  proportion  with  money  and  time 
in  any  fair  and  reasonable  project,  without  seeking  to  promote 
thereby  his  own  interest.1  It  has  been  mentioned  too  often 
already  to  dwell  here  any  longer  on  this  subject,  how  useless 
all  laws  become,  and  that  no  community  can  expect  success, 
when  public  spirit  has  fled ;  but  the  reader  will  find  below  to 


quainted  with  great  or  good  deeds  long  after  they  were  performed  in  a  manner 
which  shows  that  they  were  done  without  any  expectation  of  their  ever  becoming 
known. 

1  We  were  once  marching  on  a  road  broken  up  by  the  rain  and  the  passing  of 
many  troops.  At  each  step  we  sank  deep  in  the  clay.  It  was  a  toilsome  march  ; 
and  any  impediment  in  the  road  was  much  disrelished  by  the  weary  men.  In 
the  midst  of  this  road  happened  to  lie  a  stone  covered  by  the  mire,  but  of  suffi- 
cient size  to  hurt  any  one  who  knocked  against  it.  Each  soldier,  as  he  knocked 
himself,  grumbled  and  passed  on.  The  colonel  observed  this,  and  stopped,  whilst 
the  troops  passed.  At  last  a  soldier  arrived  who  likewise  knocked  and  hurt  him- 
self severely.  He  showed  it  by  the  expression  of  his  face,  but  immediately  went 
to  work  to  remove  the  stone,  and  then  passed  on.  ."  Stop,"  called  the  colonel: 
"  what's  your  name  ?  More  than  ten  men  have  passed  here  and  hurt  themselves, 
and  you  are  the  first  who  had  public  spirit  enough  to  remove  the  stone.  You 
shall  be  one  of  the  first  corporals."  This  was  real  public  spirit,  in  however 
humble  a  sphere. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  97 

what  political  misery  and  extravagance  the  absence  of  this 
elementary  principle  may  lead.1 


1  Where  sound  patriotism  and  healthy  public  spirit  are  wanting,  factious  spirit 
and  selfishness  united  with  boldness  must  be  rife.  This  selfishness  may  have 
ends  of  avarice,  ambition,  or  revenge.  We  all  know  into  how  deplorable  a  state 
the  South  American  States  have  been  thrown  in  consequence  of  their  want  of 
public  spirit,  of  disinterestedness  applied  to  politics,  since  they  have  broken  their 
allegiance  to  Spain.  Even  that  public  spirit  which  may  partly  arise  from  interest, 
yet  interest  well  enlightened  respecting  its  real  advantage,  is  entirely  wanting  in 
the  great  mass  of  the  people.  We  not  unfrequently  meet  with  accounts  from 
those  regions  that  the  polls  of  a  certain  place  were  entirely  deserted,  no  citizen 
appearing  to  think  it  worth  his  while  to  vote.  Apathy  leads  to,  or  is  the  effect 
of,  anarchy  and  lawlessness  ;  armed  faction  succeeds  faction  ;  and  so  frequent  has 
this  been  in  some  states  that  a  judicious  traveller,  Mr.  Chevalier,  was  enabled  to 
write  a  certain  theory  of  these  factious  movements  in  Mexico.  As  the  causes 
and  men  are  always  similar,  it  is  very  natural  that  the  different  stages  of  an 
insurrection  should  succeed  in  a  similar  and  certain  order.  "  In  Mexico,"  says 
Mr.  Michel  Chevalier,  in  a  series  of  letters  written  from  that  country,  and  pub- 
lished, in  1837,  in  the  Paris  journals,  "  insurrections  have  become  an  act  of  mere 
common  life.  There  have  gradually  been  established  perfectly  well-defined  forms 
for  it ;  which,  like  the  rules  of  the  noble  game  of  tric-trac  or  the  receipts  of  the 
cuisinitre  bourgeoise,  it  is  understood,  admit  no  deviation.  The  procedure  is 
sufficiently  simple,  and  in  Mexico  sufficiently  humane  likewise  :  it  resembles,  if 
not  a  battle  at  the  opera,  at  all  events  a  harmless  enough  guerilla  warfare.  The 
first  act  of  a  revolution  is  called  pronunciamiento.  An  officer  of  any  grade,  from 
that  of  general  to  that  of  lieutenant  downwards, pronotinces  himself  against  the 
established  order  of  things,  or  any  institution  which  he  does  not  approve  of,  or 
anything  else  of  any  description.  He  collects  a  party,  a  company,  or  a  regiment, 
which  generally  hastens  to  place  itself  at  his  disposal.  The  second  act  of  the 
revolution  is  called  grito — the  cry,  in  which  the  motives  and  objects  of  the  insur- 
rection are  reduced  to  three  or  four  heads  or  articles.  When  the  subject  is  of 
some  importance,  the  cry  assumes  the  name  of  a  plan.  In  the  third  act,  the  in- 
surgents and  partisans  of  the  government  come  into  each  other's  presence.  There 
are  skirmishes,  there  are  reconnoissances  of  their  respective  forces.  In  the  fourth 
they  come  to  action  definitively.  But,  according  to  the  improvements  which  have 
been  introduced  recently  into  the  art  of  revolution-making,  this  is  clone  in  the 
most  guarded  manner  and  at  the  most  respectful  distance.  There  must,  how- 
ever, be  a  victor  and  a  vanquished.  If  you  are  beaten,  you  unpronounct  yourself; 
if  victorious,  you  march  upon  Mexico.  In  the  fifth  and  last  act,  the  conqueror, 
whoever  he  is,  makes  his  triumphal  entry  into  the  capital,  whilst  the  vanquished 
embarks  at  Vera  Cruz,  or  Tampico,  with  all  the  honors  of  war."  With  the  ex- 
ception, perhaps,  of  the  bloodlessness  of  these  movements,  which  reminds  us  of 
the  captains  in  Italy  towards  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  counting  the  num- 
VOL.  II.  7 


9g  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

LXXIV.  The  word  old,  denoting  in  its  strict  and  primary 
sense  a  length  of  time  that  an  object  has  existed,1  came,  by  a 
natural  transition  from  designating  the  old  people,  also  to 
designate  the  times  in  which  they  lived,  and  these  once  being 
called  old,  the  previous  ones  would  be  still  older ;  old  came  to 
be  used  for  expressing  what  we  now  more  strictly  call  ancient; 
in  short,  old  is  used  not  only  to  denote  length  of  years  but 
also  distance  of  time  in  the  retrospect,  an  ambiguity  which 
has  at  times  exercised  a  certain  effect  in  politics  ;  which  obliges 
us  to  dwell  for  a  moment  upon  this  subject.  In  treating  of  it 
I  shall  not  restrict  myself  to  the  consequences  of  the  ambi- 
guity alone,  but  treat  of  old  applied  to  the  living,  to  ancestors, 
and  to  institutions,  in  so  far  as  this  is  of  moment  in  politics. 

It  belongs  to  the  province  of  ethics  in  general  to  point  out 
the  respect,  forbearance,  and  peculiar  kindness  we  owe  to 
old  age,  and  the  reasons  why  this  is  a  duty,  the  absence  of 
which  is  always  considered  by  the  virtuous  as  an  indication 
of  a  heart  in  which  anything  which  might  be  called  generous 
must  have  given  way  to  obdurate  selfishness  or  a  callousness 
which  easily  may  pass  over  into  brutality.  We  not  only  feel 
a  degree  of  respect  for  gray  hairs,  but  it  affects  us  deeply  to 
see  an  old  man  arraigned  or  convicted  of  a  crime,  because 
it  contends  so  directly  with  the  feeling  which  we  desire  to 
entertain  for  advanced  age.  A  feeling  so  general,  the  absence 
of  which  indicates  so  much  more  than  a  mere  dereliction  of 
a  single  duty,  is  of  course  of  itself  important  to  the  com- 
munity in  politics.  Its  extinction  would  indicate  general 
selfishness  and  callousness,  incompatible  with  the  essential 
success  of  any  community.  Montesquieu  goes  so  far  as  to 
say  that  "  nothing  maintains  morals  more  firmly  than  an  ex- 
treme subordination  of  the  young  towards  the  old."  This, 
it  would  seem,  is  extravagant ;  for  the  veneration  of  the  old 


bers  opposed  to  each  other,  without  fighting,  the  same  theory  applies  pretty  much 
to  the  changes  in  Portugal. 

1  The  word  old  is  derived  from  the  root  a/,  to  "grow,"  Latin  al-  and  ol-  in 
adolesco ;  Gr.  perhaps  in  akooq,  and  found  also  in  Gothic,  High  German,  and 
Irish.  Comp.  Curtius,  Gr.  EtymoL,  4th  ed.,  No.  523,  b. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


99 


may  be  coupled  with  or  arise  from  other  causes  not  pro- 
pitious to  morals.  In  no  country  is  the  subjection  of  the 
young  to  the  old  more  complete  and  systematically  as  well 
as  religiously  carried  out  than  in  China,  a  country  which  we 
would  certainly  not  place  at  the  head  as  to  morality,  however 
willingly  we  may  acknowledge  its  superiority  in  this  respect 
over  most  other  Asiatic  countries.  But  this  is  certain,  no- 
where can  sound  morality  subsist,  or  liberty  endure  and  be 
prevented  from  degenerating  into  licentiousness,  folly,  fickle- 
ness, where  the  young  are  without  modesty,  respect  and 
deference  for  superior  age  and  experience,  and  a  sincere  ven- 
eration of  those  who  by  their  works  and  continued  labors 
have  proved  the  sincerity  of  their  zeal  or  have  added  honor  to 
their  community  or  country. 

LXXV.  Authority,  which  begins  in  the  family  and  passes 
over  to  the  similarly  situated  elders  of  the  tribe,  is  naturally 
connected  in  all  early  times  with  old  age,  so  that  the  names 
of  offices  and  judicial  or  legislative  institutions  are  in  most 
early  nations  derived  from  the  words  indicating  old  age.1 
They  by  the  mere  fact  of  being  older  enjoy  a  degree  of  re- 
spect, they  have  experience  and  know  the  laws  better  than 
the  young,  because  the  latter  have  not  yet  been  able  to  learn 
them  from  tradition.  When  nearly  all  that  can  and  must 
be  learned  respecting  public  affairs  is  to  be  learned  by  oral 
transmission,  and  when  the  various  classes  of  society  are  as 
yet  little  separated  from  one  another,  but  the  education  and 
knowledge  of  all  are  nearly  on  a  par,  old  age  of  itself  must 
necessarily  be  of  considerable  importance  and  weight.  It  is 
different  when  laws,  finances,  and  other  branches  require 
study,  and  study  leisure,  which  by  the  difference  of  fortune  is 
allotted  in  very  different  degrees  to  the  various  classes.  In 
this  state  of  society  it  is  frequently  the  case  that  a  young  man 


1  It  will  be  hardly  necessary  to  remind  the  reader  of  the  word  senatus  derived 
from  senex,  of  the  Greek  yepovaia,  counsel  or  senate,  from  yepuv,  an  old  man,  and 
many  corresponding  terms  in  ancient  times  and  the  middle  ages,  as  Signior, 
Patrician,  Alderman,  Presbytery,  Council  of  the  Ancients. 


I00  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

may  have  read,  heard,  seen — in  fact,  lived  more — than  an  old 
one;  and  in  a  state  of  a  populous  society  far  advanced  in  civil- 
ization we  cannot  any  longer  assign  the  same  official  impor- 
tance to  old  age  which  naturally  is  attached  to  it  in  earlier  pe- 
riods. Men  but  too  frequently  ru.n  into  extremes,  and,  while 
we  allow  the  above  position,  we  must  also  acknowledge  the 
absurdity  of  attaching  wisdom  to  youth,  and  making  youth,  as 
it  were,  a  party-sign  and  qualification,  as  seems  now  to  be 
actually  the  case  in  some  countries.  That  there  have  been 
great  and  rare  minds  who  at  the  age  when  others  are  yet 
learning  wielded  the  helm  of  vast  affairs  or  brilliantly  shone 
in  the  sciences,  we  all  know.  Pitt,  Napoleon,  De  Witt,  Gro- 
tius,  Laplace,  and  many  other  distinguished  names  among 
the  moderns  and  ancients,  prove  it  abundantly ;  but  they  were 
extraordinary  men,  geniuses,  the  very  character  of  which  con- 
sists in  leaping  beyond  what  for  others  is  the  natural  course. 
From  exceptions  we  cannot  draw  our  rules.  Macchiavelli 
rightly  observes,  "  If  we  choose  a  youth,  he  must  have  shown 
himself  already  worthy  of  this  election  by  something  distin- 
guished." It  is  right,  then,  not  to  withhold  from  them  a  sta- 
tion due  to  their  genius  and  nobleness  of  soul ;  but  we  must 
first  have  this  pledge,  and  not  trust  to  favorites,  to  Buck- 
inghams,  despite  their  youth. 

In  the  common  course  of  things  we  know  that  the  young 
are  the  readier  and  bolder  for  action,  prompted  by  a  more 
lively  temperament,  and  not  yet  tamed  and  chilled  by  repeated 
failures  and  bitter  disappointments.  The  distinctive  age  as  to 
readiness  of  action  is  about  the  fortieth  year.  The  average 
age  of  the  signers  of  the  American  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence was  nearly  forty-four ;  yet  if  we  deduct  of  the  fifty-five 
signers  the  age  of  seven  citizens  who  were  sixty  years  old  or 
above,  the  average  age  comes  down  to  forty.1  Most  of  those 
who  first  embraced  the  Reformation  were  about  forty  years 


1  Of  fifty-five  signers  there  were  under  thirty  years  2,  both  twenty-seven  years 
old;  thirty,  and  less  than  forty,  17;  forty,  and  less  than  fifty,  22;  fifty,  and  less 
than  sixty,  8;  sixty,  and  less  than  seventy,  6;  seventy,  i. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  IOI 

old,  or  younger.1  Far  the  greater  number  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished generals  have  been  young,  and,  when  all  other 
circumstances  were  nearly  equal,  the  young  general  opposed 
to  an  old  one  has  almost  always  been  victorious.2 

Those  governments  therefore  which  contain  the  principle 
of  movement,  which  give  a  field  or  call  for  prompt  action, 


1  The  Venetian  ambassador  at  the  court  of  France,  Micheli,  reported  in  1561 
to  the  doge  that  except  among  the  common  peasantry,  "  who  continue  to  visit 
the  churches  zealously,"  "the  young  men  under  the  age  of  forty,  almost  without 
exception,"  belong  to  the  new  doctrine — that  is,  Protestantism.  According  to  a 
despatch  in  1562  from  the  Venetian  ambassador  in  Spain,  there  were  many 
Huguenots  throughout  Spain.  (Ranke,  History  of  the  Popes,  etc.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  16 
and  21.)  Passion  and  action  together  belong  chiefly  to  the  male  sex  from 
twenty  to  thirty,  during  which  age  therefore  by  far  the  greatest  number  of  crimes 
are  committed. 

3  We  must  remember  here,  however,  that  these  young  generals  had  always 
tried  and  experienced  soldiers  around  them.  They  counselled  and  planned ;  the 
young  gave  energy,  promptness,  boldness,  on  which  victory,  after  a  good  plan 
has  been  made,  so  much  depends.  Alexander,  Caesar,  Frederic,  Napoleon,  were 
young  when  first  victorious ;  Themistocles,  at  Salamis,  twenty-six ;  Leonidas, 
when  he  fell,  twenty-one;  Scipio  African  us,  when  he  conquered  Hannibal,  little 
above  twenty;  Eugene,  at  the  battle  of  Mohacz,  twenty-four;  Charles  XII.,  at 
Narva,  eighteen ;  and  many  more  might  be  cited.  Camillus  is  said  to  have 
been  but  fifteen  years  old  when  he  performed  the  heroic  deed  which  soon  ele- 
vated him  to  the  censorship,  and  in  his  eightieth  year  he  was  dictator  the  fifth 
time — a  full  life  indeed  ! 

[Dr.  Lieber's  examples  are  to  be  taken  cum grano  sails.  Themistocles,  if  born, 
as  seems  probable,  in  514  B.C.,  was  thirty-four  years  old  at  the  sea-fight  of  Sa- 
lamis. Leonidas  had  been  king,  before  he  fell,  nine  years.  His  niece  and 
wife  was,  according  to  Clinton,  twenty-nine  at  that  time.  His  brother  Doricus, 
soon  after  the  accession  of  their  half-brother  Cleomenes,  who  reigned  nineteen 
if  not  twenty-nine  years  (Clinton),  left  Sparta  to  found  a  colony,  and  Leonidas 
was  born,  as  Herodotus  says,  "right  after  Doricus."  (V.  41.)  All  this  shows 
the  story  that  he  was  only  twenty-one  at  Thermopylae  to  be  a  fable.  Scipio 
Africanus,  again,  probably  born  B.C.  234,  and  seventeen  years  old  at  the  battle 
of  the  Ticinus,  when  he  first  encountered  and  defeated  Hannibal  at  Zama  in  202 
was  thirty-two.  Prince  Eugene  did  not  command  at  Mohacz,  but  the  duke 
of  Lorraine.  His  great  victory  at  Zenta,  of  which  Dr.  Lieber  was  probably 
thinking,  was  gained  in  1697,  when  he  was  thirty-four.  The  story  of  Camillus 
being  chosen  a  censor  not  long  after  he  was  fifteen  is  ridiculous.  He  was  cen- 
sor probably  in  403  B.C.,  and  died  in  365,  so  that,  if  eighty  years  old  at  his  death, 
he  was  forty-two  when  elected  censor.  Charles  XII.  remains, — hare-brained  in 
his  youth,  hare-brained  until  his  death.] 


102  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

bring  men  upon  the  stage  of  action  at  a  comparatively  early 
age.  Many  of  the  most  prominent  Athenians  were  very 
young  when  they  first  acted;  while  in  Sparta,  founded  upon 
conservatism,  the  citizens  acquired  consideration  and  privi- 
leges with  the  different  advances  of  age.  Liberty  in  general 
is  favorable  to  bringing  forward  men  in  the  prime  of  life.- 
On  the  other  hand,  the  conservatism  which  is  an  indispen- 
sable element  of  all  true  liberty,  and  not  a  cant  or  desire  to 
retain  what  ought  not  to  be  retained,  the  spirit  which  arises 
out  of  a  conviction  that  no  healthy  government  can  spring 
into  existence  as  by  a  magic  wand,  but  that  development  of  the 
laws  wisely  founded  upon  the  existing  facts  is  necessary, — this 
is  more  generally  a  characteristic  trait  of  those  beyond  forty 
years  of  age.  They  have  experience,  not  only  the  mere  knowl- 
edge which  amounts  to  no  more  than  the  remembrance  of 
that  which  we  have  seen,  but  the  convictions  and -impressions 
and  vivid  consciousness  with  which  the  operations  and  effects 
of  laws  and  institutions,  and  the  forcible  illustrations  and  in- 
terpretations of  history  afforded  by  what  we  witness  ourselves 
in  practical  life,  deeply  imbue  our  mind  ;  they,  the  old,  have 
in  many  cases  acquired  tact  or  instinct  of  great  importance  in 
those  numerous  cases  in  which  mere  reasoning  and  counter- 
balancing the  advantages  and  disadvantages,  as  Cecil  used  to 
do,  cannot  lead  us  to  a  decisive  result.  This  tact,  indispen- 
sable wherever  we  have  to  act  in  very  complicated  cases,  may 
be  native  in  genius,  but  its  possessor  must  be  a  genius  if  it  be 
native.  If  the  old  are  on  some  occasions  too  reluctant  to  do 
what  ought  to  be  done  because  it  is  new,  the  young  are  on 
the  other  hand  apt  to  adopt  measures  because  they  are  new. 
In  times  therefore  like  ours,  in  which  new  and  powerful 
moving  agents  have  been  brought  into  play  in  politics,  such 
as  the  power  of  the  daily  papers  and  the  swift  mails,  it  be- 
hoves us  to  allow  their  full  share  to  the  principles  and  ele- 
ments more  strongly  represented  by  the  old  in  public  matters. 

LXXVI.  Veneration  for  our  forefathers  arises,  if  real, — and 
we  do  not  occupy  ourselves  here  with  hypocritic  cant, — from 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  103 

two  causes  ;  the  one  just,  the  other  erroneous.  It  is  one  of 
the  most  indelible  feelings  in  the  human  breast  that  we  honor 
the  memory  of  our  parents.  The  basest  criminal,  dead  to 
almost  all  other  feelings,  will  resent  a  reproach  cast  upon  his 
parents  ;  few  things  sting  the  heart  of  a  man  so  deeply,  even 
of  the  vulgarest,  as  reproach  cast  upon  father  or  mother.  A 
good  name  is,  with  all  honorable  men,  an  expression  of  vast 
import.  Nothing  is  so  sad  for  the  receding  Indian  as  when 
he  "  takes  leave  of  the  land  in  which  the  bones  of  his  fathers 
lie ;"  nothing  so  solemn  in  the  Old  Testament  as  when  the 
Hebrew  is  admonished  by  the  God  of  his  forefathers. 

It  would  seem  that  Providence  has  made  this  feeling  one  of 
the  primary  agents  to  unite  society,  one  generation  with  the 
other,  to  make  of  communities  continuous  societies,  and  to 
prevent  them  from  crumbling  and  disintegrating  into  mere 
masses  of -selfish  particles.  This  feeling,  as  we  have  seen,  ex- 
tends farther  back  than  to  our  own  bodily  parents.  We  feel 
grateful  for  the  blessings,  which  may  be  the  effects  of  the 
endeavors  of  our  forefathers,  perhaps  of  their  struggle  and 
suffering.  If  we  enjoy  well-founded  liberty,  it  is  they  who 
must  have  established  it  or  provided  for  its  growth ;  if  it  cost 
them  sacrifices,  they  must  have  been  prompted  to  bear  them 
by  the  consciousness  that  they  would  thereby  obtain  it  for  us; 
they  lived,  toiled,  and  died  for  their  country,  and  that  country 
includes  the  thought  of  future  generations.  If,  however,  we 
ascribe  superior  wisdom  to  our  forefathers,  we  must  have  a 
specific  reason  for  it ;  they  may  have  established  an  institution 
when  peculiar  circumstances  favored  them  to  obtain  superior 
wisdom  as  to  this  subject,  or  to  see  with  greater  disinterested- 
ness, because  the  times  may  have  been  fitter  for  it.  Enthu- 
siasm for  what  is  great  and  good  may  have  been  more  general, 
as,  for  instance,  when  our  forefathers  struggled  for  independ- 
ence. But  this  may  also  not  be  the  case.  An  Englishman 
who  should  carry  his  veneration  for  his  forefathers  so  far  as  to 
look  upon  the  courtiers  of  Charles  II.  or  his  judges  as  upon 
men  of  superior  probity  or  wisdom  would  deviate  from  all 
truth.  If,  however,  we  have  reason  to  be  grateful  to  them,  it 


IO4 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


must  be  an  active  gratitude,  not  an  oral  one,  which  frequently 
is  but  a  cloak  to  our  own  indolence,  or  our  vanity,  or  pride  of 
descent, — to  lower  others  by  comparison.  Our  gratitude  must 
consist  in  acting  out  farther  and  farther  what  they  have  begun, 
not  in  a  desire  to  remain  stationary  and  to  consider  that  which 
they  were  able  to  obtain  under  their  circumstances  as  the  last 
degree  of  perfection  that  may  be  obtained.  The  ideal  of  a 
nation,  that  for  which  it  strives,  must  lie  onward,  not  be  be- 
lieved to  consist  in  something  absolute  established  in  former 
ages  and  the  keeping  of  which  in  that  precise  state  forms  the 
highest  duty.  The  Hindoos,  the  Chinese,  thus  look  back,  not 
forward.  The  excellence  of  all  laws  depends  upon  their  fit- 
ness— that  is,  upon  the  sound  principle  judiciously  applied  to 
the  existing  state  of  things ;  these  things,  however,  change  in 
the  course  of  time ;  real  standing  still  is  therefore  impossible, 
and  if  we  do  not  move  onward,  if  we  force  the  same  laws 
upon  changed  circumstances,  we  must  ruin  the  state. 

The  erroneous  cause  of  the  veneration  of  our  forefathers  is 
the  popular  and  very  old  belief  that  times  grow  worse  and 
worse;  not  a  little  promoted  by  the  feeling  of  discomfort 
which  must  befall  all  old  people  when  men  and  things  around 
them  change.  This  belief  is  very  old.  Even  Homer  makes 
Pallas  say,  "  Few  children  indeed  are  equal  in  virtue  to  their 
father,  many  are  worse,  and  but  very  few  better."1  History 
does  not  justify  this  dictum,  and  Homer  himself,  since  he  has 
been  quoted  once,  says  in  another  passage,  "We  claim  to  be 
much  better  than  our  fathers."  Hallam,  treating  of  the  period 
of  Elizabeth,  and  speaking  of  the  Tower,  says,  "  It  seems  like 
a  captive  tyrant  reserved  to  grace  the  triumph  of  a  victorious  ( 
republic,  and  should  teach  us  to  reflect  in  thankfulness  how 
highly  we  have  been  elevated  in  virtue  and  happiness  above 
our  forefathers."  And  in  a  note  appended  to  this  passage  he 
adds,  "  There  is  no  line  in  Homer  which  I  repeat  more  fre- 
quently or  with  greater  pleasure  than  the  boast  of  Sthenelus : 
rot  Tcarlpwv  plf  ct/xetWec  £t>/«/*£#'  etvai.  This  is  a  truth  of 

1  Odyssey,  ii.  277. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  105 

which  the  impartial  study  of  history  persuades  us ;  and  yet, 
like  other  truths,  it  has  its  limitations."1  Let  us  not  forget 
that  even  the  Spartans,  certainly  the  most  conservative  of  the 
prominent  Grecian  tribes,  appeared  at  one  of  their  national 
festivals  in  different  choruses.  The  chorus  of  the  ancients 
chanted,  "We  were  brave  in  days  gone  by."  The  chorus  of 
men  responded,  "We  are  brave,  come  who  may  to  try  it;" 
when  the  chorus  of  the  boys  concluded,  "  Brave  we  shall  be ; 
our  deeds  shall  outshine  yours."  In  the  only  branch  in  which 
the  Spartans  were  proud  to  excel,  they  acknowledged  that  an 
onward  endeavor  was  the  only  spirit  to  maintain  what  they 
valued  most  highly — national  valor. 

Not  only  has  it  been  believed  that  a  regular  course  of  moral 
degeneracy  is  gcing  on,  but  at  a  very  early  period  it  was  be- 
lieved that  men  became  feebler  and  more  diminutive  with 
every  generation.2 

The  reason  of  so  general  a  belief  is  that  we  see  and  feel  the 
evils  of  the  present  time,  but  not  those  which  belong  to  the 
past,  while  dissatisfaction  with  the  present  time  or  real  suffer- 
ing causes  us  to  magnify  the  virtues  of  our  ancestors,  to  which 
a  general  respect  for  our  own  parents  and  grandparents  already 
naturally  inclines  us. 

LXXVII.  The  advantage  which  old  persons  possess  over 
young  ones  is  experience.  Respecting  the  world  in  general, 
then,  we  are  the  old  ones  compared  to  our  forefathers,  pro- 
vided always  we  have  endeavored  to  possess  ourselves  of  their 
experience  and  that  of  our  own  times,  and  do  not  presump- 
tuously think  that  the  mere  fact  of  our  being  born  after  them 
makes  us  wiser.  We  must  truly  study  and  respect  their  en- 
deavors before  we  can  say  that  we  are  wiser.  Bacon's  remark 
to  this  purpose  appears  to  be  a  mere  truism  as  soon  as  dis- 
tinctly stated;  yet  not  unfrequently  the  old  times  are  appealed 


1  Constitutional  History  of  England,  i.  202. 

a  There  existed  formerly  a  nursery-story,  founded  upon  this  belief,  which  pre- 
dicted that  men  would  become  so  small  that  the  ovens  used  by  us  would  become 
their  palaces. 


I06  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

to  as  authority  as  we  would  appeal  to  old  persons.1  But  it  is 
very  necessary  to  keep  some  points  distinctly  in  our  mind 
respecting  old  institutions.  I  will  state  them  briefly: 

The  more  ignorant  a  person,  and  the  less  acquainted  there- 
fore with  what  has  been  done,  said,  tried,  suffered,  what  has 
miscarried  or  succeeded,  what  difficulties  are  in  the  way,  or 
what  evils,  no  longer  visible,  have  been  suppressed  by  a  cer- 
tain institution  not  inconvenient  itself;  the  less  a  person  is 
conscious  of  the  great  multiplicity  of  actions  and  operations 
in  society ;  the  more  forward  he  will  be  found  to  intrude  his 
new  thought  or  system  upon  men,  as  if  happiness  or  sense 
should  date  only  from  the  day  when  his  system  was  intro- 
duced; the  more  he  believes  in  an  absolute  goodness  of  laws; 
and  the  less  substantial  the  qualities  of  his  mind ;  the  more 
prone  he  will  be  to  destroy  rather  than  maintain,  develop, 
enlarge. 

The  inexperienced  and  ignorant  alone  believe  that  a  pro- 
jected institution  can,  in  all  its  bearings,  be  comprehended  at 
once  without  practical  application,  and  that  laws  and  institu- 
tions are  finished  if  drawn  up  on  paper,  regardless  of  the  state 
of  things  in  and  with  which  they  have  to  operate. 

Those  institutions  are  the  best  which,  if  good  at  all,  have 
their  roots  deep  in  the  soil  of  the  nation,  whose  body  of  laws 
consists  mainly  in  the  alluvial  soil  deposited  by  the  course  of 
time,  since  thus  alone  institutions  which  have  grown  and 
have  developed  themselves  in  the  course  of  time  meet  with 
the  spontaneous  action  of  the  people;  they  have  been  checked, 
expanded,  fashioned  as  the  course  of  history  required,  and 
have  become  endeared  to  the  nation  as  blessings,  as  realities.2 

Old  institutions  have  the  advantage  of  being  tried,  and 


1  Benlham  calls  the  reason  which  is  derived  from  the  oldness  of  an  institution 
alone  in  its  favor  the  Chinese  argument.  Archbishop  Whately,  in  the  Appendix 
to  his  Elements  of  Logic,  has  a  few  words  on  the  term  "  old." 

"  Cicero  de  Respubl.,  ii.  i.  "  Nostra  republica  non  unius  [est]  ingenio  sed 
multorum  ;  nee  una  hominis  vita  sed  aliquot  constituta  sseculis  et  setatibus  ;  .  .  . 
neque  cuncta  ingenia  conlata  in  unum  tantum  posse  uno  tempore  providere,  ut 
omnia  complecterentur  sine  rerum  usu  et  vetustate." 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


ID/ 


hence  are  known,  while  of  new  ones  we  have  yet  to  see  how 
they  operate,  and  what  ultimate  effects  they  produce. 

Old  institutions  ought  not  to  be  pulled  down  except  evil  is 
perceived  to  be  produced  by  them. 

We  must  be  especially  careful  in  touching  those  laws  which 
were  made  by  those  whom  we  know  to  have  lived  in  better  or 
more  favorable  periods. 

It  is  a  wicked  idolatry  to  sacrifice  the  living  to  the  memory 
of  the  dead,  and  obstinately  to  insist  upon  old  laws  simply 
because  they  are  old,  although  bad,  and  perhaps  cruel. 

Stability  is  of  itself  a  most  desirable  thing;  it  promotes 
probity,  and  gives  moral  tone  to  society ;  but  to  preserve  that 
which  is  bad  is  either  foolish  or  immoral.  The  star-chamber 
was  an  old  institution :  should  it  have  been  preserved  ?  The 
institution  of  the  vizier  in  Asiatic  despotism  is  older  than  any 
British  one  :  is  it  on  that  account  good  ?  The  cause  of  civili- 
zation and  of  a  liberty  worthy  of  man  is  neither  promoted  by 
Asiatic  stagnation, — whose  Koran  says,  Every  new  law  is  an 
innovation,  every  innovation  is  an  error,  and  every  error  leads 
to  eternal  fire, — nor  by  the  arrogance  of  a  jacobin  declaring 
war  against  everything  that  exists  and  has  existed.1 


1  Dumont,  speaking  of  Paine,  in  the  Souvenirs  sur  Mirabeau,  ch.  xvi.,  says, 
"  He  was  a  caricature  of  the  vainest  Frenchman.  Paine  said  to  Dumont  that 
if  it  were  in  his  power  to  annihilate  all  libraries  he  would  do  it  without  hesita- 
tion, in  order  to  destroy  all  the  error  deposited  in  them,  and  to  commence  a  new 
chain  of  ideas  and  principles  with  the  Rights  of  Man."  How  many  Paines  in 
their  respective  spheres,  and  more  or  less  bold,  have  we  not  seen  since,  and  are 
we  not  seeing  daily  ! 


BOOK    IV. 
CHAPTER    I. 

Education. — What  it  is.  —  Strong  and  universal  tendency  to  form  Habits  and 
continue  them.  —  Great  importance  of  Education  in  Politics,  not  only  of  ele- 
mentary and  general  School  Systems,  but  also  of  superior  Education  and 
literary  Institutions.  —  Expeditions,  Libraries,  Museums.  —  Industrial  Educa- 
tion. —  The  Rich  as  well  as  the  Poor  ought  to  be  actively  engaged  in  some 
Pursuit,  whether  purely  mental,  or  industrial.  — ^-  Law  of  Solon.  —  Connection 
of  Crime  with  want  of  regular  industrial  Education  in  modern  Times. — 
Statistics. — Habits  of  Industry,  of  Obedience,  of  Independence,  of  Reverence, 
and  of  Honesty. —  Ancient  History  for  Children. — Concentric  Instruction. — 
Gymnastics.  —  Sexes.  —  The  Woman.  —  Difference  of  physical  Organization, 
Temperament,  and  Powers  in  Woman  and  Man. — The  Family  (and  through 
it  the  Society  of  Comity  and  the  Country)  is  the  sacred  Sphere  of  Woman's 
chief  Activity.  —  The  Connection  of  Woman's  Activity  with  the  State. — 
Woman  is  excluded  from  Politics.  —  She  is  connected  with  the  State  by  Patri- 
otism.— Lady  Croke. — The  Petitioning  of  Women. — Lady  Russell  a  Model. — 
History  of  Woman.  —  Is  the  Woman  represented  though  she  cannot  vote  at 
the  Poll  ? 

I.  EDUCATION,  the  transmission  of  knowledge,  skill,  and 
morality,  that  principal  tie  by  which  one  generation  is  con- 
nected with  another  and  thus  mankind  becomes  a  continu- 
ous society,  is  a  subject  of  the  first  magnitude  in  everything 
that  relates  to  society.  I  waive  the  great  importance  of 
education  in  developing  and  perfecting,  humanizing  and 
elevating  the  individual  as  such,  on  which  a  few  words  were 
given  in  the  first  volume,  when  the  views  taken  by  the  an- 
cients respecting  education  were  compared  with  the  light  in 
which  this  subject  appears  to  the  civilized  modern  nations. 

Society  is  deeply  interested  in   general  education  :   in  no 

subject  more  so;  in  very  few  equally  so.     In  educating  we 

ought  to  strive  by  aiding  and  cultivating  to  develop  the  whole 

man,  as  much  as  all  the  given  circumstances  admit.    We  have 

108 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


109 


seen  throughout  this  work  that  man,  destined  for  civilization 
as  well  as  moral  independence,  has  a  social  and  individual 
destiny,  and  man  to  be  fully  man  must  be  a  citizen,  that  is  a 
member  of  the  state.  It  is  one  of  the  unalterable  destinies 
prescribed  by  Providence  for  our  existence.  The  future  citi- 
zen, or  active  member  of  the  state,  is  then  to  be  included  in 
the  objects  of  education.  All  education  consists  in  storing 
and  training  the  mind,  if  we  comprehend  within  the  latter 
term  the  purifying  guidance  in  morals  and  religion  as  well  as 
the  training  of  the  intellect,  imparting  method  and  vigor  by 
exercise  and  habit ;  and,  finally,  the  imparting  of  sound  habits, 
which  again  may  be  moral,  intellectual,  and  social  habits,  a 
subject  of  the  utmost  importance,  because  it  is,  as  Bacon 
already  quoted  said,  custom  that  governs  man  in  far  the 
greatest  number  of  practical  cases  hourly  occurring.  Indeed, 
the  constant  tendency  of  man  to  custom  and  habit,  to  uni- 
formity in  manner,  opinions,  and  desires,  "  the  centripetal 
power  of  custom,"  as  Hallam  calls  it,  is  one  of  those  agents 
without  which  society  could  not  possibly  exist,  which  operates 
long  before  reflection  makes  us  conscious  of  it,  and  after  re- 
flection has  made  us  conscious  operates  far  more  effectually, 
generally,  and  constantly  than  mere  reflection  would  be  capa- 
ble of  doing.  This  primitive  tendency,  strongly  founded  upon 
the  impulse  of  imitation,  from  which  the  development  of  the 
mind  in  earliest  childhood  starts,  but  which  remains  a  power- 
ful agent  throughout  life,  naturally  carries  along  with  it  its 
evil  effects; — as  we  have  observed,  in  previous  passages,  of 
other  elementary  agents  or  impulses  in  the  human  soul.  It 
leads  men  to  perpetuate  evil  customs,  to  accommodate  them- 
selves to  erroneous  opinions,  to  continue  upon  bad  precedents; 
but  it  would  be  as  impossible,  and,  were  it  possible,  as  disas- 
trous to  society,  to  extinguish  this  elementary  tendency  of 
uniformity  and  custom,  of  imitation  and  perpetuation,  on  ac- 
count of  its  evil  effects,  as  it  would  be  to  quench  the  desire  of 
union  between  the  different  sexes  on  account  of  its  evil  effects ; 
as,  we  all  know,  has  been  attempted  by  many  enthusiasts  of 
all  periods  for  many  thousand  years,  if  not  in  all  mankind  at 


IIO  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

least  in  certain  classes  and  societies  and  as  an  additional 
means  of  attaining  greater  perfection.  Customs,  habits,  there- 
fore, will  be  formed;  and,  for  the  same  reason  which  was 
adduced  respecting  religion,  we  are  bound  to  cultivate  good 
habits,  even  had  we  not  other  and  urgent  considerations  for  so 
doing.  If  we  do  not  cultivate  the  habit  of  industry,  we  may 
be  sure  that  by  this  very  neglect  we  cultivate  the  habit  of  in- 
dolence ;  if  we  do  not  promote  the  habit  of  propriety  and 
modesty,  we  directly  aid  in  forming  the  habit  of  indecency 
and  boldness. 

II.  The  reader  will,  of  course,  not  expect  in  the  present 
work  a  sketch  of  a  whole  system  of  education.     I  must  con- 
fine my  remarks  to  a  few  general  observations,  and  some  hints, 
which  experience  has  taught  me  to  consider  as  not  unimpor- 
tant with  regard  to  education  as  related  to  politics.   Education, 
we  have  seen,  aims  at  developing  the  whole  man :  we  may 
consider  man,  however,  either  as  a  moral  and  religious  being, 
as  an  intellectual  being,  as  a  social  being,  as  a  physical  being, 
or  as  an  aesthetic  being,  that  is  a  being  endowed  with  taste, 
in  other  words,  who  has  a  sense  for  the  beautiful  ;  and  as  no 
man  can  be  a  good  and  sound  citizen  who  is  not  a  good  and 
sound  man,  so  the  best  education  for  future  citizens  will  be 
that  which  is  the  completest  and  fullest  education  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  an  entire  man.     Let  us  keep  in  mind  that  all  edu- 
cation, adapting  itself  to  man  in  his  various  capacities  just 
mentioned,  may  be  training,  that  is  invigorating  and  producing 
habits,  or  storing,  that  is  imparting  knowledge.     Finally,  all 
education  is  either  domestic  education,  school  education,  in- 
dustrial education,  —  by  which,  for  want  of  a  better  word,  I 
mean  all  education  for  a  trade,  profession,  or  station  in  life ; 
or  social  education,  by  which  we  may  designate  that  indirect 
yet  highly  important  training  which  every  man  receives  by  his 
living  in  and  with  a  society — the  formation  of  his  mind  by  the 
influence  of  his  society  and  age. 

III.  How  important  nay,  how  indispensable,  domestic  edu- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  Ill 

cation  is,  both  in  training  and  storing,  morally,  intellectually, 
and  physically,  is  clear  to  every  one  who  has  paid  the  slightest 
attention  to  the  subject.  For  it  is  in  the  family  where  those 
earliest  impressions  are  received  and  habits  formed  which 
adhere  longest  to  a  man,  or  go  with  him  as  far  as  to  the  last 
goal  of  his  life.  Example,  powerful  everywhere,  is  most  so  at 
home;  because  it  there  presents  itself  earliest,  most  frequently, 
and  most  authoritatively — in  that  authority  which  is  stronger 
than  that  of  king  or  law,  the  authority  of  the  parent.  Yet 
division  of  labor,  necessary  everywhere,  is  likewise  so  in  edu- 
cation :  hence  the  necessity  of  school  education ;  and  as  it  is 
out  of  the  power  of  many  whole  communities,  and  of  large 
classes  in  most  communities,  to  provide  for  a  sound  school 
education,  either  for  want  of  individual  means  or  knowledge 
sufficient  to  select  or  obtain  the  best  teachers,  general  sys- 
tems of  school  education  have  become  highly  important  for 
all  civilized  nations.  It  is  one  of  the  peculiar  traits  of  the 
latest  times  that  all  the  most  civilized  and  elevated  nations 
have  with  much  care  and  earnestness  established  general 
school  systems  or  are  actively  striving  to  establish  them. 
And  it  is  a  fact  no  less  pleasing  that  of  late  the  whole  science 
and  practice  of  education  have  become  so  diffused  and  hon- 
ored that  in  some  countries,  for  instance  in  Germany  and  par- 
tially in  France,  the  word  School  is  used  in  as  comprehensive 
a  meaning  as  the  word  Church  was  used  in  former  times,  or 
as  we  are  wont  to  use  the  word  Law  or  Bar,  meaning  thereby 
the  whole  system,  organization,  members,  and  the  distinct 
acknowledgment  of  its  importance  by  society.  Jovellanos 
said  perhaps  too  much  when  he  pronounced  that  "the  foun- 
tains of  social  prosperity  are  many,  but  all  originate  from  one 
and  the  same  well,  and  this  is  public  instruction;"1  but,  al- 
though using  too  strong  terms  when  he  recommended  a 
measure  so  much  neglected  by  his  countrymen,  this  excellent 
man  was  certainly  not  far  from  truth  and  only  erred  in  the 
expression  of  a  principle  itself  true  and  essential.  Modern 


1  Complete  Works,  Madrid,  1831,  vol.  iii.  p.  292. 


II2  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

nations  cannot  fulfil  their  duty,  nay,  they  cannot  even  protect 
themselves  sufficiently  against  evils  otherwise  unavoidable, 
the  consequences  of  civilization  and  density  of  population, 
without  general  and  public  instruction.1 

*  Although  single  persons  may  have  the  means  to  provide 
for  the  education  of  their  children  at  home,  the  sons  never- 
theless should  go  to  school.  Every  one  is  destined  for  civili- 
zation, for  society,  and  an  education  is  very  incomplete  if  the 
mind  of  the  boy  has  not  been  fashioned  among  others,  under 
the  influences  of  society.  This  begins  earliest  and  most  effect- 
ually in  the  school.  In  the  school  the  boy  steps  out  of  the 
close  family  circle,  where  it  is  possible  to  pay  attention  to  a 
thousand  minute  details,  into  a  larger  society,  yet  not  so  pub- 
lic as  public  life  —  but  still  it  is  a  sort  of  public  life.  There 
the  boy  forms  the  earliest  attachments  beyond  those  of  kin- 
dred, has  his  angular  points  rubbed  off,  learns  to  judge  for 
himself  more  freely,  and  stands  much  more  upon  his  own 
legs.  The  King  of  the  French  has  shown  in  a  remarkable 
manner  how  strong  national  society  is  at  present  by  sending 
his  sons  to  the  schools  of  Paris,  open  to  all  citizens'  boys — 
common  schools  inasmuch  as  they  are  open  to  every  one. 

IV.  It  is,  however,  a  grave  error  into  which  some  have 
fallen,  who  believe  that  the  state  as  such,  or  civil  society,  is 
interested  only  in  the  promotion  of  education  among  the  poor, 
in  other  words  in  systems  of  public  instruction  restricted  to 
the  diffusion  of  elementary  knowledge  among  large  masses. 
This  is  the  opposite  error  to  that  which  in  former  ages  so  fre- 
quently induced  governments  richly  to  endow  a  few  institu- 
tions of  learning  and  totally  to  neglect  common  education. 
A  complete  system  of  public  instruction  comprehends  all 
institutions  which  are  necessary  for  the  society,  and  which 
nevertheless  cannot  or  will  not  be  established  by  private 
means.  Society  at  large,  down  to  the  lowliest  cottager,  is 


1  I  must  ngain  refer,  respecting  this  point,  to  my  Letter  on  the  Relation  be- 
tween Education  and  Crime. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  1 13 

deeply  interested  in  the  highest  possible  degree  of  cultivation 
of  the  sciences  ;  for  they  shed  light  and  diffuse  civilization  by 
a  thousand  rays  and  in  a  thousand  channels  over  the  whole 
of  society.  If  science,  untrammelled  and  unconcerned  about 
any  immediate  application,  does  not  boldly  press  forward, 
since  its  application  to  practical  life  always  necessarily  fol- 
lows at  a  considerable  distance,  the  actual  state  of  science  will 
stand  still  or  retrograde.  The  Chinese,  spurning  every  species 
of  knowledge,  every  experiment,  which  cannot  be  proved  at 
once  to  be  of  direct  use,  furnish  us  with  a  very  impressive 
illustration  of  this  fact.  Had  Laplace  always  thought  how 
his  soaring  calculations  might  be  applied  at  once  to  naviga- 
tion, he  would  never  have  produced  his  Celestial  Mechanics, 
which  nevertheless  will  effect  great  practical  benefits,  not  only 
by  having  led  our  race  a  step  farther  on  its  great  road  of  civ- 
ilization, but  by  way  of  actual  use.  Science  is  not  a  mere 
luxury.  Well  it  is  that  science  is  a  luxury  to  some  minds  to 
reward  them  for  many  privations  or  disheartening  disappoint- 
ments. For  society  the  sciences  are  of  imperative  necessity, 
and  fall  entirely  within  the  province  of  that  civilization  which 
we  found  to  be  the  destiny  of  man.  The  sciences  are  like  the 
sun  of  heaven.  When  his  rays  descend  upon  the  blade,  the 
blossom  of  the  tree,  you  do  not  see  them  unfold  themselves 
at  once.  Yet  when  he  has  passed  onward  in  his  heavenly 
course,  the  ray  of  noon  is  still  effecting  its  enlivening  and 
transforming  processes  even  in  the  humblest  and  minutest 
herb  or  the  moss  which  derives  its  modest  existence  from  the 
bounty  of  the  lofty  tree.  The  state  is  directly  interested  in 
sustaining  the  highest  institutions  of  learning,  which  require 
means  hardly  ever  at  the  disposal  of  private  individuals  ;  nor 
has  it  any  right  to  wait  for  private  contributions  towards  the 
foundation  of  public  seats  of  learning,  however  cheerfully  it 
may  receive  them  if  offered.  Every  citizen,  as  such,  low  or 
high,  simply  as  a  member  of  the  state,  has  an  undoubted  right 
to  demand  this,  just  as  much  as  he  has  an  absolute,  natural, 
primitive  right  to  demand  an  establishment  of  some  sort 
or  other  to  administer  justice.  Even  if  political  society  were 
VOL.  II.  8 


II4  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

nothing  but  an  agglomeration  of  atoms,  if  it  were  not  as  we 
have  found  it  to  be  a  continuous  society,  it  would  still  be  the 
state's  duty  to  promote  these  institutions,  for  on  the  one  hand 
they  are  of  general  utility,  on  the  other  hand  the  pursuit 
of  the  sciences  requires  means  which  the  individual,  who 
must  turn  his  industry  towards  objects  which  by  direct  ex- 
change will  furnish  him  the  means  of  subsistence,  does  not 
possess.  These  means  are  chiefly  leisure  and  money.  Instru- 
ments, libraries,  those  conductors,  concentrators,  and  bridges 
of  civilization,  collections,  expeditions,  measurements,  scien- 
tific surveys,  are  all  wholly  or  in  part  of  a  character  not  to 
be  obtained  or  executed  by  private  means,  especially  by  the 
means  of  those  who  generally  are  the  peculiar  votaries  of 
knowledge  and  feel  the  greatest  direct  interest  in  these  sub- 
jects. Had  not  governments  effected  the  measurements  of  a 
degree,  what  private  person  would  or  could  have  done  it? 
Yet  the  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the  earth's  formation  has 
already  proved  of  great  importance  to  society  at  large  in  a 
thousand  ways.  The  more  knowledge  multiplies  and  branches 
out,  the  vaster  our  experiments  and  inquiries  become,  the 
more  time  the  various  patient  investigations  require,  the  more 
necessary  also  becomes  'public  support  of  knowledge.  Had 
the  Greeks  felt  the  same  want,  had  sciences  obtained  with 
them  the  same  importance,  and  their  pursuit  been  attended 
with  the  same  difficulties,  as  with  us,  they  would  have  simply 
taxed  their  Girards  or  Rothschilds  with  a  "liturgy,"  to  send  an 
expedition  to  the  north  pole.  We  cannot  and  must  not  do 
this.  Who,  then,  can  do  it  ?  Society,  of  course ;  and  let  me 
add,  how  small  are  these  expenses  compared  to  so  many 
others  of  less  and  even  of  doubtful  importance  !  how  incalcu- 
lable their  benefits ! 

The  fine  arts  are,  as  we  have  seen,  of  great  national  impor- 
tance, in  an  industrial,  moral,  and  patriotic  point  of  view. 
Museums,  therefore,  if  more  important  subjects  are  not  sacri- 
ficed to  them,  and  if  they  remain  national  institutions  and 
national  schools,  are  subjects  justly  claiming  their  due  and 
proportionate  support  of  the  state. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  115 

V.  Let  us  return  to  the  subject  of  general  education.  If 
general  school  education,  imparting  that  ele  r.entary  knowl- 
edge without  which  an  individual  nowadays  is  a  sort  of 
outcast  from  the  common  pale  of  civilized  society,  is  of  great 
importance  in  politics,  that  species  which  was  called  indus- 
trial education  (by  which,  I  beg  to  remind  the  reader,  I  intend 
by  no  means  a  training  in  schools  for  certain  trades)  is  not 
less  so,  and  is  perhaps  even  more  so.  Every  citizen  without 
exception,  in  some  sphere  of  activity  or  other,  strictly  indus- 
trial or  mental,  should  apply  himself,  and  manifest  himself  as 
a  real  and  active  member  of  his  society.  Without  it  he  loses 
his  hold  upon  society  and  becomes  dangerous,  whether  he 
be  prompted  to  do  so  by  riches  or  poverty.  Man  is  not  made 
for  indolence ;  he  loses  his  inward  equipoise,  and  becomes 
morbid  or  criminal,  fanciful  or  self-willed,  if  he  is  not  acting. 
He  neglects  his  duty  towards  society  if  he  thus  severs  him- 
self from  the  common  course  of  action  and  plunges  into  unde- 
fined and  indolent  selfishness.  As  to  those  who  cannot  be 
seduced  into  such  a  course  because  they  do  not  possess 
wealth,  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  among  the  most  fruit- 
ful sources  of  all  crimes  a  neglected  habit  of  industry  is  the 
foremost.  Solon,  according  to  Plutarch,  decreed  that  the  son 
was  not  bound  to  support  his  aged  father — one  of  the  most 
sacred  obligations  in  his  code — if  the  latter  had  not  brought 
up  his  son  to  some  trade.  This  is  very  striking.  Very  posi- 
tive experience  must  have  induced  that  sage  to  express  in  so 
forcible  a  form  the  observation  of  a  political  result.  Obser- 
vation in  modern  times  will  furnish  the  same  facts.  I  do  not 
speak  of  riots,  or  political  disturbances,  which,  when  they  are 
not  founded  on  a  substantial  evil,  are  in  most  cases  chiefly 
promoted  by  those  who  are  not  engaged  in  industrious  pur- 
suits, but  limit  myself  to  the  commission  of  crime.1  In  my 


1  Idleness  as  a  political  evil  reached  its  "  classical  age"  in  the  worst  periods  of 
Grecian  democracy,  and  in  Rome.  In  the  former,  presence  in  the  popular  assem- 
bly came  to  be  paid  for,  as  in  the  worst  time  of  the  French  revolution.  During 
the  decline  of  Rome,  the  idling  wretches  sank  so  low  that,  too  cowardly  to 
march  against  the  conquering  tribes,  they  nevertheless  were  delighted  at  seeing 


U(5  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

inquiries  respecting  education,  industry,  and  crime,  I  have 
found  among  other  remarkable  results  this :  that  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty-eight  criminals  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
seven  had  never  been  bound  out  to  any  trade  or  regular  occu- 
pation, seventy-nine  were  bound  out  but  ran  away  before  they 
had  stayed  out  their  time,  and  only  fifty -two  were  bound  out 
and  remained  with  their  respective  masters  until  the  comple- 
tion of  their  proper  time;  and  that  the  average  time  of  the 
sentence  of  imprisonment  in  the  case  of  those  who  had  served 
out  was  a  little  less  than  four  years,  but  of  those  who  ran 
away,  a  little  above  five  years,  thus  indicating  a  much  greater 
degree  of  criminality.  Here  it  might  be  objected  that  the 
running  away  from  the  master  is  the  effect  of  vicious  habits, 
and  not  the  cause  of  the  future  crime ;  but  whether  the  one 
be  the  cause  of  the  other,  or  both  the  effect  of  the  same  cause, 
it  is  for  our  purpose  the  same :  it  shows  how  closely  the  want 
of  industry  is  connected  with  viciousness  and  criminality, 
and  how  right  it  is,  like  Solon,  to  insist  upon  universal  indus- 
trial education. 

It  would  be  well  could  the  right  of  voting  be  connected  not 
only  with  a  degree  of  education,  but  also  with  some  steady 
employment.  This,  however,  belongs  to  Politics  proper. 

I  ought  to  observe  here  for  the  general  reader,  that  binding 
out  is  not  restricted  to  mechanical  trades,  but  extends,  with 
us,  to  agricultural  pursuits  likewise.1  The  facts  ascertained 

the  agony  of  the  dying  gladiator.  When  Treves  was  devastated  by  German 
predatory  tribes,  the  first  thing  which  the  inhabitants,  deprived  of  house  and 
property,  asked  for,  was  Circensian  games.  Salvian  de  Gub.  Dei,  vi.  146. 

1  Mr.  Wood,  warden  of  the  Eastern  Penitentiary  in  Pennsylvania,  and  Mr. 
Yard,  keeper  of  the  New  Jersey  Penitentiary,  have  with  much  kindness  made  at 
my  request  inquiries  and  furnished  me  with  statements  respecting  the  industrial 
education  of  criminals,  and  the  age  at  which  criminals  lost  their  parents,  of 
high  interest,  the  results  of  which  I  shall  not  omit  to  make  public  on  some 
proper  occasion.  The  Rev.  Mr.  Barrett,  chaplain  to  the  Connecticut  State 
PrLon,  has  furnished  me  likewise  with  valuable  statistics  as  to  the  age 
when  the  criminals  lost  their  parents.  I  made  this  point  one  of  my  inquiries, 
because  it  shows  the  probability  of  moral  and  industrial  neglect  in  the  convict 
when  young,  if  he  has  lost  his  parents  early  ;  the  great  value,  therefore,  of  sound 
education,  and — it  may  be  added — of  judicious-orphan  asylums.  For  some  im- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  117 

in  other  countries  corroborate  the  observation  made  above. 
The  training  for  vice,  as  testified  to  before  parliamentary  com- 
mittees, and  the  harvest  of  crime  growing  on  the  luxuriant 
soil  of  indolence,  is  appalling.1 

VI.  Besides  the  habit  of  industry,  the  four  following  are  of 
much  importance  in  education  applied  to  politics;  the  habit 
of  obedience,  of  independence,  of  reverence,  or  whatever  it  be 
called, — by  which  term  I  wish  to  express  that  earnestness  in 
contemplating  things  which  strives  to  know  their  real  char- 
acter and  connection,  and  the  absence  of  arrogant  forward 
ness  and  self-sufficiency,  which  considers  everything  silly, 
useless,  or  unmeaning  because  not  agreeing  with  its  own 
views  or  not  showing  its  character  at  once  to  the  superficial 
observer, — and,  lastly,  the  habit  of  honesty.  We  have  seen 
that  it  is  the  high  prerogative  of  man  to  acknowledge  supe- 
riors and  inferiors,  to  have  laws  and  to  obey  them ;  but  since 
individual  interest  as  well  as  the  pleasure  or  allurement  of 
resistance  and  opposition  is  in  itself  frequently  very  strong, 
as  selfishness  is  but  too  apt  to  grow  up  like  a  rank  weed,  we 
ought  to  imbue  the  young  early  with  true  loyalty,  that  is  with 
a  sincere  desire  to  act  as  members  of  a  society,  according  to 
rules  not  arbitrarily  prescribed  by  themselves,  and  with  a 
submission  of  individual  will  and  desire  to  that  of  society. 
They  ought  to  learn  that  it  is  a  privilege  of  men  to  obey  laws, 
and  a  delight  to  obey  good  ones.  That  these  habits,  early 
and  deeply  inculcated,  may  lead  to  submissiveness  and  want 


portant  remarks  on  the  connection  between  habits,  morality,  and  labor,  and  its 
quality,  see  H.  C.  Carey,  Principles  of  Political  Economy,  Philadelphia,  1838. 
vol.  ii.  p.  207,  et  seq. 

1  An  article  in  the  London  Times,  of  December,  1838,  contains  extracts  from 
statements  made  before  parliamentary  committees  in  1837,  respecting  the  careful 
and  effectual  education  in  crime  practised  in  London,  of  great  importance  to  the 
criminalist  and  philosopher.  Mr.  Wakefield  has  attentively  inquired  into  this 
hideous  subject,  and  written  upon  it.  It  were  desirable  that  the  French  penal 
statistics,  issued  yearly  with  such  laudable  zeal  by  government,  would  in  future 
include  some  statement  by  which  the  industrial  -education  might  be  ascertained, 
as  likewise  statements  of  the  age  when  the  convict  lost  one  or  both  his  parents. 


H8  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  independence,  is  only  to  be  feared  where  education  is  im- 
perfect or  liberty  at  a  low  ebb.  The  greater  the  liberty 
enjoyed  by  a  society,  the  more  essential  are  these  habits, 
especially  in  modern  times,  when  various  new  and  powerful 
agents  of  intercommunication  and  diffusion  of  knowledge 
have  produced  a  movability  and  thirst  for  inquiry  which  can- 
not leave  in  us  any  sincere  fear  on  the  ground  of  dull  tame- 
ness  in  the  adult,  wherever  liberty  is  at  all  established.  The 
ancients  knew  the  value  of  these  habits,  and  all  their  wise 
men  insisted  upon  them.  Nations  which  lose  the  precious 
habit  of  obeying,  that  is  of  self-determined  obedience  to  the 
laws  because  they  are  laws,  lose  invariably  likewise  the 
precious  art  of  ruling.  Greece,  Rome,  and  Spain,  for  the 
last  centuries,  as  well  as  the  worst  times  of  the  feudal  ages, 
are  examples. 

I  believe,  moreover,  that  an  individual  destitute  of  that  rev- 
erence by  which  he  feels  linked  to  his  fellow-men,  present  and 
past,  is  as  unfortunate  as  he  is  dangerous.  It  is  a  sad  thing 
to  be  imprisoned  in  selfish  arrogance.  The  habit  of  inde- 
pendence includes  the  love  of  justice,  of  right,  of  acting  man- 
fully by  principle,  of  disdaining  popularity  when  need  be,  of 
holding  up  the  head  in  spite  of  the  heavy  blows  which  fate 
may  inflict — of  being  honestly,  bravely,  yet  calmly,  a  true  man. 
Lastly,  the  habit  of  honesty  in  the  smallest  details,  and  ap- 
parent trifles,  both  as  to  truth  and  property,  cannot  be  too 
early  and  too  anxiously  cultivated.  It  is  not  sufficient  that 
the  young  learn-  early  to  shun  pilfering,  but  it  is  necessary 
that  a  sacred  regard  for  property,  in  all  its  manifestations,  be 
early  instilled  into  their  souls;  a  regard  which  must  increase 
in  the  same  degree  as  the  protection  of  property  is  wanting, 
and  towards  public  property,  even  though  consisting  only  in 
the  school  or  college  utensils,  as  much  as  towards  private 
property.  That  greatest  aim  of  all  moral  education,  to  make 
men  just  and  true,  kind  and  self-controlled,  is  also  the  most 
important  moral  education  for  the  state.  Let  men  be  just 
and  true,  and  what  is  no£  gained  ! 

As  regards  the  instruction  of  the  child  with  reference  to  its 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  1 19 

future  citizenship,  I  would  mention  that  the  soul  of  the  child 
is  best  awakened  by  noble  examples.  We  ought  to  make  it 
early  acquainted  with  some  of  the  best  in  history,  and,  as  an- 
cient history  is  far  more  striking  and  symbolical,  simpler  and 
more  direct,  as  well  as  more  significant  in  forms  and  signs, 
than  modern  history,  which  is  more  complicated  and  covered, 
if  I  may  use  this  expression,  the  former  will  always  be  found 
to  be  far  more  appropriate  to  warm,  incite,  and  occupy  the 
child.  Plutarch,  or  some  parts  of  Herodotus,  cannot  be  sup- 
planted by  books  on  the  history  of  late  centuries.  At  the 
same  time,  that  concentric  instruction  which  starts  from  what 
is  near  us  and  extends  in  wider  and  wider  circles,  indispensa- 
ble, in  my  opinion,  for  leading  the  child  to  vivid  perceptions, 
is  highly  advisable  likewise  in  leading  the  young  to  a  just 
appreciation  of  distant  actions  and  institutions  and  to  a  habit 
of  observation  and  attention.  It  is  in  political  instruction  s 
in  geography,  in  which  the  course  of  the  largest  rivers,  and 
the  laws  which  they  obey,  can  be  best  shown  by  following 
the  course  of  a  rill  or  rivulet  near  at  hand.  At  a  successive 
period  the  history  of  our  own  country  in  connection  ought  to 
follow,  and  finally  a  more  particular  acquaintance  with  our 
political  duties  and  responsibilities,  for  which  the  instruction 
in  history  gives  opportunity  in  a  desultory  yet  very  important 
manner  from  its  first  commencement.  The  attempt  to  teach 
political  economy  to  children  is  one  of  the  ludicrous  effects 
in  our  times  of  a  disregard  of  the  various  conditions  resulting 
from  different  ages,  sexes,  and  other  circumstances  —  a  folly 
resulting  from  superficiality,  not  unfrequently  from  sordid 
desire  of  gain  in  those  who  offor  instruction,  and  of  ignorance 
in  the  parents,  who  do  not  know  that  learning  formulas  by 
heart,  and  printed  answers  for  printed  questions,  drawn  up 
moreover  not  unfrequently  in  an  injudicious  manner,  does  not 
constitute  teaching  and  cultivating  the  mind  of  the  young. 
Conscientious  education  cannot  be  carried  on  in  so  hasty  or 
wholesale  a  manner. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention  gymnastics.    They  are  of 
such  decided   moment  that  I  do  not  know  what  to  say  of 


I20  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

them  except  that  they  are  even  morally  of  the  first  impor- 
tance, without  entering  into  a  discussion  the  length  of  which 
would  be  unsuited  for  the  present  work.  They  are  far  too 
little  regarded  as  an  indispensable  branch  of  education,  and 
ought  invariably  to  be  connected  with  public  instruction.  Our 
climate,  with  its  great  changes  of  heat  and  cold,  our  exceed- 
ing ease  of  travelling  without  physical  exertion,  our  free  in- 
stitutions, and  our  entire  dependence  upon  the  people  at  large 
for  the  defence  of  the  country,  demand  it  imperatively. 

VII.  I  have  spoken  here  chiefly  of  elementary  education 
only.  As  to  superior  education,  the  classical  department  will 
always  be  of  the  highest  importance.  It  is  a  principle  in  all 
education  that  its  efficiency,  thoroughness,  and  completeness 
depend  in  a  high  degree  upon  the  question  whether  it  is 
founded  upon  the  main  elements  of  that  civilization  in  which 
the  individual  to  be  educated  lives  and  has  to  act,  and  which 
he  is  expected  to  promote  in  turn.  Now,  the  factors  of  that 
product  which  we  call  our  civilization — the  civilization  of  the 
West  Caucasian  race — besides  those  factors  without  which  no 
civilization  whatever  can  exist,  namely,  accumulated  experi- 
ence (knowledge)  and  accumulated  labor  (skill  and  capital),  are 
Christianity,  antiquity,  and  the  Teutonic  element.  From  these 
three  elements  arose,  and  still  arises,  our  peculiar  and  high 
civilization,  through  them  alone  we  can  find  a  key  to  it,  and 
upon  them  we  must  found  our  education,  if  we  endeavor 
thereby  to  develop  the  mind  in  such  a  manner  that  it  may 
harmonize  with  the  civilization  we  breathe.  Every  time  that 
an  attempt  has  been  made  to  discard  one  or  the  other,  expe- 
rience has  shown  that  injurious  deficiency  must  be  the  con- 
sequence. The  history  of  education  amply  proves  it. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  gigantic  effect  of  Chinese  educa- 
tion is  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  is  strictly  founded  upon  the 
factors  of  Chinese  civilization.  Whatever  we  may  think  of 
the  latter,  and  however  fettering  instead  of  developing  and 
invigorating  we  may  consider  Chinese  education,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  effect  is  gigantic ;  perhaps  more  so  than  that 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  121 

of  any  other  extensive  national  education.  Nearly  four  hun- 
dred millions  of  bustling  and  industrious  people,  in  an  over- 
peopled country,  without  a  religious  element  which  induces 
them  to  consider  this  life  as  a  minimum  existence  to  be  regu- 
lated in  part  with  reference  to  an  endless  existence  hereafter, 
— or  if  part  of  these  people,  the  Buddhists,  believe  in  a  future 
existence,  they  believe  it  to  depend  upon  certain  performances 
rather  than  the  morality  of  their  acts  in  this  life  —  and  all 
these  many  people  under  a  weak  government,  which  does  not 
even  share  in  this  latter  religion  —  and  yet  they  live  in  peace, 
and  form  an  unbroken  whole.  It  is  by  education  alone  that 
the  Chinese  government  rules  this  colossus,  and  this  educa- 
tion does  produce  this  surprising  effect,  as  it  appears  to  me, 
only  because  it  is  strictly  founded  upon  the  chief  factors  of 
their  peculiar  civilization,  being  entirely  a  civilization  of  their 
own.  It  is  not  a  patriotic  education,  but  a  most  essentially 
Chinese  one.  I  need  not  repeat  that  I  have  mentioned  this 
instance  only  with  reference  to  the  magnitude  of  its  effect. 

VIII.  In  the  whole  scale  of  our  terrestrial  creation  we  find 
that  the  higher  life  rises  in  its  functions,  and  therefore  the 
nobler  the  organism  is  of  which  it  is  the  result,  the  more  dis- 
tinct and  prominent  becomes  the  difference  of  sexes.  Vege- 
table as  well  as  animal  life  exhibits  this  important  phe- 
nomenon. In  the  very  lowest  animals  no  difference  of  sexes 
exists ;  with  the  higher  station  of  the  animal  in  the  long 
chain  of  organic  bodies  the  marked  distinction  of  the  sexes 
increases,  until  we  find  it  in  man,  the  concluding  link,  more 
prominent  and  thorough  than  in  all  other  animals.  It  is  a 
divine  order  of  things,  and  has  been  early  acknowledged  as 
such  by  the  various  nations,  as  the  ancient  religions  and 
systems  of  philosophy  show.  So  striking  is  this  difference  in 
the  great  household  of  organic  life  that  men  have  frequently 
applied  the  same  principle  to  inorganic  matter,  and  even  to 
abstract  principles,1  while  they  likewise  naturally  expressed 


1  Most  of  the  religio-philosophical  systems  of  the  East  have  adopted  in  their 
accounts  of  creation  a  principle  by  which  they  typify  a  mysterious  union  of 


122  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

their  feeling  and  conceptions  by  applying  the  different  gram- 
matical genders  to  inanimate  objects  around  them,  as  the 
early  and  original  languages  do,  I  mean  those  idioms  which 
did  not  originate  by  the  process  of  mixture  at  a  period  when 
the  people  were  comparatively  advanced  and  reflection  pre- 
vailed over  impulse. 

The  female  of  the  human  species  is  smaller,  the  chest  nar- 
rower, the  muscular  system  little  developed,  the  voice  an  oc- 
tave higher,  and  the  nervous  system  predominant ;  hence  her 
sensibility  is  greater.  The  peculiar  state  of  her  lymphatic  and 
cellular  systems,  and  the  circumstance  that  her  sanguineous 
system  is  less  active  than  in  man,  are  the  causes  of  her  greater 
whiteness  and  transparency  of  skin  and  roundness  of  form,  in 
short  of  her  greater  charm,  of  her  less  activity,  and  of  a 
greater  want  of  fiercer  passions,  which  characterize  the  bilious 
temperament.  She  is  framed  and  constituted  more  delicately, 
and  in  consequence  of  this  marked  difference  of  organization 
has  advantages  and  disadvantages  compared  to  the  male  sex, 
differences  which  are  fundamental  and  of  the  last  importance 
for  the  obtaining  of  those  ends  for  which  man  and  mankind 
are  placed  on  this  globe,  and  from  which  likewise  different 
positions,  callings,  duties,  and  spheres  of  activity  result. 

The  woman  is  more  timid,  more  affectionate,  keener  in  feel- 
ing, hence  sprightlier  in  those  thoughts  which  originate  from 
acute  sensitiveness ;  she  is  less  ardent  in  far-reaching  plans, 
more  uninterruptedly  busy  in  a  sphere  of  quiet  activity,  more 
graceful  in  soul  and  body,  more  attractive,  more  patient  and 


the  masculine  and  feminine  principles,  from  which  the  first  existence  of  things 
takes  its  origin.  The  dogma,  in  certain  mythologies,  of  the  supposed  interven- 
tion of  a  masculo-feminine  principle  in  the  development  of  the  mundane  egg, 
bears  a  singular  parallel  to  the  Chinese  Tai-Ky,  a  mystic  figure  which  represents 
the  union  of  Yang  and  Yn,  the  male  and  female  principle.  [The  Tai-Ky  really 
denotes  the  absolute,  that  beyond  which  there  is  nothing  more.  Wuttke,  Gesch. 
Heidenth.,  ii.  14.]  Davis,  The  Chinese,  vol.  ii.  p.  65,  gives  an  account  of  it. 
Respecting  the  Hindoo  philosophy  on  this  point  I  must  refer  to  the  History  of 
Ancient  Philosophy,  by  Ritter  (iii.  349-418,  Hamb.,  1834).  So  did  the  Pytha- 
goreans enumerate  among  the  primeval  elements  of  nature  the  Masculine  and 
Feminine.  Arist.,  Met.,  i.  5,  6. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


123 


cunning  in  obtaining  her  objects,  more  confiding  and  be- 
lieving. Man  is  stronger,  bolder,  more  energetic  and  active, 
and  of  consequence  more  exhausted  by  his  efforts,  thus  stand- 
ing in  greater  need  of  deep  repose;  he  is  more  judging  and 
inquiring,  hence  more  just  if  his  passion  is  not  roused;  less 
patient  and  enduring;  less  willing  calmly  to  submit;  more 
ardent  and  much  stronger  in  the  powers  of  combination  and 
comprehension ;  his  mind  has  greater  grasp ;  he  is  more  in- 
dependent, freer  in  action  and  thought,  bolder  in  braving  the 
opinion  of  others.  These  mental  differences  are  no  less  im- 
portant for  the  constitution  of  the  family  (as  it  rises  in  char- 
acter with  the  progress  of  civilization)  than  the  physical 
difference  which  the  Creator  has  ordained  as  the  necessary 
condition  of  procreation  for  nearly  all  organic  life,  and  upon 
which  those  differences  of  disposition  and  faculties  are 
founded. 

IX.  From  this  different  organization  arise  different  rela- 
tions, as  has  been  observed  already.  The  woman  is  fitter  for 
all  those  actions  which  must  be  impelled  chiefly  by  affection; 
hence  she  is  more  fit  to  foster  and  educate  the  young,  and  to 
nurture  in  turn  their  hearts  with  affection ;  she  is  more  dis- 
posed to  cling  to  a  protector,  and  far  readier  to  consent  to 
sacrifices;  she  graces  society,  and — sentiment  being  one  of  the 
spheres  in  which  she  is  most  active,  and  chastity  her  first 
virtue  and  honor — she  is  the  chief  agent  in  infusing  delicacy, 
gentleness,  taste,  decorum,  and  correctness  of  morals,  so  far 
as  they  depend  upon  continency,  into  society  at  large.  These 
in  turn  attract  the  male  sex,  and  inspire  the  sterner  bosom  of 
man  with  those  feelings  of  romance  and  delicate  reverence 
which  form,  however  extravagant  they  may  at  times  appear, 
not  only  a  salutary  but  a  necessary  element  of  high  civiliza- 
tion. It  belongs  to  the  province  of  general  ethics  to  discuss 
the  question,  why  continency  is  the  chiefest  virtue  of  the 
woman  and  inseparably  connected  with  her  honor,  and  why, 
according  to  the  universal  sentiment  of  mankind,  incontinency 
in  the  male  sex,  however  immoral,  does  not  create  the  same 


124 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


feeling  of  disgust  with  which  it  is  viewed  in  the  other  sex. 
Thus  much  only  may  be  stated  here,  that  Providence,  ordain- 
ing that  the  family  in  its  purity  and  inviolateness  should  form 
the  nucleus  of  civilization,  and  that  it  should  be  formed  by 
the  union  of  sexes,  seems  to  have  imposed  as  one  of  the  primi- 
tive elements  of  human  society,  on  man,  not  only  the  desire 
for  this  union,  but  the  choice  of  his  desire,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  acute  feeling  of  bashfulness  of  woman  on  the  other 
hand,  so  that  man's  desire  should  partake  of  reverence  and 
be  more  than  mere  appetite,  from  which  circumstance  attach- 
ment and  perpetuity  of  union  arise.  If  the  desire  in  man 
were  not  strong,  selfishness  might  prevent  the  existence  of 
families ;  if  the  woman  were  not  bashful,  an  equal  disorder 
would  arise.  When  the  family  has  been  formed,  the  actual 
knowledge  of  the  child's  parentage — that  knowledge  which 
is  derived  from  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  and  not  from  moral 
conviction — is  confined  to  the  woman  alone ;  and  as  the 
family,  with  the  affections  between  the  parents  and  their  off- 
spring, forms  an  absolutely  necessary  element  of  man's  ethical 
and  political  relations,  the  continency  of  the  woman,  on  which 
the  purity  and  intenseness  of  family  feeling  depend,  becomes 
naturally  the  more  important,  so  that  moral  conviction  of  the 
child's  parentage  as  far  as  concerns  the  father  may  fully  sup- 
plant the  want  of  conviction  by  the  senses. 

X.  The  true  sphere  of  woman's  best  and  noblest  activity, 
and  a  sacred  one  it  is,  assigned  to  her  in  the  distribution  of 
the  degrees  of  affection  and  intellect,  ardor  and  reliance,  is  the 
family,  where  she  acts  as  wife,  mother,  daughter,  and  sister, 
and  through  it  that  society  which  we  have  called  the  society 
of  comity,  where  she  graces,  humanizes,  and  reconciles,  and, 
through  both,  the  country.  In  what  way  her  activity  is  con- 
nected with  the  country,  and  mediately  with  the  state,  is  the 
subject  which  will  now  occupy  us. 

The  nature  and  consequent  duties  of  woman  exclude  her 
from  public  life ;  her  timidity,  bashfulness,  delicacy,  and  in- 
ferior grasp  of  mind,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  acting  out 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  125 

those  sacred  duties  more  especially  assigned  to  her,  require 
her  being  more  retired  than  the  other  sex.  A  woman  loses 
in  the  same  degree  her  natural  character,  as  woman,  as  she 
enters  into  publicity.  There  are,  of  course,  women  whose 
extraordinary  mental  organization  is  such  that  they  form  ex- 
ceptions ;  but  wherever  this  fundamental  principle  is  aban- 
doned as  a  general  rule,  evil  ensues,  as  in  every  other  case  of 
deviation  from  the  laws  of  nature.  The  woman  cannot  de- 
fend the  state  :  if  she  were  physically  able  to  do  it,  she  would 
necessarily  lose  her  peculiar  character  as  woman,  and  thus  a 
necessary  element  of  civilization  would  be  extinguished.  Here, 
too,  emergencies  may  make  exceptions  —  exceptions  of  the 
noblest  and  proudest  kind ;  but  should  they  cease  to  form 
exceptions,  a  subversion  of  the  whole  moral  order  of  things 
would  be  the  consequence.  She  does  not  preach,  she  does 
not  judge  in  court,  nor  debate  in  the  legislative  halls,  nor  take 
a  direct  part  in  politics  ;  if  she  does  so,  it  is  always  to  the 
injury  of  society,  be  it  by  way  of  court  intrigue,  as  was  the 
case  in  so  eminent  a  degree  in  France  before  the  first  revolu- 
tion, or  by  way  of  popular  excitements,  as  was  frequently  the 
case  in  Scotland  during  its  most  agitated  periods  in  the  sev- 
enteenth century,1  or  in  a  hideous  degree  during  the  French 
revolution. 

We  have  seen  that  the  family  in  its  unity  and  purity  is 
necessary,  and  that  to  produce  and  maintain  these  the  retired- 
ness  of  woman  is  equally  necessary.  A  natural  consequence 
of  this  circumstance,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  her  affections 
and  feelings  are  stronger  than  those  of  man  if  not  blunted  by 
corruption  or  absurdity,  is  that  she  is  naturally  less  apt  to 
judge  of  public  business,  and  to  allow  the  principle  of  right, 
of  justice  alone,  full  weight.  Her  situation  in  the  family  gives 
her  less  opportunity  to  cultivate  this  feeling  of  mere  justice 
than  she  otherwise  might  do.  Women,  therefore,  are  carried 
away  by  that  which  naturally  operates  most  actively  in  them, 


1  Raumer,  History  of  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries,  illustrated  by 
Original  Documents,  London,  1835,  vol.  ii.  p.  337,  and  previous  passages. 


126  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

by  sentiment,  even  in  spheres  where  it  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  repress  it  as  much  as  human  frailty  will  permit.1 
Hence  the  fact  that  if  women  once  enter  into  politics,  and 
especially  take  part  in  party  strifes,  they  show  themselves  less 
scrupulous  than  men,  are  apt  to  be  entirely  carried  away  by 
personalities,  and  to  trespass  much  farther  than  men  upon  the 
limits  of  fairness,  justice,  and  truth. 

There  are  other  reasons,  however,  why  women  should  be 
strictly  excluded  from  active  politics.  The  woman,  weaker 
by  nature,  hence  gentler  and  more  dependent,  is  naturally 
given  more  to  intrigue  if  she  once  transgresses  the  line  of  her 
proper  sphere.  Boldness,  strength,  and  public  action  being 
denied  her,  originally  or  as  a  natural  consequence  of  her 
position,  she  will  the  sooner  resort  to  intrigue,  and  as  she 
naturally  acts  more  by  attraction  and  charm  she  becomes 
necessarily  the  more  dangerous.  No  true  civilization  is  possi- 
ble where  there  does  not  largely  exist  that  chivalric  feeling  in 
man  which  gladly  yields,  wherever  possible,  to  the  weaker  and 
more  delicate,  gentler  and  more  graceful  sex.  This  feeling, 
however,  operates  in  politics,  where  Right  should  rule  alone, 
very  dangerously.  If  woman  were  to  be  admitted  to  an  active 
participation  in  politics,  she  must  do  it  at  the  price  of  her 
whole  peculiar  nature,  her  grace  and  her  attraction,  and  would 
henceforth  be  distinguished  from  man  by  her  greater  weak- 
ness alone,  and  in  consequence  become  greatly  oppressed. 
If  woman  claims  to  be  admitted  as  a  member  of  a  jury,  she 
must  allow  herself  to  be  sworn  in  as  a  constable.  The  woman 
who  should  go  to  the  poll  must  have  disrobed  herself  of  her 
essential  nature  as  woman,  and  either  be  treated  as  men  are, 
which  would  lower  her  character  and  position  in  society,  or 
she  must  be  treated  with  deference,  which  would  be  disastrous 
to  the  fundamentals  of  the  state. 

The  family  is  necessary  not  only  for  procreation,  but  for  the 
promotion  of  morals  and  civilization;  unity,  love,  forbearance 

1  In  this  respect  women  are  like  people  living  in  countries  in  which  there  is  no 
public  political  life.  They  do  not  learn  to  modify  their  opinion  by  seeing  it 
opposed,  or  to  respect  the  perfect  right  of  others  to  oppose  it. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


127 


in  it  are  necessary ;  the  woman  stands  in  need  of  protection 
and  support ;  the  man,  of  being  led  to  the  sphere  of  affections, 
to  the  unselfish  love  of  his  wife  and  children.  But  if  the 
woman  were  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  politics  of  free 
countries,  the  unity  would  be  disturbed,  husband  and  wife 
would  no  longer  be  one;  the  most  gloomy  consequences 
must  follow,  it  would  be  impossible  for  womankind  long  to 
retain  modesty  and  continency,  and  thus  society  would  hasten 
to  speedy  dissolution.  She  would  likewise  lose  her  great 
privilege  of  softening  and  pacifying  society,  of  being  the  bond 
which  unites  many  discordant  elements.  If  we  look  around 
us,  we  see  how  daily  and  hourly  woman,  because  she  enjoys 
her  peculiar  position,  brings  elements  in  contact,  if  she  does 
not  reconcile  them,  which  otherwise  would  bitterly  war  with 
one  another.  "  She  shall  have  peace  in  market  or  fair,  whether 
the  feud  among  men  be  never  so  great,"  says  the  ancient  law 
of  the  Visigoths.  The  most  sacred  interests,  then,  of  man, 
of  woman,  and  of  society  demand,  as  much  as  strict  justice, 
that  she  should  not  meddle  with  politics. 

XI.  There  is,  nevertheless,  a  cord  by  which  the  woman  is 
strongly  connected  through  her  liveliest  sentiments  with  the 
state — it  is  patriotism.  Let  it  not  be  said  that  this  virtue  can- 
not be  strong  in  her  if  we  deny  her  an  active  part  in  the  daily 
political  affairs.  On  the  contrary,  that  feeling  is  frequently 
strongest  by  its  native  vigor  in  those  individuals  whose  feel- 
ings have  not  been  exposed  to  the  blunting  effects  of  political 
strife  and  rancor,  for  patriotism  is  the  love  of  country,  not  the 
love  of  the  state  only.  Through  her  husband  and  children 
and  brothers  she  is  connected  with  the  actions  of  the  state ; 
let  her  cultivate  the  noblest  feelings,  let  her  be  both  a  support 
and  an  incentive  to  her  husband,  let  her  in  herself  represent 
to  him  the  country  which  is  worth  living,  toiling,  dying  for, 
let  her  early  imbue  her  children  with  this  sacred  love,  and, 
when  finally  need  shall  be,  let  her  act  boldly  and  heroically 
if  she  have  the  constitution,  bestowing  an  honor  upon  her 
country.  Let  the  woman  look  upon  the  numberless  Roman 


128  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

wives  and  mothers  who,  though  so  strictly  domestic,  willingly 
could  die  for  their  country,  and  then  say  whether  their  lot  is 
low.  I  believe  it  can  be  said  without  contradiction  that  in  all 
periods  of  free  nations,  in  which  the  noblest  deeds  have  been 
performed  and  the  greatest  sacrifices  made  to  liberty,  and  in 
which  the  nation  has  evinced  a  spirit  that  stands  as  an  en- 
kindling example  to  the  latest  periods,  woman  has  stood  in 
this  her  true  position,  as  wife  and  mother,  linked  most  closely 
to  her  country  through  husband  and  son. 

It  seems  to  me  one  of  the  great  destinies  of  woman  that, 
not  being  ordinarily  called  upon  in  the  great  order  of  things 
to  mingle  in  the  turmoil  of  life,  in  the  strife  and  struggle  of 
the  times  and  the  bustle  of  business,  or  in  those  pursuits  of 
knowledge  or  practical  life  which  make  men  acquainted  with 
the  selfish,  criminal,  and  foul  aberrations  of  human  nature,  she 
is  more  able  to  keep  the  simple  and  elementary  sentiments 
and  impulses  untainted  in  their  native  freshness  and  purity. 
Men  in  this  respect  appear  to  me  like  the  lawyers  or  judges, 
who,  by  long  practice,  seeing  so  much,  weighing  so  much 
for  and  against,  must  frequently  become  blunted  in  their  na- 
tive quick  feelings  of  right;  but  women,  like  the  lookers-on, 
unprofessional  ye.t  deeply  interested  in  the  issue.  And  should 
it  be  necessary  to  add  that  men,  frequently  seeing  so  much 
corruption  abroad,  are  apt  to  be  influenced  by  the  lower 
standard  around  and  above  them  ?  It  becomes,  therefore,  the 
more  necessary  that  in  the  wife,  not  exposed  as  she  is  to 
these  unhallowed  effects,  and  cultivating  as  she  does  in  the 
stillness  of  the  house  the  virtue  of  her  children,  the  broad  and 
pure  principles  of  patriotism  should  continue' to  be  repre- 
sented. When  the  sentence  respecting  Hampden's  ever- 
memorable  ship-money  case  was  to  be  pronounced,  and  the 
British  court  used  its  whole  influence  to  obtain  an  opinion  of 
the  bench  favorable  to  the  unlawful  usurpations  of  the  crown, 
but  subversive  of  one  of  the  most  elementary  principles  of  the 
British  constitution,  and  nearly  all  the  judges,  dependent  crea- 
tures of  the  crown,  had  made  up  their  minds  to  support  them 
at  all  hazards,  Justices  Croke,  Hutton,  and  Denham  alone 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


129 


dared  to  side  with  justice,  honor,  truth,  and  their  country. 
Croke,  however,  before  he  gave  his  final  opinion,  had  wavered, 
not  because  undecided  as  to  the  great  question  of  right,  but 
because  he  saw  that  his  seat  on  the  bench  was  at  stake.  It 
was  then  that  his  patriotic  and  high-minded  wife  "  implored 
him  not  to  sacrifice  his  conscience  for  fear  of  any  danger  or 
prejudice  to  his  family,  being  content  to  suffer  any  misery 
with  him  rather  than  to  be  an  occasion  for  him  to  violate  his 
integrity."  Her  name  ought  to  be  held  dear  and  in  living 
remembrance  forever. 

XII.  It  is  high-minded  patriotism  which,  among  other  deep- 
seated  motives,  may  induce  women  in  times  of  emergencies 
to  perform  the  most  heroic  deeds,  boldly  braving  danger  or 
supporting  all  the  suffering  that  human  nature  can  endure. 
We  need  not  seek  for  instances  in  Telesilla,  who  valiantly 
defended  Argos  when  the  youths  of  her  country  were  slain, 
or  in  Leaena,  who,  tortured  by  Hippias  to  compel  her  to  be- 
tray the  secrets  of  her  lover  Aristogiton,  bit  off  her  tongue 
for  fear  she  might  be  unable  to  resist  the  pain;1  we  find 
many  of  the  proudest  instances  of  heroism  and  devotion  in  all 
periods  of  struggle  for  a  noble  object.  The. history  of  the 
Dutch  war  of  independence  is  full  of  the  brightest  examples, 
and  we  have  seen  in  our  own  times  the  women  of  Saragossa 
abide  by  their  fighting  husbands  unto  death,2  and  the  Prussian 
women  of  all  ranks  attend  the  hospitals,  in  organized  societies, 
and  do  every  work,  the  most  arduous  or  loathsome  not  ex 
cepted,  which  the  state  of  the  wounded  required,  in  the  years 
1813  and  1814,  when  every  able-bodied  man  was  in  the  field: 
at  which  time  they  did  not  shun  the  malignant  typhus  fever, 
then  raging  in  the  hospitals  and  carrying  off  many  of  these 
ministers  of  humanity,  who  did  not  exclude  from  their  care 
their  wounded  enemies !  It  is  sufficient  to  read  the  papers 
of  the  day  in  order  to  be  satisfied,  by  the  accounts  of  ship- 


1  [Comp.  Plut.  de  Mulier.  Virt.,  iv. ;  Pausan.,  i.  23.] 

2  Napier,  Peninsular  War,  book  v.  ch.  3. 
VOL.  II.  q 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

wrecks  for  instance,  of  what  heroism  woman  is  capable.1  Yet 
let  us  remember  that  in  those  periods  of  extremity  in  which 
woman  has  performed  so  noble  a  part,  she  had  not  prepared 
herself  for  these  arduous  deeds  by  previously  misplacing  her- 
self in  society,  or  by  intruding  into  spheres  which  would  have 
deprived  her  of  her  character.  It  was  the  loving  mother,  the 
faithful  wife,  not  the  female  politician  or  the  spinster  who  had 
delivered  public  speeches,  that  could  suddenly  step  upon  the 
wall  and  look  into  the  enemy's  face. 

I  believe,  then,  that  the  most  important  calling  of  the 
woman  respecting  politics  is,  that,  as  wife,  she  identify  herself 
with  her  husband  in  his  best  endeavors,  and  aid  him  in  keep- 
ing alive  and  active  the  purest  principles,  and  as  mother,  that, 
besides  the  whole  cultivation  of  her  children,  which  in  so 
eminent  a  degree  depends  upon  her,  she  sow  with  religious  zeal 
the  seeds  of  lofty  patriotism  in  their  hearts  from  early  infancy. 
For  this  purpose  she  ought  to  make  herself  acquainted  with 
the  best  examples  in  the  history  of  her  own  and  other  coun- 
tries. A  story  received  in  early  youth  from  a  mother's  lips' 
sinks  deep  into  the  soul,  and  becomes  a  very  part  of  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  believe  that  woman  transgresses  the 
proper  line,  to  her  own  injury  and  the  detriment  of  society  at 
large,  if  she  takes  public  part  in  the  ordinary  politics  of  the 
day.  I  think  it  highly  objectionable,  unfair,  and  injurious  if 
women  canvass  for  elections,2  and  highly  dangerous  for  their 
position  and  character  if  they  hold  public  meetings  and  pub- 
licly debate,  as  several  times  they  have  done  of  late  in  Eng- 


1  *  It  is  a  great  omission  that  the  French  women  of  the  revolution  were  not 
mentioned  here;  for,  while  the  fishwomen  of  Paris  were  loathsomely  vile  and 
bloodthirsty,  all  France  literally  abounded  with  the  greatest  heroines,  who  sacri- 
ficed themselves,  as  wives,  mothers,  sisters,  daughters,  and  friends.     See  by  all 
means   Raumer,  Histor.  Taschenb.,  Neue   Folge,  vol.  i.,  1840,  essay  3  :  "  die 
Frauen  der  Franzos.  Revolution." 

2  There  is  perhaps  no  more  striking  instance  of  ladies  canvassing  for  election, 
however  common   in   England,  on   record,  than  when,  previous  to  the  famous 
Westminster  election  in  1784,  the  duchess  of  Devonshire  and  Mrs.  Crewe  can- 
vassed for  Fox,   and  the  countess  of  Salisbury  for   Sir  Cecil  \Vray.     Wraxall 
gives  an  account  of  it  in  his  Posthumous  Memoirs. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  13 1 

land  ;T  and  I  believe  it  manifestly  out  of  place  if  they  petition 
legislative  bodies  respecting  public  measures,  unless  it  be 
against  a  direct  injustice  done  to  them  as  women,  of  which 
indeed  they  do  not  stand  in  much  danger  in  our  times. 
Women  ought  to  abstain  in  particular  from  petitions  for  par- 
doning criminals.  Their  sentiment  as  well  as  their  want  of 
acquaintance  with  practical  life  inclines  them  naturally  towards 
charity  as  soon  as  sentence  is  pronounced  upon  a  convict ; 
they  forget  his  crime,  and  the  cause  of  morality  and  society, 
little  thinking  what  injury  may  be  inflicted  by  frustrating  the 
course  of  law,  and  in  particular  by  the  new  crimes  which 
the  pardoned  criminal  will  not  be  unlikely  to  commit.  I  shall 
say  more  on  pardoning  in  general  in  another  place ;  suffice  it 
here  to  say  that  petitions  for  pardon  from  women  are  unjust 
and  unfair  in  the  highest  degree.  Either  they  study  the  par- 
ticular case  or  not:  if  they  do  not,  it  is  preposterous  to  solicit 
a  pardon  ;  if  they  do,  they  throw  away  one  of  their  first  privi- 
leges in  life,  that  of  being  exempt  from  the  necessity  of 
making  themselves  acquainted  with  the  foulest  diseases  of 
society.  I  speak  here  of  those  written  petitions  with  a  number 
of  names,  of  which  we  all  know  with  what  degree  of  ignorance 
of  the  case  in  question  they  are  signed.  Who  would  consider 
it  wrong  in  a  single  woman  to  implore  mercy  in  cases  which 
do  not  touch  common  and  base  crimes  and  which  interest  her 
individually  ? 

Were  I  asked  which  of  the  women  known  in  history  sig- 
nally embodies  those  qualities  which  appear  to  me  essential 
to  the  modern  woman,  not  by  way  of  exception  or  rare  dis- 
tinction for  talents,  but  as  eminently  showing  those  qualities 
which  ought  to  be  in  all,  in  short  showing  the"  modern  wife 
and  mother  in  the  noblest  light,  I  should  point  out  Lady 
Russell,  wife  of  Lord  William  Russell.  Kind  and  considerate 
to  children  and  husband,  she  always  invited  him  to  unbosom 


1  I  would  certainly  not  go  so  far  as  to  pronounce  against  all  meetings  of 
women,  placed  in  so  peculiar  a  situation,  for  instance,  as  those  working  in  some 
of  the  American  factories.  But  even  there  they  ought  always  to  take  care  not 
to  endanger  their  essential  female  character  by  entering  into  publicity. 


j32  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

himself  to  her  in  his  patriotic  anxieties;  she  understood  him; 
she  felt  with  him  ;  when  he  was  imprisoned,  she  did  all  pos- 
sible service  to  him ;  when  he  was  tried  for  his  life,  she  was 
not  overwhelmed,  but  stepped  forward  in  court  and  took  notes 
for  him  ;  when  he  was  sentenced,  she  lost  no  time  in  bewail- 
ing his  doom,  but  attempted  every  lawful  means  to  avert  the 
blow,  and  to  comfort  her  lord  in  prison  by  her  own  high- 
minded  composure ;  and  when,  on  the  evening  before  his 
execution,  she  took  her  last  farewell  from  a  husband  she 
loved  better  than  aught  on  earth,  and  whom  she  knew  to  be 
unrighteously  sacrificed,  even  then  she  had  the  greatness  of 
soul  to  stand  the  trial.  "  He  kissed  her  four  or  five  times ; 
and  she  kept  her  sorrow  so  within  herself  that  she  gave  him 
no  disturbance  by  their  parting."1  This  fortitude,  and  the 
patience  with  which  she  bore  her  affliction  through  the  rest 
of  her  life,  was  greater  heroism  than  any  ancient  or  Asiatic 
self-immolation  could  have  proved.2 


1  "  After  she  was  gone,"  continues  Burnet  in  his  journal,  from  which  this  ac- 
count was  taken,  "  he  (Lord  Russell)  said,  *  Now  the  bitterness  of  death  is  past,' 
and  ran  out  into  a  long  discourse  concerning  her — how  great  a  blessing  she  had 
been  to  him  ;  and  said,  '  what  a  misery  it  would  have  been  to  him  if  she  had  not 
had  that  magnanimity  of  spirit,  joined  to  her  tenderness,  as  never  to  have  desired 
him  to  do  a  base  thing  for  the  saving  of  his  life,  whereas,  otherwise,  what  a  week 
should  I  have  passed,  if  she  had  been  crying  to  me  to  turn  informer  and  be  a 
Lord  Howard  !'  "     Lady  Russell's  whole  character  may  be  seen  from  Lord  John 
Russell's  Life  of  William  Lord  Russell.     I  hope  I  do  not  trespass  the  limits  of 
a  note,  if  I  add  a  few  words  on  the  widow  of  Barneveldt.     Maurice,  stadtholder 
of  Holland,  caused  the  wise  patriot  to  be  executed ;  at  any  rate,  he  did  not,  as 
he  had  the  power  to  do,  prevent  it,  when  the  most  unfortunate  religious  excite- 
ment against  the  poor  Remonstrants  ran  high.     When,  some  time  after,  the  son 
of  Barneveldt  had  shared  in  a  conspiracy  against  Maurice,  and  been  sentenced 
to  die,  the  mother  threw  herself  at  the  stadtholder's  feet  to  implore  mercy  for 
her  son.     He  asked  why  she  could  beg  now  for  her  son,  and  had  not  done  so 
for  her  husband,  —  whom,  it  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the  stadtholder  declared 
himself  at  the  time  ready  to  save,  if  he  would  implore  mercy;  but  the  old  man 
would  not  belie  his  innocence,  as  Russell  declined  the  same.     The  heroic  answer 
of  the  afflicted  mother  but  proud  widow  was,  "  My  husband  was  innocent,  my 
son  is  guilty."     Her  prayer  was  not  granted.     Van  Campen,  History  of  the 
Netherlands,  vol.  ii.  p.  43. 

2  See  also  Letters  of  Lady  Rachel  Russell,  from  the  Manuscript  in  the  Library 
at  Woburn  Abbey,  etc.,  6th  ed.,  London,  1801. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  133 

XIII.  The  history  of  woman  in  her  domestic  and  social  as 
well  as  in  her  civil  relations,  and  more  particularly  in  her  jural 
position  and  social  influence,  is  one  of  the  most  interesting 
and  important  branches  of  the  history  of  civilization,  which, 
so  far  as  my  knowledge  of  literature  extends,  has  not  yet  been 
treated  with  the  profoundness  of  thought  and  extent  of  knowl- 
edge that  the  subject  deserves,  although  valuable  materials 
have  been  collected  for  this  inviting  task.1 

In  the  earliest  times,  when  physical  subsistence  and  bodily 
protection  form  the  absorbing  objects  of  human  activity,  it  is 
natural  that  woman  should  occupy  a  very  subordinate  position. 
She  was  not  only  considered  mentally,  but  also  morally,  in- 
ferior to  man,  as  she  was  physically  inferior  to  him.  She 
was  so  little  considered  a  human  individual  of  herself,  that 
not  only  most  essential  rights  were  denied  her,  but,  as  a 
natural  consequence,  also  moral  responsibility,  even  to  a  late 
period,  not  only  metaphysically  but  legally,  so  that  it  be- 
came necessary  to  restore  legal  responsibility  to  her.2  Man, 
being  conscious  of  the  necessity  that  the  woman  should 
associate  with  him  and  form  an  ingredient  of  the  family,  could 
not  at  once  acknowledge  this  necessary  association  and  yet  at 
the  same  time  her  entire  moral  individuality.  Though  from 
early  ages  affection  has  prevailed  over  power,  the  daughter, 
like  her  brother,  was  considered  the  property  of  her  father, 
and  when  married  she  was  sold  to  the  wooer.  The  ancient 


1  There  have  been  several  collections  of  the  biographies  of  distinguished  women. 
Alexander,  History  of  Women,  2  vols.  4to,  1779;  Segur,  Les  Femmes,  3  vols., 
1802 ;  Communications  from  the  Lives  of  Distinguished  Women  (in  German), 
Stuttgard,  1828;  with  many  other  works.  Meiners  wrote  a  History  of  the  Fe- 
male Sex  (in  German),  Hanover,  1788-1800,  4  vols.  For  any  one  who  desires 
to  inquire  thoroughly  into  what  has  been  written  on  this  subject,  as  well  as  on 
the  influence  of  Christianity  upon  the  position  of  woman,  and  other  points  con- 
nected with  the  general  subject,  it  would  be  well  to  examine  the  list  of  works 
appended  to  the  article  Woman  (Frau)  in  Krug's  Dictionary  of  Philosophical 
Sciences ;  though  it  is  far  from  being  complete. 

3  King  Magnus  Erichsen  of  Sweden  "  was  able  to  decree,  in  1335,  that  'the 
woman  shall  suffer  for  her  crimes  like  the  man,  especially  for  crimes  touching 
life.'  "  Geijer,  History  of  Sweden,  Hamburg,  1832,  vol.  i.  p.  273.  The  words 
"was  able"  are  very  significant. 


134 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


history  of  Asiatic  nations,  for  instance  the  Bible,  and  of  other 
tribes,  shows  this,  as  well  as  the  customs  observed  to  this  day 
by  the  tribes  of  the  East.1  Polygamy,  legitimate  even  with 
the  Hebrews,2  though  not  favored  or  general,3  did  not  rapidly 
promote  the  jural  or  social  emancipation  of  the  woman.  In 
Europe,  among  the  Greeks  and  Romans  as  well  as  other  tribes, 
monogamy  existed  from  early  times,  and  we  consequently  find 
the  woman  there  in  a  very  different  position.  She  has  now 
become  the  companion  of  the  husband.  Greek  history  records 
many  of  the  brightest  examples  of  women  as  wives  or  mothers, 
but  the  annals  of  no  nation  probably  exhibit  so  many  as  those 
of  Rome ;  instances  of  heroic  devotion,  which  continue  far 
into  the  corrupt  periods  of  the  Western  empire.  The  Teu- 
tonic tribes,  which  hastened  the  downfall  of  crumbling  Rome, 

• 

showed,  from  the  earliest  periods  in  which  we  find  them  men- 
tioned, no  less  than  in  their  whole  mythology,  a  peculiar  regard 
for  the  female,  which,  together  with  the  humanizing  influence 
of  the  church  in  general,  and  its  direct  efforts  in  many  instances 
to  improve  the  position  of  woman,  had  a  salutary  effect  on 
the  European  population.  When  chivalry  sprang  up,  in  which 
religious  ardor,  desire  of  adventure,  and  devotion  to  woman 
were  romantically  blended,  the  exaltation  of  woman  became, 
in  one  class  at  least,  an  absorbing  concern  of  life.  Though 
this  adoration  of  woman  led  to  many  fantastic  and  even  im- 
moral aberrations,4  and  had  far  less  effect  upon  the  essential 


1  Niebuhr  the  elder,  Burckhardt,  and  all  the  other  travellers  in  the  East.  So 
do  we  find  instances  of  the  buying  of  wives  in  Odyss.,  xi.  281;  Iliad,  xi.  244; 
Herod.,  i.  196;  Strabo,  p.  745,  etc. 

"  Michaelis,  Mosaic  Law,  ii.  85;  Saalschutz,  Mos.  Recht,  chap.  103. 

3  Michaelis,  ii.  95 ;  Jahn,  Arch.,  i.  2. 

•*  The  morals  of  the  twelfth,  thirteenth,  and  fourteenth  centuries  were  of  the 
most  licentious  character.  Chateaubriand,  in  the  third  volume  of  his  Etudes 
Historiques,  gives  instances,  such  as  establishments  in  imitation  of  nunneries 
with  vows  of  immorality.  Whoever  is  in  the  least  acquainted  with  the  morals  of 
those  ages,  with  the  peculiar  government  and  corporate  privileges  of  the  prostitutes 
in  the  various  cities  during  former  periods  and  with  the  courts  and  monasteries  of 
those  times,  will  consider  the  advance  of  morality  in  our  race  during  the  last 
two  centuries,  despite  all  existing  irregularities,  as  one  of  the  most  signal  traits 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


135 


position  of  woman  in  general,  and  the  morals  of  the  age,  than 
many  persons,  satisfied  with  insulated  and  poetic  accounts, 
rashly  believe,  still  every  one  acquainted  with  the  history  of 
civilization  will  admit  the  romantic  devotion  of  the  middle 
ages  to  have  been  one  of  the  factors  in  producing  a  better 
state  of  things  and  in  somewhat  tempering  even  the  miseries 
of  part  of  the  worst  periods.  The  cities,  with  their  industry 
and  wealth,  rose  in  power  and  number,  governments  became 
more  general  institutions,  the  feudal  lords  more  subdued ; 
peace  was  more  and  more  established,  and  the  rights  of  the 
commons,  of  the  people  in  general,  and  also  those  of  the 
women  in  particular,  became  gradually  more  clearly  defined, 
extended,  and  valued.  Woman  was  more  and  more  acknowl- 
edged in  her  own  moral  capacity.  Laws  became  juster  to- 
wards her.  When  the  period  of  re-discussion  of  all  human 
rights  began  during  the  last  century,  inquiry  naturally  was 
extended  to  the  position  and  rights  of  woman,  which,  the 
more  these  attracted  attention,  became  in  many  instances  very 
limited  indeed  as  to  extent,  though  acute  as  to  the  single 
object  which  happened  to  be  under  discussion  ;  and  finally  a 
series  of  writings  appeared,  beginning  perhaps  with  Mary  Woll- 
stonecraft's  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Women,  published 
towards  the  end  of  the  last  century,  which,  in  determining  the 
proper  sphere  of  action  in  society  and  the  state  for  man  and 
woman,  altogether  lost  sight  of  the  different  organization  of  the 
two  sexes,  and  the  pervading  divine  order  of  things  founded 
upon  it.  One  step  led  to  another,  and  finally  writers  ap- 
peared,x  both  male  and  female,  who  endeavored  to  break  up 
that  institution  which  was  already  considered  by  the  ancient 
philosophers,  poets,  and  priests  as  forming  together  with  the 
institution  of  property  the  only  firm  foundation  of  all  civiliza- 
tion— the  institution  of  matrimony.  Two  late  writers  in  par- 
ticular, a  man  and  a  woman,  have  written  upon  this  subject 
and  the  intercourse  between  the  two  sexes,  with  so  disgusting 


in  modern  history.     The  change  which  has  taken  place  is  far  beyond  what  any 
one  wlio  has  not  perused  the  histories  and  chronicles  of  the  times  can  imagine. 


I36  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

a  temerity  that  I  seriously  doubt  whether  any  previous  period 
has  been  disgraced  by  compositions  of  equally  loathsome  im- 
morality, pitiful  and  superficial  reasoning,  and  gross  ignorance. 

XIV.  Neither  the  literary  progress  of  women  and  their  dis- 
tinction in  the  province  of  letters,  on  the  one  hand,  nor,  on  the 
other,  the  question  why  females  should  be  allowed  to  sit  upon 
a  throne,  when  excluded  from  all  other  public  business,  is  a 
subject  to  be  discussed  here.  The  one  belongs  to  the  history 
of  literature  or  female  civilization,  the  other  to  politics  proper. 
It  is  nothing  more  than  a  mere  question  of  high  political  expe- 
diency. Yet  although  the  subject  of  voting  by  females  does 
not  belong,  strictly  speaking,  to  our  province,  but  to  natural 
law  and  politics  proper,  as  defined  in  the  first  part,  I  may  be 
allowed  to  give  here  a  very  few  additional  remarks  on  the 
subject. 

Either  we  acknowledge  the  difference  of  sexes,  and  conse- 
quent different  spheres  of  action,  as  necessary  and  founded  in 
the  great  order  of  things,  or  not.  If  the  former,  then  there 
is  no  more  denial  of  right  in  excluding  women  from  public 
business  than  there  is  in  not  calling  on  them  to  take  up  arms  or 
to  work,  by  way  of  taxation,  in  repairing  high-roads.  If  the 
latter  be  the  case,  we  ought  not  only  to  allow  them  to  vote, 
for  that  is  a  very  specific  and  limited  political  act  indeed,  but 
they  ought  to  be  in  every  respect  admitted  and  consequently 
called  upon  to  do  all  that  men  do.  It  is  erroneously  supposed 
by  some  that  voting  is  a  natural  and  absolute  right,  inherent 
in  each  individual.  This  is  a  very  great  mistake  ;  for  though 
every  one's  interest  ought  to  have  its  due  weight  in  the  de- 
vising of  public  measures,  whose  degree  of  justice  depends 
upon  the  average  benefit  they  bestow  upon  the  whole,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  this  be  effected  by  his  voting.  Universal  suf- 
frage is  a  term  too  vast  for  what  is  meant  to  be  expressed. 
There  are  always  persons  excluded  from  voting.  Soldiers  do 
not  vote,  and  ought  not  to  vote  for  instance  in  their  barracks  ; 
the  French  constitution  of  Herault  de  Sechelles  excluded  do- 
mestics from  voting,  because  too  dependent  in  their  situation  ; 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  137 

many  constitutions  exclude  the  clergy  from  voting,  because 
their  influence,  always  great,  is  feared  if  they  interfere  with 
politics.  Nor  is  the  question  of  universal  suffrage  to  be  other- 
wise decided  upon  abstract  ground.  Universal  suffrage  in 
Illyria  or  in  any  semi-barbarous  tribe  in  near  contact  with 
civilization  would  be  a  very  melancholy  thing.  So  no  civil- 
ized nation  in  which,  from  whatever  cause  it  may  result,  there 
are  vast  classes,  ignorant,  rude,  and  poor,  excluded  from  the 
common  stream  of  civilization,  can  endure  universal  suffrage. 
Those  who  insist  on  the  natural  birthright  of  man  to  vote 
cannot  in  my  opinion  demonstrate  the  legality  of  a  represent- 
ative government,  nor  of  any  other  government  except  that 
of  a  tribe  which  daily  decides  by  a  simple  numerical  majority 
of  all  its  members  upon  every  subject.  Yet  we  are  told  that, 
allowing  all  these  positions,  the  woman  is  not  even  repre- 
sented. This  too  rests  upon  an  error.  Is  not  the  whole  life  of 
the  husband  daily,  hourly,  and  most  thoroughly  influenced 
by  her  and  by  his  position  towards  her?  And  if  he  takes,  as 
he  necessarily  must  do,  this  whole  frame  of  mind  with  him 
into  legislative  proceedings,  is  his  wife  unrepresented  ?  The 
agriculturist  is  far  less  sure  that  a  merchant  of  his  district  will 
represent  his  interest  than  the  wife  is  that  her  husband  repre- 
sents her.1  How  are  the  sick  or  the  old  represented  who 
cannot  go  to  the  poll  ?  If  indeed  by  true  representation  be 
meant  that  each  one  should  have  a  direct  spokesman,  and  not 
the  political  organism  through  which  we  arrive  at  the  public 
opinion  and  public  will  of  the  whole,  after  those  of  the  parts 
of  society  have  modified  one  another,  I  do  not  see  how  indeed 
the  minority  is  represented  in  any  representative  government, 
or  how  a  law  of  the  majority  in  an  absolute  democracy  can 


1  It  is  always  a  painful,  sometimes  a  dangerous,  task  to  be  obliged  to  touch 
upon  important  and  highly  debated  points  without  being  able  to  give  and  develop 
the  whole:  for  it  is  not  agreeable  to  be  misunderstood  on  such  topics.  I  can  of 
course  not  explain  my  whole  view  of  governments,  etc.,  but  I  may  be  allowed  to 
add  at  least  that  I  consider  it  a  principle  in  politics  that  the  right  of  voting,  if  it 
exist  at  all,  ought  to  be  extensive,  and  not  restricted,  or  it  will  work  far  more 
mischief  than  good. 


138 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


have  any  binding  power  upon  the  minority.  For  it  is  certain 
that  in  the  former  case  the  representative  does  not  directly 
represent  the  minority,  since  he  says  and  does  things  totally 
at  variance  with  their  opinion  ;  nor  is  the  law  in  the  latter  case 
the  direct  law,  that  is  the  public  will  of  the  minority. 

I  conclude  with  a  passage  of  Mr.  Guizot's,  and  only  add 
that  he  is  the  husband  of  a  lady  highly  distinguished  even  in 
literature.  He  says,  "  Society,  however  simple  may  be  its 
structure,  has  other  affairs  than  such  as  are  merely  domestic 
to  engage  its  attention ;  affairs  that  demand  an  extent  of  ca- 
pacity not  possessed  by  females  and  minors.  Let  us  suppose 
a  discussion  to  arise  in  some  savage  tribe,  or  in  some  state 
already  civilized,  relative  to  a  warlike  expedition  or  the  adop- 
tion of  a  civil  law :  neither  women  nor  minors  are  capable  of 
deciding  upon  interests  of  this  description ;  Providence  has 
destined  the  former  for  a  state  of  existence  purely  domestic, 
while  the  latter  have  not  yet  attained  to  the  plenitude  of  their 
individual  existence  and  the  full  power  of  their  faculties. 
Naturally,  then,  and  by  the  operation  of  one  of  those  truly 
providential  laws  in  which  fact  and  right  are  so  very  harmo- 
niously blended,  the  right  of  suffrage  does  not  belong  to  them. 
Capacity,  then,  is  the  principle,  the  necessary  condition,  of 
right.  And  the  capacity  here  spoken  of  is  not  merely  due  to 
intellectual  development  or  to  the  possession  of  this  or  that 
particular  faculty;  it  is  a  complex  and  profound  whole,  com- 
prising spontaneous  authority,  habitual  situation,  and  natural 
acquaintance  with  the  different  interests  to  be  regulated  ;  in 
fact,  a  certain  aggregate  of  faculties,  knowledge,  and  methods 
of  action  which  animate  the  whole  man,  and  which  decide, 
with  more  certainty  than  his  spirit  alone,  upon  his  course  of 
conduct  and  the  use  which  he  will  make  of  power." 


CHAPTER    II. 

Obedience  to  the  Laws. — How  highly  the  Greeks  esteemed  it. — Obedience  to 
Laws  one  of  Man's  Prerogatives. — Absolute  Obedience  impossible. — Ad  Im- 
possibilia  Nemo  obligatur. — Ad  Turpia  Nemo  obligatur. — Viscount  Orthes. — 
Unlawful  Demands  made  by  lawful  Authority. — High  Importance  of  the  Judi- 
ciary with  reference  to  Obedience  to  the  Law. — Not  all  that  is  not  prohibited 
may  be  done  by  the  Citizen,  any  more  than  all  that  is  positively  permitted. 
— Penalties  are  not  equivalents  of  Crime. — Malum  in  se,  Malum  prohibi- 
tum:  Is  the  distinction  essential,  and  can  we  found  any  Rule  of  Action 
upon  it  ? — The  Question  of  Obedience  to  Laws  a  Question  of  Conflict. — Obe- 
dience in  the  Army  and  Navy. — Articles  of  War. — Obedience  in  the  Civil 
Service. — How  far  is  the  Citizen  bound  to  obey  the  Laws? — Justifiable  Dis- 
obedience.— Necessary  and  morally  demanded  Disobedience. — Non-compli- 
ance with  the  Laws,  or  passive  Resistance. — Active  Resistance.  —  Armed 
Resistance. — Insurrection. — Revolution. — Resistance  formerly  considered  law- 
ful and  received  in  the  Charters.^Mobs  and  Mob-law,  so  called. — Duty  of 
Informing:  in  the  Officer;  in  the  Citizen  at  large. — Professional  Informers  for 
Rewards. —  Secret  Police. — Delatores  and  Mouchards. — The  obligation  of 
informing  against  intended  or  committed  Offences. 

XV.  "  STRANGER,  tell  the  Lacedaemonians  that  we  lie  here 
in  obedience  to  their  laws."  '  This  was  the  simple  inscription, 
composed  by  Simonides  of  Ceos,  to  commemorate  the  heroic 
and  conscious  devotion  of  the  faithful  band  of  Leonidas  at 
Thermopylae;  and  in  which  a  nation  of  peculiar  sagacity,  and 
promptitude  of  mind  as  well  as  ardor  of  soul  for  liberty,  a  na- 
tion with  whom  "  freedom  was  what  the  sun  is  ;  the  most  bril- 
liant and  most  useful  object  of  creation — a  passion,  an  instinct," 
thought  to  express  the  highest  acknowledgment  of  a  deed 
which  every  Greek  remembered  with  national  pride.  It  was 
not  merely  the  happy  conceit  of  an  individual ;  it  was  the 
true  expression  of  the  public  spirit.  Of  all  that  was  noble 
and  great  in  this  patriotic  act,  the  noblest  and  greatest  seemed 
to  them  that  the  gallant  citizens  had  been  obedient  to  the 


1  Herodotus,  vii.  228. 

139 


140 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


laws  and  their  country  even  unto  death.  Youthful  reader, 
whose  noble  and  happy  lot  it  is  to  be  born  in  a  free  country, 
an  heir  to  the  laws  of  liberty,  weigh  well  this  inscription,  in 
which  one  of  the  noblest  nations  of  the  earth  has  concentrated 
its  lively  spirit  and  dear  experience,  a  lesson  for  every  one 
who  cherishes  freedom,  and  intends  to  make  it  prosper,  as  far 
as  in  him  lies,  as  the  best  cause  of  mankind. 

XVI.  To  make,  acknowledge,  and  obey  laws  is  one  of  the 
high  prerogatives  as  well  as  duties  of  man  among  all  the  ani- 
mate beings  of  the  visible  creation.  Obeying  a  law,  in  this 
case,  means  conforming  our  actions  willingly  to  laws,  that  is, 
to  rules  in  which  principles,  as  applied  to  a  class  of  cases,  are 
pronounced.  The  individual  himself,  as  well  as  society  at 
large,  stands  in  need  of  laws ;  without  them  there  would  be 
physical  and  moral  disorder.  The  individual  who  does  not 
adopt  general  laws  of  conduct  or  principles  of  action  is  ex- 
posed to  all  the  dangers  of  being  carried  away  by  impulses 
which  may  arise  from  causes  wholly  unconnected  with  what  is 
good,  right,  or  wise,  by  selfishness  and  vices  ;  and  society  does 
not  only  stand  in  need  of  laws  that  it  may  avoid  violence  and 
consequent  suffering,  but  also  because  without  laws  society 
would  lose  its  moral  character,  man  would  forfeit  his  destiny 
as  a  social  being,  and  civilization,  that  produce  of  united  ex- 
ertion, would  be  impossible.  Man  is  wholly  man  only  in 
society ;  society  is  what  it  ought  to  be  only  through  laws ; 
laws  are  virtually  laws  only  when  obeyed :  therefore  man's 
destiny  requires  obedience  to  laws.  Obedience  to  laws,  then, 
is  necessary,  for  without  their  being  followed  they  are  no 
longer  laws  in  essence,  because  no  longer  rules  of  action. 
Habitual  disregard  of  laws  in  a  society  not  only  produces 
confusion  and  clashing  of  action,  but  it  leads  to  a  want  of 
energy,  of  mutual  reliance,  and  of  public  spirit,  as  well  as  to 
a  want  of  manly  independence  in  the"  individual.  It  invigor- 
ates the  soul,  lends  energy  and  gives  precision  of  action,  and 
promotes  a  general  feeling  of  right,  if  the  individuals  obey  the 
laws  they  have  chosen  to  obey.  Few  things  promote  more 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  141 

the  formation  of  a  manly  character  and  a  deeply-seated  sense 
of  justice  in  the  young,  than  decisive  and  good  laws  or  pre- 
cepts, strictly  acted  out.  Even  the  severest  laws,  if  but  clearly 
pronounced  and  strictly  enforced,  may  leave  some  feeling  of 
independence;  but  dependence  upon  humor  gives  an  insuper- 
able feeling  of  slavishness.  He  who  obeys  laws  only  as  so 
many  insulated  regulations,  depriving  him  of  more  or  less  in- 
dividual liberty  which  he  has  given  up  for  the  public  good, 
has  not  penetrated  to  that  high  degree  of  civic  sense  which 
makes  obedience  to  the  laws  an  inspiring  cause  of  nobility 
of  character. 

Yet  we  have  seen  that  man  cannot  divest  himself  of  his 
moral  individuality  and  responsibility;  the  will  of  another 
cannot  virtually  become  his  own  will ;  and,  therefore,  abso- 
lute obedience  is  impossible,  and,  were  it  possible,  immoral. 
Every  approach  to  it  becomes  in  the  same  degree  immoral. 
Absolute  obedience  can  be  claimed  for  the  commandments  of 
the  Deity  alone;  but  even  here  it  must  be  observed  that  the 
evidence  that  such  commands  do  proceed  from  the  Deity 
is  to  be  judged  of  by  the  individual;  reason  and  conscience 
must  decide  upon  the  character  of  the  authority  which  de- 
mands compliance  with  the  command  presented  as  coming 
from  the  Deity.  A  law  presented  by  Mohammedans  as  a  divine 
law  would  not  be  obeyed  by  Christians  in  Turkey,  at  least 
not  as  a  divine  law.  In  all  matters  between  man  and  man 
absolute  obedience  would  destroy  the  moral  as  well  as  the 
jural  ground  on  which  their  relations  are  founded.  Never- 
theless, passion,  as  well  as  temerity  of  partial  reasoning,  has 
repeatedly  induced  man  to  claim  absolute  obedience  for  some 
authority  or  other,  in  ecclesiastic  spheres  as  well  as  political. 
I  have  stated  already  that  it  seems  to  me  to  be  one  of  our 
obligations  to  pay  serious  and  particular  attention  to  any  act 
or  institution  in  the  whole  range  of  history  or  of  our  own  ob- 
servation in  which  a  principle,  virtue,  error,  or  vice  has  been 
most  consistently  carried  out.  In  the  one  case  we  become 
acquainted  with  a  degree  of  perfection  perhaps  unattainable 
at  the  times  we  live  in,  yet  worthy  of  being  approached  as 


142 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


much  as  possible;  in  the  other  case  we  see  the  evil  acted  out 
in  all  its  hideousness,  and  therefore  the  danger  increasing 
with  every  degree  of  approach  :  they  distinctly  say  to  us, 
"  To  this  it  will  come."  In  either  case  we  observe  truth  in  its 
fulness.  Respecting  absolute  obedience  I  know  of  no  more 
striking  instance  of  its  being  carried  out  in  daring  consistency 
than  that  which  the  Jesuits  demanded  from  the  inferior  to  the 
superior,  and  we  may  well  say  to  those  who  demand  it  in 
any  other  sphere,  "  To  this  it  will  come."  z 

XVII.  Indeed,  all  promise  of  absolute  obedience  would  vir- 
tually amount  to  taking  archbishop  Laud's  famous  and  absurd 
"  Et-Caetera  Oath,"  by  which  people  should  bind  themselves 
to  "  maintain  the  government  of  the'  church  by  archbishops, 


1  "  But  one  thing  shall  exist  instead  of  every  other  relation,  every  impulse  of 
activity,  namely,  obedience,  obedience  without  any  reference  to  what  it  extends." 
(Epistle  of  Ignatius  "Fratribus  Societatis  Jesu  qui  sunt  in  Lusitania,"  7  Kal.  Apr. 
I553>  3-)  The  superior  shall  appear  as  the  representative  of  Divine  Providence, 
the  "  Locum  Dei  tenens"  (pars  5,  cap.  3,  Constit.  Ignat.) ;  even  a  sin,  if  de- 
manded in  the  name  of  Christ,  or  in  virtute  obedientiae,  shall  be  committed. 
Well  may  Mr.  Ranke,  in  quoting  the  two  following  passages  from  the  "  Consti- 
tutiones"  of  the  society,  add,  "  we  hardly  trust  our  eyes  when  we  read  this :" 

"  Et  sibi  quisque  persuadeat,  quod  qui  sub  obedientia  vivunt,  se  ferri  ac  regi 
a  divina  providentia  per  superiores  suos  sinere  debent,  perinde  ac  cadaver  essent." 
Constit.,  vi.  I. 

'fVisumest  nobis  in  domino  .  .  .  nullas  constitutiones  declarationes  vel  or- 
dinem  ullum  vivendi  posse  obligationem  ad  peccatum  mortale  vel  veniale  indu- 
cere,  si  superior  ea  in  nomine  domini  Jesu  Christi  vel  in  virtute  obedientire 
juberet."  Const.,  vi.  5. 

Is  it  to  be  supposed  that  this  iniquitous  passage  was  understood  to  mean  that 
nothing,  in  reality  a  sin,  would  be  demanded  in  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ, 
although,  according  to  all  appearance  and  common  notion,  it  might  appear  so  to 
the  inferior?  If  this  be  the  case,  waiving  the  still  remaining  audacity  and  dan- 
ger, it  would  only  prove  that  absolute  obedience  cannot  be  carried  through,  and 
must  stop  somewhere.  The  passage  contained  in  part  vi.  ch.  I  of  Const.  Ignat. 
is  not  much  better :  "  Nee  solum  in  rebus  obligatoriis,  sed  etiam  in  aliis,  licet  nihil 
aliud  quam  signum  voluntatis  superioris  sine  ullo  expresso  prsecepto  videretur." 

Bacon,  although  he  has  but  just  bestowed  fulsome  flattery  upon  a  monarch  at 
once  one  of  the  meanest  and  most  arrogant,  says,  even  to  a  James  I.,  "  Nam  qui 
caecam  obedientiam  fortius  obligare  contenderit  quam  officium  oculatum,  una 
opera  asserat,  caecum  manu  ductum  certius  incedere,  quam  qui  luce  et  oculis 
utiti.r."  De  Dignitate  Sclent.,  i. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


143 


bishops,  deans,  chapters,  et  cetaera."  "  Yet,  although  absolute 
obedience  has  been  so  frequently  demanded  in  theory,  prac- 
tice has  always  shown  its  impossibility,  and  those  who  de- 
manded it  most  have  generally  proved  the  least  ready  to  sub- 
mit to  it,  so  soon  as  it  did  not  suit  their  position.  The  Jesuits 
have  had  at  times  violent  struggles  within  the  bosom  of  their 
society ;  though  they  took  the  additional  vow  to  go  whither- 
soever the  pope  might  send  them,  they  would  not  obey  him 
had  he  commanded  anything  against  the  doctrine  of  the 
church.  They  would  say  that  he  does  not  do  this  as  pope ; 
and  this  is  all  that  ever  a  sober  mind  has  insisted  upon  for  the 
vindication  of  the  right  and  duty  of  disobeying  laws — that  is, 
that  they  are  no  longer,  or  never  were,  lawful ;  or  that  the 
authority  demanding  it  is  not,  in  doing  so,  any  longer  lawful. 
There  is  no  government  ever  so  absolute  in  theory  which 
has  not  sanctioned  acts  of  disobedience  even  to  the  command 
of  the  prince,  because  done  on  account  of  the  still  more  impor- 
tant interest  of  the  same  prince.  How  often  have  monarchs 
wished  that  they  had  been  disobeyed  !  Napoleon  was,  ac- 
cording to  Bourrienne,  on  some  occasions  highly  pleased 
when  he  learned  that  he  had  not  been  obeyed.  In  short, 
obedience  is  always  acknowledged  in  practice  as  something 
relative,  and  of  this  the  individual,  of  course,  must  judge. 
Nowhere  in  political  spheres,  probably,  was  the  theory  of 
absolute  obedience  more  roundly  acknowledged  than  in  the 
Prussian  army,  to  its  head,  the  king,  under  Frederic  Wil- 
liam I. ;  yet  when  his  son  was  tried  for  attempted  escape 
from  his  insufferable  treatment,  and  the  king  appeared  at 
least  to  insist  upon  the  blood  of  his  son,  a  colonel2  rose,  tore 
open  his  vest,  and  said,  "  If  your  majesty  want  blood,  take 
mine :  that  there  you  shall  not  have  as  long  as  I  can  utter  a 
word."  The  king,  vehement  as  he  was,  did  not  carry  out  the 
theory  of  absolute  obedience,  but  was  silent;  and  the  colonel 
was  not  prevented  from  promotion. 


1  Laud  caused  this  oath,  attached  to  certain  new  canons,  to  be  passed  by  the 
convocation  of  1640. 

3  The  name  of  this  independent  man  was  Buddenbrock. 


144 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


From  ancient  times  the  maxim  has  been  acknowledged,  Ad 
impossibilia  nemo  obligator;  that  which  is  impossible,  there- 
fore, need  not  be  attempted,  though  ordered ;  nor  is  the 
omission  of  attempting  it  punishable;  and,  farther,  that  Ad 
turpia  nemo  obligatur;  no  one  is  bound  to  do  what  is  iniqui- 
tous. Mankind  have  uniformly  agreed  in  applauding  resist- 
ance to  that  which  is  iniquitous,  because  they  have  always 
either  acknowledged  or  at  least  felt  that  man  cannot  lose  his 
own  moral  value,  his  independent  moral  individuality,  and 
that  authority,  even  if  supposed  to  rest  upon  some  divine 
origin,  may  be  and  ought  to  be  either  disobeyed  or  opposed 
if  it  perverts  its  character  and  demands  things  against  God's 
laws,  as  expressed  by  revelation,  nature,  the  feeling  of  human- 
ity, morals,  reason,  or  physical  necessity.  When  Charles  IX. 
of  France,  or  his  mother,  issued  orders  to  slaughter  the  Prot- 
estants in  the  provinces  as  they  had  been  murdered  in  Paris 
on  the  eve  of  St.  Bartholomew,  several  governors  and  other 
officers  —  Sully  mentions  seven  —  declined  obedience.  Vis- 
count Orthes,  or  Ortez,  commandant  at  Bayonne,  wrote  back, 
"  Sire,  I  have  found  in  Bayonne  honest  citizens  and  brave  sol- 
diers only,  but  not  one  executioner.  Therefore  they  and 
myself  supplicate  your  majesty  to  use  our  arms  and  lives  in 
possible  (feasible  is  the  original)  things."  *  He  was  right  to 
call  this  demanded  murder  an  impossible,  an  unfeasible  thing 
for  an  honest  man.  Iniquitous  things  (turpia)  are  as  to  obe- 
dience as  impossible  (impossibilia)  as  physically  impossible 
things. 

The  difficulty,  however,  which  arises  out  of  the  two  neces- 
sities, that  I  cannot  give  up  my  individuality,  my  responsi- 
bility and  judgment,  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  I  am  obliged 
to  obey  the  laws,  on  the  other,  is  not  thus  easily  solved. 
There  are  laws  which  though  not  atrocious  ought  to  be  dis- 


1  The  original  is,  "  Sire,  je  n'ai  trouve  parmi  les  habitans  et  les  gens  de  guerre 
que  de  bons  citoyens,  de  braves  soldats,  et  pas  un  bourreau.  Ainsi  eux  et  moi 
supplions  V.  M.  d'employer  nos  bras  et  nos  vies  a  choses  faisables."  All  the 
original  historians  of  the  times  have  it.  Count  de  Tende  was  another  officer  who 
dared  to  disobey.  Both  died  soon  after,  it  was  supposed  by  poison. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  145 

obeyed,  others  which  may  be  disobeyed,  and  still  others 
which  may  be  or  ought  to  be  resisted ;  and  again  there  is 
a  difference  between  a  just  law  and  its  unjust  execution  or 
the  mere  order  of  an  officer,  even  in  countries  where  this  dis- 
tinct difference  has  not,  as  in  England  or  the  United  States 
it  has,  been  acknowledged.  These  points  I  propose  to  con- 
sider in  the  following  sections.  Long  and  vehement  as  the 
discussions  of  the  right  of  resistance  have  been,  they  seem 
to  me  not  to  be  more  important  nor  so  difficult  as  a  clear 
view  of  the  various  questions  touching  obedience  and  non- 
compliance  which  are  of  daily  occurrence.  We  have  seen 
that  obedience  is  necessary,  in  general ;  disobeying  or  non- 
compliance  is  the  exception  ;  hence  it  is  difficult  to  find  gen- 
eral principles  of  solid  and  practical  value;  yet  the  subject 
is  so  important  that  it  deserves  our  fullest  attention,  and, 
remembering  Bacon's  "  Ut  nihil  veniat  in  practicam  cujus 
non  fit  etiam  doctrina  aliqua  et  theoria,"  we  must  endeavor 
to  discover  this  general  theory  or  those  principles  which  may 
guide  us. 

XVIII.  The  freer  a  state,  the  greater  is  the  authority  of  the 
law,  as  such  and  not  as  the  personal  direction  of  an  individual, 
and  less  circumscribed  at  the  same  time  is  individual  action. 
These  are  not  so  much,  as  we  have  seen,  necessary  conse- 
quences of  civil  liberty,  as  essential  attributes.  The  freer, 
therefore,  a  state,  the  greater  is  the  necessity  of  reverence  for 
the  law.  Despotic  governments  may  far  more  easily  dispense 
with  moral  compliance  to  the  law ;  they  may  coerce,  and  thus 
maintain  their  character;  free  states  stand  in  need  of  willing 
compliance  with  the  law,  because  it  is  law;  otherwise  disor- 
ganization, instead  of  advance  of  society,  must  follow.  Civil 
liberty  shows  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other  respects,  its  superior 
character.  Force  may  greatly  support  absolutism  ;  liberty  is 
of  a  moral  nature.  Yet  we  must  needs  know  what  is  the  law. 
Is  every  demand  in  the  name  of  the  law,  every  order  of  an 
individual  clothed  with  authority  by  the  law,  that  law  which 
the  conscientious  citizen  is  desirous  of  obeying?  Can  no  law 
VOL.  II.  10 


!46  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

though  made  by  the  proper  authority  transgress  its  rightful 
limits  ?  Do  not  laws  themselves,  if  applied  to  practical  cases, 
contradict  each  other  at  times,  so  that  it  becomes  impossible 
to  obey  both  at  once  ?  And,  finally,  cannot  laws,  the  organs 
of  the  state,  injure  or  destroy  the  very  objects  of  the  state, 
and  are  there  no  cases  in  which  refusal  of  compliance^or  even 
positive  resistance  becomes  the  necessary  and  the  only  duty 
of  the  citizen  ?  All  these  questions  have  been,  at  various 
times,  more  or  less  comprehensively  discu-ssed,  generally 
under  the  excitement  of  disturbed  times,  when  passionate  par- 
tiality, or  a  judgment  warped  by  considerations  foreign  to  the 
jural  character  of  the  state,  has  induced  men  to  assert  extrav- 
agant opinions  beyond  the  proper  limits  of  truth  one  way  or 
the  other.  Or  men,  anxious  to  carry  out  with  consistency 
one  theory  or  the  other,  have  arrived  at  opposite  results,  the 
one  as  far  removed  from  truth  as  the  other.  It  was  natural, 
besides,  that  the  views  entertained  of  this  subject  should  par- 
take of  all  the  errors  or  necessary  peculiarities  incident  to  the 
gradual  progress  of  political  civilization.  Power  is  the  most 
striking  attribute  of  the  state,  and  we  have  seen  already  that 
that  part  of  government  which  wields  it  most  signally  is,  in 
the  course  of  political  progress,  for  a  long  time  mistaken  for 
the  government  itself,  a  mistake  which  misleads  farther,  so 
that  he  or  they  who  have  supreme  public  power  come  to  be 
considered  the  state  itself.  '  Had  these  political  errors  not 
existed,  disobedience  to  officers  would  not  have  been  con- 
sidered equivalent  to  disobedience  to  law,  non-compliance 
with  lawar  refusal  to  yield  obedience  to  orders  of  one  branch 
of  government  only  equal  to  resistance,  and  resistance  equiv- 
alent to  insurrection.  So  deeply  seated  has  become,  in  the 
course  of  time,  the  idea  that  the  executive,  or  the  executive 
in  conjunction  with  the  law-making  power,  is  the  whole  gov- 
ernment, that  many  writers  to  this  day,  although  belonging 
to  the  liberal  portion  of  mankind,  consider  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  principle  that  somewhere  in  the  state  an  authority 
may  exist  which  can  decide  upon  the  legality  of  government 
measures,  to  be  an  "engrafting  of  revolution  upon  the  state," 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


147 


classing  the  ancient  Justicia  (chief  justice)  of  Aragon  z  in  the 
same  category  with  the  ephori  of  the  Spartans  or  the  council 
of  the  hundred  in  Carthage.  We  cannot  discuss  here  the 
best  means  of  watching  over  the  legality  either  of  executive 
measures  or  of  laws  themselves,  in  how  far  they  agree  with 
or  differ  from  general  laws  or  principles  declared  to  be  funda- 
mental. It  is  a  subject  which  belongs  to  politics  proper;  but 
the  principle,  so  far  from  being  revolutionary,  is  the  only  con- 
servative principle  of  free  and  civilized  nations,  as  we  have 
seen  when  speaking  of  the  all-important  subject  of  an  inde- 
pendent judiciary.  It  is  a  fact  that  an  authority,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  watching  over  the  lawful  course  of  the  high  author- 
ities of  the  state,  either  has  or  has  not  power  superior  to  them. 
If  it  have  not,  it  is  inefficient,  and  becomes  only  the  more 
dangerous  by  apparently  legalizing  the  respective  measures; 
if  it  have,  it  is  the  supreme  authority,  and  requires  in  turn  to 
be  restrained  and  watched.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  no  expe- 
dient will  be  discovered  so  efficient,  safe,  and  lawful  in  its 
operation  as  the  independence  of  a  judiciary,  which  in  each 
practical  case  may  declare  unlawful  and  without  authority  an 
order,  measure,  or  decree  purporting  to  be  a  law  ;  an  operation 
.  far  more  extensive  than  at  first  glance  it  might  appear,  because 
every  decision  of  a  single  case  settles  or  distinctly  pronounces 
the  essential  principle  involved  in  the  whole  class  of  cases. 
The  independence  of  the  judiciary  may,  indeed,  frequently  be 


1  If  the  reader  will  refer  to  the  Introduction  of  Prescott's  Ferdinand  and  Isa- 
bella, he  will  find  the  high  authority  of  the  Justicia,  and  admit,  I  suppose,  that 
although  those  early  times  had  not  yet  discovered  many  expedients  which  we 
possess  to  insure  the  easy  operation  of  the  law  against  executive  encroachment, 
nor  that  of  making  responsible  ministers  answerable  for  every  act  of  the  monarch, 
yet  the  essential  idea  in  the  Justicia  was  the  insurance  of  the  law  against  power, 
and  that  this  institution,  considering  the  general  state  of  the  times,  so  far  from 
engrafting  revolution  on  the  state,  was,  on  the  contrary,  fitted  to  insure  much 
more  quiet.  That  it  did  not  develop  and  modify  itself,  and  become  more  and 
more  a  blessing  to  the  state,  seems  to  be  owing  far  less,  if  at  all,  to  any  inherent 
incongruity  with  sound  government  than  to  powerful  extraneous  circumstances, 
— the  vast  and  rapid  increase  of  power  in  Spain  in  general,  connected  as  much 
with  domestic  as  with  general  European  causes. 


148  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

\ 
unable  to  calm  the  high  seas  of  power,  but  it  may,  like  firm 

rocks  on  shore,  break  the  single  wave  and  disperse  it  into 
harmless  spray.1 

The  danger  that  in  turn  the  judiciary  may  become  the  su- 
preme authority  and  may  err  as  well  as  the  others,  is  greatly 
obviated  by  the  following  circumstances,  which  have  in  part 
been  mentioned  already.  The  judiciary  has  neither  honor  nor 
places  to  bestow  ;  it  is  accompanied  by  no  pageant ;  its  po\ver 
rests  more  essentially  upon  moral  power  than  that  of  any 
other  branch  ;  it  gives  the  reasons  of  its  decisions  after  dis- 
cussion ;  it  is  comparatively  no  compact  body,  and  its  de- 
cisions may  in  time  be  overruled.  I  cannot  conclude  this 


1  In  England,  proclamations,  etc.,  of  the  executive  are,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
subject,  as  to  their  legality,  to  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  and  every  officer  exe- 
cuting an  unlawful  order,  even  were  it  from  the  king  in  council,  does  it  at  his 
own  peril.  But  Lord  Coke  (8  Coke,  118),  Chief-Justice  Hobart  (in  Dayw.  Sav- 
age, Hob.  87),  and  Chief-Justice  Huh  (City  of  London  vs.  Wood,  12  Mod.  R.  687) 
held  and  decided  that  even  in  England,  where  parliament  is  technically  termed 
omnipotent,  acts  of  parliament  may  be  controlled  either  by  common  law  or  by 
natural  equity.  This  natural  equity  is  what  Cicero  beautifully  calls  the  reason  of 
God  :  "  Lex  vera  atcjue  princeps,  apta  ad  jubendum  et  ad  vetandum,  ratio  est 
recta  summi  Jovis."  (De  Legg.,  ii.  4.)  In  the  United  States,  as  was  observed 
in  the  first  part,  the  proper  courts  must  decide  whether  a  law,  made  by  a  legis- 
lature acting  under  a  constitution,  is  in  conflict  with  the  supreme  law,  or  not.  In 
the  state  courts  or  circuit  courts  of  the  United  States  the  principle  had  long  been 
acted  upon,  when  in  the  case  of  Marbury  vs.  Madison,  Secretary  of  the  United 
States  (i  Cranch,  137),  in  1803,  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  through 
the  chief  justice  Marshall,  declared  it  to  be  "  the  power  and  duty  of  the  judiciary 
to  disregard  an  unconstitutional  act  of  congress  or  of  any  state  legislature," — "  an 
argument  approaching  to  the  precision  and  certainty  of  a  mathematical  demon- 
stration," as  Chancellor  Kent  (Comment.,  vol.  i.  453,  or  part  iii.  lect.  xx.)  ex- 
presses it.  (See  the  same  Commentaries,  vol.  i.  p.  448.)  The  report  of  the  case 
is  likewise  contained  in  the  collection  of  Chief-Justice  Marshall's  most  important 
"Writings  upon  the  Federal  Constitution"  (Boston,  1839),  consisting  of  the 
opinions  of  that  eminent  man,  delivered  in  the  supreme  and  circuit  courts 
on  constitutional  questions  of  vital  importance.  It  is  a  valuable  compilation,  of 
great  interest  to  every  student  of  constitutional  history  and  politics.  As  to  obey- 
ing officers  demanding  unlawful  things,  of  which  I  have  twice  already  spoken, 
there  is  no  civil  liberty  possible  where  the  principle  of  the  armies  is  followed, 
that  the  citizen  must  first  obey,  and  then  complain,  and  where  the  judiciary  has 
not  to  decide  on  each  particular  case  in  due  form  of  justice,  whether  the  de- 
mand is  lawful  or  not,  and  whether  the  citizen  therefore  is  not  right  in  disobeying. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  149 

section  without  remarking  that  since  the  first  part  of  this 
work  has  been  published  I  have  been  asked,  from  a  distant 
country,  what  I  precisely  understand  by  an  independent  ju- 
diciary. I  own  that  my  previous  observations  on  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  judiciary  were  calculated  for  Americans  or 
Englishmen.  I  will  add  here  that  the  chief  demands  of  an 
independent  judiciary  are  that  the  decision  upon  law  be 
wholly  left  to  it,  and  that  in  no  case  the  judge  demand  ex- 
planation of  the  law  in  a  pending  case  from  any  person  or 
branch  soever  except  the  law  itself;  that  the  judiciary  decide 
in  cases  between  the  citizen  and  the  executive;  that  the  judge 
be  in  a  situation  which  shall  insure  moral  independence  as 
much  as  possible ;  that  therefore  he  be  not  removable  except 
with  comparative  difficulty,  for  instance  by  impeachment,  and 
that  he  hold  his  office  during  good  behavior.  For  further 
remarks  I  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  chapter  on  judges, 
farther  below. 

XIX.  Before  I  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the  subject 
proper,  I  may  be  permitted  to  make  the  following  brief  re- 
marks, connected  with  obedience  to  the  laws.  We  have  seen 
already  that  a  conscientious  citizen  is  not  at  liberty  to  do  all 
that  is  directly  permitted  by  law :  unjust,  immoral,  and  cruel 
things  have  at  times  been  permitted.  When  the  English  law 
made  it  felony  to  teach  a  Catholic  child  in  Ireland,  and  the  in- 
former was  remunerated  out  of  the  forfeited  property  of  the  con- 
demned, an  honest  citizen  was  not  on  that  account  in  conscience 
allowed  to  make  use  of  the  law.  As  the  British  courts  of 
law  hold  him  answerable  who  does  anything  against  law, 
though  directed  to  do  so  by  lawfully  constituted  authority, 
as  having  acted  in  that  single  case  unlawfully,  so  we  may 
suppose,  if  there  be  any  responsibility  at  all,  will  God  hold 
him  responsible  who  does  anything  upon  the  authority  of 
injustice  passed  in  the  form  of  law  against  his  eternal  laws 
of  justice,  reason,  and  humanity.  The  law  does  not  make  us 
unthinking  and  unjudging  beings  ;  it  does  not  substitute  itself 
for  individual  responsibility.  We  cannot,  consequently,  allow 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

ourselves  either  to  do  all  that  is  permitted  or  that  is  not  pro- 
hibited. There  are  many  evil,  and  even  wicked  things,  which 
cannot  be  prohibited,  or  whose  prohibition  has  not  yet  been 
called  for,  as  the  ancient  Roman  laws,  we  are  told,  were  silent 
upon  parricide. 

A  sheriff  in  the  state  of  Kentucky,  in  a  contested  election 
case,1  withheld  the  ballot-box,  because  the  returns  were 
against  his  party.  There  was  indeed  no  specific  positive  law 
prohibiting  this  daring  offence  against  all  reason  and  justice. 
Was  he  on  that  account  justifiable  in  doing  so?  The  state 
soon  after  made  it  felony  for  the  future.  When  Tiberius 
Gracchus  ordered  the  clerk  to  promulgate  the  motion  of  his 
first  agrarian  law,  his  colleague  Octavius  steadily  forbade  the 
clerk  to  read  it,  no  tribune  being  allowed  to  read  it  himself. 
Octavius  had  the  general  tribunal  power  of  vetoing,  but  he 
nevertheless  acted  unjustly. 

Nor  are  punishments  equivalents  to  offences,  or  compo- 
sitions, as  the  fines  for  most  crimes  were  called  in  the  early 
penal  tariffs  so  peculiar  to  the  Teutonic  tribes.  We  are  there- 
fore by  no  means  allowed  to  commit  offences  or  disobey  laws 
merely  on  the  ground  that  we  have  previously  made  up  our 
minds  to  submit  willingly  to  the  appointed  penalty.  Not  to 
speak  of  the  fact  that,  even  taking  the  penalty  as  an  equiva- 
lent of  the  offence,  we  should  remain  debtors  to  society  so 
long  as  we  have  not  submitted  to  the  penalty,  there  remains 
always  the  moral  consideration  of  the  individual  case,  the  in- 
jury we  do  to  the  sufferer,  and  to  society  at  large  ;  for,  though 
all  offences  should  be  punished,  increase  of  crime  would  remain 
equally  deplorable,  and  punishment  is  by  no  means  intended 
as  a  moral  or  social  atonement  for  the  offence.  Yet  nothing 
is  more  frequent  than  this  belief  of  offenders,  even  though 
they  have  committed  the  blackest  crimes.  All  who  are  ac- 
quainted with  the  moral  treatment  of  convicts  know  well  that 
this  supposition,  that  the  moral  account  is  balanced  by  the 


1  In  the  contested  case  between  Mr.  Moore  and  Mr.  Letcher,  in  Lincoln,  Ken- 
tucky. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  151 

suffering  of  penalty,  as  debt  and  credit  are  in  money  matters, 
is  one  of  the  most  common  obstacles  to  finding  entrance  into 
an  obdurate  heart.1  It  is  well  known  that  fines  are  frequently 
the  avowed  equivalents  for  acts  demanded  by  authority,  with- 
out any  reference  to  morality  or  offence ;  in  many  cases  they 
are  preferred.  That  these  fines,  not  being  penalties,  have  no 
connection  with  the  above  question  is  evident,  but  it  is  neces- 
sary not  to  mistake  fines  intended  as  penalties  for  offences  for 
fines  intended  as  equivalents  for  services.  Whenever  a  fine  is 
imposed  fora  service  which  may  be  fully  obtained  for  that 
service,  we  have  a  right  to  consider  the  fine  as  an  equivalent 
for  the  service.  But  it  is  necessary  that  this  service  must  be 
fully  obtainable  for  the  money  paid  as  fine.  If  the  service  is 
such  that  besides  the  work  to  be  done  it  is  important  on  ac- 
count of  public  opinion  that  every  citizen  should  cheerfully 
join,  we  must  not  consider  the  fine  as  a  full  equivalent.  If 
the  demanded  service,  for  instance,  is  a  share  of  labor  in  the 
building  of  a  public  road,  the  corresponding  fine  may  in  ordi- 
nary times  be  considered  an  equivalent.  But  if  the  citizens 
of  a  beleaguered  town  are  requested  to  throw  up  redoubts, 
and  it  is  important  that  every  one  should  contribute  to  keep 
alive  patriotic  cheerfulness  and  readiness  to  do  all  in  his  power 
to  save  the  town,  the  fine  would  not  be  an  equivalent.  That 
fines  for  omissions  by  which  the  community  is  endangered,  for 
instance  for  omitting  the  sweeping  of  chimneys,  or  for  actions 
by  which  the  rights  of  others  are  endangered,  as  for  trespassing 
on  their  grounds,  cannot  be  considered  as  equivalents  of  the 
acts  or  omissions,  is  clear. 

XX.  The  peculiar  view  taken  of  an  original  state  of  nature, 
according  to  which  the  state  appeared  something  made,  arti- 
ficial, and  not  unfrequently  arbitrary — a  view  which  I  have 


1  Even  that  remarkable  criminal,  the  woman  Gottfried,  already  cited,  ex- 
pressed repeatedly,  during  her  last  days,  that  a  person  could  do  no  more  than 
die  for  his  sins,'  and  several  other  opinions,  which  clearly  indicated  that  she  con- 
sidered her  moral  account  perfectly  balanced.  It  will  be  remembered  that  she 
poisoned  above  thirty  persons,  including  her  parents,  children,  friends,  etc. 


152 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


endeavored  to  show  in  its  whole  untenableness  in  the  first 
part  of  the  work — has  affected  no  part  of  the  theory  of  law 
more  strangely  than  that  which  treats  of  the  degree  of  obe- 
dience due  to  the  laws  according  to  their  presumed  original 
source,  namely,  nature,  revelation,  and  positive  human  legis- 
lation. As  the  original  view  was  founded  upon  an  error,  so 
was  the  view  of  the  obedience  due  to  the  laws  equally  erro- 
neous. Jurists  distinguished  between  mala  in  se,  that  is 
actions  pronounced  immoral  by  conscience  according  to  na- 
ture or  revelation,  and  mala  prohibita,  that  is  actions  "  simply 
and  purely  penal,  where  the  Jthing  forbidden  or  enjoyed  is 
wholly  a  matter  of  indifference,  and  where  the  penalty  in- 
flicted is  an  adequate  compensation  for  the  civil  inconve- 
nience supposed  to  arise  from  the  offence."  (i  Blackstone,  58.) 
The  commentator,  who  has  previously  called  the  legislating 
authority  of  the  state  an  "  inferior  authority,"  that  is  inferior 
to  the  natural  law,  thus  arrives  actually  at  what  was  termed 
in  a  previous  passage  a  tariff  of  penalties,  and  positively  states 
that  conscience  is  no  farther  concerned  in  the  non-compliance 
to  the  law  "  than  by  directing  a  submission  to  the  penalty  in 
case  of  the  breach  of  those  laws"  (the  commission  of  mala 
prohibita,  see  the  same  place  as  above).  Errors  in  original 
notions  necessarily  lead  to  inconsistencies,  and  thus  we  find 
grave  ones  in  those  passages  of  Blackstone  in  which  he  treats 
of  the  present  subject.  He  instances  the  case  of  a  poacher 
as  one  in  which  the  offender  may  simply  take  the  penalty  as 
an  equivalent  for  the  malum  prohibitum  ;  but  I  apprehend  it 
would  be  very  difficult  to  make  out  that  transportation,  and  not 
fine,  is  equivalent  for  unlawfully  shooting  deer.  On  the  other 
hand,  Blackstone  concludes  his  passage  on  mala  prohibita, 
and  the  penal  theory  founded  on  the  idea  of  equivalents,  with 
these  remarkable  words  :  "  But  where  disobedience  to  the  law 
involves  in  it  also  any  degree  of  public  mischief  or  private 
injury,  there  it  falls  within  our  former  distinction,  and  is  also 
an  offence  against  conscience."  Now,  with  what  earthly  sub- 
ject has  the  state  a  right  to  meddle  by  way  of  penal  law 
except  it  involve  "public  mischief  or  private  injury"  ? 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  153 

XXI.  The  distinction  which  is  imagined  by  some  writers  to 
exist  between  natural  law,  and  the  law  made  by  the  "  inferior 
authority"  of  the  law-makers,  vanishes  if  the  view  of  the  state 
which  I  have  labored  to  establish  be  correct,  namely,  that  the 
state  is  the  sole  state  of  nature  of  man.  It  is  one  of  God's 
highest  ordinances,  if  in  a  human  manner  we  may  distinguish 
between  them,  that  man  should  live  in  the  state.  He  wills 
the  state  through  the  laws  he  planted  in  our  reason  and  the 
principles  he  established  in  our  physical  constitution.  A 
legislature  making  laws  is  no  less  natural  than  the  original 
feeling  of  right  in  man.  Every-wise  and  just  law  is  willed  by 
God  as  much  as  he  wills  that  the  infant  receive  nourishment 
from  the  mother,  or  that  man,  gifted  with  reason  and  hands 
and  having  the  earth  before  him,  shall  plough  it  up,  sow,  and 
reap ;  for  our  intellect  is  his  gift,  our  living  in  the  state  his 
ordinance,  and  hence  our  providing  for  ourselves  by  laws,  his 
work.  "  In  every  law  positive  well  made  is  somewhat  of  the 
law  of  reason  and  of  the  law  of  God ;  and  to  discern  the  law 
of  God  and  the  law  of  reason  from  the  law  ppsitive  is  very 
hard."  ' 

Secondly,  the  relation  which  the  revealed  law  bears  to  the 
state  can  only  be  appreciated  if  we  remember  that  the  state  is 
emphatically  the  jural  society,  that  is,  it  has  to  do  with  right 
only,  so  that  the  revealed  law  can  enter  into  state  law  so  far 
only  as  it  has  to  do  with  right ;  which  idea  of  right  implies, 
among  other  things,  that  if  more  mischief  ensues  from  state 
interference  than  from  leaving  an  evil  untouched,  it  ought  to  be 
left  untouched.  Thus,  natural  as  well  as  revealed  law  prohibits 
theft.  Nevertheless,  most  codes  declare  that  a  child  living  in 
the  house  of  its  parents  cannot  commit  theft  against  the 
latter.  Yet  the  moral  evil  remains  ;  the  child  commits  a 
grievous  sin,  but  the  state  thinks  it  wiser  not  to  make  it  a 
punishable  crime. 

The  reason  why  all  mankind  feel  that  there  is  a  great  differ- 


*  Words  quoted  in  Christian's  note  to  I  Blackstone,  58,  from  the  Doctor  and 
Student,  Dial.  I.  chap.  4. 


154 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


ence  as  to  the  degree  of  guilt  in  various  actions  is  twofold : 
first,  the  degree  of  danger  to  which  the  act  exposes  may  be 
different,  and  I  speak  here  of  moral  danger  as  well  as  phys- 
ical ; '  secondly,  the  law  in  question  may  be  viewed  differently 
by  different  persons  as  to  wisdom,  if  it  is  enacted  for  some 
convenience,  or  it  may  relate  to  a  principle  which  every  one 
without  exception  acknowledges,  such  as  the  broad  and  fun- 
damental principles  of  morality.  Blackstone  calls  mala  in  se 
acts  which  are  "  naturally  and  intrinsically  wrong."  But  acts 
of  themselves  are  never  intrinsically  wrong  ;  it  is  the  principle 
alone  which  makes  them  so.  Thus,  killing  is  not  intrinsically 
wrong,  for  there  is  justifiable  homicide  and  demanded  homi- 
cide, if,  for  instance,  I  defend  my  wife  against  pirates.  If  a 
shepherd  makes  a  fire  in  the  field,  it  may  be  a  very  innocent 
act,  but  it  is  a  highly  penal  act  in  many  countries.  Nor  is 
it  intrinsically  wrong  if  the  same  shepherd  makes  a  fire  near 
the  sea-shore,  where  vessels  are  constantly  passing,  thus  ex- 
posing the  lives  and  property  of  many  fellow-creatures  to 
destruction. 

The  difficulty,  therefore,  as  to  conscientious  obedience  to 
the  laws  does  not  lie  in  distinguishing  between  mala  in  se  and 
mala  prohibita,  because  as  the  general  rule  it  is  malum  in  se,  it 
is  naturally  and  intrinsically  wrong — a  positive  moral  wrong — 
to  disobey  the  law ;  for  it  is  the  will  of  God  and  demand  of 
nature  that  we  have  laws,  and  consequently  obey  them.  The 
difficulty  arises  solely,  as  in  the  other  cases  of  duty,  out  of 
conflict.  'No  man  has  a  right  to  disobey  a  law  without  rea- 
son, but  he  may  and  in  many  cases  must  disobey  it  when  that 
law  conflicts  with  superior  laws  ;  and  the  difficulty  for  the  con- 
scientious man  lies  in  settling  in  many  cases  which  is  the  supe- 
rior law.  It  is  in  politics  as  in  other  spheres.  We  must  obey 
father  and  mother.  Yet  Christ  says  the  son  will  be  against 
the  father  for  his  sake.  The  difficulty  in  many  practical  cases 
arises  out  of  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  to  the  satisfaction  of 


1  I  have  given  my  view  respecting  the  moral  and  physical  danger  in  the  Letter 
on  Subjects  of  1'enal  Law. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  155 

the  conscience  whether  there  be  a  sufficient  reason  to  disobey 
so  true  and  holy  a  law  as  that  requiring  obedience  to  father 
and  mother.  It  is  the  object  of  the  following  passages  to 
discuss  these  cases  of  conflict  in  politics. 

XXII.  In  obeying  laws  we  must  guard  ourselves  against 
interpreting  them  too  loosely  or  too  strictly  in  favor  of  indi- 
vidual interest,  and  against  a  pedantic  observance  of  their 
letter  beyond  their  spirit.  In  either  case  we  do  not  act  accord- 
ing to  the  true  sense  of  the  law.  When  Napoleon  returned  in 
October,  1799,  from  Egypt,  expected  by  France  to  rescub  her 
from  anarchy  and  advancing  enemies,  it  was  natural  for  him 
not  to  stop  at  Frejus,  his  landing-place,  to  perform  quaran- 
tine, and  for  the  people,  believing  him  to  be  the  only  one  who 
could  save  the  country,  to  break  through  all  the  sanitary 
regulations.  The  rule  in  these  cases  is  the  common  moral 
rule,  that  the  important,  essential,  and  general  prevails  over 
the  trivial  or  particular.  The  practice  of  this  rule  is  daily  and 
hourly  called  for  in  life.  The  same  applies  to  clashing  laws. 
I  have  given  my  ideas  more  fully  on  this  subject  in  the  Legal 
and  Political  Hermeneutics,  to  which  I  must  be  permitted  to 
refer. 

We  must  observe  here  that  as  "  it  is  an  established  rule  in 
the  exposition  of  statutes  that  the  intention  of  the  lawgiver 
is  to  be  deduced  from  a  view  of  the  whole  and  of  every  part 
of  a  statute,  taken  and  compared  together,"1  so  it  is  in  doubt- 
ful or  conflicting  cases  the  obligation  of  a  citizen  to  examine 
and  understand  a  whole  law  as  a  part  of  the  whole  political 
system,  and  to  understand  it  in  that  sense  in  which  alone  any 
authority  can  be  vested  in  the  lawgiver,  that  is,  as  limited  by 
the  lawful  objects  of  the  state  and  the  immutable  principles 
of  right  and  wrong.  All  that  is  to  the  contrary  is  not  lawful, 
and,  strictly  speaking,  not  law  at  all,  because  ordained  or  de- 
manded against  legitimate  authority.  The  principle  is  suffi- 
ciently evident  and  simple;  the  application  not  so,  because 


1  Kent,  Comment.,  i.  461. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  opinions  of  men  differ  or  are  strongly  affected  by  the 
prevailing  interest  at  the  time. 

XXIII.  The  efficiency  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  depends 
so  essentially  upon  unity,  quickness,  and  energy  of  action, 
that  at  all  times  stricter  and  far  less  limited  obedience  has 
been  exacted  in  the  army  and  navy  than  in  any  other  branch. 
The  Roman  soldier  stood,  in  many  respects,  in  the  relation  of 
a  slave  to  his  commanding  general.  Armies  without  disci- 
pline are  not  only  of  no  use,  but  they  are  positive  evils  to 
their  country  ;  and  discipline  consists  mainly  in  a  universal 
habit  of  obedience  throughout  the  whole  body.  History  is 
full  of  the  most  striking  instances :  take,  for  instance,  the 
efficiency  of  the  navy  under  Cromwell,  and  the  respect  in 
which  England  was  universally  held  as  a  maritime  power,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  lax  state  of  the  navy  under  Charles 
II.,  when  De  Ruyter  swept  the  Thames  and  naval  disaster 
followed  disaster,  on  the  other  hand,  because  there  was  no 
discipline,  no  obedience  in  the  navy,  most  of  the  captains 
being  young  noblemen  of  families  in  high  favor  at  the  cor- 
rupt court,  as  we  most  abundantly  learn  from  Pepys's  Diary.1 
Not  that  discipline  can  become  a  substitute  for  patriotism  or 
that  ambition  with  which  a  great  captain  knows  how  to  inspire 
his  army.  One  Spartan  who  glories  in  falling  for  his  country 
is  worth  twenty  Medes  who,  as  Herodotus  tells  us,  were 
whipped  into  the  fight  by  their  officers  against  the.  Grecian 
band  at  Thermopylae.  Patriotism  in  an  army,  however,  will 
become  efficient  only  in  the  same  degree  as  it  is  coupled  with 
discipline.  The  Prussian  militia  in  1813  were  animated  by 
the  best  spirit;  they  loved  to  fight  for  their  country;  they 
willingly  died  for  it;  yet  they  became  truly  efficient  and 
averted  danger  only  in  the  same  degree  as  they  became  dis- 
ciplined. The  history  of  the  American  war  of  independence 
shows  the  same. 


1  Diary  of  Pepys  [especially  notices  in  1666,  1667;  and  comp.  Knight's  His- 
tory of  England,  vol.  iv.  chap,  xviii.]. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


157 


Yet  even  in  the  army  and  navy  absolute  obedience  is  not 
and  cannot  be  demanded.  Disobedience  to  commands  of 
superiors  in  these  branches  of  the  service  may  take  place  be- 
cause the  command  may  be  unlawful.  Or  the  command  may 
be  lawful,  yet  the  inferior  may  be  absolutely  convinced  that  it 
was  given  under  misapprehension,  and  that  the  superior  would 
not  have  given  it  had  he  possessed  the  same  knowledge  which 
he,  the  inferior,  possesses  of  facts  as  they  really  were  at  the 
time  when  the  command  was  given,  or  as  they  have  come  to 
be  since  it  was  given ;  or  that  the  execution  of  the  command 
would  be  absolutely  destructive ;  or,  finally,  that  the  command 
or  order,  though  lawful  according  to  the  letter  of  the  law,  is 
unlawful  according  to  the  general  and  immutable  objects  of 
all  law  and  government,  that  is,  the  security  and  welfare  of 
the  state,  or,  in  free  countries,  the  safety,  prosperity,  and  liberty 
of  the  people. 

XXIV.  As  to  the  first,  —  disobedience  to  unlawful  com- 
mands, because  contrary  to  the  established  law  of  the  land, — 
it  is  now  settled  in  England  and  the  United  States  that  an 
officer  of  the  forces  who  executes  the  unlawful  order  remains 
personally  answerable.  If  the  highest  in  command,  the 
British  monarch  himself,  order,  contrary  to  law,  an  officer  to 
quarter  his  soldiers  upon  the  citizens,  to  annoy  and  oppress 
them,  as  Charles  I.  did,  the  officer  remains  responsible  in  the 
fullest  sense  of  the  term  to  the  law  of  the  land.  All  that  has 
been  gained  by  the  arduous  and  protracted  struggle  which 
began  to  show  itself  most  signally  under  Charles  I.  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  few  words,  that  the  law  shall  be  superior 
to  all  and  every  one  and  to  every  branch  of  government;  that 
there  is  nowhere  a  mysterious,  supreme,  and  unattainable 
power  which  despite  the  clearest  law  may  still  dispense  with 
it  or  arrest  its  course.  This  is  the  sum  total  of  modern  civil 
liberty,  the  great,  firm,  and  solid  commons'  liberty.  The 
British  and  American  articles  of  war  demand  obedience  to  all 
lawful  commands.1 


1  Article  ix.  of  the  American  Rules  and  Articles  of  War  says,  "  Any  officer  or 


l$S  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

As  obedience  to  commands  and  thorough  discipline  are  so 
absolutely  necessary  to  obtain  those  objects  for  which  the 
forces  are  maintained,  and  as,  therefore,  the  power  given  to  a 
superior  over  his  inferiors  is  much  more  extensive  and  dis- 
cretionary than  in  any  other  branch,  the  inferior,  before  he 
disobeys,  ought  to  be  convinced  that  the  command  is  most 
clearly  illegal.  He  must  decide  it  at  his  own  peril  or  respon- 
sibility. But  even  in  absolute  monarchies,  where  the  executive 
and  legislative  are  one,  and  where  the  principle  is  adopted  that 
all  right  of  complaint  or  hope  of  redress  is  forfeited  at  once 
by  not  first  of  all  obeying  the  superior,  it  is  always  acknowl- 
edged that  under  certain  circumstances  the  inferior  may  dis- 
obey; for  instance,  if  the  superior  were  to  command  the  inferior 
to  commit  a  palpable  crime  or  treason,  or  if  he  should  show 
himself  palpably  cowardly  in  surrendering  a  fortress.  The 
oath  to  be  taken  by  every  soldier,  according  to  the  Prussian 
articles  of  war,  ends  with  these  words  :  "  I  will  everywhere  obey 
the  articles  of  war  now  read  to  me,  and  conduct  myself,  in 
the  execution  of  all  my  duties,  always  in  such  a  manner  as  is 
proper  and  fit  for  an  honorable  (the  original  is  elirliebcnd,  that 
is,  honor-loving)  and  undaunted  soldier."  He  clearly  can  do 
nothing,  then,  against  honor  and  conscience. 

Respecting  the  second  point,  disobedience  on  the  ground 
that  the  commander  could  not  possibly  have  been  sufficiency 
informed,  we  find  in  all  wars  instances  which  have  been  ac- 
knowledged as  lawful.  An  officer  would  make  himself  highly 
responsible  were  he  pusillanimously  to  allow  a  manifest 
advantage  or  victory  to  escape,  when  it  was  evident  that  the 
commander  in  giving  his  order  could  not  have  considered  or 


soldier  who  shall  strike  his  superior  officer,  etc.,  being  in  the  execution  of  his 
office,  on  any  pretence  whatever,  or  shall  disobey  any  lawftil  command  of  his 
superior  officer,  shall  suffer  death,  or  such  other  punishment,"  etc.  Article  xiv. 
of  the  Naval  Law,  page  95  of  the  Red  Book,  Washington,  1826,  snys  likewise, 
"  No  officer  or  private  in  the  navy  shall  disobey  the  laivfitl  orders  of  his  superior 
officer,"  etc.  So  the  British  articles  of  the  navy,  which  have  served  as  a  model 
to  the  American,  say  (Art.  xxii.),  "And  any  person  presuming  to  quarrel  with 
any  his  superior  officer,  being  in  the  execution  of  his  office,  or  disobeying  any 
lawful  command  of  any  his  superior  officer,  shall  suffer  death  or,"  etc. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  159 

known  of  the  particular  combination  of  circumstances.  There 
are  instances  of  this  in  the  wars  of  Napoleon.  Yet  here  again 
the  inferior  must  act  upon  his  own  responsibility,  and  a  very 
high  one  it  is :  yet  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  natural  conse- 
quence of  the  fact  that  those  who  command  are  but  limited 
and  finite  men,  and  that  those  who  obey  do  not  cease  to  be 
individual  men  with  their  own  power  and  duty  of  reflection 
and  responsibility.  Sully,  in  his  Memoirs,  speaking  of  the 
war  of  Henry  IV.  against  the  duke  of  Savoy,  says,  "  I  did 
not  scruple  to  disobey  his  (the  king's)  orders  by  forwarding 
the  ammunition,"  etc.1  The  case  is  far  more  difficult  when 
the  inferior  officer  disobeys,  not  because  he  is  convinced  that 
the  superior  was  insufficiently  informed  or  circumstances  have 
changed  since  the  order  was  given,  but  because  he  sees  the 
commander  was  in  error,  and  a  great  advantage  is  to  be  gained 
by  disobedience,  perhaps  impending  ruin  to  be  averted.  Deli- 
cate and  dangerous  as  these  cases  are,  yet  there  have  been 
such  as  would  not  only  warrant  but  even  demand  disobedience 
of  an  honorable  man.  There  are  exceptions  when  we  must, 
as  in  other  cases  of  grave  conflict,  seriously  weigh  the  matter, 
and  if  we  feel  bound  to  obey  the  higher  commands  of  con- 
science, honor,  and  patriotism,  we  must  do  it  with  a  full  con- 
sciousness and  readiness  to  abide  by  the  consequences  of  the 
strict  law  of  martial  discipline  should  they  eventually  fall  upon 
us.  Of  Nelson  himself  it  was  said  that  at  times  "he  would 
look  at  signals,  given  him  in  battle,  with  his  blind  eye."2  If 
the  plain  and  direct  order  has  been  disobeyed,  it  has  been  gen- 
erally held  that  the  disobeying  officer  should  be  made  strictly 
answerable,  without  regard  to  the  success,  even  if  it  were  bril- 


1  Memoirs  of  Sully,  book  xi.  vol.  ii.  p.  26,  London,  410,  eel.  of  1761. 

2  *  A  courier  arrived  just  before  the  battle  of  Zentha,  and  Prince  Eugene  told 
him  to  wait  until  after  the  battle.     He  would  not  open  the  dispatches,  knowing 
their  contents. 

Major  Saldern  resolutely  declined  the  plundering  of  Hubertsburg  Castle  in 
1761,  as  "  contrary  to  honor  and  duty,"  which  Frederic  the  Great  had  ordered. 
Fred;ric  ordered  Icilius  to  do  it,  and  was  obeyed.  Saldern  lost  nothing  of  the 
high  favor  in  which  he  stood  with  the  king.  Preuss,  Leben  Filed,  d.  Gros.,  p.  249. 


1 60  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

liant,  of  his  disobedience ;  and  this  is  right ;  for  so  great  is  the 
general  necessity  of  strict  obedience,  and  in  many,  nay,  most 
cases,  the  impossibility  of  penetrating  all  the  combinations  of 
the  commander  in  issuing  his  orders,  that  disobedience,  were 
it  authorized,  would  bring  on  ruin.  A  man  who  loves  his 
country  and  knows  likewise  the  nature  of  the  service  will  be 
ready  to  satisfy  the  discipline  by  manfully  bearing  the  conse- 
quences of  his  disobedience,  which  nevertheless  he  thinks 
right.  Such  a  conflict  may  end  tragically  ;  yet  should  not 
a  man  know  how  to  die  willingly  for  his  country,  even  if 
her  call  presents  itself  in  this  stern  demand  of  her  military 
law? 

The  last  case  is  that  when  we  know  the  order  to  be  lawful 
according  to  the  letter  of  the  law,  but  wickedly  intended 
against  the  objects  for  which  these  laws  were  established. 
This  is  a  case  of  the  uttermost  responsibility;  yet  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  all  obedience  without  exception,  even  the 
military  oath  of  obedience,  is  conditional ;  that  it  can  be  de- 
manded only  with  reference  to  the  ultimate  ends  of  all  gov- 
ernment, the  eternal  objects  of  mankind  organized  in  a  state. 
The  military  man  does  not  become  an  unfeeling,  unthinking, 
unseeing,  absolute  instrument.  Yet  when  is  he  to  resort  to 
this  last  and  highest  authority?  Again,  it  is  impossible  to 
give  rules,  for  these  are  cases  of  extremity,  nor  can  any  one 
else  decide  for  the  individual  placed  in  that  difficulty.  If  be- 
fore his  God  he  is  plainly  convinced  that  the  orders  of  his 
superiors  are  palpably  at  variance  with  the  essential  objects 
of  the  state  and  therefore  traitorous  to  his  country,  and  if  at 
the  same  time  he  is  fully  convinced  that  his  disobedience,  or 
resistance,  if  need  be,  does  not  bring  on  greater  calamity  than 
the  execution  of  the  orders,  he  is  in  conscience  bound  to 
disobey.  According  to  the  British  law,  the  monarch  is  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  all  the  forces,  and  disposer  of  peace  and 
war.  Admiral  Pennington  had  been  sent  by  Charles  I.,  amid 
the  acclamations  of  England,  seemingly  to  carry  out  a  humane 
treaty  with  the  oppressed  and  besieged  Huguenots  at  Ro- 
chelle  ;  but  he  had  no  sooner  arrived  at  the  place  of  his  des- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  l6l 

tination  than  he  found  himself  under  secret  orders  to  give  up 
his  vessels  to  French  command  in  a  "  murderous  warfare 
against  British  honor  and  the  Protestant  religion."  Here  was 
a  flagrant  conspiracy  of  Charles  and  Buckingham  against  the 
state,  an  outrageous  abuse  of  power  executed  with  criminal 
deception,  and  Pennington  was  right  not  to  obey,  and  to  draw 
up  his  high-minded  protest;  the  sailors  were  right  who  wrote 
"  what  is  called  a  round  robin  against  the  service,  end  laid  it 
under  the  Bible  of  their  admiral,  whose  sentiments  accorded 
with  their  own."2  An  officer  of  Charles  X.  of  France  who 
in  1830  was  convinced  that  it  was  the  government,  not  the 
people,  which  had  daringly  broken  the  fundamental  law,  was 
right  in  not  firing  upon  the  latter;  the  soldiers  were  right, 
they  were  in  honor  bound  to  join  them.  An  English  soldier 
who  was  wholly  convinced  that  James  II.  had  become  a 
usurper  by  breaking  down  the  law  of  the  land  was  right  in 
joining  William  III.  So  long  as  there  is  doubt  in  the  breast, 
it  is  honorable  to  remain  even  with  the  unsuccessful  com- 
mander; that  moment  at  which  it  becomes  clear  to  us  that 
country  and  commander  stand  opposite  to  one  another,  the 
name  of  honor  used  to  designate  obedience  to  the  commander 
has  no  longer  any  meaning  ;  for  there  is  no  honor  without 
doing  right,  and  it  is  right  to  abide  by  the  country  in  preference 
to  all  else. 

XXV.  The  civil  service  not  requiring  that  instant  energy 
and  decisive  unity  of  action  which  is  necessary  to  make  the 
army  and  navy  answer  their  ends,  it  follows  that  less  abso- 
lute power  ought  to  be  given  to  the  superiors,  and  that  civil 
officers  have  a  wider  scope  to  consider  the  legality  of  an 
order,  or  may  take  more  time  for  farther  information  from 
their  superiors  before  they  obey  orders,  than  military  officers. 
As  to  free  countries,  where,  as  has  repeatedly  been  remarked, 


1  Brodie,  History  of  the  British  Empire,  Edinburgh,  1822,  vol.  ii.  p.  70.  Also, 
Lord  Nugent,  Memorials  of  John   Hampden,  London,  1832,  vol.  i.  p.  IOO,  and 
Appendix  A  of  vol.  i.,  where  the  instructions  are  given.     See  also  note  2  to  p.  35 
of  vol.  ii.  of  Forster's  British  Statesmen,  in  Lardner's  Cabinet  Cyclopaedia. 
VOL.  II.  ii 


!62  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  law  is  supreme,  it  is  clear  that  no  officer  is  bound  or 
ought  to  obey  an  illegal  order.  When  Charles  X.  shortly 
before  the  last  French  revolution  sent  orders  to  the  civil 
officers  throughout  the  kingdom  to  vote  for  certain  candidates 
for  the  chamber  of  deputies,  the  officers  were  clearly  free  of 
all  obligation  to  obey  such  mandates.  That  the  civil  officer 
has  the  same  right,  and,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  same  duty  in 
cases  of  extremity  to  disobey  a  command  although  within 
the  letter  of  the  law,  with  the  officer  of  the  army  or  navy,  is 
evident.  In  ancient  and  modern  times  laws  have  been  issued 
which  demand  disobedience  to  the  orders* of  superiors  under 
certain  circumstances.1  I  shall  speak  more  fully  on  some 
obligations  of  the  officers  belonging  to  the  executive  depart- 
ment in  another  place,  and  at  once  turn  to  the  subject  of  the 
disobedience  to  law  of  the  citizen  at  large. 

In  countries  in  which  the  people  are  not  conceived  to 
form  the  state,  which  is  understood  to  be  one  and  the  same 
with  the  government,  it  is  very  clear  that  proportionally  high 
notions  of  the  duty  of  obedience  are  entertained  by  the  rulers. 
If,  however,  the  view  of  the  state  as  given  in  the  first  volume 
is  correct,  many  cases  of  just  non-compliance  or  actual  dis- 
obedience take  place.  We  call  that  citizen  loyal  who,  satis- 
fied with  the  main  principles  of  his  government,  although  he 
may  be  very  strongly  opposed  to  the  characteristic  features 
of  the  administration  for  the  time  being,  conscientiously  en- 
deavors to  act  in  the  main  not  only  according  to  the  letter, 
but  also  and  rather  according  to  the  true  spirit,  of  the  laws  of 
his  land,  so  long  as  he  can  conscientiously  do  it.  Laws  may 
be,  or  under  certain  circumstances  must  be,  disobeyed,  if  they 
are  contrary  to  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land,  if  they  are 


1  Majorian,  that  excellent  emperor  of  Rome,  too  late,  however,  to  find  a  sphere 
for  his  noble  soul,  prohibited  the  infamous  pulling  down  of  ancient  monuments 
for  private  purposes,  and  decreed  the  severest  penalties  to  be  inflicted  upon  every 
subordinate  officer  who  should  obey  his  superiors  in  these  scandalous  grants. 
(Gibbon,  chap,  xxxvi.,  or  vol.  iv.  pp.  63,64,  Bonn's  ed.)  The  Norwegian  Consti- 
tution (of  November  4,  1814)  says,  ?  85,  "  He  who  obeys  an  order  whose  object 
is  to  disturb  the  liberty  or  safety  of  the  storthing  makes  himself  guilty  of  treason 
against  his  fatherland. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  163 

against  the  law  of  God,  that  is  of  morality,  nature,  and  con- 
science, against  primordial  rights,  against  the  spirit  of  the 
times,  if  I  am  driven  by  superior  force  to  comply  with  other 
commands,  and,  in  general,  if  I  cannot  obey  otherwise  than 
by  disobeying  a  superior  law. 

XXVI.  We  are  citizens  because  we  are  men,  and  in  order 
to  obtain  our  ends  as  men ;  and  we  shall  continue  to  be  moral 
individuals  long  after  we  have  ceased  to  be  either  citizens  or 
men.  The  demands  of  the  state,  therefore,  are  by  no  means  the 
sole  or  ultimate  laws  by  which  in  cases  of  exttemity  we  must 
regulate  our  conduct.  If  a  law  prohibits,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, giving  a  degree  of  education  to  my  child  which 
I  nevertheless  may  be  convinced  that  its  peculiar  capacity 
deserves,  I  am  not  bound  to  obey ;  for  it  is  one  of  the  very 
first  objects  of  man  to  become  all  that  God  has  given  him  the 
capacity  to  become.  In  Hesse-Cassel  it  was  found  that  far 
too  many  young  men  received  a  university  education,  thus 
>reparing  them  for  careers  in  which  they  could  not  succeed, 
owing  to  the  number  of  applicants.  A  law  was  passed  which 
allowed  the  children  of  certain  parents  only  to  study  in  the  uni- 
versities. Yet  if  a  father  in  that  country  should  have  seen  that 
his  son  was  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  sciences,  would  he  have 
been  chargeable  with  any  dereliction  of  duty  if  he  should  have 
evaded  the  law  and  sent  his  son  to  some  foreign  university  ? 
Dissenters  were  formerly  not  allowed  to  keep  schools  in  Eng- 
land ;  yet  in  many  districts  there  were  none  other  but  dis- 
senters' schools.  Was  it  disloyal  for  dissenters  to  keep  a 
school  despite  the  law  ?  Was  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  a  mani- 
fest duty  to  disobey,  provided  there  was  the  slightest  chance 
of  success,  because  the  state  glaringly  transcended  its  legiti- 
mate sphere  ?  x  A  law  may  be  disobeyed  if  unlawful  authority 


1  Lord  Russell,  Memoirs  of  the  Affairs  of  Europe  from  the  Peace  of  Utrecht, 
says,  "  The  Schism  Bill  was  introduced  by  Sir  William  Wyndham, — one  of  the 
chief  ornaments  of  their  party.  Its  object  was  to  prevent  the  education  by  dis- 
senters in  any  way  ;  and  it  went  to  prohibit  them  from  keeping  schools  even  for 
their  own  children."  So  I  find  it  quoted ;  I  have  not  the  work  at  hand. 


1 64  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

has  issued  it,  or  rather  it  is  no  law,  because  against  the  funda- 
mental law,  for  instance  when  James  I.  bestowed  unlawfully 
the  soap  monopoly  upon  favorites.  We  must  not  forget  that 
laws  may  be  passed  in  regular  and  lawful  form,  and  yet  be 
clearly  against  the  plainest  rights  of  the  citizens,  although 
outwardly  conformable  to  the  fundamental  law.  There  is, 
however,  a  fundamental  law  superior  to  any  fundamental 
charter,  that  is  reason,  right,  and  nature,  and  that  superior 
fundamental  law  of  all  humanity  requires,  in  cases  of  high 
conflict,  first  to  be  obeyed.  An  immoral  law  is  no  law,  and 
my  yielding  to  it  or  not  is  a  mere  question  of  expediency,  just 
as  I  may  or  may  not  yield  to  the  demands  of  a  robber.  If 
my  government  prevents  me  from  importing  what  books  I  see 
fit  to  use  for  the  pursuit  of  my  studies,  I  have  an  undoubted 
right  to  evade  the  law  if  I  deem  it  expedient,  for  the  pursuit 
of  truth  is  a  law  of  infinitely  greater  authority,  and  therefore 
infinitely  more  demands  obedience,  than  any  law  enacted  by 
temporary  authority  ever  can. 

Laws  which  are  manifestly  against  the  spirit  of  the  time, 
which  cannot  be  obeyed  whatever  the  law  may  demand,  may 
and  must  be  disobeyed.  If  the  government  neglects  changing 
the  laws  according  to  the  change  of  circumstances,  it  is  not 
the  obligation  of  the  citizen  to  adhere  to  the  law.  Such  are 
laws  manifestly  fallen  in  disuse,  of  which  some  striking  ones 
have  been  mentioned  in  previous  passages,  laws  which  it 
would  be  morally  impossible  to  obey.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that 
by  the  strict  principles  of  the  common  law  an  act  of  parlia- 
ment cannot  be  repealed  by  a  "non-user;"1  yet  where  are 


1  2  Term  Rep.  275 ;  2  Dwarris  on  Statutes,  672.  But  the  contrary  has  been 
laid  down  by  a  writer  of  authority,  Wooddeson's  Elements,  63,  and  it  is  also  to  be 
found  in  the  Roman  law,  Digest,  lib.  i.  tit.  3,  \  32.  I  must  be  permitted  here  to 
give  the  whole  of  that  section,  because  it  contains  true  principles  of  right,  and 
many  of  my  readers  out  of  the  profession  of  tlie  law  may  not  have  an  easy  oppor- 
tunity of  perusing  it.  The  Digest  says,  "  Respecting  those  matters  for  which  we 
have  no  written  law,  that  must  be  followed  which  has  been  introduced  by  cus- 
tom and  manners,  and  if  this  does  not  exist  respecting  a  subject,  that  must  be 
followed  which  lies  nearest  and  that  which  results  from  analogy  of  similar  cases  : 
if  nothing  else  can  be  obtained  even  in  this  way,  the  custom  of  the  city  of  Rome 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  165 

there  more  laws  virtually  fallen  into  disuse,  which  it  would 
be  impossible  to  act  out  and  which  it  is,  consequently,  not 
immoral  to  disobey,  than  in  England?  Let  us  not  forget  that 
even  Lord  Mansfield,  when  acting  as  the  highest  organ  of  the 
law  itself,  told  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  of  theft  for  an  amount 
far  less  than  the  articles  before  the  eyes  of  the  jury  evidently 
amounted  to,  in  order  to  rescue  the  prisoner  from  the  effects  of 
a  law  wholly  dissonant  with  the  spirit  of  the  time,  and  to  give 
her  the  benefit  of  more  humane  and  more  efficient  modes  of 
punishment,  discovered  since  the  establishment  of  the  ancient 
law.  Whatever  reason  there  was  in  early  times  for  punish- 
ing almost  any  theft  with  hanging,  in  England,  whether  the 
state  of  society  then  required  it,  or  whether  even  then  the  law 
was  injudicious,  sure  it  is  that  Lord  Kenyon  pronounced  no 
more  than  a  solemn  truth  when  he  said,  when  a  girl,  sen- 
tenced to  be  hung  for  her  first  theft,  dropped  down  dead  in 
court,  "  I  then  felt,  as  I  now  feel,  that  this  was  passing  sen- 
tence not  on  the  prisoner  but  on  the  law."  J 

If  a  law  is  against  nature  I  am  at  liberty  to  disobey.  It  is 
God's  order  that  all  animal  life  shall  be  sustained  by  food ;  if 
then  government  lays  so  high  a  duty  on  necessary  articles  of 
food  that  it  becomes  impossible  properly  to  support  the  body, 
as  has  been  the  case  and  that  repeatedly,  I  have  a  right,  if  I 
am  able  and  see  fit  in  other  respects,  to  import  the  food 
against  the  law.  The  duty  on  salt  was  in  some  parts  of 
France  before  the  first  revolution  so  exorbitant  that  the 
people  could  not  purchase  it.  Had  the  most  conscientious 


must  be  followed.  All  rooted  custom  is  justly  followed  as  law,  and  that  which 
has  been  founded  by  custom  is  law.  For  if  the  laws  themselves  bind  us  for  no 
other  reason  than  because  they  have  been  adopted  by  the  pronounced  will  of  the 
people,  that  likewise  binds  justly  every  one  which  the  people  have  sanctioned 
without  writing  ;  for  what  matters  it  whether  the  people  declared  their  will  by 
voting  or  by  the  thing  and  fact  itself?  It  has  therefore  with  perfect  justice  like- 
wise been  adopted  as  a  rule  that  laws  may  be  abrogated  not  only  by  the  pro- 
nounced will  of  the  lawgiver,  but  also  in  consequence  of  universal  tacit  consent 
by  disuse." 

1  Related  by  Mr.  Morris,  in  the  house  of  commons,  in  1811. — (English)  Law 
Journal,  May,  1837,  296. 


166  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

citizen  to  reproach  himself  in  any  degree  if  he  smuggled  salt 
for  his  family?  What  is  more  natural  than  language?  what 
more  ungodly  and  tyrannical  than  to  make  the  use  of  one's 
mother  tongue  penal  ?  Yet  governments  have  repeatedly 
passed  laws  to  that  effect.  If  laws  are  passed  respecting  re- 
ligious beliefs,  they  are  naught  in  themselves,  because  they 
aim  at  that  which  is  impossible, — to  believe  according  to  com- 
mand. And  if  I  believe  that  a  certain  service  is  essential  to 
my  religion,  I  have  certainly  an  undoubted  right  to  disobey 
the  law  and  celebrate  it  in  secret,  if  I  thereby  do  not  injure 
any  one  else.  If,  finally,  I  am  forced  by  a  conqueror  or 
usurper  to  obey  his  orders  contrary  to  the  laws  of  the  land,  I 
am  not  answerable  for  disobedience,  for  one  of  the  first  objects 
and  duties  of  all  governments  and  laws  is  to  protect  me ;  if 
they  fail  to  do  so,  I  am  not  bound,  though  I  may  choose  to 
do  so,  to  expose  myself  to  the  penalties  of  the  rulers  in  actual 
possession. 

To  sum  up  the  whole,  then,  it  is  evident  that  in  obeying 
laws  we  must,  wherever  laws  clash,  obey  the  superior  in 
preference  to  the  inferior;  and  this  superior  law  may,  in 
many  cases,  be  one  that  was  never  enacted,  perhaps  for  the 
very  reason  that  it  was  of  itself  universally  binding,  like  the 
demands  of  physical  nature  ;  farther,  in  many  cases  of  this 
conflict,  nothing  can  decide  which  is  the  superior  law,  and 
whether  disobeying  the  inferior  law  be  justified,  except  the 
conscience  of  the  individual.  I  am  well  aware  that  hasty  and 
forward  citizens,  fanatics,  and  wicked  men  have  asserted  that 
their  conscience  commanded  them  to  disobey,  when  it  ought 
to  have  told  them  the  opposite.  South  asserts  the  truth  when 
he  says,  "  No  such  instrument  to  carry  on  a  refined  and  well- 
woven  rebellion  as  a  tender  conscience  and  a  sturdy  heart. 
He  who  rebels  conscientiously  rebels  heartily."  Abuse,  how- 
ever, does  not  disprove  the  rule.  Men  have  often  pretended 
to  change  their  religion  for  conscience'  sake,  when  sordid  in- 
terest or  turpitude  guided  them.  Should  we  establish  on  that 
account  the  rule  that  the  conscience  must  not  decide  upon  the 
change  of  one's  religion  ? 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  1 67 

XXVII.  Merely  disapproving  of  a  law  by  no  means  gives 
us  a  right  to  disobey  it ;  we  must  be  clearly  and  conscien- 
tiously convinced  that  it  may  be  disobeyed  upon  one  of  the 
main  grounds  enumerated,  or  that  it  does  not  come  from  law- 
ful authority,  when  in  fact  it  is  not  law  but  the  semblance  of 
law.    Another  question  is,  whether  we  may  under  any  circum- 
stances make  use  of  or  profit  by  a  law  of  which  we  disap- 
prove.    If  the  law  goes  against  our  own  main  principles  we 
must  not  expect  to  stay  its  own  evil  effects  by  partial  compli- 
ance ;  for  instance,  if  we  were  in  times  of  violence  to  accept 
of  confiscated  property  with  a  view  to  restore  it  to  the  owner 
or  to  rescue  it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  despoilers.     That  this 
is,  however,  very  dangerous  is  very  clear,  for  the  feeling  of 
every  one  marks  such  a  procedure  as  a  partial  co-operation, 
and  no  one  at  present  will  read  without  disapproval  or  very 
reluctant  excuse  the  account  that  some  persons,  otherwise 
standing  high    for  their  virtuous  character,  accepted  at  the 
hands  of  James  II.  the  lands  confiscated  in  consequence  of 
Jeffrey's  sanguinary  procedures,  with  the  declared  view  of 
making  the  best  use,  of  them  and  preventing  their  falling  into 
the  hands  of  his  greedy  and  licentious  courtiers.1 

XXVIII.  So  far  we  have  considered  only  the  cases  when  a 
conscientious  citizen  may  disobey  or  must  disobey;  for  the 
latter  must  depend  upon  his  conscience  alone.     If  he  believes 
that  by  obedience  he  positively  co-operates  in  the  furtherance 
of  iniquity,  he  must  disobey.     This  is  the  ground  upon  which 
the  Quakers  decline  paying  taxes  towards  the  army.     Still,  it 
is  not  to  be  forgotten  in  any  of  these  cases  that  obedience  to 
the  laws  is  of  itself  a  duty  so  long  as  we  can  conscientiously 
obey,  and  that  the  penalty  is  not  an  equivalent ;  and  that  we 
must  carefully  guard  ourselves  against  presumption,  that  is 
setting  up  our  conscience  against  that  of  all  who  made  or 
favor  the  law.     The  case,  therefore,  must  always  be  a  strong 
one. 


1  See  Mackintosh's  History  of  the  Revolution  of  1688. 


!68  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

Another  question  is,  has  the  citizen  the  right  to  resist,  and 
can  he  under  certain  circumstances  go  so  far  as  to  take  up 
arms  against  those  in  power  ?  Despite  the  vehement  discus- 
sions on  this  point  at  periods  when  it  was  of  practical  impor- 
tance, there  has  been  but  little  difference  as  to  the  actual 
theory.  Those  monarchs  who  have  most  strenuously  main- 
tained the  principle  of  "absolute  non-resistance,"  for  instance 
the  Stuarts,  have  fostered  and  fomented  resistance  against  the 
governments  established  in  consequence  of  their  own  de- 
thronement. George  III.,  who  maintained  very  high  notions 
respecting  the  obedience  due  to  a  government,  not  only  con- 
nived at  but  promoted  the  plan  of  Queen  Matilda  of  Den- 
mark, then  residing  at  Zelle,  to  overthrow  the  existing 
Danish  government,  and  to  make  herself,  not  what  she  had 
been  before  the  execution  of  Struensee,  but  actually  regent 
of  the  kingdom.1  Ferdinand  VII.  rewarded  the  persons 
who  had  resisted  the  cortes  and  himself,  after  he  had  been 
re-established  in  absolute  power  by  the  assistance  of  Louis 
XVIII.  The  duchess  of  Berry  incited  the  people  to  civil 
war,  from  whom  she  claimed  the  throne  on  the  principle  of 
legitimacy.  The  pope  has  in  repeated  instances  promoted 
resistance  and  fostered  revolt. 

So  far  the  question  has  only  respected  resistance  to  the 
whole  government  on  account  of  its  entire  unlawfulness. 
Another  is,  may  a  lawful  government  be  resisted  in  unlawful 
demands  ?  and,  finally,  may  a  people  take  up  arms  against  a 
whole  government,  previously  considered  lawful  ?  When 
this  question  has  been  discussed  without  peculiar  reference  to 
practical  cases  of  deep  interest  at  the  time,  the  greater  num- 
ber of  jurists  and  philosophers  have  allowed  that  there  are 
cases  in  which  it  is  lawful  and  necessary  to  resist  with  arms, 
that  is  to  resort  to  insurrection.  Generally  writers  have  re- 
stricted the  cases  of  justified  resistance  against  monarchs  to 
resisting  atrocities  on  the  part  of  the  prince ;  in  short,  they 


1  Wraxall,  Posthumous  Memoirs  [i.  374-418.  Compare  what  Lord  Mahon  says 
in  his  History,  v.  chap.  50,  note.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  169 

have  maintained  that  armed  resistance  is  admissible  only 
against  tyrants,  and  among  the  characteristics  of  a  tyrant,  who 
was  generally  depicted  in  such  a  manner  that  there  was  no 
necessity  of  telling  people  that  it  was  lawful  to  resist  such  a 
monster,  atrocious  cruelty  was  generally  one.  This  was  partly 
because  writers  were  afraid  to  speak  out,  partly  because  they 
really  feared  to  make  resistance  too  easy.  Times  have 
changed,  however.  Physical  cruelty  is  no  longer  considered 
as  the  only  ground  upon  which  resistance  is  admissible. 
Already  have  German  and  other  continental  writers  ex- 
pressed themselves  very  differently.1  As  to  the  principle 
there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever.  Every  unlawful  govern- 
ment ought  to  be  resisted  and  permanently  changed,  if  it 
permanently  and  obstinately  insists  upon  a  course  injurious 
to  the  people,  and  if  the  evils  accompanying  the  change  are 
not  greater  than  the  blessings  to  be  obtained  by  the  change. 
In  the  abstract  we  might  easily  go  farther;  we  might  say, 
Government  ought  to  be  resisted  whenever  it  acts  unlawfully. 
But  there  arises  the  unavoidable  difficulty  of  deciding  when 
it  acts  unlawfully;  for  the  people  may  be  mistaken  as  well  as 
the  government.  Our  forefathers  enacted  in  many  cases  that 
if  the  ruler  distressed  the  people  against  law,  it  was  lawful  to 
resist  him.2  The  difficulty  adhering  to  all  discussions  on  the 


1  One  of  the  early  writers  who  treats  the  subject  with  great  freedom  is  Hubert 
Languet,  in  his  Vindicise  contra  Tyrannos,  sive  de  Principis  in  Populum  Popu- 
lique  in  Principem  legitima  Potestate,  Stephano  Junio  Bruto,  Celta  Auctore, 
Edinburgi,  1579.  A  work  I  recommend  to  the  student. 

3  Charles  the  Bald,  grandchild  to  Charlemagne,  was  obliged  to  sign  in  856 
A.D.  a  charter  in  which  it  was  pronounced  that  the  nobility  should  have  the  right, 
unitedly,  and  with  arms,  to  resist  whenever  the  emperor  should  demand  anything 
unjust.  The  Magna  Charta  says,  "  Ipsi  Barbnes  cum  communitate  totius  terroe 
distiingent  et  gravabunt  nos  modis  omnibus  quibus  poterunt,  scilicet  per  captionem 
castrorum,  terrarum,  possessionum,  et  aliis  modis  quibus  potuerint,  donee  emen- 
datum  fuerit  secundum  arbitrium  eorum."  [But  in  the  Charta  this  is  made  the 
end  of  a  series  of  attempts  to  obtain  justice.  See  art.  70.]  Andrew  II.  of 
Hungary  granted  the  right  of  resistance  in  case  the  then  concluded  compact 
should  be  broken.  King  John  of  Denmark  acknowledged  the  right  in  the  three 
kingdoms  subject  to  his  power,  if  he  should  not  listen  to  their  complaints  of 
grievances.  (Schiitz,  Universal  History,  v.  194.)  Alphonso  III.  of  Aragon 


170  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

practical  application  of  the  right  of  resistance,  which  has  ever 
been  acted  upon  by  the  people  when  it  comes  to  the  last,  and 
will  be  acted  upon  so  long  as  the  world  stands,  has  been  in- 
creased by  the  two  circumstances  of  which  we  have  spoken 
already;  that  the  executive  has  been,  and  still  frequently 
is,  mistaken  for  the  government,  and  resistance  against  the 
executive,  though  it  should  be  in  defence  of  the  law,  as 
in  France  in  1830,  is  taken  for  resistance  against  the  whole 
government ;  and,  secondly,  that  monarchs  have  been  erro- 
neously surrounded  with  an  extra-political  halo.  A  relation 
between  the  subject  and  the  monarch  on  religious  grounds 
beyond  the  foundation  of  the  state  and  law  is  imagined ;  a 
sacred,  indelible,  and  indestructible  allegiance  is  supposed  to 
exist.  Yet  that  the  Bible  does  not  teach  the  theory  of  non- 
resistance  we  may  easily  gather  from  the  Old  Testament; 
and  it  is  a  fact  that  Christ  does  not  speak  of  politics,  and  that 
none  have  so  much  disagreed  on  the  subject  as  the  theo- 
logians. Indeed,  they  have  advocated  resistance,  under  cir- 
cumstances which  to  them  seemed  to  warrant  it,  more  freely 
and  positively  than  any  other  writers.1  No  set  of  theologians 
have,  I  believe,  so  stanchly  and  unequivocally,  though  by  no 
means  in  all  cases  consistently,  maintained  the  principle  of 
non-resistance  as  the  writers  of  the  Church  of  England  during 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  They  did  not  in- 


granted  in  1287  to  the  barons  by  the  two  Pacts  of  Union  the  right  of  insurrection 
against  the  king  if  their  liberties  should  be  infringed  after  they  had  protested. 
(Prescott,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  Introduction,  xci.)  Of  the  Polish  rocoss  I 
have  spoken  previously.  I  might  increase  the  instances.  [See  what  Mr.  Guizot 
says  of  the  right  of  resistance  in  feudalism,  History  of  Civilization,  i.  100,  and 
History  of  Civilization  in  France,  iii.  96,  97,  Amer.  ed.  of  trans].] 

1  Even  Luther  did  not  hesitate  to  sanction  resistance  to  the  emperor  who  will 
not  follow  "  signed  privileges"  (beschriebene  Rechte),  and  considered  an  em- 
peror lawfully  dethroned  if  the  empire  and  electors  unitedly  dissolve  the  alle- 
giance. Luther  saw  this  case  of  a  German  emperor  clearer  because  he  was  an 
elected  prince.  For  us  there  is  no  difference.  All  princes  are  conditionally 
monarchs,  that  is  for  the  good  of  the  people.  None  is  by  intrinsic  legitimacy 
so.  The  mild  Melanchthon  thought  tyrannicide  admissible.  Loci  Theologici, 
De  Magistr. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS, 


171 


deed  maintain  the  doctrine  of  absolute  obedience,  for  they 
demanded  "  passive  obedience"  only,  and  allowed  therefore 
non-compliance.1 

XXIX.  Of  the  force  of  allegiance  we  have  spoken  already. 
Yet  even  where  the  theory  which  I  have  endeavored  to  estab- 
lish in  the  first  volume  is  not  admitted,  it  is  certain  that  no 
man  can  be  lawfully  bound  or  lawfully  promise  to  do  what  is 
unlawful.  This  is  self-evident.  Even  the  canon  law  says,  "In 
malis  promissis  non  expedit  servare  fidem."  So  that  neither 
allegiance  nor  oath  can  bind  to  obey  that  which  is  unlawful. 
This  therefore  would  absolve  every  one  from  absolute  obedi- 
ence. Yet  if  we  merely  decline  to  co-operate  or  obey  but  do 
not  in  cases  of  uttermost  emergency  resist,  we  leave  all  power 
to  do  that  which  we  hold  to  be  unlawful  in  the  hands  of  the 
government.  In  the  opinion  of  those  who  sincerely  believe 
that  dynasties  or  certain  specific  governments  are  from  God, 
we  ought  to  suffer  everything  at  their  hands  as  so  much  pun- 
ishment inflicted  by  the  Deity.  That  this  idea  does  not  agree 
with  our  views  of  government  supported  throughout  this  work 
is  clear.  The  government  is  an  organism  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  the  great  ends  of  the  state,  the  state  an  institution 
to  secure  the  great  social  and  individual  ends  of  humanity, 
and  if  the  former  ceases  to  obtain  its  object,  either  from  want 
of  energy  or  because  it  endeavors  systematically  and  con- 
stantly to  undermine  and  destroy  those  ends,  society  has  no 
doubt  the  simple  right  of  establishing  a  new  one,  even  where 
there  is  no  particular  compact  between  the  rulers  and  the 
ruled.  The  government  is  no  longer  a  lawful  one,  though 
established  according  to  all  the  formalities  of  the  law,  because 
no  longer  answering  the  purpose  or  obtaining  the  ends  and 
objects  of  the  law.  Mankind  have  always  acted  upon  this 
principle.  Yet  so  necessary  is  a  government,  so  unrighteous 
is  it  not  to  deliberate  in  all  matters  relating  to  society  whether 


1  Hallam,  Constitutional  History,  in  various  places,  among  others,  vol.  ii.  p.  625, 
et  seq. 


1/2 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


we  may  not  injure  others  more  than  we  assist  them,  so  doubt- 
ful, calamitous,  and  frequently  demoralizing  are  the  effects  of 
insurrection  and  of  civil  war,  so  easily  is  the  individual  de- 
ceived respecting  his  own  rights  and  the  probable  success  of 
measures  which  may  appear  suitable  to  the  temperament  of 
our  mind  at  the  time,  so  much  increased  is  the  evil  of  tyranny 
in  case  of  unsuccessful  attempts  at  resistance,  so  frequently 
does  resistance,  even  though  successful  against  the  govern- 
ment, lead  to  a  tyranny  worse  than  the  previous  one  —  to 
military  government  —  and  so  often  does  it  open  an  arena  for 
the  worst  passions  and  for  a  shallow  mediocrity,  noisy,  for- 
ward, and  unconcerned  about  the  harm  it  produces,  that  he 
who  on  slight  grounds  resorts  to  force  against  the  existing 
government  indeed  commits  treason  against  society.1 

An  insurrection  may  take  place  on  the  strict  ground  of  re- 
sistance ;  that  is,  people  may  take  up  arms  to  resist  every 
attempt  to  enforce  a  certain  law  or  measure,  without  the  in- 
tention of  going  farther  than  this  resistance.  This  may 
especially  take  place  when  single  provinces  rise.  In  very 
many  cases  in  history  such  insurrections  have  had  salutary 
results ;  because  government  learns  practically  that  it  cannot 
go  beyond  a  certain  line.  Every  measure  of  sufficient  mag- 
nitude and  radical  importance  may  be  sufficient  to  warrant 
armed  resistance ;  but  as  it  necessarily  leads  to  political  inter- 
ruption, and  especially  as  a  partial  insurrection  may  lead  to  a 
revolution  though  originally  intended  for  armed  resistance 
only,  it  .is  necessary  both  that  the  cause  be  of  sufficient  mag- 
nitude, and  that  all  common  and  regular  means  of  redress 
have  previously  been  fairly  and  honestly  tried.  By  revolution 
I  understand  a  violent  change  of  the  fundamentals,  or  one 
fundamental,  of  the  government;  a  violent  change  of  the  ad- 
ministration would  be  a  rebellion,  or  rebellious  riot.  Aristotle 
(Pol.,  v.  1,4)  mentions  two  species  of  revolutions,  those  by 
which  the  constitution  is  changed,  and  those  which  leave  the 


'See  the  judicious  remarks  of  Mackintosh  in  his  History  of  the  Revolution 
of  1688,  chapter  ix. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


173 


constitution  but  bring  another  set  of  men  into  power :  he  does 
not  mean,  however,  by  another  set,  another  administration, 
but  other  rulers,  for  he  instances  the  monarchy  and  oligarchy. 
The  change  of  persons  in  these  states,  that  is,  the  change  of 
the  power-holders,  is  evidently  a  change  of  one  of  the  fun- 
damentals of  the  government,  and  thus  falls  within  our  defi- 
nition. 

As  to  revolutions,  they  can  never  be  justified  by  a  single 
executive  measure — except  it  be  a  coup  d'etat — but  by  a  per- 
verse course  of  ruinous,  unjust,  and  malevolent  or  infatuated 
measures,  and  after  all  civil  means  of  redress  have  been  tried 
in  vain ;  and  there  must  be  either  fair  hope  of  success,  or  the 
people  be  driven  to  desperation,  so  that  a  serious  risk  shall 
seem  more  endurable  than  the  existing  state  of  things.  For 
revolutions  are  most  grave,  bitter,  and  uncertain  processes. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  exists 
no  nation  with  well-established  freedom  which  has  not  been 
obliged  to  resort  at  some  period  to  resistance  and  does  not 
owe  some  of  its  choicest  blessings  and  most  deeply-founded 
liberties  to  armed  resistance  or  revolution.  There  is  rarely  a 
clear  understanding  between  the  government  and  the  people 
of  free  nations  unless  at  some  period  or  other  they  have 
passed  through  this  process  and  crisis.  It  is  a  maxim  ascribed 
to  the  duke  de  Sully,  and  adopted  by  Burke,1  that  there  are 
no  unprovoked  revolts.  If  we  understand  by  revolts  insur- 
rections of  the  people,  and  not  conspiracies  of  the  nobility  or 
generals,  the  remark  is  certainly  true.  Thus  Sully  must  have 
meant  it,  for  otherwise  his  own  times  would  but  too  abun- 
dantly furnish  us  with  instances  to  the  contrary,  while  we 
have  but  to  look  at  South  America  to  see  unprovoked  army 
revolts  happening  in  almost  uninterrupted  succession.  Revo- 
lutions are  fearful,  yet  they  are  at  all  times  not  only  unavoid- 
able but  salutary.  The  whole  political  institution  of  a  country 
may  become  so  corrupt  or  so  thoroughly  unfit  for  the  existing 


1  Sally's  Memoirs,  and  Burke,  Thoughts  on  the  present  Discontents  [Works, 
i.  310,  Bohn's  ed.]. 


174 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


and  changed  state  of  things  that  it  engenders  misery  and 
political  immorality  and  altogether  loses  its  jural  character. 
Revolutions  then  become  unavoidable  and  just;  nor  should 
any  conscientious  citizen  then  shrink  from  them.  -What  the 
great  Boerhaave  says  of  fevers, "  Febris  saepe  sanationis  optima 
causa,"  applies  with  equal  force  to  political  diseases.  I  do 
not  speak  here  of  separations  of  colonies  from  their  mother 
countries,  which  we  call  likewise  revolutions  in  the  English 
language  though  they  differ  materially  from  domestic  revolu- 
tions.1 Whatever  power  affections  may  have,  and  they  are  in 
many  instances  salutary,  it  is  certain  that  so  soon  as  a  distant 
colony  has  the  power  of  maintaining  its  independence,  and  can 
promote  the  whole  social  interest  by  independent  domestic 
laws,  she  has  the  right  and,  it  may  be,  the  sacred  duty  of 
entering  into  the  lists  with  independent  nations.  ' 

XXX.  If  there  is  danger  in  the  right  and  necessity  of  re- 
sistance or  in  justifying  revolution,  there  is  much  more  danger 
in  the  doctrine  of  non-resistance ;  for,  while  power  naturally 
and  by  inherent  quality  tends  to  increase,  the  people  are  re- 
luctant to  resort  to  resistance  except  in  cases  of  extremity, — 
a  powerful  and  privileged  class  always  excepted.  The  under- 
tainty  of  success,  the  difficulty  of  united  action,  the  natural 
disposition  in  the  citizen  to  follow  the  law  and  authority  much 
rather  than  to  disobey  it,  are  no  mean  guarantees  against  the 
wicked  application  of  the  right  of  resistance.  Moreover,  we 


1  Revolutions  may  be  of  a  very  different  character.  They  may  be  revolutions 
of  the  people  against  the  domestic  government,  as  the  English  and  French  revo- 
lutions were;  or  against  foreign,  imposed  governments,  as  Ihe  revolution  of 
Portugal  against  the  Spaniards,  that  of  Masaniello  in  Naples,  or  of  Hofer  in 
Tyrol,  if  the  latter  be  not  called  mere  insurrections  on  account  of  failure  of  suc- 
cess; or  the  separation  of  colonies  or  distant  provinces,  as  the  North  and  South 
American  revolutions ;  or  the  separation  of  part  of  the  country,  as  in  the  late 
case  of  Belgium;  or  the  re- establishment  of  independence,  as  in  Portugal  when 
the  Spaniards  were  expelled  ;  or  the  expulsion  of  one  branch  of  the  family  by 
another  without  participation  of  the  people,  as  not  unfrequently  in  Asia;  or  a 
revolution  of  the  prince  against  the  state,  for  instance  when  an  elective  monarch 
makes  himself  hereditary. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  175 

ought  to  remember  that  the  resistance  or  revolt  of  no  people 
is  so  fearful  and  calamitous  as  that  of  those  who  have  not  been 
accustomed  to  freedom.  The  resistance  of  the  freest  nations 
has  been  the  freest  from  those  atrocious  crimes  which  sully 
the  civil  wars  of  nations  that  shake  off  the  chain  of  bondage ; 
so  that  the  very  acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  resistance,  as 
an  accompaniment  of  liberty,  becomes  a  guarantee  of  its  being 
used  rarely  and  of  its  being  attended  with  less  evil  than  if  the 
right  were  denied. 

The  necessity  of  resistance  has,  as  we  have  seen,  often  been 
acknowledged.  I  will  not  speak  of  the  emperor  Trajan,  who, 
when  he  handed  the  sword  of  the  praetorian  prefect  to  Sabu- 
ranus,  said,  "  Use  it  for  me  if  I  rule  well,  if  not,  against  me."1 
As  a  sentiment  it  is  fine  for  a  Roman  emperor;  but  acted 
upon  as  a  political  principle  it  would  be  a  sort  of  janizary 
constitutional  law,  and  make  Saburanus  a  strange  super- 
emperor.  Hume  says  that  the  laws  ought  to  be  silent  on  the 
right  of'resistance,  but  he  guards  himself  against  the  suspi- 
cion that  he  desired  to  prevent  its  discussion.  If  by  resistance 
is  meant  the  citizen's  resisting  any  procedure  against  him 
contrary  to  the  law,  then  the  laws  of  England  and  the  United 
States  have  in  a  great  measure  sanctioned  it,  and  there  is 
indeed  no  firm  and  substantial  civil  liberty  imaginable  without 
its  acknowledgment.  If  resistance  against  laws  themselves,  as 
contrary  to  the  fundamental  law  or  on  any  other  ground,  be 
meant,  it  would  be  useless  and  inconsistent  were  the  laws  to 
acknowledge  it  beforehand  ;  for  who  shall  decide  whether  the 
law  be  lawful  or  not?  If  the  citizen  for  himself,  nothing  is 
gained  ;  if  some  authority,  except  the  courts  in  the  regular 
course  of  expounding  and  administering  law  as  to  the  specific 
case,  then  this  authority  again,  whoever  it  might  be,  might 
abuse  its  power.  The  constitution  must  acknowledge  some 
highest  legislative  power,  and  cannot  at  the  same  time  call 
upon  the  people  to  resist  if  this  power  should  be  abused;  this 


1  [Djon  Cass.,  Ixviii.  16;     Victor,  de  Goes.,  13,  who  mentions  the  prefect's 
name.] 


176  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

would  require  another  power  to  resist  the  abuse  of  the  latter. 
The  French  therefore  had  gained  nothing  when  they  declared 
in  the  rights  of  men  enumerated  in  the  constitution  of  1793,  "  If 
the  government  violates  the  rights  of  the  people,  insurrection 
is  for  the  people  and  for  every  portion  of  the  people  the  most 
sacred  and  most  indispensable  duty."  Insurrection  belongs 
strictly  to  political  ethics,  and  must  in  cases  of  extremity  be 
decided  upon  by  the  most  solemn  act  of  the  conscience ;  it 
cannot  be  made  a  subject  of  politics  proper  and  be  drawn  into 
positive  law ;  but  resistance  may  so  far  be  made  matter  of 
positive  law  that  an  authority  may  be  appointed  by  the  con- 
stitution which  shall  decide  —  after  the  resistance  has  taken 
place — whether  the  resisted  law,  measure,  or  demand  was 
conformable  to  the  fundamental  law  or  not,  and,  consequently, 
whether  or  not  resistance  was  warranted.  And  the  courts  of 
the  United  States  have  actually  such  power. 

XXXI.  Entirely  different  from  resistance,  yet  frequently 
confounded  with  it,  or  justified  on  the  same  ground,  is  what 
by  a  contradiction  in  the  term  itself  has  been  called  of  late 
mob  law.  A  mob — the  o-/X<>q  of  the  Greeks,  and  turba  of  the 
Romans,  is  a  lawless  multitude  impelled  by  a  common  desire 
for  the  obtaining  of  some  immediate  object,  or  drawn  together 
by  a  common  impulse,  for  instance  curiosity.1  A  mob,  it 


1  Mob  is  the  abbreviation  of  mobile  (the  movable),  which  we  find  used  at 
length  in  the  diaries  and  familiar  letters  written  at  the  time  of  James  II.  and 
Charles  II.  I  do  not  remember  that  it  occurs  in  Pepys.  It  is  of  frequent  occur- 
rence in  the  Ellis  correspondence,  edited  by  Lord  Dover,  London,  1828.  The 
abbreviation  was  probably  brought  into  use  by  the  newspapers,  like  so  many 
others,  for  instance  scrip.  Whether  the  word  mobility,  which  Walter  Scott  puts 
in  the  mouth  of  a  courtier  of  James  I.  (in  the  Fortunes  of  Nigel),  it  should  be 
presumed  without  anachronism,  preceded  the  introduction  of  the  word  mobile, 
or  vice  versa,  I  do  not  know.  It  is  evidently  a  word  of  derision  closely  resem- 
bling that  of  nobility,  and  must  have  come  in  use  when  the  masses  attracted  at 
least  so  much  notice  as  to  be  derided  by  the  privileged,  which  always  precedes 
that  period  when  the  masses  really  obtain  power.  It  was  so  in  Rome,  the 
Netherlands,  France,  England.  For  the  barbarous  word  mobocracy,  that  is  the 
aristocracy  of  the  mob,  though  properly  speaking  the  rabble  is  meant  in  this  case, 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  177 

would  appear,  need  not  be  the  rabble,  by  which  we  designate 
more  especially  a  tumultuous  congregation  of  the  vulgar  or 
their  aggregate  in  the  abstract.  The  term  "  dregs  of  the  peo- 
ple," the  faex,yfo£  infima,  of  the  Romans,  designates  the  ab- 
ject class  of  a  population  visited  with  ignorance  and  poverty 
and  consequently  stricken  with  vice  and  crime.  They  were 
also  most  significantly  called  by  the  Romans,  carrying  out 
the  trope  of  the  vessel  of  the  state,  the  bilge-water  of  the 
republic,  expressing  at  once  their  loathsomeness,  danger, 
and  fickleness,  which,  together  with  a  gust  of  wind,  may 
indeed  throw  the  vessel  on  her  beam-ends.  "  Sin  tu  exieris, 
exhaurietur  ex  urbe  tuorum  comitum  magna  et  perniciosa 
sentina  rei  publicae."  Cic.,  Cat.,  I,  5,  12. 

When  Suetonius  (Julius,  xiv.)  tells  us  that,  when  Caesar  in- 
sisted upon  punishing  the  Catiline  conspirators  by  confiscation 
alone,  "  a  body  of  the  equestrian  order,  holding  up  their  arms, 
threatened  him  with  immediate  death,"  they  acted  as  a  mob, 
though  they  were  originally  lawfully  assembled  there  as  a 
guard.  Thus  the  British  commons  have  been  hyperbolically 
called  at  times  a  mob,  to  designate  their  occasional  planless 
procedures.  I  have  already  spoken  of  the  grievous  and 
mischievous  error  in  politics1  when  a  mob  take  the  law  into 
their  own  hands,  as  it  is  inappropriately  called,  for  the  law 
ceases  to  be  such  at  the  instant  it  is  taken  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  legitimate  officer,  be  this  by  prince,  officer,  or  mob. 
On  that  occasion  the  error  was  chiefly  considered  in  the 
light  of  justice  and  natural  law.  In  this  place  I  shall  add 
a  few  observations  respecting  the  ethical  character  of  the 
subject. 

The  most  noticeable  political  effects  of  mobs  are  when  they 
pretend  to  deal  out  justice,  when  they  overawe  the  legislature 
or  administration  of  law  and  destroy  property  for  their  own 


that  caricature  of  government  when  the  mob  claim  the  privileges  of  exemption 
from  law,  the  Greek  term  was  oxkoKparia.  It  is  one  of  the  most  uncompromising 
specie*  of  aristocracy. 

1  See  on  Lynch  Law,  in  Part  First. 
VOL.  II.  12 


178  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

supposed  interest  and  necessary  support;  as  was  the  case 
with  the  machine-breakers  in  England  some  time  ago.1 

Although  the  people  composing  mobs  will  generally  con- 
fess that  in  interfering  with  the  regular  course  of  justice  they 
only  do  so  by  way  of  exception,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
no  moral  phenomenon  is  more  common,  of  which  every  one 
upon  reflection  finds  instances  in  his  own  life,  and  of  which 
we  have  spoken  already,  than  that  interest,  excitement,  or 
passion  presents  to  us  that  case  which  excites  us  as  a  par- 
ticular one,  deserving  of  exception  from  the  principles  we  may 
have  laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  our  own  action  in  calmer 
moments.  One  of  the  main  objects  of  all  justice  is  protec- 
tion by  the  interposition  of  law  between  blinding  interest  or 
excited  passion  and  the  object  complained  of.  The  mob 
tramples  down  this  wall  of  safety,  and  derides  the  majesty  of 
the  law — a  term  of  the  greatest  import,  however  shamefully 
it  has  been  abused  in  periods  of  political  and  legal  degeneracy. 
The  very  existence  of  the  mob  is,  in  most  cases,  evidence  of 
the  excitement,  hence  of  its  unfitness  to  judge  or  execute 
judgment.  The  mob,  generally,  consists  of  the  most  mova- 
ble part  of  the  population,  not  of  the  steady  laborer  or  me- 
chanic, hence  of  the  least  reflecting  and  most  excitable  people ; 
and  of  those  whom  it  is  not  difficult  to  guide  with  any 
moderate  skill  in  the  art  of  the  demagogue.  The  London 
apprentices,  so  conspicuous  in  British  history,  afford  instances. 
In  delicate  times,  when  the  best  patriots  labor  to  secure  great 
blessings  by  a  steady  and  considerate  course,  and  when  it 
requires  all  the  consideration  of  the  calmest  minds  not  to 
trespass  a  distinct  line  beyond  which  all  becomes  insecure 
and  dangerous,  a  mob  not  unfrequently  rends  the  whole. 

The  mob  disregards  property;  and  everything  which  ren- 


1  How  ill-guided  the  destroyers  of  the  machinery  were,  who  believed  that  they 
should  lose  their  bread,  can  now  be  incontrovertibly  proved  by  statistics.  Ma- 
chinery made  cotton  goods  so  cheap  that  millions  could  use  them  who  formerly 
could  not,  and  consumption  altogether  increased  in  an  unexampled  manner,  so 
that  far  more  hands  are  now  employed  with  the  machines  to  satisfy  the  increased 
demand  than  formerly  whhout  them. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


179 


ders  property  insecure,  by  whatsoever  means,  be  it  by  un- 
settled and  partial  taxation,1  or  government  oppression,  or 
insecure  inheritance,  or  mob  violence,  destroys  one  of  the 
chief  objects  of  the  state,  security  of  property,  a  chief  object 
not  only  on  account  of  mere  safety,  but  also  because  inse- 
curity of  property  injures  the  steady  and  moderate  pursuit  of 
property,  and  engenders  idleness,  immorality,  and  unfitness 
for  substantial  liberty.  The  fact  that  either  there  is  no  chance 
of  acquiring  property,  or  little  chance  of  preserving  that  which 
has  been  acquired,  has  the  effect,  not  to  cause  people  now  to 
strive  to  obtain  the  more  in  order  to  be  the  better  able  to 
sustain  partial  loss,  but  to  give  up  altogether  the  accumulation 
of  property. 

The  suspicion  and  fear  of  being  overreached,  want  of  confi- 
dence in  themselves,  and  consequent  fretfulness  arising  from 
the  absence  of  organization ;  the  consciousness  of  unlawful 
and  very  brief  power,  and  consequent  thirst  for  making  rapid 
use  of  it;  the  fearful  and  natural  operation  of  mutual  excite- 
ment, of  which  I  have  spoken  before ;  the  absence  of  indi- 
vidual responsibility,2  and  the  desire  in  many  of  outdoing  in 
boldness  the  rest,  with  the  unrestricted  action  of  revenge  and 
final  cruelty,  are  so  many  reasons  why  mobs,  when  they  take 
it  upon  themselves  to  execute  what  they  believe  to  be  justice, 
interfere  most  injuriously  with  the  lawful  state  of  mankind  ; 
and  no  one  who  loves  his  country,  respects  the  dignity  of 
man,  has  regard  for  the  sacred  objects  of  society,  or  reverence 


1  Boeckh,  in  his  Political  Economy  of  Athens,  translated  from  the  German,  2 
vols.,  London,  1828,  specifically  mentions  the  liturgy,  or  special  and  heavy 
charge  of  rich  individuals  for  the  performance  of  some  public  act,  as  one  of  the 
causes  of  public  ruin  by  rendering  property  insecure,  and  the  author  substantiates 
his  case,  not  without  the  aid  of  ancient  authors  themselves. 

*  There  is  a  saying  of  Napoleon's,  in  Las  Cases,  not  unworthy  to  be  mentioned 
here.  At  St.  Helena  he  found  an  old  Malny,  of  (he  name  of  Toby,  who  had 
been  kidnapped  and  sold  at  that  island.  Napoleon  was  much  affected  by  his  re- 
cital, and  said,  among  other  things,  "  If  this  crime  has  been  committed  by  the 
captain  alone,  he  is  no  doubt  one  of  the  worst  of  men  ;  but  if  it  has  been  com- 
mitted by  the  whole  crew  unitedly,  it  may  have  been  done  by  persons  who,  after 
ill,  are  not  so  wicked  as  one  would  think  at  first."  Vol.  ii.  p.  26,  ed.  of  1825. 


l8o  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

for  truth  and  justice  (which  is  truth  enacted),  will  talk  slightly 
or  speak  jocosely  of  them ;  which,  nevertheless,  is  but  too 
frequently  done  in  our  papers.  The  hanging  at  the  lantern 
in  the  beginning  of  the  French  revolution,  the  awful  and  un- 
righteous excitement  and  cruelty  in  the  times  of  Titus  Gates, 
the  barbarous  slaughtering  of  the  prisoners  of  war  in  Spain, 
when  a  commanding  officer  declared  by  proclamation  that  the 
people  demanded  the  slaughter  of  fifty-five  persons,  and 
rather  justified  the  act  upon  this  ground,1  evidently  from  fear, 
the  procedures  in  our  own  country  at  Vicksburg  in  i8352 
and  at  Boston  against  a  convent,  are  warnings  which  no  one 
ought  to  leave  unheeded.  No  one  who  has  not  been  present 
at  such  unfortunate  procedures  can  have  any  idea  of  the 
rapidity  with  which  suspicion  rises,  is  received,  passes  on,  in- 
creases, and  terminates  in  a  sanguinary  act  of  revenge.  The 
multiplying  power  of  excitement  in  a  mob  by  rapid  circula- 
tion is  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous  example  of  the  power 
of  reciprocal  influence  and  sympathy  lodged  in  our  nature 
that  human  life  ever  presents. 

To  overawe  the  legislature  or  courts  of  justice  is  equally 
pernicious  and  unjust.  We  can  trace  in  the  history  of  every 
revolution  the  fact  that  evil  consequences  of  the  gravest  kind 
have  attended  it.  In  France  the  sans-culottes  at  the  bar,  in 
England  the  people  in  the  galleries  in  the  times  of  the  ascend- 

1  We  find,  in  the  year  1838,  Juntas  of  Retaliation  formed  in  Spain,  and  the 
Paris  journals  published  a  proclamation  of  the  general  commanding  at  Valencia, 
which  contains  the  following  deplorable  passage :  "  Brave  national  guards  and 
inhabitants  of  Valencia  :  The  Junta  of  Retaliation  began  its  labors  yesterday. 
Conformably  to  its  advice  and  the  general  clamor  of  the  people,  although  much 
against  my  inclination  and  painfully  for  my  heart,  I  find  myself  under  the  neces- 
sity of  causing  to  be  shot  fifty-five  of  the  Carlist  captives  in  the  prisons  of  this 
city,  etc.  .  .  .  The  fatal  system  of  moderation  which  we  have  followed  must 
cease.  The  enemies  of  the  throne  and  of  liberty  tremble  in  learning  that  her 
mnjesty's  government  has  recovered  all  its  energy  and  suppressed  forever  all 
that  benevolent  sentiment  which  made  us  regard  them  only  as  erring  Spaniards. 
If  the  despot  pretends  to  subjugate  us  by  blood,  it  is  in  blood  that  we  will  extin- 
guish his  projects,  and  it  is  with  blood  that  we  will  consolidate  the  constitutional 
throne  of  Isabella  and  liberty." 

*  Niles's  Register,  Baltimore,  August  I,  1835. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  181 

ency  of  the  Presbyterians  and  Independents,  and  the  boister- 
ous people  in  the  hall  of  the  cortes  in  1821,  are  all  instances 
of  what  is  nere  maintained ;  and  little  do  those  who  invoke 
this  overawing  by  the  mob  know  what  chains  at  that  moment 
they  rivet  on  their  own  limbs.  Silence,  therefore,  in  legisla- 
tive halls  and  courts  is  not  only  a  debt  of  respect  and  decency, 
but  a  political  duty  of  grave  import;  not  to  speak  of  other 
inconveniences  arising  out  of  habitual  applause  or  disappro- 
bation from  the  galleries.  It  is  one  of  the  surest  means  to 
give  confidence  to  those  insipid  yet  ever-ready  talkers  of 
whom  every  assembly  has  some,  and  who  constitute  a  polit- 
ical as  well  as  social  nuisance.  Overawing  by  the  mob  does 
not  only  occur  in  times  of  revolution :  we  find  an  instance  of 
it  during  peace,  in  Walpole's  day,  in  the  commons,  when  an 
outcry  was  made  against  the  excise  bill,1  the  people  being 
heated  into  fury  by  the  frauds  of  stock-jobbers  at  the  time  of 
the  South  Sea  bubble ;  and  of  late,  in  the  legislature  of  one  of 
our  states,  another  of  a  very  serious  character. 

When  we  come  to  speak  of  the  nature  and  essence  of  the 
representative  government,  we  shall  see  how  utterly  incom- 
patible with  it  is  the  influence  of  mobs  upon  the  representa- 
tives—  mobs  which  daringly  assume  the  name  of  people. 
Mobs,  if  in  any  way  allowed  to  influence  assemblies,  produce 
those  bursts  of  passion  or  excitement,  so  much  to  be  dreaded 
in  all  politics,  monarchical  or  republican,  for  which  the  French 
during  the  first  revolution  had  a  technical  term,  calling  them 
decrets  d'enthoitsiasme,  so  that  Dumont,  in  his  Memoirs  of 
Mirabeau,  gives  us  an  instance  of  a  decree  of  enthusiasm  of 
war.  There  is,  we  all  know,  such  a  thing  as  passing  a  propo- 
sition by  acclamation ;  but  in  excited  times  it  is  exceedingly 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  universal  enthusiasm  and  uni- 
versal bawling  respecting  the  passage  of  a  measure,  either  to 
urge  it  forward  or  to  denounce  it.  When  on  February  7, 
1787,  Sheridan  brought  forward  his  fourth  charge  against 
Hastings,  and  had  charmed  the  audience  by  his  most  brilliant 


1  Robert  Walpole's  Memoirs,  vol.  iii.,  ed.  of  1816. 


l%2  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

display  so  much  that  members,  peers,  and  strangers  expressed 
their  approbation  by  long-continued  applause  —  a  procedure 
new  and  irregular — an  adjournment  of  the  debate  was  moved 
and  carried  "  to  afford  time  for  the  dispassionate  consideration 
of  the  question,  and  to  avoid  coming  to  a  vote  while  the 
minds  of  members  were  under  the  fascinating  impression  of 
that  speech."  Tomline  calls  this  reason  justly  an  "unprece- 
dented" one,  although  just.  Fox  opposed  it,  but  it  was  carried 
without  a  division.1 

XXXII.  The  obligation  of  informing  the  proper  state 
authority  against  offences  before  or  after  the  fact  has  at  all 
times  been  considered  a  very  serious  one,  and  demands  our 
attention.  The  whole  subject  may  be  considered  first  in  re- 
gard to  government  officers,  and  secondly  respecting  the  citi- 
zen at  large.  That  every  officer  has  not  only  the  right  but 
the  duty  to  inform  against  all  offences  belonging  to  his  proper 
sphere  which  come  to  his  notice,  and  diligently  to  trace  them 
out,  is  evident.  For  what  else  is  he  appointed,  if  not  to  sup- 
port and  assist  in  the  regular  course  of  law  ?  An  officer, 
therefore,  is  bound  by  the  relation  in  which  through  his  office 
he  stands  to  society,  and  the  object  for  which  power  and  au- 
thority have  been  delegated  to  him,  not  only  to  take  proper 
notice  of  offences  relating  to  his  department,  if  he  has  unde- 
niable evidence  of  them,  but  also  diligently  to  trace  out  the 
truth  so  soon  as  he  has  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion.  With 
respect  to  offences  which  do  not  touch  his  particular  depart- 
ment, he  has  only,  it  seems  to  me,  the  obligation  common  to 
all  citizens  at  large.  Before  we  treat  of  this  latter  subject,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  speak  of  some  dangers  and  evils  con- 
nected with  informing. 

Governments  have  not  unfrequently  held  out  regular  re- 
wards, proportioned  to  the  offence  or  crime  of  which  infor- 
mation is  given.  It  was  formerly  so  in  England.  The  more 
a  government  is  a  government  of  law,  and  not  of  executive 


1  Tomline,  Memoirs  of  \Villiam  Pitt,  vol.  ii.  p.  271,  2d  ed. 


•    POLITICAL  ETHICS.  183 

management  alone,  the  less  effective  must  necessarily  become, 
upon  the  whole,  a  preventive  police;  for  one  of  the  main 
ideas  of  a  strict  government  of  law  and  of  civil  liberty  is  that 
the  citizen  be  allowed  to  do  all  he  chooses,  provided  he  do  not 
offend  against  the  laws,  and  that  proper  notice  shall  be  taken 
of  the  offence  only,  and  then  only  according  to  law,  after  an 
abuse  of  that  right  to  do  what  one  chooses  has  taken  place, 
in  other  words,  after  an  offence  has  been  committed.  I  do 
not  mean  to  say  that  all  preventive  police  is  contrary  to  civil 
liberty.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  infinitely  better  to  prevent 
crimes  than  to  punish  them  ;  and  one  of  the  means  to  prevent 
them  is  a  preventive  police.  Yet  it  is  certain,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  a  preventive  police  cannot  and  ought  not  to  be 
established  on  so  expensive  and  thorough  a  plan  in  a  free 
country  as  is  possible  in  a  well-regulated  and  carefully  or- 
ganized absolute  monarchy.1 

The  comparative  inefficiency  of  a  thoroughly  organized  pre- 
ventive police,  under  institutions  of  civil  liberty,  might  induce 
us  to  consider  this  additional  means  of  detecting  offences  by 
holding  out  a  regular  reward  for  information,  as  peculiarly 
necessary  in  free  countries  ;  for  the  necessity  of  punishing 
offences  remains  in  all  societies  the  same.  But  we  must  con- 
sider that  none  but  the  abject  portion  of  the  community  will 
show  themselves  willing  to  make  a  profession  of  informing 
for  money,  people  who  are  incapable,  perhaps,  owing  to  their 

1  *  There  are  two  questions  not  distinctly  stated  here :  Is  a  man  bound  to  in- 
form? and  when  is  he  bound  not  to  inform  ?  For  the  latter  compare  the  follow- 
ing words  of  Lord  Mansfield,  when  speaking  of  the  laws  against  the  Catholics,  in 
the  case  of  James  Webb,  at  the  suit  of  Payne,  a  "common  informer"  of  that 
period  : 

"  But  now  the  case  is  quite  altered.  The  pope  has  very  little  power,  which 
seems  to  grow  less  and  less  daily.  As  for  Jesuits,  they  are  now  banished  out 
of  most  kingdoms  in  Europe;  so  that  there  is  now  nothing  to  fear  from  either  of 
these  quarters,  and  consequently  no  necessity  of  enforcing  these  laws ;  neither 
was  it  ever  the  design  of  the  legislators  to  have  these  laws  enforced  by  every 
common  informer,  but  only  at  proper  times  and  seasons,  when  they  saw  a  neces- 
sity for  it,  and  by  proper  persons  appointed  by  themselves  for  that  purpose;  and 
yet  more  properly  speaking,  they  never  were  designed  to  be  enforced  at  all,  but 
were  only  made  interrorem."  From  J.  Holiday's  Life  of  Mansfield,  1797,  p.  179. 


184  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

lost  reputation,  or  unwilling,  to  make  a  living  in  the  steady 
and  industrious  pursuit  of  a  regular  trade.  These  informers, 
therefore,  will  not  limit  themselves  to  informations  of  fully- 
committed  crimes  and  to  lawful  evidence  of  them,  but  they 
have  always  been  found  prone  to  foment  crimes,  to  mature 
offences,  which  otherwise  would  not  have  been  consummated, 
with  whatever  care  they  could,  to  invent  evidence  and  procure 
perjured  witnesses  who  share  in  their  reward;  so  that  the 
professional  informers  themselves  become  in  turn  a  most 
criminal  portion  of  the  community,  and  constitute  a  most 
alarming  evil,  totally  inadmissible  in  a  well-regulated  society.1 
I  do  not  mean  to  discuss  here  how  far  the  police  should  feel 
authorized  in  thickly-settled  countries,  and  especially  in  very 

1  Various  acts  to  encourage  the  apprehending  of  felons  were  passed  in  Eng- 
land, in  1692,  1694,  1699,  1707,  1720,  1741,  and  1742,  granting  rewards  from 
;£lo  to  ^£50  sterling.  By  the  statute  of  1699,  besides  the  .£40,  an  immunity  from 
all  parish  offices  was  allowed  to  any  person  who  should  prosecute  to  conviction 
a  felon  guilty  of  certain  crimes.  The  Tyburn  tickets,  as  the  certificates  of  ex- 
emption were  called,  were  sold  at  high  prices,  even  to  ^306.  In  1813  the  reward- 
money  amounted  to  .£18,000.  Officers  would  seduce  poor  people,  especially,  to 
utter  counterfeit  money,  in  order  afterwards  to  prosecute  them.  A  certain 
M'Daniel  confessed,  in  1756,  that  he  had  caused  by  his  testimony  seventy  men 
to  be  condemned  to  death.  When  he  was  tried  with  two  others,  the  people  feared 
so  much  his  acquittal  upon  some  flaw  or  other  that  they  were  killed  on  the  spot. 
In  1792  a  similar  case  happened,  in  which  twenty  men  had  become  the  victims 
of  an  informer.  In  1817  four  police-officers  conspired  against  poor  men  and  were 
sentenced  to  death,  but  released  upon  judicial  informalities  by  the  twelve  judges. 
These  conspirators  had  induced  poor  women  to  pass  counterfeit  money  and  seized 
them  in  the  act ;  they  frequently  changed  small  offences  into  capital  ones,  for  in- 
stance if  a  work-bag  had  been  stolen  they  swore  that  it  had  been  tied  with  a 
string  to  the  arm  and  torn  from  it  by  violence,  thus  theft  became  robbery,  and 
they  received  ^"50.  Another  revolting  case  happened  in  1817,  when  two  soldiers 
wrestled  for  a  wager  of  one  shilling,  and  wilh  the  greatest  difficulty  escaped  death, 
the  sentence  for  robbery  having  already  been  pronounced,  through  the  perjured 
exaggeration  of  the  police.  Counterfeiters,  well  known  to  the  police,  were  fre- 
quently not  prosecuted,  because  good  customers,  but  only  the  utterers.  Alder- 
man Wood  asserted  in  1818,  in  parliament,  that  visiting  the  prisons  he  had  found 
thirteen  men,  mostly  Irish  or  Germans,  who  had  received  counterfeit  money  to 
buy  bread,  and  were  seized  upon  in  the  act  of  passing  it  by  the  police.  These 
iniquitous  rewards  were  at  length  abolished  in  1818  by  an  act  58  George  III., 
c.  70;  but  the  abuse  respecting  counterfeit  bank  notes,  for  the  convicted  utterance 
of  which  banks  pay  ^30,  remained. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  185 

populous  cities,  for  the  necessary  protection  of  the  commu- 
nity, to  make  use  of  crime  and  vice  itself  to  obtain  hints  and 
clues  of  the  criminal  doings  in  the  community,  for  instance 
by  pardoning  criminals  on  condition  of  their  informing  the 
proper  authority  in  future  of  the  procedures  of  their  for- 
mer comrades.  I  am  too  well  acquainted  with  the  fact  that 
criminals  in  large  cities  act  upon  most  extensive  and  ingenious 
plans,  and  carry  on  crime  upon  systems  ramified  in  a  thou- 
sand directions,  including  distant  agents  to  dispose  of  goods, 
and  men  who  know  the  law  to  defend  them  with  perjured  wit- 
nesses and  for  rewards  which  are  a  share  of  the  criminal  plun- 
der. Constables  of  large  cities  and  experienced  agents  of 
prisons  are  the  only  ones  who  have  a  sufficient  knowledge 
of  these  often  frightfully  extensive  ramifications,  necessarily 
hidden  from  the  honest  part  of  the  community.  So  much, 
however,  is  certain,  that  although  the  protection  of  the  honest 
may  render  these  operations  of  the  police  excusable,  they  are 
wholly  incompatible  with  right,  justice,  and  sound  govern- 
ment, so  soon  as  they  are  made  use  of  for  anything  farther 
than  to  obtain  clues  of  crimes  afterwards  fully  to  be  proved 
upon  regular  evidence  and  not  on  that  of  the  criminal  informer 
alone,  or  so  soon  as  they  are  carried  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
foment  and  prosper  crime. 

XXXIII.  I  have  referred  so  far  to  common  crimes  only;  but 
when  a  government  keeps  spies,  or  establishes  what  is  called 
"a  secret  police,"  to  report  upon  the  doings  and  the  disposition 
of  the  honest  part  of  the  community,  especially  upon  their 
political  sentiments,  it  is  engaged  in  a  ruinous  and  criminal 
course  of  measures.  To  watch  and  mislead  men  under  false 
pretences  has  at  all  times  been  considered  so  dishonorable  and 
shameful  an  occupation,  even  by  the  employers  of  the  spies, 
that  none  but  the  worthless  and  abandoned  will  enter  upon  so 
disgraceful  a  trade.  All  the  dangers  mentioned  in  the  previous 
section  are  in  this  case  increased,  for  here  the  question  is  of 
dispositions  which  cannot  be  strictly  defined,  and  the  inno- 
cent may  be  affected ;  the  citizen  has  no  remedy  against  such 


1 86  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

espionage,  because  the  reports  are  made  secretly,  and  therefore 
may,  and  generally  do,  vastly  differ  from  truth;  it  is  of  itself  an 
unlawful  proceeding  of  government,  which  is  established  to 
protect  and  to  acknowledge,  pronounce  and  maintain  right  and 
law,  not  to  pry  into  the  thoughts  and  dispositions  of  the  citi- 
zens ;  and  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  spies  and  secret 
police,  besides  destroying  candor,  frankness,  and  the  spirit  of 
mutual  reliance,  engenders  immorality  by  the  conviction  which 
the  people  have  that  the  government  consider  themselves  sepa- 
rate from  and  opposite  to  the  people.  Of  all  the  unfortunate 
features  of  that  institution  which,  view  it  in  whatever  light  we 
may,  appears  as  one  of  the  worst,  most  immoral  and  demoral- 
izing, if  indeed  there  is  another  equally  unjust  one  in  history 
— the  Inquisition,  the  most  deplorable  perhaps  was  that  it 
rendered  an  extensive  system  of  spies  —  called  familiars  — 
necessary,  and,  by  the  help  of  fanaticism,  made  espionage  and 
informing  honorable  among  all  classes ;  for  there  were  famil- 
iars among  the  highest  nobility  and  poorest  pedlars.  And, 
ruinous  as  this  whole  institution  has  been  for  Spain,  this  part 
of  its  operation  had  probably  the  most  mischievous  effect  upon 
the  national  character  of  the  Spaniard,  who  thereby  became 
distrustful.  If  we  are  told  that  by  a  system  of  informers  many 
offences  may  be  discovered  which  otherwise  might  never  be 
brought  to  light,  we  shall  place  the  whole  question  at  once  on 
its  proper  ground,  by  asking  that  question  which  we  are  bound 
to  ask  whenever  we  wish  to  judge  correctly  of  an  institution : 
What  is  among  other  effects  its  moral  operation,  always  of 
greater  importance  than  the  physical  ?  The  many  sacrifices 
which  have  been  offered  by  the  Inquisition  are  doubtless  a 
grave  subject,  but  it  is  of  little  importance  that  the  various 
writers  differ  by  many  thousands.  It  is  the  moral  effect  which 
this  baleful  institution  has  had,  which  is  infinitely  greater 
than  all  the  physical  pain  which  it  inflicted  with  fiendish  zeal. 
Those  who  were  burnt  would  at  any  rate  slumber  now  in 
the  grave,  but  the  nation  where  it  flourished  continues  to  be 
ruined. 

The  history  of  every  despotic  government  is  replete  with 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  187 

proofs  of  the  misery  entailed  by  informers  and  a  secret  police. 
The  informers  during  the  Roman  empire  form  one  of  its  worst 
features ;  they  grew  out  of  the  pestilence  of  demoralization, 
and  flourished  by  the  public  ruin.  All  that  Tacitus  says  of 
the  delatores,  the  vermin  and  pests  of.human  society,  and 
whom  he  calls  "  genus  hominum  publico  exitio  repertum,"  is 
but  too  true.  The  secret  informations  and  summary  actions 
upon  them  in  the  former  republic  of  Venice  were  often  awful.1 
All  the  imprecations  in  France  against  the  "mouchards"  were 
but  too  well  founded.2  The  secret  police  under  Napoleon  in 
France  and  all  the  countries  he  conquered,  in  all  classes  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  and  the  counter  secret  police  to. 
observe  the  first,  were  some  of  the  .most  melancholy  traits  in 
that  grave  period.  To  the  shame  of  our  advanced  race,  we 
find  that  the  Chinese  penal  code  makes  all  anonymous  infor- 
mation against  a  penal  offence  punishable  with  death,  whether 
the  information  be  true  or  not,  and  any  officer  who  takes  upon 


1  The  brass  lion  hollow  and  with  open  mouth  in  front  of  the  doge's  palace 
received  the  anonymous  informations. 

2  Within  our  own  times  a  case  has  occurred  which  shows  the  effects  of  such  a 
system  in  all  its  horror.     The  elder  branch  of  the  Bourbons,  after  their  restora- 
tion, soon  found  that  they  were  not  the  race  of  the  people, — not  national.    Their 
government  became  uneasy.     Conspiracies  were  suspected  ;  a  desire  to  punish 
soon  grew  up.     Carron,  an  officer  residing  at  Colmar,  in  Alsace,  was  in   1822 
abused  by  a  diabolical  intrigue  of  the   ultra-party  to  commit  himself  so  that  a 
show  of  an  intended   insurrection  in  Alsace  might  be  made.     Kochlin,  deputy 
from  that  part  of  France,  intrepidly  published  in  1823  the  whole  plot,  for  which 
he  was  punished.     A  court-martial  sentenced   Carron  to  death  ;  letters  to  bring 
the  sentence  before  the  court  of  cassation  at  Paris,  to  which  Carron  had  a  right 
by  law,  were  retained  by  the  post-office  for  some  days,  and  an  application  to  the 
keeper  of  the  seals  for  staying  the  execution  until  the  court  of  cassation  should 
decide,  received  answer  from  Mr.  Peyronnet,  then  keeper  of  the  seals,  that  he 
would  consider  it  after  a  few  days,  on  October  4.     In  the  mean  time  a  telegraphic 
despatch  had  ordered  the  execution  of  Carron  on  the  2d  October,  when  it  actually 
took  place.     And  now  for  the  "  mouchards."     Two  of  them,  sergeants,  were 
made  officers  ;  a  captain  was  made  chef  d'escadron  ;  the  two  former  and  another 
sergeant  received  each  one  hundred  and  fifty  francs,  and  others  still  the  cross  of 
the  legion  of  honor.     The  French  dictionary  says,  ad  verbum  Mouchard,  with 
much  naivete,  "  Those  who  have  the  misfortune  to  employ  these  abject  persons 
think  to  disguise  their  contemptibleness  by  calling  them  observers." 


1 88  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

himself  to  proceed  upon  such  anonymous  information  shall 
receive  one  hundred  blows,  while  no  individual  shall  be  pun- 
ishable upon  evidence  thus  obtained.  I  do  not  even  find  that 
high  treason  makes  in  this  case  an  exception,  though  the  code 
exempts  cases  of  treason  from  almost  every  advantage  granted 
to  the  accused.1  In  Spain  the  Inquisition  proceeded  not  only 
upon  secret  information,  but  the  accused  could  not  learn  the 
accuser  and  informer — a  right  frequently  though  unsuccess- 
fully asked  for  by  the  descendants  of  the  Jews  and  Moors, 
who  were  willing  to  pay  for  it  a  high  sum. 

Governments  are  frequently  desirous  either  to  get  rid  of 
individuals  against  whom  they  have  not  sufficient  evidence  to 
justify  any  serious  procedures,  or  to  obtain  more  power  by  a 
show  of  danger.  For  this  purpose  they  ensnare  their  victims 
in  pretended  conspiracies,  or  induce  them  to  utter  unlawful 
cries,  and  the  like.  This  diabolical  procedure,  to  which  all 
despotisms  resort  if  convenient,  was  technically  termed  tre- 
panning, under  Charles  II.  and  James  II.  The  public  trials  for 
treason  at  the  time  are  full  of  evidence  of  this  infamous  meas- 
ure, and  the  diaries  and  correspondence  of  the  times  show 
us  the  use  of  the  term.  Any  free  people  who  omit  promptly 
to  impeach  a  minister  guilty  or  strongly  suspected  of  this 
crime  of  trepanning,  or  even  of  establishing  a  system  of  mou- 
chards,  omit  one  of  their  most  urgent  public  duties. 

The  Greeks  had  probably  no  systematic  secret  police,  ex- 
cept under  the  tyrannis.  There  we  find  perfect  models  of  it. 
Hiero  I.  used  to  send  listeners  to  the  banquets  of  citizens, 
The  Greeks  have  various  names  for  these  instruments  of 
tyranny.2  But  the  absolute  democracy  of  Athens  had,  if 
not  a  regularly  organized  secret  police,  its  sycophants  or  in- 
formers, a  shameless  class  of  men,  who  were  as  mischievous 
in  the  passionate,  wavering,  and  arbitrary  administration  of  jus- 
tice of  the  times  of  democratic  absolutism  as  the  demagogues 


1  Sir  G.  T.  Staunton's  translation,  p.  360. 

2  Aristotle,  Pol.,  v.  ix.  3,  speaks  of  them.     They  were  called  TloTayuyidef  at 
Syracuse.     Hpoaayuyevc  was  another  term  for  a  mouchard. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  189 

were  in  its  politics.  The  sycophants  were  considered  by  the 
ancients  as  a  natural  and  unavoidable  consequence  of  absolute 
democracy,  and  in  this  as  in  many  other  instances  we  see 
the  great  similarity  which  all  absolute  governments,  of  what- 
ever form,  bear  to  each  other,  a  fact  on  which  we  have  dwelt 
already  in  the  first  volume.1  The  worst  period  of  the  French 
revolution  shows  the  same. 

It  is  a  different  question  whether  governments  have  a  moral 
right  to  allow  a  crime,  of  which  they  have  knowledge,  to 
mature  to  a  certain  degree.  Undoubtedly  it  is  a  principle  of 
justice  as  well  as  of  policy  rather  to  prevent  crime  than  to 
punish  it  when  committed,  as  has  been  stated  already;  but  it 
is  not  unfrequently  of  great  importance  for  the  public  service 
to  punish  or  otherwise  extinguish  a  criminal  act,  for  instance 
a  conspiracy,  of  which  government  may  have  evidence  suffi- 
cient for  moral  but  not  for  legal  conviction.  Were  a  govern- 
ment in  these  cases  to  proceed  in  the  prosecution  at  too  early 
a  stage  of  the  crime,  it  would  only  turn  public  opinion  against 
itself,  by  showing  itself  unable  to  sustain  its  charges,  and  would 
thus  in  many  cases  strengthen  the  offenders.  A  government 
has  certainly  not  an  absolute  obligation  to  stay  crime  of  which 
as  yet  there  exists  no  legally  convincing  proof;  but  it  has  no 
right  to  allow  the  crime  to  mature  to  such  a  point  that  citi- 
zens suffer  thereby,  if  it  have  any  convincing  proof;  still  less 
to  favor  the  consummation  of  crime  in  any  way  whatsoever. 

.  XXXIV.  Most  codes  of  civilized  nations  make  it  a  punish- 
able act  to  omit  informing  either  the  proper  police  authority 
or  the  endangered  person  of  an  intended  crime  against  the 
safety  of  society  or  the  life,  health,  honor,  reputation,  or 
property  of  an  individual,  if  it  can  be  done  without  endanger- 
ing one's  self  or  any  third  person.  The  English  law  does  not 
acknowledge  this  obligation  except  in  cases  of  conspiracies 
against  the  community  or  state.  The  former  codes  on  the 


'See,  for  instance,  Athen.,  iii.,  74 ;  Schol.  Aristoph.,  Plut.,  31;    Simoniies, 
apud  Plutarch.,  Timol.,  37. 


190  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

continent  of  Europe  made  informing  after  the  fact  likewise  a 
legal  obligation ;  but  all  inflicted  only  a  very  slight  punish- 
ment for  the  omission,  because  the  informer,  if  not  bound  by 
his  office,  has  at  all  times  been  held  "  in  universal  and  natural 
abhorrence,  which  the  legislator  has  reasons  to  esteem." T 
The  lightness  of  the  penalty  shows  that,  even  in  countries 
where  informing  is  obligatory,  the  penalty  for  the  omission 
may  be  fairly  considered  as  belonging  to  those  which  I  have 
a  right  to  consider  as  an  equivalent  for  the  offence,  to  which 
I  may  willingly  expose  myself  if  I  have  reason  to  disobey 
the  law.  Informing,  therefore,  becomes  everywhere  an  act 
wholly  or  nearly  wholly  one  which  we  must  strictly  consider 
as  falling  within  the  sphere  of  political  ethics. 

On  the  one  hand,  a  frank  and  honorable  intercourse  among 
the  members  of  society  is  so  necessary  for  its  whole  well- 
being,  and  informing,  without  urgent  reasons,  has  been 
always  so  much  abhorred  by  honorable  men,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  condign  punishment  of  crime  is  so  necessary 
for  the  physical  and  moral  welfare  of  society,  that  the  rules 
for  an  upright  citizen  need  to  take  both  these  considerations 
into  account.  The  establishment  of  a  government  in  itself  in 
a  very  great  measure  relieves  the  private  citizen  from  the 
obligation  of  informing;  for  all  the  sacrifices  of  time,  prop- 
erty, and  other  things  made  to  the  government,  and  the 
restrictions  to  which  he  submits  are,  for  the  very  purpose, 
among  others,  that  the  government  shall  protect  him  and 
shall  find  out,  prosecute,  and  punish  offences.  This  is  its. 
business.  The  more  a  government  circumscribes  individual 
action,  the  less  obliged  is  the  citizen  freely  to  assist.  This 
has  always  been  felt.  The  more  restricted  a  government  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  more  it  becomes  the  affair  of  the 
people,  and  the  greater  ought  also  to  be,  and  generally  will  be, 
the  people's  readiness  to  assist  the  government.  Now,  I  hold 
it  to  be  a  sound  rule  that  a  citizen  has  a  fair  right  to  leave  it 


1  Remarks  on  the  Penal  Code  of  Bavaria,  Munich,  1813,  published  by  author- 
ity, vol.  i.  p.  221,  also  p.  211. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  191 

wholly  to  his  government  to  look  after  all  minor  offences,  for 
otherwise  a  citizen  might  lose  his  whole  time.  Police  offences, 
except  those  of  a  generally  dangerous  character,  for  instance 
against  general  health,  belong  to  this  class.  The  citizen, 
however,  ought  freely  to  inform  against  grave  offences  or 
crimes,  unless  the  information  would  militate  against  other 
sacred  duties  or  ties,  for  instance  those  of  near  consanguinity. 
Yet  it  must  be  observed  that  the  citizen  is  not  bound  to  ferret 
out  the  crime  if  he  suspects  it  only  upon  rumor  or  insufficient 
indications,  nor  will  he  find  himself  obliged  or  at  liberty  to 
inform  of  offences  the  apportioned  punishment  for  which  he 
holds  to  be  wholly  out  of  proportion.  No  honorable  man 
would  have  felt  himself  at  liberty  to  inform  against  a  shop- 
lifter while  the  English  law  existed  which  punished  even  the 
first  offence  with  death.1  Or  who  would  inform,  except  in 
cases  of  utmost  extremity,  against  near  relations-?  The  family 
ties  are  so  sacred  and  of  such  primary  necessity  for  society  that 
they  must  be  respected.  The  Chinese  code  makes  informa- 
tion against  superior  relations  a  punishable  act.  (Staunton's 
transl.,p.  3/1.)  But  it  is  pusillanimous  not  to  inform  against, 
or,  where  the  law  allows  of  individual  prosecution,  to  prose- 
cute crimes  or  offences  which  endanger  society,  its  safety  or 
liberty,  and  the  penalties  for  which  are  in  due  proportion  to 
reason  and  justice.  The  citizen  who  omits  to  take  the  proper 
step  to  bring  a  murderer,  a  public  defaulter,  a  conspirator 
•against  public  liberty,  or  a  traitor,  to  his  just  punishment,  or 
who  allows  a  fellow-creature  whom  he  knows  to  be  innocent 
to  be  prosecuted  or  his  reputation  unjustly  injured,  loads  his 
conscience  with  a  great  offence,  and  promotes  the  disregard 
of  public  morality,  without  which  society  cannot  obtain  its 


1  According  to  the  Spanish  law,  the  descendants  of  a  convict  in  the  first  and 
second  degrees  are  incapable  of  holding  office.  What  Spaniard  would  not 
have  condemned  a  person  who  should  have  informed  against  such  a  person  who 
might  have  succeeded  in  obtaining  an  office,  the  crime  of  the  father  being  for- 
gotten ?  What  must  every  man  think  of  Lord  Bristol,  himself  a  Catholic,  when 
he  impeached  Lord  Clarendon,  in  1663,  among  other  things,  for  having  en- 
deavored to  bring  in  popery?  Compare  Pepys's  Diary  under  July  IO,  1663. 


1 92  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

highest  and  noblest  ends.  He  gravely  offends  against  the 
general  moral  law.  Public  spirit  and  patriotism  require  him 
to  act  even  at  the  price  of  his  own  inconvenience.1  Informing 
becomes  an  especial  duty  when  the  committed  offence  con- 
tinues to  affect  the  rights  or  essential  interests  of  others,  for 
instance,  as  observed  above,  if  an  innocent  person  is  con- 
sidered guilty  or  even  only  prosecuted,  if  a  slur  remains  upon 
the  reputation  of  a  man,  if  he  continues  to  be  deprived  of 
lawful  property,  as  by  documents  we  know  to  be  falsified,  if 
the  committed  crime  is  an  indication  that  similar  ones  will  be 
committed,  such  as  theft  or  the  fabrication  of  false  documents, 
and  if  the  offence  is  against  the  liberty  and  protection  of  the 
people,  like  that  of  unlawful  voting,  or  falsified  returns  of 
polls.  Of  course  it  must  depend  upon  the  citizen  whether 
he  thinks  it  more  advisable  to  inform  the  authority  or  the 
interested  individual.2 

These  rules  relate  to  offences  already  committed.  Respect- 
ing inchoate  crimes,  or  any  offences  of  a  graver  sort,  with 
which  an  honest  citizen  may  become  acquainted,  it  is  too 
clear  upon  all  grounds  of  morality,  and  the  love  of  our  neigh- 


1  There  existed  a  short  time  ago,  and  probably  still  exists,  in  one  of  the  Amer- 
ican cities,  a  society  of  gentlemen  mutually  pledged  to  inform  against  the  com- 
mitting of  a  certain  offence  which  they  considered  of  great  injury  to  society.  That 
division  of  responsibility,  if  I  can  so  call  it,  so  frequently  used  for  iniquitous  pur- 
poses, was  applied  here  for  a  good  end.  The  obligation  was  entered  into  upon 
general  grounds.  The  odium  attached  to  individual  information,  therefore,  did^ 
not  exist;  and  when  the  individual  case  occurred,  the  odium  or  reluctance 
caused  by  the  individual  case  and  by  the  temporary  office  of  prosecutor  vanished 
and  was  merged  in  the  general  and  distinct  obligation  into  which  many  had  pre- 
viously entered.  We  have  only  to  glance  at  history  to  observe  how  frequently  a 
similar  division  has  served  for  the  same  reason,  namely  on  account  of  the  ap- 
parent extinction  of  personality  in  the  case,  for  evil  ends.  I  have  spoken  of  this 
in  the  Legal  and  Political  Hermeneutics. 

a  The  Motives  of  the  Penal  Code  for  the  Kingdom  of  Wiirtemberg,  1835,  say 
(page  92)  that  the  new  code  abolishes  the  general  obligation  of  denunciation  ex- 
isting according  to  the  old  laws,  because  informing  is  against  the  general  senti- 
ment. Exceptions,  however,  are  made,  respecting  crimes  of  general  danger  or 
if  innocent  persons  are  under  trial,  from  which,  again,  are  excepted  cases  where 
the  accused  is  by  blood  or  marriage  a  relative  of  the  individual  who  might  inform, 
or  where  knowledge  of  the  fact  has  been  obtained  by  religious  confession. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


193 


bor,  both  in  relation  to  the  party  who  intends  to  offend  and 
that  against  whom  the  offence  is  intended,  that  the  citizen 
acquainted  with  the  projected  evil  is  bound  to  prevent  the 
offence,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  either  by  dissuading  the  evil- 
disposed  party,  or,  if  this  be  impossible  or  promise  no  success, 
by  informing  the  endangered  party. 


VOL.  II.  13 


CHAPTER    III. 

Associations. — Associated  Means,  Endeavors. — Associations  for  the  Promotion 
of  Morals. — Pledges. — Trades-Unions. — Ancient  Guilds. — Unlawful  Combi- 
nations for  Purposes  lawful  if  pursued  by  the  Individual.  —  Evil  Effects  of 
Trades-Unions. — Disclosures  respecting  them  in  Scotland  and  England. 

XXXV.  DIVISION  and  combination  of  labor,  of  energy,  or 
of  means,  and  the  tendency  to  association,  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
two  of  the  main  elements  of  all  civilization.  Both  develop 
themselves  more  distinctly  and  forcibly  with  each  step  of 
the  progress  of  society,  and  associated  endeavors  in  a  great 
variety  multiply  with  every  advance  of  civil  liberty.  Despot- 
ism naturally  dislikes  association ;  yet  each  association,  if  not 
carefully  regulated,  bears  within  it  the  germ  of  more  or  less 
despotism,  either  towards  others  or  its  own  individual  mem- 
bers, for  the  simple  reason  that  it  increases  intensity  of  action, 
separates  in  some  degree  at  least  the  associated  members  from 
the  rest  of  the  community,  and  subjects  them  to  separate  rules 
of  action.  We  have  associations  for  the  promotion  of  mutual 
industrial  interest,  such  as  insurance  companies,  for  public 
convenience1  or  objects  of  public  spirit,  or,  as  is  frequently  the 
case,  for  both  ends  united ;  associations  for  the  promotion  of 
knowledge  in  the  higher  spheres,  as  academies  of  sciences,  or 
for  the  diffusion  of  general  knowledge,  common  schools,  etc.; 
associations  for  the  promotion  of  charity  or  other  moral  ends, 
such  as  societies  to  promote  prison  discipline,  temperance, 
or  vaccination ;  religious  associations,  such  as  the  monastic 


1  General  insecurity  as  well  as  the  religious  spirit  produced  innumerable  frater- 
nities and  associations,  sometimes  of  a  purely  devotional  character,  at  others  for 
the  purposes  of  public  utility  and  safety,  yet  connected  with  religious  usages. 
Such  were,  for  instance,  the  fratres  pontifices,  or  bridge-brethren,  in  the  south  of 
France,  from  the  thirteenth  to  the  fifteenth  century,  for  the  building  and  sup- 
porting of  bridges,  roads,  ferries,  hospices,  and  their  safety  and  police.  They 
degenerated,  and  were  abolished  by  Pope  Julius  II. 
194 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  195 

orders  and  Bible  societies ;  and  political  associations.  These 
may  be  either  for  mutual  protection,  as  in  times  of  great 
danger  or  feebleness  of  a  government,  when  it  is  unable  to 
perform  certain  acts  which  are  nevertheless  necessary  for  men, 
like  administering  justice,  or  common  protection  in  general; 
or  for  the  obtaining  of  certain  rights  or  privileges;  or,  finally, 
for  opposing  and  ultimately  changing  a  government.  These 
are  generally  and  necessarily  for  a  time  secret  societies. 

It  is  evident  that  there  are  societies  which  combine  several 
of  these  objects  at  once.  In  1584  an  association  was  formed 
in  England  the  object  of  which  was  to  protect  Queen  Eliza- 
beth against  every  attack  upon  her  or  her  government;  a 
similar  one,  it  is  well  known,  was  formed  under  William  III. 
in  1696,  and  in  a  degree  made  compulsory.1  The  Spanish 
Hermandad  was  a  league  of  numerous  cities  to  protect  their 
liberties  in  seasons  of  civil  war — so  common  in  the  feudal 
times.2  But  these  associations  of  cities,  of  great  importance 
in  the  middle  ages,  and  which  did  the  greatest  service  in  the 
advance  of  civilization  and  of  the  civil  liberty  of  the  commons, 
may  be  more  properly  called  leagues.  The  Carbonari  were  a 
secret  Italian  society  for  the  promotion  of  certain  political 
ends.  Ireland  has  seen  of  late  many  political  associations, 
among  the  rest  the  so-called  precursor  society,  formed  by  Mr. 
O'Connell.  The  clubs  in  France  at  the  time  of  the  first  French 
revolution  were  political  associations,  which  have  acquired 
great  notoriety. 

Not  unfrequently  associations,  temporary  or  permanent, 
have  been  formed  to  carry  elections,  defray  their  expenses,  or 
pay  counsel  at  disputed  elections.  We  shall  find  a  more  con- 
venient place  to  consider  all  these  strictly  political  associations, 
after  having  spoken  of  the  subject  of  parties.  At  this  oppor- 
tunity we  shall  consider  associations  in  a  moral  point,  and 
such  as  exist  in  the  regular  state  of  society,  when  govern- 
ment is  in  full  operation  and  neither  anarchy  nor  revolution 


1  Trevor,  William  III.,  vol.  ii.  p.  291. 

a  See,  for  instance,  Prescott,  History  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  Introduction. 


196  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

demands  peculiar  protection.  Finally,  we  may  mention  those 
societies  which  preserve  some  religious,  moral,  or  other  mys- 
tery. In  the  early  stages  of  society  it  can  be  easily  imagined 
that  the  ignorance  and  vehement  superstition  of  the  whole 
people  at  large  should  make  it  necessary  to  make  of  some 
great  religious  truth,  for  instance  the  belief  in  one  God,  per- 
haps introduced  from  some  distant  and  more  advanced  region, 
a  mystery,  for  fear  that  if  not  kept  as  such  it  would  soon  be 
entirely  eradicated.  So  likewise  may  certain  scientific  truths* 
militating  with  the  common  belief,  be  exposed  to  total  extir- 
pation by  fanaticism,  if  not  kept  within  a  circle  of  initiated 
persons ;  but  it  seems  that  knowledge  and  religion  with  the 
white  race  have  become  so  diffused  that  no  such  mysteries  are 
any  longer  necessary,  and  that  we  are  thus  likewise  spared 
the  dangers  to  which  these  societies  must  always  expose 
themselves  as  well  as  others. 

XXXVI.  The  law  must  determine  what  are  lawful  com- 
binations and  associations  and  what  are  not;  but  there  are 
many  which  the  law  cannot  and  ought  not  to  prohibit,  which 
nevertheless,  being  either  dangerous  or  injurious,  ought  to  be 
avoided  by  the  conscientious  citizen.  The  law  of  all  countries 
says  in  general  that  every  combination  is  unlawful  which  in- 
terferes with  the  just  and  fair  rights  of  others  or  of  society; 
but  political  ethics  demands  that  we  should  avoid  not  only  all 
associations  which  interfere  directly  with  the  rights  of  others, 
or  in  a  manner  that  it  may  be  cognizable  by  law,  but  also 
those  which  have  a  tendency  indirectly  to  do  so,  or  which  in 
the  nature  of  things  lead  to  that  indirect  persecution  which 
although  not  cognizable  by  law  may  nevertheless  be  very 
oppressive. 

The  first  rule,  then,  is  that  we  should  inquire,  Does  the 
association  directly  or  indirectly  abridge  the  free  exercise  of 
any  fair  right  of  those  who  do  not  belong  to  it  ?  Such  asso- 
ciations will  in  general  be  the  most  harmless  as  have  a  simple 
clearly-defined  object,  openly  stated ;  and  especially  if  they 
are  for  mutual  industrial  interest  or  the  promotion  of  arts  or 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


197 


sciences  only.  But  when  the  moral  conduct  becomes  the  ob- 
ject of  associations,  it  must  be  remembered  that  they  easily 
superinduce  a  spirit  of  exclusiveness,  of  supposed  superiority, 
of  indirect  injury  to  others  by  advancing  the  members  of  the 
association  only,  in  the  various  ways  of  mutual  assistance,  and 
of  hypocrisy  in  some,  who,  seeing  that  they  are  in  need  of  the 
aid  of  such  an  association  for  worldly  purposes,  accommodate 
themselves  outwardly  to  it.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  no 
moral  phenomenon  is  more  common  than  that  the  more  com- 
pact an  association  becomes,  the  more  its  members  are  apt,  be 
it  by  the  common  esprit  de  corps  or  by  an  erroneous  feeling 
of  honor,  to  value  the  interest  of  the  association  higher  than 
any  other,  and  sometimes,  as  has  but  too  frequently  happened, 
to  end  in  adopting  a  moral  code  or  standard  of  their  own,  to 
be  judged  of  only  by  the  promotion  of  the  interests  of  that 
association.  In  a  free  country  there  is  this  additional  danger, 
that  such  associations  once  formed,  and  having  obtained  a 
strong  hold  upon  the  affections  and  sympathies  of  its  mem- 
bers, most  easily  become  channels  and  vessels  of  political  agita- 
tions and  dissensions.  Political  unions,  however,  in  themselves,N 
have  always  been  so  interesting  to  all  members  of  free  states 
that  they  alone,  without  any  additional  aid,  have  a  sufficient 
tendency  to  create  divisions  and  separations,  frequently  dis- 
turbing the  plain  and  easy  intercourse  of  society.  Nor  can  it 
be  denied  that  experience  amply  proves  that,  whenever  mixed 
up  with  extraneous  matters,  such  clubs  become  injurious 
and  may  easily  end  in  fanaticism  of  one  sort  or  another. 
Morality  is  a  general  obligation,  and  every  individual  ought 
to  promote  it  as  much  as  in  him  lies,  and  keep  himself  as 
much  untrammelled  respecting  all  moral  action  as  possible. 
Speaking  in  a  general  way,  specific  pledges  will  not  easily 
improve  the  state  of  society  at  large,  which  is  promoted  by 
general  improvement,  instruction,  and  general  diffusion  of 
morality.  Yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  a  great  moral 
power  in  mutually  countenancing  one  another  by  association, 
and  vices  may  have  become  so  general  or  have  obtained  such 
strong  hold  upon  society  at  large  that  the  individual,  such  as 


198  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

most  men  naturally  are,  will  be  too  weak  or  frail  to  make  a 
bold  stand  against  them.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  the  vice 
of  gaming  has  become  so  general  in  some  or  all  classes  that 
it  actually  has  infused  itself  into  the  whole  intercourse  of  so- 
ciety, and  that  a  man  who  should  make  a  bold  stand  against 
it  would  not  only  be  derided,  but  actually  cut  off  in  a  great 
measure  from  that  intercourse  which  is  nevertheless  necessary 
for  him.  Such  a  state  of  things  has  existed.  Even  then  I 
believe  it  is  far  more  thoroughly  beneficial  for  society,  in  most 
cases,  for  the  individual  to  take  his  stand  boldly,  prevail  on 
others  to  join  his  endeavors  and  promote  their  common 
views,  than  to  form  a  specific  society  for  that  purpose.  The 
operation  may  be  at  first  slower,  but  will  be  safer  and  more 
radical,  without  exposing  us  to  the  inconveniences  or  dangers 
indicated  before.  Dissension,  hypocrisy,  pride,  the  error  of 
seeking  the  essence  of  virtue  and  distinction  of  goodness  in  a 
few  definite  outward  actions  only,  and  indirect  oppression  are 
evils  carefully  to  be  avoided.  Still,  it  will  be  admitted  that 
cases  of  extremity  make  here  as  everywhere  exceptions.  In- 
temperance has  been  to  this  day  a  national  calamity  in  our 
country.  Innumerable  other  vices  and  crimes  as  well  as  great 
misery  arise  out  of  it.  Temperance  societies  have  had,  in 
many  parts  of  our  country,  a  beneficial  effect.  Yet  even  a 
society  with  so  simple  an  object  has  led  in  some  instances  to 
dissension  and  indirect  oppression.  It  is  safe  to  say,  then,  that 
all  associations  formed  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  regulating 
the  moral  conduct  of  its  members  by  means  of  pledges  should 
be  resorted  to  by  way  of  exception  only.  We  might  other- 
wise dissolve  society  into  numberless  associations  of  a  similar 
kind,  and  coercion  and  violence  instead  of  freedom  of  con- 
science would  be  the  consequence. 

XXXVII.  A  species  of  association  which  has  lately  ac- 
quired great  importance  requires  to  be  mentioned  here  in 
particular ;  I  mean  the  trades-unions,  or  those  associations 
of  mechanics  which  have  for  their  purposes  the  regulation  of 
wages  and  time  of  labor,  as  well  as  the  turns  in  which  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  199 

members  of  the  union  shall  find  employment,  or  the  propor- 
tion in  which  the  employment  of  the  unskilled  shall  stand  to 
that  of  the  skilled. 

In  former  times  there  existed  all  over  Europe  corporations 
or  guilds  of  mechanics,  with  monopolies  and  political  privi- 
leges. They  were  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  humble 
burgher  and  infant  industry  against  an  unruly  aristocracy,  as 
well  as  in  some  cases  for  the  transmission  of  knowledge  and 
skill.  Moreover,  it  was  the  prominent  feature  of  the  times 
that  every  mass  of  men  in  any  way  whatever  associated  was 
also  incorporated.  Without  them  the  cities  would  never  have 
performed  their  high  service  in  the  promotion  of  civilization 
and  the  acknowledgment  of  the  burgher's  rights.  The  vari- 
ous trades  were  separated  by  these  guilds,  but  within  them 
the  employer  and  employed  had  a  common  interest.  The 
French  revolution  abolished  these  corporations,  which  in  turn 
had,  in  many  cases,  become  oppressive  in  the  highest  degree. 
Many  other  countries,  for  instance  Prussia,  followed  the  ex- 
ample, and  in  England  their  political  influence  was  totally 
overthrown  by  the  late  reform  act.  The  administration  of 
justice  has  become  general,  governments  have  become  na- 
tional, and  skill  and  knowledge  are  so  diffused  that  no  special 
protection  by  way  of  monopolizing  corporations  is  any  longer 
deemed  necessary.  The  more  enlightened  countries  acknowl- 
edge it  as  one  of  the  most  substantial  blessings  of  civil  liberty 
and  order  that  labor,  skill,  and  industry  find  their  proportion- 
ate reward  in  the  market  open  to  all.  But  now  associations 
were  formed  for  the  above-named  purposes  ;  they  divided  the 
employed  as  a  class  distinct  from  and  opposite  to  the  em- 
ployer. Trades-unions  may  be  considered  in  their  relations 
to  law,  morals,  political  economy,  and  politics  in  general,  as 
to  their  general  influence  upon  the  safety  of  society. 

Not  a  few  persons  believe  that  all  lawful  acts  may  likewise 
be  lawfully  done  in  regulated  combination  with  others  ;  yet  it 
is  a  principle  of  the  law  of  all  civilized  nations  that  not  only 
unlawful  acts  become  the  more  criminal  if  done  by  combina- 
tion of  many,  but  also  that  lawful  acts  may  become  unlawful 


200  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

by  combination,  if  the  just  exercise  of  the  rights  of  others  or 
the  lawful  operation  and  necessary  intercourse  of  society  is 
thereby  infringed.  Such  combination  is  called  conspiracy,  and 
the  conspiracy  is  committed  when  such  a  combination  has 
been  entered  into,  though  no  further  combined  act  may  have 
taken  place.  An  officer  may  throw  up  his  commission  when- 
ever he  likes,  but  if  a  number  of  officers  combine  to  throw  up 
their  commissions  at  the  same  time  it  justly  becomes  a  pun- 
ishable act.1  All  this  has  been  repeatedly  decided  in  England 
and  America,2  and  Mr.  Livingston  in  his  projected  code  defines 
conspiracy,  in  Art.  683,  thus  :  "  Conspiracy  is  an  agreement 
between  two  or  more  persons  to  do  any  unlawful  act,  or  any 
of  those  designated  acts  which  become  by  combinations  inju- 
rious to  others."  In  Art.  689  he  says  that  the  agreement 
"  stipulating  that  the  parties  to  it  will  not  give  more  than  a 
certain  price  for  any  particular  species  of  service  or  property, 
or  that  they  will  not  furnish  or  render  any  such  property  or 
service  for  less  than  a  stipulated  price,  is  injurious  to  that  free 
competition  necessary  to  commerce.  And  if  such  agreement 
be  made  between  two  or  more  persons,  not  being  partners,  it 
is  a  conspiracy,  and  shall  be  punished,"  etc.  It  is  needless  to 
quote  other  codes.  All,  I  believe,  agree  in  considering  a  com- 
bination to  extort  higher  prices  as  unlawful;  few,  however, 
declare  it  with  sufficient  distinctness  equally  unlawful  for 
employers  to  extort  by  combination  lower  wages ;  although 
the  cases  do  not  differ  for  the  political  economist,  who  well 
knows  that  the  latter  combination  falls  entirely  within  the 
sphere  of  the  first ;  for  if  the  employer  extorts  lower  wages 
he  only  extorts  a  higher  price  (that  is,  demands  more  labor 
done)  for  the  money  which  he  pays,  as  in  the  reversed  case 
the  workman  wants  more  money  for  his  labor.  That  simple 


1  It  was  decided  by  Lord  Mansfield,  Burr.  2472,  Vertue  vs.  Lord  Clive ;  Ib. 
2419,  Parker  vs.  Lord  Clive. 

3  Mod.  R.  10 ;  Ib.  320,  The  King  -vs.  Edwards  et  al.;  2  Mass.  R.  329,  The  Com- 
monwealth vs.  Dryden  and  others.  So  in  New  York,  by  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
the  case  of  the  People  vs.  George  M.  Fisher,  Stephen  Fowler,  and  Anthony  C. 
Hoyt. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  2OI 

principle  of  political  economy,  that  if  I  buy  a  barrel  of  flour 
for  six  dollars  from  A  B,  A  B  likewise  buys  six  dollars  for  a 
barrel  of  flour  from  me,  is,  though  so  evident  and  of  primary 
importance  in  judging  of  a  thousand  relations  both  of  ex- 
change and  of  right,  continually  forgotten ;  in  other  words,  it 
is  always  forgotten  that  money  is  nothing  but  a  commodity, 
although  the  most  desired  by  all.  Justice  therefore  demands 
as  a  matter  of  course  that  a  combination  among  employers 
for  the  purpose  of  denying  higher  wages  or  of  lowering  the 
same  is  as  unlawful  as  that  of  the  employed  not  to  take  any- 
thing less  than  a  certain  amount.  Indeed,  the  act  is  morally 
more  unlawful,  inasmuch  as  it  is  easier  for  the  employers  to 
combine  than  for  the  day-laborers,  and  they  can  generally  hold 
out  longer. 

XXXVIII.  The  evil  effects  of  these  trades-unions,  as  they 
have  appeared  of  late,  in  many  countries,  may  perhaps  be 
summed  up  thus :  They  are  oppressive  to  the  employer,  who 
cannot  freely  choose  the  workmen  he  prefers ;  they  interfere 
with  society  at  large,  by  interrupting  the  free  course  of  de- 
mand and  supply,  create  unnatural  prices,  or  wholly  inter- 
rupt entire  branches  of  industry;  they  necessarily  therefore 
drive  capital  to  other  regions,  where  it  will  find  its  natural 
market,  and  thus  the  workman  is  injured;  they  promote  idle- 
ness by  procuring  for  the  unskilled  the  same  chance  of  labor, 
and,  when  once  established,  are  oppressive  to  apprentices,  of 
whom  they  admit  but  a  small  number  in  order  not  to  increase 
the  number  of  workmen  and  consequently  the  chance  of  labor ; 
they  intimidate  and  oppress  masters  and  those  workmen  who 
are  not  members ;  they  promote  expense  and  immorality 
among  the  members  by  the  strikes,  and  have  it  always  in 
their  power  to  injure  grievously  their  employers  by  selecting 
periods  for  their  strikes  when  they  are  under  heavy  engage- 
ments ;  they  hurt  themselves  by  actually  raising  wages  in 
many  cases  above  the  natural  price,  and  thus  make  industry 
flow  to  other  countries ;  they  are  the  more  apt  to  adopt  and 
follow  their  own  code  of  morals,  the  more  secret  and  unlaw- 


202  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

ful  they  know  their  proceedings  to  be ;  they  impose  heavy  taxes 
upon  the  intimidated  and  fearfully  support  the  guilty  of  their 
association.  In  brief,  they  form  a  most  oppressive,  flagrant, 
and  unrighteous  aristocracy,  knowing  no  interest  or  moral 
code  but  their  own. 

According  to  our  principle,  that  we  ought  always  to  pay 
proper  attention  to  those  cases  in  which  the  principle  of  the 
subject  under  consideration  has  most  strongly,  distinctly,  and 
consistently  shown  itself,  I  will  give  here  a  few  facts  respect- 
ing the  trades-unions  in  England  and  Scotland  elicited  by 
several  trials  and  statements  before  parliamentary  committees.1 
Of  course  it  is  not  meant  that  all  have  committed  the  same 
outrages,  but  these  are  the  evils  to  which  they  may  lead. 
Trades-unions  are  originally  voluntary  associations,  but  they 
easily  intimidate  those  workmen  who  will  not  join  them ; 
they  force  the  masters  to  employ  men  of  their  union  only ; 
they  fix  the  proportion  of  the  number  of  the  skilful  workmen 
to  the  apprentices  to  be  employed ;  they  elect  their  overseer ; 
they  regulate  wages  and  time  of  labor;  and  woe  to  him  who 
disobeys.  In  many  cases  refractory  workmen  have  been 
murdered,  or  were  made  blind  by  vitriol  being  thrown  into 
their  eyes.  The  colliers  of  Lanarkshire,  taking  advantage  of 
the  great  demand  for  iron  in  1835  and  1836,  issued  a  mandate 
that  no  colliers  should  work  more  than  three  days  or  four  in 
the  week,  and  at  the  utmost  five  hours  in  each  day.  The 
order  was  implicitly  obeyed,  not  only  there  but  in  many  other 
counties.  They  held  out  several  months,  and  the  price  of 
coal  was  immeasurably  raised,  so  that  the  total  loss  from 
coal  monopoly  and  strike  caused  by  the  colliers'  combina- 
tion in  eighteen  months  amounted  to  ^"678,000  sterling. 
The  master  is  forced  to  employ  those  whose  turn  it  is  on  the 
list:  thus  the  main  inducement  to  industry  and  skill  is  anni- 
hilated, and  the  inferior  workmen,  always  more  numerous 


1  Report  of  the  Trial  of  Thomas  Hunter,  Peter  Racket,  etc.,  Operative  Cotton 
Spinners  in  Glasgow,  before  the  High  Court  of  Justiciary  at  Edinburgh,  January, 
1838,  for  the  crimes  of  illegal  conspiracy  and  murder.  By  Archibald  Swinton, 
Edinburgh,  1838. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


203 


than  the  skilful,  are  encouraged.  To  keep  the  union  from 
increasing  too  much,  a  very  large  entrance-fee  is  demanded, 
and  the  time  of  apprenticeship  made  very  long.  High  re- 
wards are  paid  for  discovering  any  disobedience,  or  even  for 
"  unshopping,"  that  is,  throwing  out  of  employment,  highly 
skilful  hands.  Secret  oaths  were  taken  to  keep  the  first  oath 
itself  secret,  to  inform  against  refractory  workmen,  and  even 
to  commit  assassination  of  obnoxious  masters,  if  commanded 
by  the  secret  committee  elected  by  intermediate  elections. 
High  sums  were  paid  for  assassination,  the  defence  of  the 
assassins  carried  on  by  common  expense,  and  false  alibis 
easily  sworn  to.  In  single  cases  the  unions  must  be  almost 
always  successful ;  because,  as  was  stated  already,  they  select 
for  their  strikes  those  periods,  if  possible,  when  the  employers 
are  most  embarrassed  and  heavy  bills  are  running  against 
them,  while  those  that  strike  are  supported  from  the  common 
fund.  The  trades-unions  wean  the  members  from  their  fam- 
ilies, and  crimes,  as  is  exhibited  by  statistical  tables,  have  in- 
creased lamentably  with  their  increase.  The  enormous  losses 
which  the  community  at  large  has  suffered  during  the  fifteen 
years  when  the  unions  have  been  in  most  vigorous  action,  and 
which  were  ultimately  likewise  sustained  as  a  matter  of  course 
by  the  working  classes,  are  almost  inconceivable.  Never  has 
aristocratic  monopoly  been  probably  carried  out  more  sternly, 
ruinously,  and  barbarously  than  by  the  Scottish  trades'  unions.1 
If  it  should  be  objected  that  the  abuse  here  stated,  and  un- 
deniably proved  by  judicial  and  patient  trials  as  well  as  by 
minute  statistical  inquiries,  proves  no  more  against  trades- 
unions  in  general  than  murders  would  prove  the  unlawfulness 
of  keeping  arms  in  general,  we  must  observe  that  the  cases 


1  With  regard  to  Ireland,  see  Mr.  O'Connell's  speech,  Mirror  of  Parliament, 
February  4,  1838. 

I  would  refer  the  reader  to  an  article  on  Trades-Unions  and  Strikes,  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review  for  April,  1838,  replete  with  most  interesting  facts  and 
statistics. 

See  also  Miss  Martineau's  Tale  of  the  Manchester  Strike. 

Respecting  combinations  in  general,  see  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates, 
1825.  Also,  T.  Gibson's  opinion,  in  Hall's  Journal  of  Jurisprudence,  226. 


204 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


are  not  the  same,  for  trades-unions,  if  they  are  for  the  pur- 
pose of  extorting  higher  wages,  are  in  their  principle  unlawful 
as  well  as  unjust  on  moral  grounds ;  that  according  to  the 
natural  course  of  things,  according  to  the  universal  character 
of  man,  they  must  lead  to  oppression  and  great  abuse,  as  they 
have  done  everywhere,  though  they  need  indeed  not  lead  to 
assassination;  but  that  with  regard  to  this  latter  point  we 
ought  also  to  remember  that  these  awful  effects  of  trades- 
unions  took  place  not  in  nations  where  murder  is  common, 
but  among  the  Scotch — a  people  not  prone  by  any  means 
to  violent  crimes. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  mention  that  unions  among  the 
working  classes  for  charitable  purposes  and  mutual  support 
in  distress  are  lawful  and  highly  laudable. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

Liberty  of  the  Press. — Primordial  Right  of  Communion. — Journalism. —  High 
moral  Obligations  of  Editors. — Temptations  in  the  way  of  Editors.  —  Power 
of  Leaders,  good  or  bad,  rests  upon  their  seizing  upon  that  principle  which 
is  the  moving  Agent  of  the  Mass.  —  In  what  the  Power  of  leading  Papers 
consists.  —  Conditions  which  give  great  power  to  single  Papers.  —  Populous 
Capitals  in  Connection  with  the  Influence  of  Papers.  —  Obligation  of  Veracity 
peculiarly  strong  for  Editors. — Political  Importance  of  gentlemanlike  Tone. — 
Publishing  private  Letters. — Dangers  of  Newspaper  Flippancy. — The  Political 
Position  of  the  Clergyman.  —  Opinion  of  ancient  Theologians.  —  How  far  the 
Clergyman  ought  to  share  in  the  Politics  of  his  Country. 

XXXIX.  IT  has  been  seen  that  the  liberty  of  the  press,  or 
communion  by  print,  belongs  properly  to  the  general  and 
primordial  right  of  communion,  and  ought  to  be  abridged, 
among  those  nations  which  under  the  developing  influence  of 
civilization  have  arrived  at  a  distinct  perception  of  rights,  only 
in  exceptional  cases,  for  instance  in  a  besieged  fortress.  Com- 
munion is  absolutely  necessary  for  men,  and  the  free  inter- 
communion of  minds  by  means  of  print  is  as  necessary  for 
the  existence  of  civilized  society  as  the  word  of  mouth  for 
the  daily  intercourse  of  men.  The  story  reported  by  ^Elian 
is  too  pointed  a  caricature  of  the  restriction  of  communion 
not  to  be  mentioned  here.1  A  certain  tyrant  Tryzus  pro- 
hibited talking,  in  order  to  prevent  dangerous  combinations 
among  the  citizens.  They  resorted  to  communion  by  ges- 
tures ;  these  too  were  prohibited.  The  citizens  obeyed ;  but 
it  so  happened  that  some  general  misfortune  touched  all  of 
them  so  deeply  that  they  were  on  the  point  of  breaking  forth 
in  tears.  These  symptoms  of  their  feelings  would  likewise 
have  been  a  sort  of  communion,  and  Tryzus  ordered  his  police 
to  prevent  and  prohibit  weeping  in  the  market.  Upon  this,  at 


1  .Lilian,  Var.  Hist.,  xiv.  22. 

205 


206  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

length,  some  idea  of  individual  and  primordial  right,  above 
the  government — and  that  of  sighing  or  crying,  it  would 
appear,  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  one — occurred  to  the 
patient  burghers  :  they  revolted,  and  the  tyrant  was  slain.1 

The  press  is  a  power,  a  gigantic  power;  and  can  it  not  in 
turn  become  tyrannical,  as  well  as  other  powers  can  ?  The 
press,  and  especially  the  newspaper  press,  which  with  its 
whole  organization  and  all  its  qualities  and  powers  is  now 
termed  journalism,  has  been  mentioned  already  as  one  of  the 
mightiest  agents  in  all  that  interests  society,  and  especially  in , 
politics,  peculiar  to  our  own  times,  of  which  neither  the  an- 
cients nor  the  middle  ages  knew  anything.  It  not  only  gives 
increased  rapidity,  and,  in  many  cases,  greater  vigor,  at  least 
for  a  time,  to  political  action  for  better  or  worse,  but  it  gives 
to  public  opinion  a  new  intensity  as  well  as  rapidity  of  action, 
and  even  where  it  is  best  regulated  draws  before  the  public  a 
thousand  transactions  or  events  which  without  it  would  have 
remained  strictly  private,  and  by  the  force  of  public  sentiment 
submits  individuals  to  some  sort  of  public  trial.  I  do  not 
speak  here  of  common  cases  of  slander,  but  of  cases  which, 
however  private  in  their  origin,  oblige  the  individual  to  pay 
regard  to  public  opinion  simply  because  the  case  has  once 
been  touched  upon  by  the  papers  and  the  reputation  of  an 
individual  is  at  stake,  or  in  which  it  is  otherwise  necessary  to 
disabuse  the  community.  For  instance,  a  London  physician 
of  eminence  was  lately  suspected  not  to  have  rendered  that 
speedy  and  humane  assistance  to  a  friend  travelling  in  his 
company  on  the  railroad  and  suddenly  falling  sick,  which  it 
was  believed  he  ought  to  have  rendered.  A  long  controversy 
and  several  statements  by  the  physician  and  his  friends,  ex- 
culpating him  by  proof  of  facts,  were  the  consequence.  It 
would  have  availed  the  physician  little  to  go  to  law,  for  some- 


1  *  The  Spanish  government  published  an  order  by  beat  of  drum,  at  Madrid, 
prohibiting  all  persons  from  speaking  of  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  off 
Sicily  by  Admiral  Byng  (Viscount  Torrington)  on  the  nth  of  August,  1718. 
.Dispatch  of  St.  Aignan  to  the  Regent  of  France,  M6moires  de  Noailles,  vol.  v. 
p.  96.  I  quote  from  Lord  Mahon's  History  of  England,  i.  477  (i.  331). 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  2O/ 

thing  was  at  stake  which  never  could  have  been  fully  estab- 
lished by  a  legal  trial,  bound  as  it  necessarily  is  to  fixed  forms 
within  a  fixed  sphere.  Here  the  press  subjected  a  private 
individual  to  a  trial  of  its  own.  Similar  instances  are  daily 
occurring.  It  is  not  maintained  that  this  is  to  be  deplored.  I 
merely  speak  for  the  present  of  the  fact  as  showing  the  new 
and  great  power  of  the  press.  Very  frequently,  indeed,  it 
re-establishes  reputation,  however  bitter  the  trial  may  be  to 
which  the  individual  must  submit  in  being  unceremoniously 
handled  by  just  and  unjust,  honorable  and  malignant  editors. 
But  for  the  press,  rankling  slander  would  go  on,  without 
being  openly  inquired  into  or  satisfactorily  contradicted,  and 
would  be  taken  for  truth  in  that  circle  in  which  it  became 
known,  or  would  leave  sinister  suspicion.1 

Whenever  a  vast  new  agent  of  society  is  brought  into  play, 
it  takes  some  time  before  it  and  the  laws  become  mutually 
adapted ;  it  was  so  when  Christianity  became  a  vast  social 
agent,  when  the  commons  or  third  estate  rose  in  importance, 
power,  and  political  consciousness,  when  the  Reformation 
became  a  great  agent  and  diffused  knowledge :  hence  it  appears 
to  me  that  upon  examination  it  will  be  found  that  one  of  the 
main  problems  of  our  times  is,  and  for  a  long  time  to  come 
will  continue  to  be,  how  this  agent  of  the  public  press,  un- 
equalled perhaps  in  power,  at  any  rate  in  movability,  by  any 
previous  one,  is  properly  to  co-exist  with  the  rights  of  the 
individual,  of  society,  and  of  the  state  at  once.  The  struggle 
through  which  all  great  problems  must  necessarily  pass  has 
only  begun,  and  we  find  on  the  one  hand  as  much  tyrannical 
abuse  of  this  mighty  power  as  on  the  other  hand  we  find 
fruitless  or  ruinous  endeavors  to  disown  its  naturalness  and 


1  The  recent  case  of  Lady  Flora  Hastings  is  strikingly  in  point.  Bitter  indeed 
as  for  her  this  public  trial  must  have  been,  is  it  not  upon  the  whole  better  for  her 
that  all  has  thus  become  known  than  that  infamy  should  carry  on  covert  slander  ? 
The  above  was  written  and  going  to  press  when  the  news  of  the  death  of  this 
lady  arrived.  What  was  stated  in  the  previous  lines  has  been  still  more  strikingly 
illustrated.  The  injured  maiden  made  a  dying  request  that  her  innocence  should 
be  proved  by  a  post-mortem  examination.  It  has  been  done,  and  the  papers  are 
carrying  the  certificate  of  the  physicians  into  all  parts  of  the  reading  world. 


208  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

its  necessary  pl'ace  in  the  course  of  civilization,  as  indeed 
has  always  been  the  case  when  new  agents  come  into  ex- 
istence and  play.  Crowns  have  been  lost  because  those  who 
wore  them  shut  their  eyes  against  the  press  or  attempted  to 
strangle  it;  and  societies  have  been  convulsed  because  the 
press  would  act  as  though  it  were  an  agent  which  justly  pos- 
sessed absolute  power.  The  ministers  of  Charles  X.,  in  their 
report  of  July  26,  1830,  which  preceded  the  fatal  decree  that 
"  The  liberty  of  the  periodical  press  is  suspended,"  had  this 
passage:  "At  all  periods,  indeed,  has  the  periodical  press 
been  only,  and  it  is  in  its  nature  to  be  only,  an  instrument  of 
disorder  and  sedition."1  The  same  has  been  said  at  times,  for 
similar  reasons,  against  printing  in  general,  against  the  claim 
of  the  people  freely  to  read  the  Bible,  against  natural  philoso- 
phy, the  study  of  which  was  actually  abolished  in  the  Spanish 
universities  by  a  decree  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  indeed  against 
all  inquiry.  The  press  is  like  a  thousand  other  things ;  the 
question  is  not,  shall  we  rule  without  it  ?  It  may  be  interest- 
ing by  way  of  speculation  to  inquire  whether  it  would  be 
better  for  mankind  were  there  no  press ;  but  this  is  a  wholly 
fruitless  inquiry  in  politics,  for  the  press  is  a  fact,  a  given  con- 
dition of  our  period,  just  as  much  as  the  soil  forms  one  of  the 
given  conditions  for  each  country,  or  the  clime  for  each  region. 
The  statesman  has  not  to  speculate  about  them,  but  his  laws 
must  take  them  as'  facts,  and  be  shaped  accordingly.  The 
only  question  is,  how  shall  we  regulate  and  preserve  liberty, 


1  This  report,  signed  by  seven  French  cabinet  ministers,  is  a  valuable  docu- 
ment, which  I  would  recommend  for  perusal,  not  to  satisfy  curiosity  respecting 
what  a  party  considered  tyrannical  has  to  say, — this  is  not  the  true  use  which  we 
ought  to  make  of  historical  documents  of  such  importance, — but  because  it  prob- 
ably embodies  the  most  important  views  of  one  of  the  two  contending  parties  on 
that  subject  in  our  times.  We  must  never  forget  that  the  true  principle  respect- 
ing subjects  of  magnitude  develops  itself  out  of  the  struggle,  and  is  never  pro- 
duced at  once  in  an  absolute  and  finished  manner.  United  with  this  report  and 
the  subsequent  ordonnances  must  be  the  spirited  protest  of  the  Paris  journals  and 
that  of  the  deputies.  I  believe  we  do  not  venture  too  far  if  we  say  that  the 
liberty  of  the  press  and  consequently  the  journals  had  become  the  pledge  and 
symbol  of  civil  liberty. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  209 

public  and  private,  with  the  press  ?  It  is  as  natural  and  neces- 
sary now  as  crying  was  to  the  subjects  of  Tryzus.  The  same 
question  might  be  raised  respecting  large  cities :  do  they  or 
do  they  not  promote  crime,  tumults,  rebellions?  this  is  not 
the  question.  We  have  them,  we  ought  to  have  them,  civ- 
ilization requires  them,  there  they  are ;  the  question  can 
only  be,  how  shall  we  maintain  order  and  liberty  with  them  ? 
A  distinguished  writer  of  the  last  century  discussed  the 
subject  whether,  upon  the  whole,  the  disadvantages  of  easy 
intercommunication  by  good  roads,  especially  in  cases  of  in- 
vasion, did  not  overbalance  their  advantages?  He  is,  upon 
the  whole,  against  many  good  roads.  But  this  is  not  the 
problem.  Roads  belong  to  the  social  agents  of  civilization ; 
the  question  can  only  be,  how  shall  we  govern  with  them  ? 
It  would  be  as  rational  to  ask  whether  it  would  not  be  easier 
to  govern  a  state  composed  of  blind  people.  It  is  for  the 
science  of  politics  proper  to  indicate  how  this  great  agent  is  to 
be  reconciled  and  amalgamated  with  all  the  other  great  and 
indispensable  objects  of  the  state  or  of  society  at  large:1 
here  our  object  can  only  be  to  consider  the  ethic  points 
involved  in  the  great  subject 

XL.  The  whole  periodical  press,  literary,  religious,  and 
political,  is  of  vast  importance  to  society;  the  diffusion  of 
knowledge,  truth,  error,  or  falsehood  is  multiplied.  The 
press  at  the  same  time  is  not  unfrequently  conducted,  partly 
or  wholly,  by  persons  so  unqualified  and  upon  principles  of 
moral  responsibility  so  doubtful  that  it  most  assuredly  de- 
serves the  closest  and  frankest  attention.  But  the  general 


1  Thus,  it  has  been  proposed  in  an  article  ascribed  to  one  of  the  most  eminent 
men  of  our  age  that  protective  societies  should  be  formed  against  newspaper 
slander  and  all  attacks  upon  reputation,  partly  to  discourage  subscription  to  slan- 
derous papers,  partly  to  prosecute  them  at  law  with  the  rigor  of  united  means; 
and  possibly  such  protective  societies  may  become  necessary  in  some  parts  of  the 
world.  'If  the  press  really  becomes  tyrannical,  and  the  individual  should  be 
incapable  of  resisting  it  single-handed,  societies  of  this  kind  would  be  as  neces- 
sary as  protective  unions  were  necessary  in  the  middle  ages  against  feudal  aris- 
tocracies. 

VOL.  II.  14 


2io  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

subject  of  the  present  work  requires  that  we  should  limit  our 
inquiries  to  the  political  press.  Of  this  the  newspapers  form 
of  course  the  most  prominent  part,  although  it  seems  that  his- 
tory will  point  out  the  influence  of  some  quarterly  periodicals 
as  very  great,  because  they  offer  an  opportunity  for  discussions 
extensive  enough  to  be  thorough  or  detailed,  and  yet  too 
short  to  form  a  work;  which  discussions  often  would  not  have 
found  half  as  many  readers  had  they  been  issued  as  separate 
books.  The  periodical  reappearance  of  these  works,  and 
therefore  the  periodical  rediscussion  of  important  subjects  in 
their  various  aspects,  increases  greatly  their  power. 

Newspapers  have  become  the  substitutes  of  the  oral  com- 
munion in  the  ancient  market,  when  cities  were  states ;  but 
their  action  is  in  some  respects  greater  and  more  lasting,  be- 
cause print  lasts.  Journalism  is  communion  multiplied  and 
of  swifter  action  than  oral  communion ;  what  orally  would 
slowly  travel  from  mouth  to  mouth,  or  drop  before  it  had 
become  extensive  rumor,  is  now  conveyed  within  a  few  hours 
to  many  thousands.  All  the  moral  obligations,  therefore,  of  a 
man  and  citizen  which  refer  to  communion  in  general,  hold 
likewise  respecting  this  species  of  communion,  with  this  ad- 
ditional characteristic,  that  in  the  same  degree  as  this  com- 
munion is  vaster  and  more  powerful,  so  do  all  the  moral 
responsibilities  connected  with  it  increase  in  intensity.  This 
appears  to  be  evident :  if  a  man  says  an  untrue  thing  of  his 
neighbor  to  a  single  person,  it  is  an  offence  of  which  he 
ought  to  be  ashamed,  yet  not  so  great  an  offence  as  if  he  says 
the  same  in  an  assembly ;  this  again  is  not  so  great  as  if  he 
writes  it  in  a  letter  to  be  shown  to  many  ;  this  in  turn  is  a  less 
offence  than  when  the  same  is  coolly  stated  in  a  pamphlet. 
Yet  party  excitement  seems  to  have  almost  established  it  as  a 
principle  that  the  wider  and  more  rapid  the  action  of  commu- 
nication, the  less  binding  are  the  moral  obligations  of  him  who 
makes  them.  If  there  is  a  class  of  men  upon  whom  it  would 
be  more  binding  to  be  good  men,  good  citizens,  and  true  gen- 
tlemen than  upon  any  other,  that  class  are  editors.  To  me, 
the  calling  of  an  editor,  be  it  as  promulgator,  instructor,  guar- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  211 

dian,  or  leader,  seems  a  very  grave  one,  however  many  of 
them  may  disregard  it  themselves ;  they  have  peculiar  charges 
in  the  service  of  modern  civilization,  taking  this  word  in  its 
most  comprehensive  meaning. 

Yet  every  fair  observer  will  acknowledge  that  many  diffi- 
culties are  inherent  in  and  peculiar  to  this  branch  of  industry, 
such,  for  instance,  as  that  a  newspaper,  while  on  the  one  hand 
it  assumes  the  charge  of  informing  if  not  always  of  instruct- 
ing, is  on  the  other  hand  an  article  of  merchandise,  and  sub- 
ject, as  a  matter  of  course,  to  all  the  laws  which  regulate 
every  demand  and  supply ;  and  that,  owing  to  the  multiplicity 
of  papers,  a  certain  strong  language  is  necessary  to  effect  only 
a  hearing  which  by  language  far  less  strong  is  obtained  in 
private  intercourse,  or  in  works  in  which  arguments  may  be 
developed  at  their  full  length  ;  or  that  when  a  newspaper  be- 
longs avowedly  to  a  party  it  becomes  in  a  degree  its  organ, 
and  will  be,  therefore,  more  careful  in  not  allowing  advantages 
to  the  opposite  party  than  the  private  citizen  as  member  of  a 
party  feels  called  upon  to  grant,  while  this  circumstance  like- 
wise is  a  strong  temptation  to  trench  upon  the  cause  of  truth. 
For  these  and  many  other  reasons  it  becomes  only  the  more 
necessary  to  consider  the  ethical  obligations  of  conductors  of 
papers.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  seen  that  unshackled  liberty 
of  the  press  is  not  only  a  most  valuable  right  of  freemen,  but 
society  at  large  is  deeply  interested  in  seeing  free  discussion 
of  all  public  measures  and  men  protected  in  as  wide  a  range 
as  public  security  and  morality  as  well  as  private  rights  admit; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  licentiousness  of  the  press  and  its 
tyranny  is  a  great  calamity,  and  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to 
maintain  the  precise  line  between  the  two  by  positive  law, — 
in  many  cases  is  absolutely  impossible.  The  moral  obligation 
of  the  conductors  of  the  press,  therefore,  becomes  the  greater 
from  whatever  point  of  view  we  may  consider  it.  For  this 
purpose  it  is  necessary  to  dwell  on  some  particulars  for  a 
moment  longer. 

XLI.  Some  persons  believe  that  the  power  of  newspapers 


212  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

to  lead  the  public  is  far  greater  than  it  actually  is;  others  un- 
dervalue their  power.  In  general  it  may  be  observed,  as  has 
been  alluded  to  already  in  a  previous  part  of  this  work,  that 
leaders,  be  they  citizens  in  private  or  in  official  situations, 
editors,  parliamentary  leaders,  legislators,  reformers,  or  even 
monarchs,  possess  power  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  the  pene- 
tration, intellectual  or  moral  vigor,  sagacity,  instinct,  greatness 
of  soul,  divination,  or  whatever  else  it  may  be,  to  seize  upon 
the  principal  moving  agent  of  the  masses  or  times,  to  pro- 
nounce clearly  what  the  masses  feel,  and  to  act  out  what  all 
more  or  less  consciously  strive  for  or  the  circumstances  of  the 
times  demand.  This  maybe  for  better  or  worse  according  to 
the  tendency  of  that  body  of  men  whose  feelings  or  purposes 
the  leader  sagaciously  pronounces  or  represents.  The  chief 
of  a  piratical  expedition  is  in  this  respect  as  much  a  leader  as 
the  wisest  statesman  or  purest  patriot  may  be  for  a  whole 
nation  in  its  noblest  and  grandest  efforts.  It  is  true,  therefore, 
that  a  leader  can  be  such  only  and  in  so  far  as  he  follows  the 
general  impulse  or  acknowledges  the  common  principle  of 
movement ;  but  it  is  likewise  true  that,  this  once  done,  a  leader 
greatly  concentrates,  invigorates,  propels,  and  accelerates.  In 
a  leader  a  party  or  society  becomes  conscious  of  its  own 
wants,  endeavors,  and  energies. 

These  remarks  apply  to  newspapers  according  to  the  degree 
of  leadership  which  they  possess.  A  remarkable  instance 
seems  to  be  on  record.  It  is  confidently  reported  that  when 
the  question  of  British  reform  was  on  the  eve  of  being  seri- 
ously discussed  in  the  commons,  the  proprietors  of  the  London 
Times  newspaper  sent  agents  into  various  parts  of  England 
to  ascertain  how  the  great  body  of  the  people  seemed  actually 
disposed  respecting  this  intended  great  measure.  The  report 
was  that  the  people  were  in  favor  of  it.  This  once  done,  no 
one,  I  believe,  will  deny  that  this  paper,  in  conjunction  with 
others,  such  as  the  London  Chronicle  and  the  Globe,  were  of 
decided  and  marked  service  in  bringing  about  this  measure. 
They  acted  like  burning-glasses.  Where  there  are  no  rays* 
the  burning-glass  cannot  collect  them ;  but  where  they  are 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


213 


scattered  about  it,  may  collect  them  and  direct  them  power- 
fully to  one  point  A  paper,%the  Rhenish  Mercury,  edited  in 
1813  and  1814,  when  the  allied  powers  warred  against  Napo- 
leon, was,  somewhat  hyperbolically,  yet  not  without  truth,  fre- 
quently called  "the  fifth  ally,"1  the  other  four  being  Great 
Britain,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia. 

The  chief  papers  of  the  various  countries  occupy,  in  this 
respect,  different  positions.  The  more  populous  the  capital 
of  a  country,  and  the  more  the  political  and  social  life  of  a 
whole  nation  is  concentrated  in  such  a  capital,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  more  the  laws  or  other  circumstances  prevent  a  mul- 
titude of  papers,  the  greater  will  be  the  specific  influence  of 
single  ones ;  because  the  subscription-list  of  the  papers  will 
be  greatly  increased,  which  of  itself  would  enhance  their  in- 
fluence, and  the  income  of  the  paper  being  so  much  larger,  its 
proprietors  have  it  in  their  power  to  unite  higher  and  more 
varied  talent  in  its  service.  Papers  may  thus  acquire  a  power 
which  may  be  very  dangerous  or  salutary,  according  to  cir- 
cumstances. In  no  country,  I  believe,  have  papers  within 
their  respective  countries  a  greater  influence  than  in  France, 
owing  to  the  peculiar  position  which  Paris  as  a  capital  enjoys. 
Subscription-lists  of  daily  papers  have  amounted  there  to 
twenty  thousand.  Each  paper  is  not  only  read  by  several 
persons,  as  is  common  everywhere,  but  there  are  "  reading 
cabinets"  in  which  people  throng  from  morning  to  night  to 
read  them,  and  some  places  where  a  person  reads  the  most 
important  parts  to  audiences  around  them.  In  England, 
owing  to  the  very  different  position  which  London,  although 
much  larger  than  Paris,  as  being  the  capital  of  a  less  numer- 
ous nation,  occupies,  and  because  the  political  life  is  far  more 
diffused  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  papers  do  not  exercise 
such  dictatorial  power.  In  France  likewise  it  is,  as  it  seems, 
on  the  decrease  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  communities  at 
large  acquire  more  and  more  distinct  political  life  and  action.2 


1  By  Mr.  Gorres. 

a  An  extensive  view  of  the  circulation,  and  remarks  upon  the  influence,  of  the 


214  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

In  the  United  States,  where  there  is  no  capital  to  be  compared 
to  Paris  or  London,  where  the  political  action  which  otherwise 
might  become  dictatorial  is  broken  by  the  circumstance  of 
the  population  being  scattered  over  a  vast  country,  by  the 
numerous  state  legislatures,  and  by  the  great  political  action 
each  community  enjoys,  the  leading  influence  of  the  papers  is 
comparatively  small.  Yet  all  papers,  it  will  be  allowed,  pos- 
sess a  propelling  power  in  their  sphere.  Even  if  we  consider 
many  papers  as  nothing  more  than  letters  written  to  sub- 
scribers, they  receive  an  influence  from  their  uniformity  in 
writing  the  same  to  many,  from  their  constant  repetition,  and, 
what  is  not  the  least,  from  the  fact  that  anything  in  print,  even 
although  he  who  prints  may  not  be  held  in  universal  esteem 
either  for  rectitude  of  conduct  or  capacity  of  mind,  has  for 
most  men  some  sort  of  authority ;  at  any  rate,  whatever  stands 
before  our  eyes  in  print  receives  more  attention  than  what  is 
uttered  by  word  of  mouth,  or  pen  and  ink  alone. 


London  papers  and  periodicals  are  to  be  found  in  a  work  entitled  "  The  Great 
Metropolis,"  1837,  London  and  New  York.  The  facts  collected  there  are  of  high 
interest.  The  article  "Newspapers"  in  McCnlloch's  Commercial  Dictionary 
contains  most  valuable  statistical  information,  especially  respecting  Great  Britain. 
For  remarks  on  the  history  of  Newspapers,  and  their  existence  in  the  various 
countries  in  the  world  about  ten  years  ago,  see  the  article  "  Newspaper,"  in  the 
Encyclopaedia  Americana.  It  is  well  known  that  within  the  last  few  years  a 
government  paper  in  Turkish  has  been  established  in  Constantinople ;  while  the 
Sandwich  Islands  as  well  as  New  South  Wales  have  theirs.  About  eight  years 
ago  a  weekly  paper  called  the  Cherokee  Phoenix  was  established  at  New  Echota, 
in  the  state  of  Georgia,  printed  partly  in  Cherokee,  partly  in  English.  Gradually, 
however,  the  Cherokee  part  in  it  seemed  to  diminish,  and  I  am  not  aware  whether 
it  still  exists.  The  newspaper  has  become  so  decided  an  accompaniment  of  our 
civilization  that  wherever  it  extends  the  newspaper  likewise  takes  its  root.  Even 
the  negro  colonists  at  the  infant  colony  of  Liberia  have  their  paper. — For  a 
general  estimate  of  the  papers  issued  by  the  American  press,  see  the  American 
Almanac,  annually  issued  in  Boston. — The  newspaper  is  emphatically  a  con- 
comitant of  modern  European  civilization.  The  Chinese  have  long  possessed  a 
paper  in  their  capital;  but  it  is  only  an  official  promulgator.  [A  number  of 
newspapers  now  published  in  the  United  States  (1874)  for  number  of  subscribers 
compare  with  the  most  popular  European  ones,  and  for  enterprise  in  collecting 
news  from  various  parts  of  the  world  far  outstrip,  it  is  believed,  any  published 
outside  of  England.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  21$ 

XLII.  Though  daily  or  weekly  papers  are  expected  to  give 
an  account  of  all  the  most  interesting  facts  which  occur,  to 
be  in  a  degree  the  cast  of  actual  life  as  it  passes  on,  presented 
for  the  calm  consideration  of  the  beholder,  it  is  advisable  for 
every  paper  that  it  should  have  one  branch  of  communication 
in  which  it  is  peculiarly  strong  and  may  be  depended  upon, 
of  whatever  sphere  this  may  be.  Thus  alone  it  can  calculate 
upon  lasting  and  considerable  influence.  Steadiness  and 
singleness  of  purpose  have  here  as  everywhere  else  a  great 
effect  Let  the  editor  clearly  know  himself,  in  what  branch 
he  is  capable  of  being  a  guide,  and  in  what  he  ought  to 
attempt  merely  to  be  a  reporter  of  what  occurs. 

It  is  not  only  allowable,  but,  I  believe,  desirable  and  neces- 
sary, that  parties,  societies,  institutions,  of  importance  and 
engaged  in  a  decisive  movement,  should  have  their  avowed 
organs,  papers  to  which  the  community  can  at  all  times  look 
for  the  particular  view  which  that  part  of  society  takes  of 
specific  cases.  But  this  in  no  way  disengages  such  an  organ 
either  from  the  common  and  eternal  obligation  of  truth  or  plain 
morality,  which  must  ever  regulate  the  intercourse  of  men,  if 
society  is  to  be  maintained ;  still  less  does  it  allow  any  one 
actually  to  sell  his  talent  or  conscience  either  for  specific  re- 
ward or.  for  the  profit  expected  from  subscription.1  This 
would  be  a  prostitution  of  mind  and  soul.  In  no  case  what- 
soever can  an  editor  be  allowed  to  utter  a  known  or  suspected 
falsehood,  or  imprudently  to  assert  anything  against  the  repu- 
tation of  individuals  or  societies.  It  is  his  bounden  duty  first 
to  inquire.  The  assertion  that  if  false  it  will  be  contradicted 
is  of  no  avail.  This  would  equally  well  apply  to  many  false- 
hoods in  private  life,  and  the  obligation  of  truth  is  general ; 
but  though  falsehoods  uttered  in  papers  may  in  many  cases 
be  expected  to  be  contradicted  in  large  cities,  where  there  are 
many  opposite  papers,  or  if  vented  against  eminent  men,  it 


1  It  has  happened  that  an  English  paper  wilfully  slandered  a  respectable  lady, 
merely  to  come  into  notice  by  the  ensuing  trial,  which  was  worth  more  to  the 
paper  than  it  lost  by  the  fine.  Goede,  if  I  recollect  right,  mentions  a  case  in  his 
England,  Wales,  etc.,  Dresden,  1806. 


2l6  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  contradiction  does  not  neces- 
sarily flow  in  the  same  channel  and  to  the  same  parts  of  the 
country.  There  cannot  be  any  doubt  that  a  man  may  be 
seriously  injured  by  false  assertions,  leaving,  even  if  contra- 
dicted, shades  of  suspicion,  which  all  who  are  vain  of  their 
own  peculiar  sagacity  are  ever  ready  to  adopt,  especially  if 
the  attack  be  systematically  repeated.  Not  only  may  contem- 
poraries be  deceived,  but  posterity  likewise.  A  newspaper 
ought  ever  to  keep  in  mind  that  it  acts  in  a  most  unfair  and 
ungentlemanly  manner  by  using  that  advantage  which  it 
daily  has  over  a  private  individual  of  uttering  to  many  hearers 
whatever  it  pleases.  If  hints  and  insinuations  are  highly 
reprehensible  in  private  intercourse,  they  are  on  this  account 
far  more  so  in  newspapers. 

It  would  be  hardly  necessary  to  mention  that  if  in  any  situ- 
ation the  pampering  of  vitiated  or  criminal  appetites  is  one 
of  the  greatest  derelictions  from  duty,  it  becomes  tenfold  so 
in  newspapers.  It  is  no  answer  that  the  respectable  or  moral 
part  of  the  community  Will  not  read  them.  Perhaps  not;  but 
many  do  read  them  who  are  vitiated  by  these  accounts  and 
become  more  and  more  confirmed  in  their  disposition.  Any 
person  who  has  paid  attention  to  the  unfortunate  portion  of 
the  other  sex,  and  to  criminals  in  general,  well  knows  that 
lascivious  papers  as  well  as  the  constantly  repeated  detailed 
accounts  of  atrocious  crimes  do  infinite  mischief  in  all  coun- 
tries.1 There  is  not  the  slightest  testimony  of  competent 


1  Reports  of  trials  are  necessary;  the  public  are  deeply  interested  in  them; 
but  they  differ  from  those  accounts  of  crime  and  atrocity  which  depict  merely  to 
satisfy  a  vicious  craving  for  atrocious  stories,  or  represent  vices  and  offences 
with  levity.  There  are  weekly  papers  which  occupy  a  large  part  of  their  columns 
with  these  accounts,  accompanied  by  disgusting  wood-cuts.  There  exists  an 
American  weekly  periodical,  called  the  Terrific  Register,  etc.,  the  title  itself 
being  a  register  of  everything  that  is  loathsome  and  criminal.  Quite  similar 
periodicals  exist  in  England  and  France.  There  are  several  mentioned  in  "  The 
Stranger  in  America."  Many  criminals  have  not  only  been  originally  familiar- 
ized with  crime  by  such  accounts,  but,  as  they  have  confessed,  their  appetite  was 
first  excited  by  it.  This  is  not  a  fit  place  to  discuss  the  psychologic  phenomenon — 
the  fact  may  well  be  mentioned — that  frequently  the  desire  of  incendiarism,  and 
sometimes  that  of  poisoning,  is  awakened  by  accounts  of  these  crimes. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

persons  to  the  contrary,  that  I  am  aware  of.  But  we  need 
not  speak  of  these  two  extreme^  only.  There  are  many  other 
injurious  dispositions  or  inclinations  which  may  be  pampered, 
developed,  sped  to  a  ruinous  extent,  by  the  papers.  Ridi- 
culing whatever  commands  respect,  with  that  zest  which  for 
many  persons  mere  boldness  or  impudence  ever  has,  and 
which  is  so  often  mistaken  for  wit ;  attacking  directly  or  in- 
directly private  character ;  seasoning  with  gross  personalities 
excitement  of  all  sorts  arising  from  political  and  religious 
fanaticism,  hypocrisy,  or  narrow-mindedness ;  making  light  of 
the  laws  of  the  land ; — all  these  evils  may  be  greatly  promoted 
by  newspapers.  They  may  indeed  be  caused  by  any  writing; 
but  newspapers  are  more  widely  diffused  and  constantly  re- 
newed, hence  if  bad  their  danger  is  greater.  Many  papers 
act  in  times  of  excitement  as  though  there  were  no  danger  in 
throwing  brands  at  random  among  combustibles,  as  if  their 
highest  duty  were  to  foment  and  disturb,  and  as  if  they  were 
not  conscious  of  the  infinite  concatenation  of  everything  good 
or  bad  in  the  millions  of  elements  constituting  society,  inter- 
course, and  national  life. 

In  continually  making  overstatements,1  or,  what  is  of  course 
still  worse,  habitually  employing  misrepresentations,  which 
generally  are  far  worse  than  positive  falsehoods,  because  so 
much  more  insinuating,  language  loses  its  proper  value,  and 
part  of  the  community  accustom  themselves  to  look  upon  all 
similar  assertions  as  not  to  be  trusted,  so  that  truth  can  no 
longer  rouse  from  torpor  or  find  entrance  with  those  to  whom 
it  is  not  advantageous  or  palatable.  This  is  a  state  of  things 
which  very  frequently  takes  place  in  times  of  great  excitement. 
The  spirit  of  veracity  and  with  it  of  honesty  and  courtesy  flies, 
and  a  considerable  part  of  the  community  becomes  morally 


1  Instances  are  unnecessary :  still,  one  may  stand  here  for  many,  and  is  ex- 
traordinary enough.  A  London  daily  paper,  one  of  the  first  of  its  pa^rty,  said  in 
August,  1838,  that  every  true  Englishman's  blood  must  curdle  at  the  idea  that 
Lord  Durham  had  proposed,  at  a  public  entertainment  in  Canada,  the  health  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  Even  merely  as  an  entertaining  anecdote  I 
think  it  is  not  undeserving  of  a  place  in  a  note. 


218  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

blunted.  Society  is  not  only  interested  in  a  general  gentleman- 
like intercourse  on  account  of  general  convenience  and  refine- 
ment, but  free  states  are,  in  my  opinion,  for  political  reasons 
deeply  interested  in  a  general  esteem  of  gentlemanly  pro- 
priety, founded  upon  a  nice  feeling  of  that  honor  which  is 
ashamed  of  doing  anything  even  slightly  mean,  upon  mutual 
acknowledgment  and  readiness  to  serve,  or  absence  of  selfish- 
ness, and  upon  habitual  avoidance  of  what  may  hurt  one's 
neighbor,  which  elements  are  perhaps  the  most  prominent  in 
the  character  of  the  true  gentleman.  In  this  respect  polite- 
ness, decorum,  acquire  political  importance.  Cicero  and 
Washington  fully  acknowledge  it  in  their  writings.  News- 
papers, however,  may  very  largely  and  essentially  contribute 
to  lower  this  sentiment  by  ungentlemanly  personalities,  and 
in  general  by  discarding  those  rules  which  are  universally 
acknowledged  in  well-bred  society  and  from  which  they  can 
never  be  absolved.1  "  Nothing  is  easier,"  wrote  Erasmus 
(Jortin's  Life  of  Erasmus,  i.  257),  "  than  to  call  Luther  a  block- 
head ;  nothing  more  difficult  than  to  prove  him  one."  Editors 
ought  to  remember,  likewise,  that,  as  a  uniformly  gentleman- 
like behavior  gives,  according  to  all  experience,  great  influence 
in  deliberative  assemblies,  so  does  a  paper  acquire  a  very 
powerful  aid  from  a  uniformly  unruffled  gentlemanlike  tone. 
Its  words  will  be  taken  in  their  full  value;  its  arguments  will 
be  allowed  more  readily;  its  sincerity  will  find  greater  credence. 
Is  it  necessary  to  mention  here  that  editors  sport  with  most 
sacred  rights  if  they  publish  private  letters  without  being 
authorized,  and  that  in  these  cases  they  constitute  themselves 
what  we  have  seen  to  be  one  of  the  most  hateful  features  of 
despotism — a  secret  police?8  It  is  not  unfrequently  the  case 


1  That  scurrilous  papers  use  all  sorts  of  language  is  natural ;  but  both  in  Eng- 
land and  America  leading  papers  forget  themselves  frequently.  A  distinguished 
citizen  of  the  United  States  was  frequently  called,  during  one  of  the  late  most 
exciting  discussions,  by  opprobrious  names,  that  alluding  to  his  name  not  ex- 
cepted.  A  leading  London  paper  of  December  22, 1834,  speaks  of  the  "  goose- 
head  patriot  of  Charing  Cross."  The  duke  of  Wellington  was  called  "  blockhead" 
during  the  reform  -excitement. 

<*  *  That  to  do  this  is  against  law  unless  permission  of  the  writers  [or  theii 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


219 


that  single  editors,  and  among  them  many  who  have  had  no 
other  preparation  for  their  task  than  that  of  having  been  com- 
positors, assume  the  task  of  judging  of  all  subjects,  of  politics, 
literature,  theology,  or  the  fine  arts.  Leaving  their  presump- 
tion out  of  the  case, — which  must  draw  the  ridicule  of  the 
considerate  upon  them, — they  lower  that  tone  of  reverence 
which,  whatever  may  be  said  to  the  contrary  for  the  sake  of 
flattering,  is  indispensable  for  the  true  life  of  every  individual 
and  of  all  society.  Where  skill,  talent,  industry,  knowledge, 
learning,  perseverance,  proved  rectitude,  experience,  profes- 
sional reputation,  no  longer  receive  that  due  share  of  regard 
and  influence  which  talent,  virtue,  and  reputation  ought  to 
enjoy,  to  distinguish  human  society  from  animal  herds,  it 
cannot,  it  will  not  prosper.  Folly  must  necessarily  supersede 
wisdom,  arrogance  must  outweigh  worth.  I  cannot  conclude 
this  section  without  mentioning  the  disingenuousness  of  giving 
garbled  reports.  It  is  a  mere  subterfuge,  unworthy  of  an  age 
in  which  it  is  largely  acknowledged  that  in  all  human  interests 
common  sense  must  aid  us  in  ascertaining  and  maintaining 
truth,  to  say  that  in  having  given  mutilated  and  garbled  reports 
we  have  asserted  nothing  false.  Such  a  report  may  be  one 
of  the  worst,  nay,  most  infamous,  falsehoods.1 

It  does  not  lie  within  our  scope  to  speak  of  the  general 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  an  extensive  news  press,  the 
diffusion  of  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  which  it  undoubt- 
edly promotes,  and  the  superficiality  and  hastiness  of  argu- 
ment on  the  other ;  or  the  unity  of  feeling  which  it  creates  in 
large  countries  by  aiding  that  general  sympathy  and  greater 
uniformity  of  feelings  and  desires,  without  which  liberty  can- 
not avoid  constant  exposure  to  partial  and  provincial  corn- 


heirs  or  other  representatives]  be  obtained  was  fully  settled  in  the  case  of  Pope 
vs.  Curll,  June  5,  1741,  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  quoted  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  the 
famous  case  of  Miller  vs.  Taylor,  respecting  the  unauthorized  print  of  Thom- 
son's Seasons,  4  Burr.  2303.  Holliday's  Life  of  Mansfield,  p.  216. 

1  An  article,  ascribed  to  Lord  Brougham,  on  the  Abuses  of  the  Press,  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review  for  April,  1838,  deserves  to  be  read:  though  the  author  ap- 
pears to  place  some  evils  in  too  bold  a  light. 


220  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

motions.  Upon  the  whole,  the  good  derived  from  newspapers 
is  decided,  and,  though  it  were  not,  it  is  certain  that  they  form 
one  of  the  conditions  of  modern  social  life :  we  must  en- 
deavor, therefore,  to  have  them  as  sound,  respectable,  and  true 
to  every  good  cause  as  possible.  All  are  interested  in  this. 
Vicious  papers  should  be  frowned  down  and  lose  all  support; 
active  and  good  ones  ought  to  meet  with  all  possible  fair 
support. 

XLIII.  It  is  desirable  that  we  should  consider  the  press  in 
one  more  view.  The  state  or  a  society  cannot  be  supported  by 
those  three  branches  alone  of  which  we  have  spoken  on  pre- 
vious occasions ;  namely,  the  legislative,  judiciary,  and  execu- 
tive. A  power  is  necessary  which  penetrates  where  those 
powers  cannot  reach :  it  is  the  censorial  power,  that  power 
which  watches  over  morality,  private  life,  and  industrial  econ- 
omy, so  far  as  they  form  integrant  elements  of  the  common- 
wealth. The  ancients  embodied  this  power  in  institutions. 
In  Rome  it  was  the  censorship,  which  Cicero  calls  the  magis- 
tratus  pudoris  et  modestise.  But  the  sphere  of  the  censor 
extended  farther  than  merely  to  what  we  should  strictly 
express  by  morals :  the  censor  watched,  for  instance,  over  the 
agriculture  and  took  official  notice-of  a  neglected  farm.  The 
areopagites  in  Athens,  and  the  Spartan  ephori,  had  a  similar 
tutorial  power.  We  moderns  have  not  enacted  this  censorial 
principle  into  an  institute,  but  our  states  are  societies  like 
theirs,  and  we  cannot  dispense  with  the  principle  any  more 
than  they  could ;  that  is,  we  too  want  a  power  which  will 
impel  the  indolent  and  restrain  the  licentious.  We  do  not 
constitute,  however,  this  power  into  an  institution ;  we  leave 
the  censorial  action  of  society,  with  very  few  exceptions,  which 
include  as  a  matter  of  course  public  immorality,  to  the  gen- 
eral action  of  public  opinion.  This  public  opinion,  which  we 
have  acknowledged  already  as  so  mighty  a  power,  appears, 
therefore,  in  this  case  likewise  as  an  indispensable  agent  of 
society.  It  is  not  necessary  to  investigate  here  how  far  the 
press  may  be  considered  as  leading  public  opinion  :  it  suffices 


POLITICAL   ETHICS,  221 

to  consider  that  they  are  closely  connected.  We  all  know, 
moreover,  that  wherever  there  exists  in  cases  like  the  present 
any  connection  at  all,  there  is  likewise  a  continual  reciprocal 
action  and  reaction.  The  papers,  therefore,  stand  in  a  close 
connection  with  this  censorial  power  of  the  state — necessary, 
and  yet  so  easily  becoming  tyrannical  in  its  exercise;  a  power 
which  it  may  be  as  wrong  to  weaken  by  making  light  of  vice, 
as  to  use  despotically  to  the  discomfort  of  the  individual. 

XLIV.  Owing  to  the  peculiar  relation  in  which  the  clergy- 
man stands  to  his  flock,  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  consider 
for  a  moment  his  position  with  reference  to  political  ethics.  It 
is  a  question  solely  appertaining  to  politics  proper,  whether 
it  be  wise  or  necessary  that  the  clergy  should  be  represented 
as  a  separate  body  in  the  legislative  assemblies,  whether  it 
ought  not,  or  under  what  circumstances  it  ought,  to  be  con- 
sidered as  forming  a  separate  "  estate"  by  itself.  We  can 
occupy  ourselves  only  with  the  question  whether  there  are 
any  rules  applicable  peculiarly  to  the  clergy  to  guide  their 
action  in  matters  relating  to  politics. 

The  sacred  charge  which  a  priest,  clergyman,  or  minister 
has  of  instructing  and  guiding  the  people  is  so  necessary  and 
constant  a  one,  that  from  the  earliest  to  the  latest  times  of 
Christianity  there  have  been  distinguished  theologians  who 
have  maintained  and  urged  that  not  only  should  the  clergy 
nowise  occupy  themselves  with  politics,  but  that  they  should 
continue  faithfully  to  discharge  their  sacred  duties  uncon- 
cerned about  the  government,  even  though  a  usurper  swayed 
the  supreme  power.  It  is,  so  maintained  those  theologians, 
no  matter  of  theirs.1  I  am  well  aware  that  in  the  earlier  times 


1  Among  the  many  passages  which  might  be  quoted  I  will  instance  but  the  fol- 
lowing. See  the  History  of  the  Gallican  Church  (in  French),  vol.  i.  I,  2,  year 
383,  respecting  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  and  Gallic  bishops,  and  of  St.  Martin 
himself,  towards  the  tyrant  Maximian;  the  letter  of  St.  Ambrosius  (Ep.  Ivii.,  ad 
Eugen.)  to  the  usurper  Eugenius,  who  was  placed  on  the  throne  by  Arbogastes 
the  Frank  when  Valentinian  II.  was  strangled ;  the  letter  of  Gregory  the  Great 
to  Phocas,  who  had  massacred  the  emperor  Maurice  and  his  family  (lib.  13, 


222  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  Christianity  this  view  was  sometimes  taken  partly  on  the 
ground,  or  at  least  partly  originated  from  the  belief,  that  the 
clergy  were  too  sacred  to  occupy  themselves  with  the  so-called 
merely  worldly  affairs  of  the  laymen.1  Such  views  were  nat- 
ural when  an  ascetic  spirit  was  likewise  natural;  and,  consider- 
ing the  turmoil  and  warring  confusion  of  the  times,  it  was  a 
view  not  without  its  salutary  effects.  Nor  am  I  ignorant  that 
in  not  a  few  cases  the  Catholic  church  maintained  this  view 
to  make  the  clergy,  the  church,  the  more  independent  and 
compact  in  itself.  But  these  were  not  the  only  grounds,  nor 
were  they  the  lasting  reasons,  upon  which  the  above  view  was 
supported. 

XLV.  Our  times  have  arrived  at  different  convictions.  We 
believe  that  governments  exist  according  to  the  decrees  of 
God,  which  ordained  man  to  be  a  social  being,  and  to  have 
reason  that  he  might  maintain  right;  we  believe  that  civil 
freedom  is  as  sacred  and  holy  a  cause  as  any  on  earth,  and 
that  every  one  ought  cheerfully  and  conscientiously  to  con- 
tribute his  aid  for  supporting  it.  A  minister  or  priest,  there- 


Judic.  vi.,  Ep.  xxxi.,  ad  Phocam) ;  the  protocols  of  the  clerical  assemblies  of 
France  (in  French),  vol.  iii.  p.  686,  et  seq.;  and,  on  pages  90  and  91,  the  answer 
of  pope  Gregory  XIII.,  which  ever  since  has  been  considered  as  a  rule  of  con- 
duct. We  all  know  very  well  that  the  church  has  but  too  frequently  meddled 
with  politics;  but  these  were  at  least  the  professed  and  acknowledged  principles. 
As  to  Protestant  theologians,  there  have  been  some,  indeed,  who  taught  contrary 
principles,  but  far  more  professed  the  same.  Quite  recently,  in  1839,  the  Meth- 
odist conference  in  New  Jersey  passed  a  resolution,  if  the  papers  have  reported 
correctly,  declaring  that  any  clergyman  who  should  hereafter  become  a  candidate 
for  the  state  legislature  or  congress  would  receive  the  general  disapprobation  of 
the  conference. 

1  Eusebius  says,  "One  description  of  Christians  live  a  higher  life  than  that  of 
the  founders  of  Greek  and  Roman  freedom.  .  .  .  He  who  has  chosen  out  this 
life  to  himself,  who  is  dead  to  the  lower  life  of  mankind,  who  lingers  on  earth 
with  his  body  only,  and  dwells  in  thought  and  with  his  soul  in  the  heavens, 
looks  down  on  this  world  as  it  were  contemptuously,  like  a  deity."  In  another 
passage  the  same  author  calls  the  laity  the  lower  class,  because  they  care  for 
household  concerns,  engage  in  judicial  business,  carry  on  trade  or  agriculture, 
and  for  learning  and  hearing  the  word  of  God  have  appointed  fixed  days  only. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

fore,  ought  to  give  a  good  example  in  the  performance  of  our 
civil  duties.  I  think  they  ought  to  vote  whenever  called  upon, 
if  it  does  not  interfere  with  their  clerical  duties,  or  if  they  have 
not  otherwise  specific  reasons  to  abstain  from  it.  But  it  seems 
that  no  one  ought  to  guard  himself  more  strictly  against  med- 
dling, directly  or  indirectly,  with  politics,  taking  part  with 
one  or  the  other  side,  than  the  clergy.  There  are  many 
powerful  reasons,  which  perhaps  may  be  comprehended  under 
the  following  heads. 

A  minister  will  necessarily  lessen  his  influence  and  the  good 
he  may  do,  as  the  messenger  and  fosterer  of  peace  and  love, 
in  the  same  degree  as  he  sides  strongly  for  or  against  a  meas- 
ure or  party.  All  are  Christians,  and  to  all  he  should  be  a 
friend,  an  unsuspected  and  unprejudiced  friend. 

The  more  ministers  meddle  with  politics,  the  more,  in  the 
natural  course  of  things,  is  religion  carried  over  into  politics, 
and  the  more  we  are,  consequently,  exposed  to  fanaticism  and 
persecution,  open  and  violent,  or  secret  and  indirect.  We 
cannot  be  too  careful  of  leaving  these  two  elements  separate. 
Shall  history  have  recorded  so  innumerable  and  melancholy 
accounts  in  vain  ?  so  many  proofs  that  religion,  instead  of 
being  the  balm  of  life,  becomes,  if  once  brought  into  contact 
with  party  strife,  the  fiercest  of  all  excitements  ?  The  history 
of  the  Netherlands,  when  most  of  the  ministers  had  become 
politicians,  and  persecutions  and  executions  of  the  wisest  and 
purest,  such  as  Barneveldt,  were  the  consequences,  would  alone 
suffice,  if  honestly  and  attentively  perused,  to  check  our  rash- 
ness in  this  respect  forever. 

It  is  not  only  against  the  most  essential  interests  of  the 
minister  and  of  the  cause  for  which,  if  pure,  he  lives,  when 
the  pulpit  is  turned  into  a  rostrum  of  political  strife;  it  is  also 
unfair  in  the  highest  degree.  The  minister  has  not  been  ap- 
pointed nor  is  he  supported  for  that  purpose.  Merely  regard- 
ing him  as  a  gentleman,  he  ought  never  to  make  use  of  that 
place  where  no  one  can  answer  him,  to  debate  politics.  Is 
he  not,  among  gentlemen,  considered  peculiarly  exempt  from 
insults  because  he  is  known  to  be  unable  to  answer  them  like 


224  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

other  men  ?  On  a  similar  principle  he  ought  to  abstain  from 
political  discussions  or  allusions  in  the  pulpit 

Ministers,  like  all  other  men  whomsoever,  from  the  president 
to  the  constable,  are  apt  to  mistake  opposition  to  them  per- 
sonally, or  to  certain  steps  of  theirs,  for  opposition  to  their 
whole  cause  and  to  the  principles  or  systems  which  they 
defend.  But  as  the  cause  of  the  ministers,  for  which  they 
professionally  live,  is  religion,  they  are,  upon  this  principle 
common  to  all  men,  apt  to  mistake  any  opposition  or  resist- 
ance to  them  for  an  opposition  to  religion.  Hence  partly  the 
great  vehemence  and  inveteracy  whenever  religion  is  mixed 
up  with  politics. 

The  minister  or  priest  has  naturally  much  influence  over 
part  of  his  flock :  on  this  ground  it  becomes  dangerous  to  the 
people  if  they  abuse  this  influence  in  making  it  serve  for 
political  ends.  Civil  liberty  can  nowhere  exist  where  the 
clergy  act  thus  against  their  own  sacred  calling.  That  the 
clergyman  cannot  observe  these  rules  if  he  strives  for  or  ac- 
cepts of  political  offices,  and  must  interfere  by  doing  so  with 
his  own  essential  efficiency  as  a  clergyman,  is  evident.  The 
^English  revolution,  as  well  as  the  history  of  the  British  court, 
furnishes  ample  proofs. 

XLVI.  I  do  not  recommend  political  indifferentism.  On 
the  contrary,  I  believe  that,  generally  speaking,  the  clergy  in 
our  times  urge  far  too  little  the  importance  and  sacredness  of 
all  civil  duties  and  political  virtues  upon  the  people.  Let 
them  cultivate  and  expound  the  holiness  of  obedience  to  the 
laws  of  the  land,  of  love  of  liberty,  of  the  fruitfulness  of  pub- 
lic spirit  for  the  community  as  well  as  for  him  who  possesses 
it,  of  the  inspiration  of  patriotism,  of  the  instructive,  invigor- 
ating, and  tempering  effect  of  the  study  of  our  own  history; 
and  if  they  make  these  virtues  gush  forth  from  the  heart  like 
pure  and  native  streams  to  nourish  and  irrigate  a  thousand 
different  plants,  the  ministers  will  not  be  idle  as  citizens,  but 
will  form,  even  in  a  political  point  of  view,  a  most  invaluable 
class  of  men.  But  so  soon  as  they  turn  the  Bible  to  support 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


225 


or  attack  one  measure  or  the  other,  they  cannot  but  diffuse 
mischief.  In  cases  of  extremity,  when  the  land  is  in  danger 
by  invasion,  when  liberty  is  to  be  defended  by  war,  then  in- 
deed let  them  mount  the  pulpit  and  inspire  their  hearers  with 
all  the  life  they  can ;  when  citizens,  faithful  to  their  country, 
suffer  hunger  and  plague,  besieged  by  the  enemy,  let  them 
exhort  and  comfort  and  strengthen,  as  those  of  Leyden  did 
against  the  Spaniards,  as  George  Walker  did  in  Londonderry 
in  I689-1  Who  that  believed  William  III.  a  benefactor  to 
England  would  not  thank  Walker  for  his  conduct?  On  the 
other  hand,  we  have  the  instance  of  the  hermit  Nicolas  of 
Flue,  who,  when  the  Swiss  cantons  in  1481  were  on  the  point 
of  disunion  because  they  could  not  agree  on  a  division  of 
Burgundian  booty,  and  when  the  danger  had  reached  its 
highest  point,  darted  forth  from  his  solitude,  went  among  the 
confederates,  and  called  for  peace  in  the  name  of  that  God 
who  had  given  them  so  many  victories.  His  words  were 
penetrating,  his  admonition  powerful ;  he  saved  his  country. 
He  could  not  have  done  it  had  he  habitually  or  occasionally 
interfered  with  politics.2  The  Rev.  Dr.  Witherspoon  was 
one  of  the  signers  of  the  American  Act  of  Independence. 
Those  times  were  of  an  extraordinary  character;  but  even  in 
those  excited  times  he  continued  to  exhort  from  the  pulpit, 
to  show  a  spirit  strong  in  resisting  any  call  to  surrender  the 
rights  of  freemen,  yet  ready  for  reconciliation  upon  the  con- 
dition of  the  security  of  those  rights.3 

Nearly  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  ethico-political  obliga- 
tions of  schoolmasters  with  reference  to  their  pupils.  Let 
them  cultivate  true  and  generous  patriotism. 


1  Trevor,  Life  of  William  HI.,  vol.  ij.  chap.  3. 

a  Johannes  von  Muller,  Swiss  History,  vol.  vi.  p.  299.  A  very  hrief  account 
may  be  found  in  the  Swiss  History  forming  part  of  Lardner's  Cabinet  of  His- 
tory. 

3  For  instance,  in  his  Pastoral  Letter  from  the  Presbyterian  Synod  of  New 
York  and  Philadelphia,  in  1775,  written  after  the  battles  of  Bunker  Hill  and 
Lexington. 

VOL.  II.  15 


BOOK    V. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Voting. — Principle  of  Unanimity ;  of  Majority  and  Minority. — Deliberative  Pro- 
cedures.— All  who  have  a  right  to  vote  ought  to  vote. — According  to  what 
Rules. — (Election  Statistics.) — Voting  for  Officers. — When  we  ought  to  abstain 
from  Voting. — Influencing  Elections. — Canvassing. — Intimidation,  individual 
and  official. — Bribery. — Severe  Laws  against  it  at  Athens. — Mutual  Insurance 
Companies  for  Bribing  at  Athens.  —  Bribes  of  common  Voters. — Bribing 
Judges;  Legislators. — Bribes  by  a  Government  of  its  own  Citizens. — Bribes 
by  foreign  Powers. — Betting  on  Elections. — Election  Riots  and  Disturbance 
around  the  Poll. — Various  other  Election  Malpractices. 

I.  VOTING  is  the  usual  way  of  ascertaining  the  disposition 
of  any  number  of  men  or  a  society  respecting  the  adoption  or 
rejection  of  a  certain  measure  or  person.  Whenever  a  num- 
ber of  men  must  come  to  a  final  conclusion  and  joint  action, 
voting  must  be  resorted  to  if  there  is  not  unanimity  among 
them.  By  voting  on  a  large  scale,  public  opinion  passes  into 
public  will.  The  ancients  were  acquainted  with  voting,  and 
had  largely  introduced  it  into  politics ;  they  had  majorities 
and  minorities ;.  but  in  the  middle  ages  the  principle  of  una- 
nimity, and,  in  cases  where  mere  rejection  of  some  proposed 
measure  did  not  suffice,  of  forced  unanimity,  a  principle  we 
act  upon  still  in  England  and  America  in  jury  verdicts,  was 
in  many  cases  adopted.  The  election  law  of  the  German 
emperor,  of  1356,  called  the  Golden  Bull,  decrees  that  if  the 
electors  shall  not  have  chosen  an  emperor  within  thirty  days 
they  shall  have  nothing  but  water  and  bread  until  choice  be 
made,  and  that  when  the  election  has  ultimately  taken  place 
it  shall  always  be  considered  as  unanimous.1  A  single  voice 


1  Constitutio  Aurene  Bullse,  tit.  ii.  5  and  6. 
226 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


227 


against  a  bill  at  the  diet  of  Poland  was  sufficient  for  its  defeat. 
Any  single  member  of  the  ancient  Aragonese  Cortes  had  the 
power  to  put  a  stop,  by  his  dissent,  to  the  progress  of  any 
measure  during  the  whole  session.1  Many  instances  might 
be  added.  In  other  cases,  for  instance  when  the  council  of 
free  cities  voted,  a  majority  of  three-fourths  was  requisite  for 
the  passing  of  a  proposition.2  There  were  many  reasons  why 
procedures  appearing  to  us  so  surprising  were  natural  in  those 
ages.  In  a  future  part  of  this  work  we  shall  recur  to  this 
subject,  when  we  have  to  treat  of  the  citizen  as  representative, 
and  of  Instruction.  Here  it  may  be  observed  that  the  depu- 
ties in  the  middle  ages  were  agents  sent  from  more  or  less 
independent  bodies  or  corporations,  not  representatives  of 
nations,  which  nations  or  states  were  not  yet  considered  and 
felt  to  be  one  organic  whole ;  people  had  not  yet  re-learned — 
for  the  experience  of  the  ancients  had  been  lost — that  the 
excellence  of  a  measure  is  not  an  absolute  one,  that  people 
therefore  may  widely  differ  in  their  views  respecting  laws, 
even  though  passed ;  and  parliamentary  management  and  the 
laws  of  deliberative  assemblies  had  not  yet  become'  settled 
and  developed  ;  nor  is  it  so  even  to  this  day  in  many  nations 
whose  state  is  one  of  political  infancy.3 


1  Prescott,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  2d  edit.,  Introd.,  xciii. ;  Schmidt,  History 
of  Aragon,  Leipsic,  1828  (in  German),  6th  division,  Constitution. 

3  Among  other  works,  see  Sismondi's  History  of  the  Italian  Republics,  vol.  xiv. 
ch.  126. 

3  The  American  or  English  reader,  brought  up  almost  from  early  youth  in  an 
acquaintance  with,  and  in  many  respects  even  under  the  influence  of,  the  parlia- 
mentary law  and  usage — for  it  extends  to  our  very  schools — considers  many 
things  indeed  most  natural  and  hardly  worth  reflection  which  nevertheless  re- 
quired ages  to  become  acknowledged,  and  for  want  of  which  civil  liberty,  or  at 
least  the  expedition  of  the  common  business,  could  not  prosper.  All  usages  and 
laws  which  relate  to  debating,  such  as  we  know  them,  for  instance  as  they  are 
embodied  in  Hatsell's  Precedents  of  Proceedings  in  the  House  of  Commons  or 
Jefferson's  Manual  of  Parliamentary  Practice  for  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
are  of  essential  importance  to  liberty  itself,  and  they  must  be  considered  as  one 
of  the  safeguards  of  liberty  which  we  possess  in  advance  of  the  ancients.  Jeremy 
Bentham  has  systematically  treated  of  this  subject  in  his  Tactics  of  Legislative 
Assemblies — a  work  which  contains  much  that  is  excellent.  To  form  an  idea 


228  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

The  more  civil  liberty  becomes  acknowledged  and  pro- 
tected, the  more  important  also  becomes  the  subject  of  voting. 
There  is  no  subject  connected  with  voting,  that  I  can  think 
of,  \\hich  is  not  deserving  of  great  attention,  from  the  ques- 
tion who  shall  have  a  right  to  vote  and  for  what,  to  the  mere 
external  conveniency  and  security  of  the  poll  and  other 
measures  of  election  police.  The  extent  of  the  right  of  voting, 
as  to  citizens,  and  the  subjects  which  shall  depend  upon 
voting,  the  expediency  of  frequent  voting,  of  direct  or  mediate 
election,  the  age  of  voters,  their  registering,  the  open  vote  or 
the  vote  by  ballot,  the  legal  obligation  of  voting,  the  distribu- 
tion of  polls,  their  accommodation,  what  subjects  shall  depend 
upon  mere  majorities,  what  shall  require  two-thirds  of  the 
votes,  the  question  of  majorities  and  pluralities,  of  judges  of 
elections,  of  their  managers, — all  these  subjects  are  either  in 


how  piteously  people  had  formerly  to  struggle,  for  want  of  experience  in  this 
means  of  ascertaining  and  guarding  deliberative  truth,  and  how  difficult  it  was 
for  them,  with  the  best  wishes,  to  observe  deliberation  and  come  to  any  conclu- 
sion, the  reader  may  peruse,  for  instance,  the  account  given  of  the  French  diet 
in  1614,  in  Raumer's  History  of  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries,  illus- 
trated by  Original  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  438,  et  seq.  Well  may  Mr.  Raumer 
end  this  communication  with  the  words,  "All  these  manuscript  sources  of  informa- 
tion confirm  the  fact  that  fixed  form  and  rights  were  wanting  to  these  assemblies. 
There  was  much  ado  about  nothing."  The  whole  first  French  revolution  is  one 
continued  melancholy  instance  of  the  want  of  this  law  and  usage.  For  a  whole 
week  the  members  of  the  assembly  would  debate  and  inflame  one  another,  with- 
out having  even  so  much  as  a  question  before  the  house.  Dumont,  the  well- 
known  editor  of  Mr.  Bentham's  works,  relates,  in  his  Reminiscences  of  Mirabeau 
and  the  two  first  Assemblies,  edited  by  J.  L.  Duval,  an  instructive  anecdote.  He 
says,  "  These  primary  assemblies  [to  elect  deputies]  were  at  a  loss  how  to 
organize  themselves  and  to  make  an  election.  During  breakfast,  at  Mon- 
treuil-sur-Mer  (if  I  recollect  right),  our  landlord  gave  us  an  account  of  the 
tumult  and  embarrassment  of  their  meetings:  two  or  three  hours  had  been 
lost  already  in  palavering  and  disorder ;  a  president,  a  secretary,  ballots  or 
votes,  counting  the  votes,  all  this  was  unknown.  Dumont  and  his  friends,  in 
mere  joke,  drew  up  some  regulations.  The  host,  delighted,  took  it,  and  when 
Dumont  arrived  at  Paris  the  papers  bestowed  much  praise  on  the  commune  of 
Montreuil,  on  account  of  the  greater  order  with  which  the  election  had  been 
carried  en  than  anywhere  else."  In  order  to  have  a  just  idea  of  British  consti- 
tutional history  it  is  necessary  likewise  to  follow  up  the  history  of  parliamentary 
usage. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


229 


principle  or  practice  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  must  be 
treated  of  in  politics  proper. 

II.  The  question  has  been  made,  whether  a  citizen,  pos- 
sessing the  right  to  vote,  ought  not  to  be  legally  bound  to 
vote  for  general  elections,  as  the  citizen  is  obliged  to  serve 
on  juries.1  Why,  it  is  asked,  should  those,  for  instance,  who 
possess  most  property  and  receive  the  full  benefit  of  the  law, 
from  indolence,  superciliousness,  or  cowardice  be  allowed  to 
refuse  to  join  in  that  manner  of  expressing  public  opinion  or 
of  appointing  law-makers  which  the  law  of  the  land  estab- 
lishes ?  It  cannot  be  denied  that  affixing  a  penalty  for  un- 
excused  omission  of  votiifg  would  have  this  advantage  at 
least,  that  the  public  opinion  respecting  the  obligation  of 
every  citizen  lawfully  to  aid  in  the  politics  of  his  country,  and 
the  discountenance  given  to  political  indifferentism,  would  be 
fixedly  pronounced  by  law.  But  there  would  also  be  diffi- 
culties in  the  way,  deserving  attention.  If  the  penalty  were 
imprisonment,  it  would  be  a  very  harsh  measure  in  many 
cases ;  if  it  were  a  fine,  it  would  be  difficult  either  to  make  it 
expansive  enough  to  strike  the  rich  and  poor  with  equal  force, 
or  to  prevent  tyrannical  exaction,  to  which  all  extensive  fines 
are  but  too  liable.  The  case,  in  whatever  light  it  may  be 
viewed,  however,  differs  essentially  from  that  of  the  jury,  as 
the  slightest  attention  will  show.  The  subject,  as  being  one 
of  right  alone,  belongs  properly  to  politics;  but  it  is  for  polit- 
ical ethics  to  consider  the  moral  obligation  of  the  citizen  to 
go  to  the  poll.  We  have  treated  already  of  the  bad  motives 
and  mischievous  tendency  of  political  apathy  or  supercilious- 


1  The  ancient  Galli  punished,  according  to  Qesar,  B.  G.,  v.  56,  absence  from 
or  coming  too  tardy  to  armed  popular  assemblies,  with  death.  This  is  somewhat 
strong.  In  Athens,  those  who  attended  received  three  oboli,  called  the  iKKhr/oiaa- 
TIKOV,  except  such  as  came  too  late,  as  the  sans-culottes  of  Paris  were  paid  for 
attendance  when  the  first  revolution  was  highest.  This  is  dragging  the  suffrage 
into  the  mire  at  once.  It  draws  the  poorest,  even  the  paupers,  to  the  poll,  and 
they,  finding  their  account  in  elections,  will  increase  their  number.  It  makes  of 
elections  schools  of  idleness,  which  we  have  seen  it  is  one  of  the  first  interests 
of  society  to  repress,  and  extinguishes  every  spark  of  public  spirit. 


230  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

ness.  A  man  who  from  indolence  or  blamable  disdain  does 
not  go  to  the  ballot-box  knows  little  of  the  importance  of 
the  whole  institution  of  the  state,  or  must  be  animated  by 
very  little  public  spirit ;  or  he  deserves  the  mantle  of  lead 
which  Dante  apportions  to  cowards  in  the  lower  regions. 
There  seem  to  me  to  be  t\vo  rules  of  perfect  soundness  and 
elementary  importance  in  popular  politics. 

1.  There  is  no  safer  means  of  preventing  factious  move- 
ments of  any  kind,  and  the  state  from  falling  a  gradual  prey 
to   calamitous  disorders,  wherever  the  franchise  of  voting  is 
enjoyed  on  an  extensive  scale,  than  the  habitual  steady  voting 
of  all  who    have  the  votive    right  at  all  primary  elections ; 
and  , 

2.  The   moral   obligation  of  depositing  without  fail  one's 
vote  increases  in  the  same  ratio  as  the  right  of  suffrage  ex- 
tends, which   right  will   necessarily  more  and  more  extend 
with  modern  civilization,  so  that  with  increasing  civilization  . 
this  obligation  of  voting  increases. 

When  democratic  absolutism  and  fearful  corruptions  had 
reached  their  height  in  ancient  Greece  and  several  places  of 
Lower  Italy,  it  was  natural  that  some  philosophers  laid  it  down 
as  a  maxim  that  a  man  who  loved  wisdom  should  not  meddle 
with  politics,  and  included  in  this  meddling  with  politics  the 
voting  in  the  place  of  assembly.  When  the  ascetic  spirit  of 
the  middle  ages,  partly  from  misunderstood  disregard  of  this 
world,  and  the  transplanting  of  asceticism  from  Asia  into 
Europe,  and  partly  from  the  troubled  state  of  Europe,  was  a 
natural  effect  of  the  state  of  things,  we  cannot  be  surprised 
at  finding  it  again  and  again  recommended  that  we  should 
withdraw  as  far  as  possible  from  this  wicked  world  and  all  its 
affairs.  Our  times,  however,  move  on  a  different  principle — 
that  of  substantial,  practical,  civil  liberty,  in  conjunction  with 
open,  public  civilization  and  knowledge,  not  merely  contem- 
plative knowledge  retired  within  itself.  There  is  no  great 
principle  which  has  ever  actuated  mankind  that  has  not  had 
likewise  its  inconvenience  for  the  individual ;  so  has  the  main 
moving  principle  of  our  times  ;  but  we  are  not  on  that  account 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


231 


absolved  from  conscientiously  acting  upon  it  and  acting  it  out. 
Therefore,  if  we  have  a  mind  honestly  to  join  in  the  great 
duties  of  our  period,  we  must  act  as  conscientious  citizens,  and 
if  we  mean  to  do  this  we  must  go  to  the  poll.  It  is,  I  repeat 
it  to  my  young  readers,  of  primary  importance,  and  the  more 
they  read  history  the  more  they  will  feel  convinced  of  it.  The 
more  extended  the  elective  franchise  is,  the  more  it  must  like- 
wise extend  to  those  persons  to  whom  time  is  of  little  value, 
to  people  who  make  a  feast-day,  perhaps  a  riotous  day,  of  the 
election-time.  They  whose  voting  is  the  least  desirable  are 
the  surest  to  be  at  the  poll;  but  the  industrious  mechanic,  the 
laborious  farmer,  the  man  of  study,  the  merchant  and  pro- 
fessional man,  in  short  all  those  who  form  the  sinew  and  sub- 
stance of  the  state,  feel  it  a  sacrifice  of  time  to  go  to  the  place 
of  voting,  where  they  are  not  unfrequently  delayed  for  a  long 
time  by  the  other  class  from  depositing  their  vote,  especially 
in  populous  places.  They  are,  therefore,  the  more  impera- 
tively called  upon  to  keep  constantly  before  their  minds  how 
important  it  is  that  they  should  vote,  and  not  leave  the  elec- 
tion to  be  decided  by  those  who  have  the  smallest  stake  in 
society.  Let  no  man  be  prevented  from  voting  by  the  con- 
sideration of  the  loss  of  a  day's  labor,  or  the  inconvenience  to 
which  he  may  expose  himself  in  going  to  the  poll.1 


1  Election  statistics  are  of  much  interest.  Among  other  things,  they  show  the 
interest  taken  in  elections. 

In  Athens  not  more  than  5000  votes  were  generally  given  on  the  most  interest- 
ing questions.  (Thucyd.,  viii.  72;  Boeckh,  Public  Economy  of  Athens,  Eng. 
trans.,  vol.  i.  page  309,  note.)  For  ostracism  6000  votes  were  requisite.  The 
whole  number  of  citizens — that  is,  as  I  understand  it,  of  voters,  not  the  children 
•included — amounted  to  about  20,000  or  25,000.  (Boeckh,  i.  book  i.  7.)  So  that 
about  the  fifth  man  made  use  of  his  franchise. 

In  France  we  find  that  in  1834  the  number  of  electors  was  171,015,  the 
number  of  real  -voters  129,211.  In  1837  there  were  198,836  entitled  to  vote, 
and  151,720  did  vote.  That  is,  in  1834  there  were  151  votes  given  out  of  200, 
and  in  1837,  153  out  of  200.  (Paris  papers  of  September,  1837.)  Thus,  .in 
France  about  three  voted  out  of  four  who  had  the  right. 

The  proportion  greatly  decreases  with  the  extension  of  the  franchise,  as  will 
be  seen  from  the  following  statistics  of  the  United  States.  The  reason  is 
probably  twofold.  First,  the  extension  of  the  franchise  itself  is,  unfortunately,  a 


232 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


III.  If  it  is  important  for  every  one  to  vote  who  has  this 
right,  it  is  of  course  of  great  importance  to  know  how  the 
individual  should  be  influenced  in  giving  his  suffrage.  The 
object  of  primary  elections  is  either  the  appointment  of  men, 
or  the  settlement  of  a  law  or  measure  which  may  come  before 
the  primary  elective  bodies  directly,  for  instance  when  the  final 
adoption  of  a  constitution,  or  amendments,  are  proposed  to 
them,  or  indirectly,  when  we  know  that  the  election  of  an 
individual  mainly  or  solely  turns  upon  the  final  adoption  or 
rejection  of  a  certain  law. 


cause  of  decrease  in  interest.  The  individual  thinks  his  single  vote  will  not 
make  much  difference.  Secondly,  where  the  franchise  is  universal  many  persons 
find  it  inconvenient  to  leave  their  work,  or  to  move  to  a  distant  county  poll,  while 
in  France  the  elective  franchise  is  restricted  to  the  class  which  lives  in  ease. 

At  the  election  for  governor  in  Connecticut,  in  1830,  it  will  be  found  that  the 
seventeenth  person  of  the  whole  population  voted.  ,  Yet  where  there  is  universal 
suffrage  it  is  certainly  not  beyond  truth  if  we  suppose  that  every  fifth  or  at  least 
sixth  person  has  a  right  to  vote.  Suppose  that  the  many  manufactories  in  Con- 
necticut, employing  a  large  number  of  females,  increase  the  proportion,  we  may 
at  least  say,  with  perfect  safety,  that  every  seventh  man  has  a  right  to  vote.  Hence 
less  than  half  who  had  a  right  to  vote  did  vote.  In  the  same  state  there  were 
given,  in  1839,  for  governor,  43,578  votes,  which,  if  the  papers  have  reported 
correctly,  would  indicate  a  very  highly  increased  interest.  [In  1873  l^e  votes  for 
governor  were  86,881,  or  more  than  I  to  3^  of  all  the  males.] 

In  Pennsylvania  I  find  that  in  1830  (when  the  census  was  taken,  and  the  popu- 
lation therefore  is  known)  every  tenth  man  voted.  The  late  propositions  in  that 
state,  first  to  hold  a  convention  to  amend  the  constitution,  and  afterwards  upon 
the  proposed  amendments,  excited  of  course  much  interest.  According  to  the 
official  journals,  there  were  polled  for  a  convention  86,670,  against  it  73,166, 
together,  therefore,  159,836;  and  for  the  amendments  to  the  constilution,  pro- 
posed by  the  convention,  113,971,  against  them  112,759,  together,  therefore, 
226,730.  This  would  give  about  the  sixth  man  of.the  whole  population,  and,  if 
we  take  the  fifth  man  entitled  to  vote,  it  shows  a  very  intense  interest  indeed. 

At  the  presidential  election  of  1828,  the  votes  given  throughout  the  Union 
amounted  to  1,200,000;  the  white  population,  at  the  same  time,  amounted  to 
9,500,000 :  hence  every  eighth  white  man  voted,  which  shows  much  interest  in 
the  election.  In  1836  the  votes  polled  for  the  presidential  election  amounted  to 
1,498,885,  while  the  white  population  in  1830  amounted  to  10,526,248.  Consid- 
ering the  increase  of  the  population  from  1830  to  1836,  we  shall  find  that  only 
one  out  of  eleven  white  persons  voted.  In  the  above  votes  those  of  South  Caro- 
lina are  not  counted,  because  the  legislature  then  elected  the  presidential  electors 
in  that  slate.  This  circumstance  would  bli^htly  alter  the  proportion  in  favor  of 
the  interest  shown  in  the  election. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


233 


Respecting  the  election  to  single  offices  it  ought  to  be 
hardly  necessary  to  mention  that  a.  citizen  should  give  his 
vote  for  that  individual  only  who  unites  with  general  worth 
and  fitness  the  peculiar  capacity  requisite  for  the  specific  office 
in  question.  Yet  it  is  unfortunately  but  too  frequently  the 
case  that  the  citizens  of  free  countries  at  large,  as  well  as  the 
appointing  officers  in  free  or  unfree  countries,  are  swayed  by 
totally  different  considerations,  and  quiet  their  conscience  by 
the  consideration,  "  he  will  do  well  enough."  The  appoint- 
ment of  incapable  officers,  however,  and  the  habitual  appoint- 
ment to  offices  on  considerations  wholly  foreign  to  the  office, 
be  it  family  interest,  court  favor,  party  reward,  or  clannishness, 
is  equally  detrimental  to  free  and  to  absolute  states.  It  lowers 
the  whole  standard  of  morality,  capacity,  and  activity  in  the 
public  service,  and  with  it  the  public  morality  of  the  commu- 
nity at  large ;  it  deprives  the  state  of  that  necessary  promotion 
of  the  public  good  which  can  be  effected  only  by  having 
sound  and  capable  officers  devoted  to  the  public  service,  and 
makes  them  satisfied  with  barely  coming  up  to  the  words  of 
their  patent  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  duties ;  it  begets  bold- 
ness in  the  incapable  or  dishonest.  These  remarks  must 
appear  almost  superfluous,  if  thus  stated;  yet  the  importance 
of  the  subject  invites  attentive  reflection  in  all  its  bear- 
ings. The  history  of  Spain  during  the  last  century,  and  that 
of  Athens  after  Pericles,  give  proper  illustrations  of  the  above 
remarks. 

If  a  citizen  has  to  vote  for  an  individual  in  a  more  or  less 
representative  character,  he  ought  to  be  influenced  by  the 
candidate's  wisdom,  probity,  and  general  tenor  of  life  respect- 
ing those  principles  which  the  voter  holds  to  be  essentially 
important.  If  there  are  other  more  or  less  strong  additional 
guarantees,  for  instance  that  a  candidate  is  bound  to  these 
principles  by  his  connections,  his  family,  or  any  strong  inter- 
ests of  a  worldly  character  or  of  reputation,  so  much  the 
better.  But  neither  single  sayings  nor  single  transient  actions 
nor  protestations  ought  to  weigh  much.  (As  to  regular 
pledges,  I  shall  speak  of  them  in  treating  of  representatives.) 


234  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

We  do  not  judge  of  a  character  in  history  by  single  anecdotes; 
we  must  take  the  whole  man,  and  above  all  the  tenor  of  his 
actions,  unless  the  very  character  of  a  single  act  or  saying  is 
in  itself  sufficient  to  show  the  mind  of  the  man.1  "  I  ask," 
says  Montesquieu  in  the  preface  to  his  Spirit  of  the  Laws,  "one 
favor  of  the  reader,  which  I  fear  will  not  be  granted,  namely, 
not  to  judge  by  the  perusal  of  a  moment  the  work  of  twenty 
years ;  to  approve  or  to  condemn  the  whole  book,  and  not 
some  passages.  If  we  are  desirous  of  discovering  the  plan  of 
the  author,  it  is  not  possible  to  do  it  except  in  the  plan  of  the 
entire  work."  No  one  can  deny  the  reasonableness  of  this 
request ;  and  may  it  not  with  equal  force  be  applied  to  public 
characters  and  the  whole  lives  of  men  ?  Have  they  not  the 
very  fair  right  of  asking  to  be  judged  by  "their  work,"  that 
is,  by  their  actions  taken  in  connection  ?  Has  he  who  wishes 
to  judge  of  the  man,  generally,  anything  else  by  which  he 
could  do  it  conscientiously?  Is  not  many  a  man  justly 
acquitted  in  court  from  apparently  very  strong  charges, 
simply  because  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  any  connection 
between  the  single  offence  charged  to  him  and  the  unde- 
viating  tenor  of  his  life  ?  Yet  no  blindness  is  recommended, 
nor  can  the  principle  of  law  that  a  man  shall  be  considered 
innocent  until  proved  to  be  the  contrary  be  transferred  to 
politics,  so  that  a  man  shall  be  considered  capable  until 
proved  the  contrary.  We  want  positive  proofs  and  facts  in 
order  to  elect  a  man.  "  Les  gens  de  bon  sens  jugent  des 
faits,"  said  Napoleon,  according  to  Las  Cases. 

IV.  Absolute  knowledge  is  possible  in  human  life  only  in 
a  few  cases,  and  our  judgment  respecting  our  votes  is  subject 
to  the  same  rules  for  forming  an  opinion  to  which  our  judg- 
ment is  always  subject.  We  judge  directly  where  we  can, 
mediately  through  those  of  whose  sound  judgment  and 
agreement  with  our  principles  we  have  sufficient  knowledge, 


1  See  Legal  and  Political  Hermeneutics,  where  I  speak  of  the  interpretation 
of  spoken  words. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  235 

or  by  strong  probabilities,  derived  from  past  facts.  If,  how- 
ever, a  citizen  is  incapable  of  deciding  respecting  a  man  or  a 
measure  by  his  own  knowledge  or  capacity,  and  if  he  finds 
that  those  he  has  most  reason  to  trust  are  divided  upon  a 
measure  or  course  of  policy  which  nevertheless  strongly 
affects  his  country,  in  that  case,  it  seems  to  me,  he  ought  not 
to  be  swayed  by  extraneous  circumstances,  but  to  abstain 
from  voting ;  for  this  omission  to  vote  in  such  a  case  seems 
to  me  to  be  even  necessary  for  a  substantial  representation 
of  public  opinion  upon  such  a  measure.  This  is  one  of  the 
very  few  and  rare  cases  in  which  a  citizen  should  consider 
himself  absolved  or  even  prohibited  in  his  conscience  from 
casting  his  vote. 

If  he  must  give  his  vote  on  a  measure,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, as  mentioned  above,  let  him  in  no  case  whatsoever 
forget  to  ask  himself,  how  will  the  law  operate  in  given  cir- 
cumstances ?  The  essence  of  the  law,  the  reality  of  the  law, 
consists  neither  in  its  wording  nor  in  its  professed  principles 
of  themselves,  but  in  the  action  of  those  principles  upon  the 
material.  If  you  read  a  proposed  law,  imagine  it  passed,  and 
say  to  yourself,  "  And  what  then  ?"  Try  to  see  it  operate  in 
advance ;  represent  it  clearly  and  in  a  lively  picture  to  your- 
self; but  do  not  suffer  yourself  to  be  disposed  one  way  or  the 
other  by  party  vanity — a  very  powerful  agent — dislike,  re- 
venge, or  merely  the  pronouncing  of  a  favorite  principle  or 
political  idea  of  yours.  This  question  respecting  the  actual 
operation  of  a  law  becomes,  perhaps,  most  important  when  we 
abolish  institutions.  Laws  and  institutions  ought  to  be  abol- 
ished, not  with  our  faces  turned  backward  to  the  principle 
from  which  we  started,  but  with  the  principle  in  our  mind 
turned  forward  to  anticipate  its  operation ;  for  surely  we  do 
not  make  laws  for  the  pleasure  of  proclaiming  them,  but  for 
their  action.  The  wisest  is  he  who,  like  Janus,  may  look  at 
once  back  into  history  and  forward  at  the  future  operation. 
Quacks  or  deceivers  always  deal  most  in  general  principles; 
honest  and  wise  men  know  and  feel  their  sacredness  and 
prove  them  by  facts. 


236  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

V.  All  popular  representation  rests  essentially  upon  elec- 
tion ;  everything,  therefore,  which  in  any  way  interferes  with 
election,  either  by  demoralization  of  the  voters  or  by  disturb- 
ance or  falsification  of  the  election,  is  a  grave  offence  against 
public  liberty;  but  in  a  representative  republic,  in  which  the 
whole  government  rests  on  representation  and  supreme  power 
is  in  the  people,  we  cannot  but  consider  every  such  offence  as 
a  crime  against  the  majesty  of  the  people,  a  crimen  laesae 
majestatis.  As  it  is  treason  in  monarchies  to  falsify  acts  of  the 
prince,  or  to  control  his  actions  by  combination  around  him, 
as  it  has  been  punished  as  treason  strongly  to  influence  the 
prince  to  the  detriment  of  the  people's  liberty,  so  we  cannot 
but  acknowledge  that  in  principle  every  forcible  or  malicious 
influence  upon  elections,  or  their  unlawful  interruption  or 
falsification, — by  false  votes  or  false  returns, — is  treason  against 
the  people  in  an  elective  and  representative  republic ;  for  it  is 
a  hostile  act  against  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  body 
politic.  I  do  not  know  that  a  greater  political  outrage  can  be 
committed  than  to  surround  the  poll  with  a  set  of  stout  fel- 
lows and  thus  forcibly  prevent  all  voters  of  the  opposite  side 
from  depositing  their  vote.  It  is  the  use  of  brutal  force  in  a 
place  all  the  meaning  and  sense  of  which  is  that  the  opinion 
of  the  assembled  citizens  shall  be  ascertained.  It  amounts  to 
waylaying  and  carrying  off  the  monarch  in  order  to  extort  his 
assent  to  certain  acts.  When  Huskisson  was  candidate  for 
Dover,  in  1802,  he  was  opposed  by  Mr.  Spencer  Smyth,  whose 
brother,  Sir  Sidney,  had  got  possession  of  the  church  in  which 
the  election  was  held  with  his  boat's  crew,  and  effectually 
prevented  the  approach  of  any  voter  for  Huskisson.  No  year 
passes  in  which  similar  outrages  are  not  committed  in  the 
largest  cities  of  America  and  England.  As  to  bribes,  they  are 
prostitution  in  the  bribed,  simony  in  the  briber — a  simony  of 
the  worst  kind — and  treason  in  both.  We  shall  return  to  the 
subject  of  bribes. 

Elections  may  be  wrongfully  influenced  by  unjustly  influ- 
encing the  voters  before  they  give  their  votes.  I  do  not  speak 
here  of  maliciously  publishing  falsehoods — though  every  elec- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


237 


tion  in  America  and  England  exhibits  instances  of  this  polit- 
ical immorality,  which  is  too  clear  in  itself,  nor  of  the  grave 
offence  of  influence  on  elections  by  officers,  as  I  shall  return 
to  this  subject  on  another  occasion.  Canvassing  may  be  un- 
lawful, permitted,  or  desirable.  How  jealously  the  early 
Romans  considered  the  abuse  of  canvassing  appears  from 
the  origin  of  the  word  ambitus,  from  ambire,  to  "  go  about," 
though  afterwards  it  was  done  most  publicly  and  the  crimen 
ambitus1  included  all  electioneering  offences,  bribing,  etc.,  and 
all  ways  of  obtaining  an  office  by  unlawful  means,  except,  as 
it  would  seem,  the  ambire  itself.  Canvassing  is  not  only 
allowable  but  necessary  in  many  cases.  The  people  ought  to 
know  their  candidates,  and  if  these  are  young,  or  if  a  particular 
question  is  pending,  they  or  their  friends  ought  publicly  to 
avow  their  views.  In  this  respect  hustings  and  speeches  "on 
the  stump,"  if  unaccompanied  by  feasting  and  riot,  are  on 
occasions  advisable  in  thinly-settled  countries  or  where  the 
people  have  not  known  their  representative  personally.  Per- 
sonal intercourse  and  political  contact  between  representative 
and  constituents  are  necessary  in  order  that  the  representation 
shall  be  real.  But  I  believe  all  individual  canvassing  by  men 
or  women — and  the  latter  often  takes  place  in  England, — all 
individual  canvassing  in  the  houses  of  voters  or  elsewhere,  to 
be  objectionable,  both  in  itself  and  because  it  leads  but  too 
naturally  to  the  greatest  of  all  evils  in  representative  govern- 
ments, bribery,  whether  direct  or  indirect.  There  are  cases, 
it  is  readily  allowed,  of  very  little  difference  as  to  the  choice 
between  the  candidates,  for  instance  when  both  belong  to  the 
same  party  and  are  not  in  the  least  opposed  to  one  another, 


1  The  term  crimen  ambitus,  in  the  French  brigue,  which  is  retained  in  the  law 
of  countries  that  have  adopted  the  civil  law,  refers  to  the  obtaining  of  an  office 
by  unlawfully  influencing  some  person  or  persons,  and  signifies  with  reference  to 
government  officers  something  similar  to  simony  respecting  ecclesiastic  appoint- 
ments. The  German  word  for  ambitus  is  very  significant,  and  means  the  obtain- 
ing of  an  office  by  fawning  and  creeping  (AmiserscAleichttftg).  Simony, according 
to  the  canon  law,  embraces,  in  its  widest  signification,  nineteen  chief  crimes,  of 
which  the  ambitus  ecclesiasticus  is  a  species.  Feuerbach,  Manual  of  the  Common 
German  Penal  Law,  \  181,  et  seq.,  and  note  to  \  184. 


238  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

I 

but  merely  try  both  their  chance  of  election.  It  would  seem 
that  these  cases  are  very  rare  in  England.  In  America  they 
occur  occasionally,  and  not  only  when  the  election  is  for  in- 
ferior places,  for  I  have  known  two  frien-ds  of  the  same  party 
to  run  for  the  governorship  of  a  state  without  opposing  one 
another  farther  than  by  thus  aiming  at  the  same  place.  In 
these  cases  individual  canvassing  by  the  friends  of  one  or  the 
other  candidate  might  be  harmless  ;  but  such  cases  are  rare,  and 
if  common  would  introduce  a  dangerous  custom.  Properly 
speaking,  individual  canvassing  is  the  opposite  of  what  it  often 
pretends  to  be ;  it  is  saying  to  a  citizen,  We  know  or  suspect 
that  you  care  so  little  about  giving  your  vote  conscientiously 
that  we  come  to  beg  you  to  throw  it  into  our  scale.1 


1  There  is  an  interesting  passage  in  a  letter  from  Mr.  Macaulay  in  reply  to  one 
from  the  secretary  of  the  Leeds  Political  Union  respecting  certain  questions 
previous  to  Mr.  Macaulay's  election.  I  quote  from  the  Spectator  of  August  15, 
1832: 

"The  practice  of  canvassing  is  quite  reasonable  under  a  system  in  which  men 
are  sent  to  parliament  to  serve  themselves;  it  is  the  height  of  absurdity  under  a 
system  in  which  men  are  sent  to  parliament  to  serve  the  public.  While  we  had 
only  a  mock  representation,  it  was  natural  enough  that  this  practice  should  be 
carried  to  a  great  extent.  I  trust  it  will  soon  finish  with  the  abuses  from  which 
it  sprang.  I  trust  that  the  great  and  intelligent  body  of  people  who  have  obtained 
the  elective  franchise  will  see  that  seats  in  the  house  of  commons  ought  not  to  be 
given,  like  rooms  in  an  almshouse,  to  urgency  of  solicitation  ;  and  that  a  man 
who  surrenders  his  vote  to  caresses  and  supplications  forgets  his  duty  as  much  as 
if  he  sold  it  for  a  bank-note.  I  hope  to  see  the  day  when  an  Englishman  will 
think  it  as  great  an  affront  to  be  courted  and  fawned  upon  in  his  capacity  of 
elector  as  in  his  capacity  of  juryman.  In  the  polling-booth,  as  in  the  jury-box, 
he  has  a  great  trust  confided  to  him — a  sacred  duty  to  discharge:  he  would  be 
shocked  at  the  thought  of  finding  an  unjust  verdict  because  the  plaintiff  or  the 
defendant  had  been  very  civil  and  pressing;  and,  if  he  would  reflect,  he  would, 
I  think,  be  equally  shocked  at  the  thought  of  voting  for  a  candidate  for  whose 
public  character  he  felt  no  esteem,  merely  because  that  candidate  had  called 
upon  him  and  begged  very  hard  and  had  shaken  his  hand  very  warmly.  I  am 
delighted,  though  not  at  all  surprised,  to  find  that  the  enlightened  and  public- 
spirited  gentlemen  in  whose  name  you  write  agree  with  me  on  this  subject.  My 
conduct  is  before  the  electors  of  Leeds;  my  opinions  shall  on  all  occasions  be 
stated  to  them  with  perfect  frankness :  if  they  approve  that  conduct,  if  they  con- 
cur in  those  opinions,  they  ought,  not  for  my  sake  but  for  their  own,  to  choose 
me  as  their  member.  To  be  so  chosen  I  should  indeed  consider  as  a  high  and 
enviable  honor;  but  I  should  think  it  no  honor  to  be  returned  to  parliament  by 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


239 


All  intimidation  previous  to  an  election,  all  personal  or 
official  bullying,1  all  threats,  as  for  instance  of  withdrawing 
employment  of  workmen,  which  happens  with  us  on  account 
of  the  extended  franchise,  or  of  shopkeepers,  which  happens 
frequently  in  London,  all  intimidation  of  tenants,  as  often  in 
England,  or  of  government  officers  holding  their  appointment 
at  the  pleasure  of  some  superior  officer — are  high  political 
offences.  The  worst  of  all  election  offences,  however,  is 
bribery. 

VI.  Whatever  offence  or  crime  may  be  committed,  it  be- 
comes doubly  loathsome  if  committed  for  the  consideration  of 
money — if  to  the  offence  itself  the  meanness  of  doing  it  for 
gain  or  hire  is  added.  At  all  periods  have  laws  pronounced 
the  public  abhorrence  of  bribed  voting,  and  all  states  where 
this  evil  has  become  common  have  been  irretrievably  lost. 
The  laws  of  Athens  were  severe  against  bribing  of  any  kind, 
both  against  the  briber  and  the  bribed.2  But  when  Athens 
sank  into  licentious  democratic  absolutism,  bribing  became 
so  common  that  bribing  companies  were  formed,  called  syno- 
mosies  (ffuvw^oaia,  an  association  upon  oath) — a  sort  of  mutual 
immoral  insurance  companies  to  bribe  the  judges,  the  council, 
and  popular  assemblies,  for  the  benefit  of  the  members,3  not 
unlike  the  companies  formed  towards  the  end  of  the  thirteenth 
century  in  England  to  bribe  judges,  whose  bribes  had  risen 
since  the  high  penal  laws  passed  against  them  under  Edward  I.4 


persons  who,  thinking  me  destitute  of  the  requisite  qualifications,  had  yet  been 
wrought  upon  by  cajolery  and  importunity  to  poll  for  me  in  despite  of  their  better 
judgment." 

1  I  know  of  a  case,  which  happened  some  fifteen  years  ago,  when  a  notorious 
duellist  of  great  courage  carried   numbered  ballots  to  the  voters,  telling  them 
that  he  would  fight  every  one  whose  respective  numbered  vote  should  not  appear 
on  counting  the  votes. 

2  Ae«a<r^6f,  the  office  of  bribing ;  6upo&Kia,  of  being  bribed.      [See  Meier  u. 
Schom.,  Alt.  Prozess,  p.  351.] 

3  Thucyd.,  viii.   54;    Xenophon,  de  Republ.  Ath.,  iii.  7  ;    Pollux,  viii.   121; 
Demost.,  Or.  poster,  in  Steph.,  p.  1137. 

•*  Hume,  History  of  England,  chap.  13. 


240  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

[At  Rome,  in  the  worst  times  of  the  republic,  bribery  was 
even  more  common  than  at  Athens.  In  the  latter  state  there 
were  public  prosecutions  (fpa<paC]  of  both  givers  and  receivers 
of  bribes,  and  it  lay  with  the  judges  to  estimate  the  amount  of 
the  penalty,  which,  it  is  probable,  might  even  be  the  loss  of 
life.  At  Rome  the  multitude  of  laws  concerning  ambitus  would 
be  a  proof  of  the  frequency  and  inveteracy  of  the  crime,  if 
history  did  not  furnish  us  with  clearer  proofs.]  The  Romans 
bribed  in  the  way  of  giving  festivals,  as  well  as  money  directly 
on  the  largest  scale,  as  soon  as  public  offices  were  sought  for 
the  profit  they  afforded,  and  the  sums  previously  spent  to 
obtain  them  were  looked  on  as  a  mere  outlay,  to  be  largely 
refunded  by  plunder  and  extortion  after  the  office  was  obtained. 
This  cancer  had  long  been  eating  in  the  vitals  of  Rome,  until 
at  length  it  was  with  criminal  shamelessness  sanctioned  in 
the  case  of  the  election  of  Vatinius,  a  partisan  of  Caesar's,  to 
the  prsetorship,  to  the  exclusion  of  Cato.  The  consuls  had 
largely  bribed  the  people,  and,  to  escape  the  danger  of  heavy 
penalties  on  account  of  the  crimen  ambitus,  they  moved  in 
the  assembly  of  the  people  a  resolution,  which  passed,  to  the 
effect  that  the  new  praetors  should  not  be  liable  to  any  punish- 
ment for  illegally  obtaining  their  election:  "ne  qui  praeturam 
per  ambitum  cepisset  ei  propterea  fraudi  esset"  I1 

The  English  laws  are  very  severe  against    bribing,2  but 


1  Cicero,  pro  Plane.,  \\  15-19,  Ccel.,  \  7,  Sest.,  \  15,  ad  frat.,  ii.  3,  iii.  I,  51; 
Plutarch,  Vit.  Cses.,  \\  21,  28,  29,  Pomp.,  \  51,  Cato  Min.,  \  44;  Sueton.,  Vit. 
Jul.  QES.,  \  19;  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.,  ii.  19. 

3  The  following  is  an  extract  as  they  now  stand  : 

First,  as  regards  the  bribed. 

Every  person  having,  or  claiming  to  have,  a  right  to  vote, 

Who  shall  take,  or  even  ask  for,  any  money  or  other  reward,  by  way  of  gift, 
or  loan,  or  any  device; 

Or  who  shall  agree  or  contract  for  any  money,  gift,  employment,  or  other 
reward  whatsoever — 

Either  to  vote,  or  to  forbear  from  voting — is  subject 

First,  to  a  penalty  of  ^500,  which  may  be  recovered,  together  with  all  costs 
of  suit,  by  any  person  who  thinks  proper  to  sue  for  the  same. 

Secondly,  to  indictment  or  information,  and,  upon  conviction,  to  fine  and  im- 
prisonment. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


241 


the  crime  is  common,  as  it  is  in  many  large  cities  with  us 
despite    our   laws    against   it.     Livingston,    in    his  code   for 

Thirdly,  on  judgment  being  obtained  against  him  in  any  such  action,  or  on 
any  such  indictment  or  information,  he  becomes  at  once  forever  disabled  to  vote 
in  any  future  election  ;  as  well  as, 

Fourthly,  disabled  to  hold  or  exercise  any  office  or  franchise  to  which  he  may 
then  or  afterwards  be  entitled  as  a  member  of  any  city  or  borough,  the  same  as 
though  he  were  naturally  dead.  Thus,  if  a  burgess  of  any  city  or  borough,  he 
loses  his  burgess  right  forever. — Statute  2  Geo.  II.,  c.  24. 

And  any  person  who  shall  accept  any  money,  gift,  or  reward,  or  any  promise 
thereof,  or  who  shall  accept  any  office,  place,  or  employment,  upon  any  engage- 
ment to  procure,  or  endeavor  to  procure,  the  return  of  any  person  to  parliament, 
shall  forfeit  the  value  of  any  money  so  received  to  the  queen,  and  he  shall 
forfeit  any  such  office,  place,  or  employment : 

And  shall  besides  forfeit  a  penalty  of  ^500,  to  b«  recovered,  with  full  costs  of 
suit,  by  any  person  who  shall  sue  for  the  same. — Statute  49  Geo.  III.,  c.  118. 
Secondly,  as  regards  the  briber. 

Any  person  who  shall  by  any  gift  or  reward,  or  by  any  promise  or  agreement 
for  gift  or  reward,  corrupt  or  procure  any  person  to  vote,  or  to  forbear  to  vote, 
is  subject — 

First,  to  a  penalty  of  ,£500,  to  be  recovered,  with  full  costs  of  suit,  by  any 
person  who  shall  sue  for  the  same. 

Secondly,  to  fine  and  imprisonment. 

Thirdly,  to  the  loss  of  his  vote  forever. 

Fourthly,  to  disability  to  hold  any  office  or  franchise,  as  member  of  any  city 
or  borough,  as  in  the  former  case.  Statute  2  Geo.  II.,  c.  24,  sec.  7. 

And  any  person  who  shall  give,  directly  or  indirectly,  or  promise  to  give,  any 
sum  of  money,  gift,  or  reward,  to  any  person,  on  an  engagement  to  procure, 
or  endeavor  to  procure,  the  return  of  any  person  to  serve  in  parliament,  shall — 

If  himself  returned,  be  incapacitated  to  sit  in  parliament  on  such  election. 

If  not  returned,  shall  forfeit  the  sum  of  ^1000,  to  be  recovered,  with  full 
costs  of  suit,  by  any  one  who  'may  sue  for  the  same. — Statute  49  Geo.  III.,  c. 
118,  sec.  I. 

For  a  history  of  the  laws  against  bribing,  see  Hallam,  Constitutional  History, 
vol.  iii.  p.  405,  et  seq.,  and  other  passages,  for  which  see  his  index. — According 
to  the  English  papers  themselves,  bribery  at  elections  has  increased  much  ot 
late.  The  following  is  a  case  of  interest,  Rogers  vs.  Mills,  tried  it  Lewes  in 
1837.  The  action  was  brought  to  recover  the  ^500  penalty  accorded  by  the  Act 
of  George  III.,  and  was  instituted  by  Henry  Rogers  against  James  Mills  (agent  of 
Mr.  Easthope,  one  of  the  proprietors  of  the  Morning  Chronicle)  for  having  on 
17th  April  last  corrupted  one  James  Baker  at  the  election  for  Lewes,  to  give  his 
vote  for  John  Easthope,  a  candidate,  by  giving  to  him  ,£15,  which  was  given  as 
a  reward  for  his  vote,  whereby  the  defendant  forfeited  for  his  offence  ^500.  The 
case  was  ably  argued,  and  the  trial  lasted  eighteen  hours.  In  summing  up,  Mr. 
Justice  Littledale  said  the  matter  charged  was  equally  an  offence  whether  the 
VOL.  II.  16 


242  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

Louisiana,  is  no  less  severe.1  Yet  it  is  but  too  true  that  if 
the  people  at  large  are  so  debased  that  bribing  for  elections 
becomes  morally  possible,  laws  against  it  will  avail  very  little, 
simply  because  public  opinion  is  already  corrupt.  If,  then, 
history  holds  up  such  fearful  examples;  if  the  universal  spirit 
of  mankind,  expressed  in  the  laws  of  all  ages,  points  out 
bribing  as  a  shameless  crime;  if  conscience  tells  us  unequivo- 
cally that  it  is  a  crime;  if  we  know  that  a  representative  gov- 
ernment becomes  a  melancholy  farce  when  we  acknowledge 
the  form  and  violate  the  principle;  if  we  remember  that  all 
nations,  Asiatic  or  European,  however  widely  different  the 
principles  of  their  political  and  domestic  life,  have  invariably 
felt  or  pretended  to  feel  the  same  disgust  at  bribery, — for  the 
pretence  shows  in  this  case  as  much  the  truth  of  the  principle 
as  the  feeling  itself — no  citizen  who  values  either  his  own 
honor  or  conscience,  or  the  safety  of  the  state,  or  the  essence 
of  civil  liberty,  or  right,  or  virtue,  ought  on  any  account  to 
offer  or  receive  a  direct  or  indirect  bribe,  however  safe  the 
latter  might  be  against  any  punishment  according  to  the  letter 


party  to  whom  the  money  was  given  were  corrupted  or  not.  The  question  was, 
whether* or  not  Baker  was  mistaken  in  saying  that  Mills  was  the  man  who  gave 
him  the  £1$;  and  the  jury  would  decide  whether  the  admission  of  Mills  that 
he  gave  the  money  was  spoken  in  a  serious  manner  or  merely  as  an  interrogation. 

The  jury  retired  for  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  and  found  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff  of  ^500  ;  costs,  40.?. 

There  exists  probably  far  less  bribery  with  us,  owing  to  the  greater  extent  of 
the  franchise,  and  thinner  population;  on  the  other  hand,  we  never  prosecute  a 
case  of  bribery. 

Before  a  member  of  the  Netherlandish  chamber  is  admitted  to  the  oath  as 
representative,  the  constitution  demands  of  him  to  take  the  following  oath  : 

"  I  swear  that  I  have  neither  promised  nor  given,  neither  shall  I  promise  or 
give,  any  gift  or  present,  direct  or  indirect,  under  whatsoever  pretence,  to  any  per- 
son in  or  out  of  office,  in  order  to  obtain  my  election  as  member  of  the  second 
chamber  of  the  States-General."  Constitution  of  the  Netherlands,  $  84. 

1  Code  of  Crimes  and  Punishments,  Title  vii.  chap,  i.,  "  Of  Bribery  and  undue 
Influence."  The  first  article  punishes  offering  or  receiving  bribes  to  influence 
votes  at  public  elections  with  a  fine  not  less  than  one  hundred  dollars  nor  more 
than  five  hundred  dollars,  forfeiture  of  all  political  rights  (the  Greek  alimia),  and 
imprisonment  for  not  less  than  six  months  nor  more  than  one  year.  The  penalty 
for  bribing  judges  is  still  higher,  as  might  be  supposed. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


243 


of  the  law.  In  monarchies  it  is  held  that  the  subject  owes 
allegiance  to  the  prince  whether  the  latter  be  actually 
crowned  or  not,  or  the  former  have  actually  taken  the  oath 
of  allegiance  or  not.  Is  there  no  natural  allegiance  to  truth 
and  liberty,  whether  we  have  taken  our  oath  in  court  or  not  ? 
We  have  called  certain  acts  in  voting,  falsifications,  trea- 
son against  liberty;  bribery  is  the  worst  of  these  treasons. 
It  would  amount  to  treason  of  the  highest  kind  in  a  mon- 
archy to  substitute  a  changeling  for  the  -legitimate  infant 
who  is  heir  of  the  crown.  Is  it  less  criminal  to  substitute 
a  counterfeit  for  a  genuine  public  opinion,  for  what  the  true 
election  returns  ought  to  be — the  foundations  on  which  the 
fabric  of  civil  liberty  greatly  rests?  And  do  we  not  commit 
these  substitutions  if  we  allow  ourselves  in  any  way  to  be 
bribed, — that  is,  if  we  allow  ourselves  by  any  considerations 
of  interest  or  favor  to  vote  differently  from  what  our  judgment 
tells  us  we  ought  to  do  ?  Does  it  not  amount  to  perjury  if  I 
solemnly  deposit  a  vote — that  vote  which  the  most  funda- 
mental laws  of  the  state  carefully,  jealously,  and  solemnly 
secure  for  me — which  is  against  my  conscience?  Is  this  act 
not  a  guiltier  lie  than  a  false  word  in  a  mere  account  of  an 
event?  There  are  many  lies  infinitely  worse  than  the  lies  in 
words — they  are  the  lies  of  actions,  of  the  tenor  of  our  life. 
Since  then  laws  cannot  avail  much  in  this  particular,  and  ruin 
must  inevitably  follow,  if  bribery  becomes  common,  it  is  for 
each  citizen  to  hold  himself  bound  by  all  that  is  true  and  holy 
and  just  and  pure  to  crush  this  crime  wherever  he  meets  it, 
as  infallibly  as  he  would  rush  to  arms  should  he  discover  a 
band  of  enemies  in  the  midst  of  his  own  camp.1 


1  The  classical  age  of  Bribery  is  when  the  Roman  empire  was  sold  by  the  prse- 
torians,  and  the  zenith  of  this  splendid  period  is  when  the  praetorians  sold  it  by 
auction  to  the  highest  bidder  after  the  death  of  Pertinax;  when  Didius  Julianus 
obtained  it  against  the  bidding  of  Sulpicianus,  father-in-law  of  Pertinax.  Still, 
the  public  would  not,  depraved  as  it  was,  brook  this  ;  and  Severus  made  it  the 
reason  why  he  disbanded  the  praetorians. 

A  most  startling  instance  of  regular  bribery  reduced  to  a  proper  price  current 
is  given  in  Raumer's  Europe  from  the  E;id  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  to  the 
American  War,  from  Documentary  Sources,  vol.  i.,  where  he  speaks  of  the  in- 


244  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

In  writing  this  I  am  not  unmindful  of  that  trial  of  a  good 
citizen,  one  of  the  severest  he  can  be  placed  in,  when  he  sees 
that  the  malignant  and  shameless  are  ruining  his  own  beloved 
liberty  by  the  infamy  of  bribery,  and  that  would  he  but  resort 
by  way  of  defence  to  the  same  expedient  he  might,  apparently, 
save  it.  Has  he  not  the  right  to  defend  himself,  as  against  a 
murderer  or  in  war,  by  the  same  means  that  are  employed 
against  him  ?  No,  he  has  not.  The  difference  is  essential. 
Killing  is  in  itself  not  criminal;  bribing  is.  We  might  thus 
protect  ourselves  by  perjury  against  perjury.  If  I  kill  a  man 
who  strives  to  murder  me,  I  do  not  commit  murder.  Bribery 
remains  bribery.  Besides,  what  is  gained  ?  If  bribe  be  op- 
posed to  bribe,  general  demoralization  is  only  consummated 
the  sooner,  while  one  party's  abstaining  from  it  may  become 
the  germ  of  a  better  state  of  things,  and  may  indeed  save  the 
country. 

"  Corruption  wins  not  more  than  honesty. 
Still  in  thy  right  hand  cany  gentle  peace, 
To  silence  envious  tongues.     Be  just,  and  fear  not : 
Let  all  the  ends  thou  aim'st  at  be  thy  country's, 
Thy  God's,  and  truth's."          SHAKSPEARE,  Henry  VIII. 


trigues  of  France,  England,  Russia,  etc.,  in  Sweden,  previous  to  the  Revolution 
in  1771,- — when  the  king,  Gustavus  III.,  upset  the  old  constitution, — especially  on 
pages  216,  222,  and  234.  The  diplomatic  dispatches  say  that  the  present  diet 
will  cost  us  so  much,  for  we  require  so  many  votes :  the  votes  of  the  nobility  cost 
so  much,  those  of  the  clergy  so  much,  the  election  of  the  speaker  of  the  cities  so 
much,  that  of  the  speaker  of  the  peasants  so  much.  See  this  especially  on  page 
235,  where  the  British  minister  writes  home,  March  24,  1769.  He  makes  a 
classification  of  votes,  namely:  I,  votes  to  be  had  by  the  highest  bidder;  2, 
those  who  have  taken  their  resolution  but  require  pay  to  go  to  the  diet  to  vote 
according  to  their  resolution  (that  is  Bacon's  selling  justice,  but  not  injustice); 
3,  unbribable  ones.  Three  thousand  dollars  were  needed  for  a  vote  of  the  first 
class ;  two  thousand  dollars  for  a  vote  of  the  second.  The  election  of  the 
speaker  of  the  citizens  will  cost  one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  of  the  peasants 
thirty  thousand.  The  whole  diet  will  cost  thirty-four  thousand  five  hundred  and 
forty  pounds.  Later  dispatches  say  the  clergy  may  be  had  for  six  thousand 
pounds.  Russia  had  spent  three  hundred  thousand  rubles,  Denmark  one  hundred 
thousand  rix-dollars,  and  added  later  ninety  thousand  ;  France  paid  four  million 
five  hundred  thousand  livres.  The  bribing  of  the  diet  was  estimated  to  cost  me 
various  powers  three  hundred  a,nd  seventy  thousand  pounds. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


245 


VII.  The  bribing  of  judges'  is  so  vile  an  outrage,  and, 
thanks  to  the  advances  of  society  in  the  most  civilized  coun- 
tries, so  unheard-of  a  crime,  at  least  with  reference  to  direct 
bribes,  that  I  abstain  from  dwelling  upon  it.  It  is  like  poi- 
soning a  well  from  which  hundreds  of  beings  must  draw 
their  water.1  Bribing  legislators,  however,  is  not  by  any 
means  so  unheard  of;  and  yet  is  it  not  a  fearful  crime? 
Legislators  indeed  have  been  known  to  consider  themselves 
fairly  "  retained"  by  the  receipt  of  a  fee,  and  have  argued  that 
the  retainer  was  received  by  them  simply,  as  they  said,  that 
they  should  use  their  influence  in  expediting  a  measure, 
whether  the  result  should  prove  favorable  or  unfavorable ; 
thus  cloaking  over  what  cannot  be  and  never  has  been  other- 
wise considered  than  bribery.  Such  a  case  I  believe  was 
that  of  Sir  John  Trevor,  speaker  of  the  commons,  who  was 
expelled  from  the  house  in  1694  for  having  received  one 
thousand  guineas  for  expediting  a  very  just  and  humane 
bill  respecting  certain  property  and  privileges  of  the  London 
orphans.2  So  we  have  seen  that  Bacon  in  his  case  of  bribery 
made  a  distinction  between  "sale  of  justice,"  which  he  avowed 
he  had  done,  "  and  of  injustice,"  which  he  had  not  committed, 
in  the  which,  Lord  Nugent  says,3 — and  let  us  mention  it  to 
rejoice  at  the  improved  state  of  things — he  was  "  countenanced 
by  long-prevailing  practice  in  that  court  (the  chancery  court) 
and  by  such  examples  as  it  would  be  shameful  to  urge  in 
excuse  of  such  a  man." 

All  bribes  offered  to  members  of  legislative  bodies,  as  in- 


1  That  this  crime  may  be  still  now  and  then  committed  in  the  United  States, 
Germany,  England,  or  France,  in  the  most  secret  darkness,  is  possible;  that  even 
some  trial  of  a  judge  for  this  crime  may  have  occurred  of  late,  without  my  knowl- 
edge, I  will  certainly  not  deny;  but  I  consider  it  well  worth  stating  as  a  fact, 
that,  beinw  no  inconsiderable  reader  of  the  newspapers  of  various  countries,  I  do 
not  remember  having  met  with  such  a  case,  or  so  much  as  the  breathing  of  sus- 
picion of  bribery  against  a  judge,  in  any  paper,  say  for  the  last  ten  years.      [Dr. 
Lieber  could  not  have  written  this  in  1874.] 

2  Trevor's  Life  of  William  III.,  vol.  ii.  c.  15. 

3  Lord  Nugent,  Some  Memorials  of  John  Hampden,  his  Party  and  Times,  Lon- 
don, 2  vols.,  1837,  vol.  i.  p.  44. 


246  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

deed  all  bribes,  may  be  classed  under  the  heads  of  direct, 
indirect,  and  unconscious  bribes.  Direct  bribes  given  by 
private  individuals  to  legislators  are  now  exceedingly  rare,  or 
perhaps  do  not  occur  at  all,  owing  chiefly,  it  is  probable,  to 
the  Argus-like  press,  to  the  dread  of  inevitable  ruin  should  it 
ever  be  divulged,  and  to  the  great  probability  that  some  day 
or  other  the  evil  deed  will  transpire,  and,  once  transpiring,  will 
be  most  extensively  known  through  the  papers.  But  bribes 
proceeding  from  the  government  are  not  of  rare  occurrence 
either  in  England,  the  United  States,  or  France.  They  con- 
sist generally  in  the  direct  promise  or  intimation  of  prefer- 
ment, or  elevation  of  rank,  either  with  reference  to  the  general 
course  on  which  a  legislator  shall  proceed,  or  to  his  vote  and 
influence  respecting  some  specific,  important  measure.  Direct 
money  bribes  offered  by  governments  are  probably  now  rare; 
they  are  difficult  to  be  kept  from  detection,  owing  to  the 
better  state  of  the  control  of  finances.  Yet  Lord  Russell  tells 
us  in  his  History  of  England  that  the  favorite  ministerialists 
under  Lord  North's  administration  were  permitted  to  take 
part  in  the  loans,  which  they  sold  directly  at  ten  per  cent,  ad- 
vance, that  Fox  charged  Lord  North  repeatedly  with  having 
sacrificed  nine  hundred  thousand  pounds  sterling  of  a  loan  in 
order  to  buy  votes,  and  that  some  members  of  parliament  at 
that  time  received  money  directly  for  their  votes.  Indirect 
bribes  occur  frequently,  though  they  are  sufficiently  open  to 
be  branded  at  once  in  the  eye  of  every  honest  citizen  with 
their  true  character,  and  though  their  shape  can  appease  only 
those  consciences  which  are  ready  to  derive  comfort  from  the 
forms  and  not  the  essence  of  transactions.  The  promise  to 
legislators  in  America  of  the  privilege  of  subscribing  for  a 
certain  number  of  bank  shares,  and  the  guarantee  of  a  fixed 
advance  on  the  par  price,  provided  a  bank  charter,  yet  pend- 
ing, should  pass,  is  no  less  than  a  direct  bribe  amounting  to 
the  sum  thus  guaranteed  in  advance,  whatever  the  form  of  the 
bribe  may  be.  According  to  the  English  papers,  it  appears 
that  sometimes  considerable  sums  are  given  to  members  of 
either  house,  but  especially  to  lords,  in  order  to  induce  them 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


247 


to  vote  for  canals,  roads,  or  railroads,  if  they  pass  through  and 
injure  the  property  of  those  members.  It  has  been  frankly 
maintained  that  this  is  fair,  for  it  was  certain  that  the  person 
in  question  would  not  vote  to  his  own  injury  if  no  equivalent 
were  paid.  If,  however,  we  consider  the  case  plainly,  it  will 
appear  to  be  indirect,  perhaps  even  direct,  bribery;  for  the 
legislator  ought  not  to  vote  in  his  private  and  interested 
capacity,  but  in  his  legislative.  As  the  juryman  must  give 
his  verdict  according  to  evidence  and  nought  else,  so  must 
the  legislator  vote  for  the  general  welfare  to  the  best  of  his 
judgment,  and  for  nought  else. 

I  would  call  that  person  unconsciously  bribed  who  un- 
consciously allows  hims-elf  to  be  swayed  in  his  judgment 
respecting  his  vote  as  legislator  by  advantages  probably 
accruing  to  him  or  his  friends  from  the  passing  or  defeat  of  a 
bill.  We  are  all  exposed  to  this  error,  and  must  be  the  more 
careful  to  avoid  it,  the  more  easily  it  may  steal  upon  us.  But 
above  all,  let  no  legislator  under  any  circumstances  allow 
himself  to  be  rewarded,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  any  way 
whatsoever,  for  his  vote.  It  must  needs  ultimately  lead  to 
that  system  of  pilfer  and  pillage  of  which  we  have  spoken 
several  times ;  it  takes  away  from  the  representative  or  legis- 
lator all  feeling  of  manly  independence  and  bold  reliance  on 
his  own  honor,  and  diffuses  a  general  depression  of  morals, 
substituting  sordid  selfishness  for  public  spirit. 

There  is  one  species  of  bribes,  of  great  importance  in  his- 
tory, and  happily  likewise  on  the  decline  in  our  times — 
namely,  the  influence  which  foreign  powers  once  exercised 
by  gratifying  the  sordid'  interest  or  vanity  of  citizens,  min- 
isters, or  even  monarchs.  The  pensions  paid  by  Louis  XIV. 
to  so  many  ministers  of  other  states ;  the  money  he  gave  to 
Charles  II.  on  condition  that  he  should  do  what  the  latter 
knew  to  be  unlawful ;  the  regular  presents,  that  is  pensions, 
which  the  cardinals  formerly  received  from  the  chief  mon- 
archs, especially  from  Spain  and  France,  and  according  to 
which  they  were  openly  divided  into  French,  Spanish,  or 
other  "  factions,"  that  is  parties,  which  followed  distinct 


248  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

leaders,  acknowledged  as  such  by  the  respective  foreign  mon- 
arch ;  the  unhallowed  gold  which  flowed  so  abundantly  from 
Persia  into  Greece,  that  Boeckh  considers  it  as  an  important 
source  of  the  increase  of  gold  in  Europe,  and  which  set 
Greek  against  Greek ;  the  snuff-boxes  with  diamonds,  por- 
traits with  brilliants,1  the  titles,  orders,  and  estates  offered 
to  a  foreign  minister  if  a  proposed  peace  should  be  brought 
about — all  these  belong  to  this  species  of  international  bribes, 
and  ought  not 'to  be  suffered  in  any  shape. 

VIII.  A  practice  which  affects  elections  in  an  immoral  and 
mischievous  manner,  and  which  has  become  very  widely 
spread  in  the  United  States,  according  to  the  proofs  in  the 
newspapers  as  well  as  the  charges  of  various  grand  juries,2  is 
betting  on  elections.  The  practice  is  not  new  :  we  meet  with 
bets  in  Rome  on  papal  elections,  three  centuries  ago  ;3  but 


1  The  American  Constitution  prohibits  every  officer  from  taking  any  present 
whatsoever  from  foreign  powers  or  in  the  course  of  any  public  transaction.     In  a 
very  few  cases  it  was  believed  necessary  to  accept  them  ;  but  they  have  been  in- 
variably deposited  with  the  United  States.    It  was  lately  mentioned  by  the  papers 
— it  is  to  be  hoped  with  truth — that  the  late  signing  of  the  treaty  between  the  six 
powers  relative  to  Belgium   and  Holland  would  be  the   second  signing  of  an 
important  treaty  without  the  usual  presents  of  snuff-boxes,  rings,  etc.,  to  the 
respective  diplomatists.    The  treaty  when  these  presents  were  first  dispensed  with 
was  said  to  have  been  the  alliance  between  England,  France,  Spain,  and  Por- 
tugal, respecting  the  two  latter  countries. 

2  At  a  sitting  of  the  court  of  common  pleas,  in  Bucks  county,  Pennsylvania,  in 
December,  1834,  Judge  Fox  very  properly  called  the  attention  of  the  grand  jury 

'to  the  prevailing  practice  of  betting  on  elections,  and  to  the  law  on  that  subject. 
The  Bucks  County  Intelligencer  says,  "The  judge  said  he  intended  hereafter  to 
bring  this  subject  to  the  attention  of  the  respective  grand  juries  :  he  believed  it 
to  be  pregnant  with  the  most  pernicious  consequences  to  society,  and  indirectly 
subversive  of  the  purity  and  fairness  of  the  elective  franchise.  He  said,  the  law 
prohibitory  of  such  practice  ought  to  be  known,  and,  being  known,  he  should  en- 
join it  upon  grand  juries,  hereafter,  to  observe  its  letter  and  spirit.  He  referred 
to  the  election  in  Philadelphia,  and  said  that  betting,  there,  had  become  a  com- 
plete system  of  gambling,  and  was  the  pursuit  of  many  men,  during  the  excite- 
ment which  precedes  elections." 

3  Odds,  we  are  told,  were  very  strong  against  cardinal   Monte;  yet  he  was 
elected  pope,  in  1550.     Monte  called  himself  Julius  III.     Ranke,  History  of  the 
Popes,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  177  (Eng.  trans.,  i.  172). 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


249 


the  betting  persons  were  not  voters  themselves.  Everything 
is  to  be  much  dreaded  which  leads  elections  in  anyway  what- 
ever from  their  true  and  straight  channel.  By  bets,  persons 
frequently  the  most  doubtful  in  character  among  the  voters 
become  deeply  and  passionately  interested  in  the  elections, 
and  when  high  sums  are  at  stake,  as  is  frequently  the  case, 
use  any  illegal  means  to  insure  their  winning.  It  is  frightful 
indeed  to  behold — by  the  offers  which  many  brokers  publicly 
make  in  the  papers  or  in  their  shop-windows,  or  by  the  clus- 
ters of  persons  who  offer  or  accept  election  bets  at  certain 
places  in  some  of  our  large  cities  previous  to  elections — an 
election  turned  into  a  lottery  affair  or  the  sport  of  gamesters. 
In  many  states  the  laws  are  against  it ;  everywhere  they  ought 
to  be  enacted ;  for  they  would  at  least  prevent  public  offers  of 
bets,  which  cannot  be  considered  other  than  a  glaring  political 
indecency.1  In  England  a  vote  is  invalidated  if  a  man  is 


1  I  copy  the  following  advertisement  from  the  Albany  Argus  of  October  17, 
1832.  These  advertisements  are  quite  common,  and  I  merely  select  this  because 
it  happens  to  be  at  hand  : 

"  Bets — To  all  persons  who  feel  the  least  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  op- 
position tickets.  The  following  bets,  or  hazards,  have  been  left  with  the  sub- 
scribers, for  negotiation.  Responsible  persons,  desirous  to  take  them  up,  will 

please  call  at  our  office. 

First  Bet. 

$500  That  the  Jackson  electoral  ticket  will  be  elected  in  Pennsylvania. 

$500  That  Andrew  Jackson,  if  he  lives,  will  be  elected  president  of  the  United 
States. 

$500  That  William  L.  Marcy  will  be  elected  governor  of  this  state  at  the 
ensuing  election. 

^500  That  the  Jackson  electoral  ticket  will  be  elected  in  the  state  of  New 

York. 

Second  Bet. 

$1000  That  Andrew  Jackson,  if  he  lives,  will  be  elected  president  of  the 
United  States. 
$1000  That  Martin  Van  Buren,  if  he  lives,  will  be  elected  vice-president  of  the 

United  States. 

Third  Bet. 

$100  That  the  Jackson  electoral  ticket  will  be  elected  in  Ohio. 

do.  do.  do.  do.          Kentucky. 

do.  do.  do.  do.          Louisiana. 

$100  do.  do.  do.  do.          Pennsylvania. 


250  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

proved  to  have  been  interested  in  a  bet.1  This  is  right,  but 
by  no  means  sufficient.  No  good  citizen  ought  to  suffer  him- 
self to  promote  or  be  drawn  into  an  evil  by  which  an  addi- 
tional vicious  and  most  active  passion,  that  of  gaming,  is 
connected  with  politics ;  for  to  protect  politics  against  pas- 
sions which  it  naturally  produces,  without  perplexing  it  by 
additional  ones,  has  been  at  all  times  the  most  difficult  problem 
of  the  wisest  legislators  and  best  citizens.  What  would  the 
public  think  if  it  should  become  known  that  physicians  of  a 
hospital  were  in  the  habit  of  betting  on  the  chances  of  recovery 
of  the  patients  under  their  charge?  The  case  seems  to  me  very 
similar.  We  should  feel  disgusted  if  they,  appointed  to  heal 
and  save  if  possible,  allowed  frivolous  ideas  of  gain,  which 
might  even  influence  their 'actions,  to  mix  up  with  their  calling. 

IX.  The  process  of  election  itself  may  be  seriously  dis- 
turbed by  the  riot  and  drunkenness  which  in  many  places 
accompany  it.  It  is  humiliating  indeed  to  think,  what  is 
nevertheless  a  fact,  that  on  election-days,  the  days  when  the 


$100  That  the  Jackson  electoral  ticket  will  be  elected  in  Illinois. 

$JOO 

do. 

do. 

do. 

do. 

Indiana. 

$100 

do. 

do. 

do. 

do. 

Missouri. 

$100 

do. 

do. 

do. 

do. 

Mississippi. 

$100 

do. 

do. 

do. 

do. 

Alabama. 

$100 

do. 

do. 

do. 

do. 

New  Jersey." 

Here  follow  the  names  of  the  brokers,  with  other  lottery  advertisements. 

1  In  1838,  the  Youghal  election  committee  of  the  British  commons  was  occu- 
pied a  whole  day  with  the  following  case : 

"  The  petitioners  objected  to  the  vote  of  James  Browne  on  the  ground  that  he 
had  betted  a  new  hat  on  the  result  of  the  Youghal  election,  by  which  act  it  was 
contended  that  he  had  become  interested  in  the  event,  and  had  consequently 
rendered  himself  utterly  incompetent  to  exercise  the  franchise  with  which  he  had 
been  intrusted.  The  case  excited  the  deepest  interest  throughout  the  day,  and  so 
nicely  were  the  arguments  on  both  sides  balanced,  so  equal  the  weight  of  au- 
thority adduced,  that  it  was  not  till  about  three  minutes  before  the  speaker  was 
at  prayers  that  the  committee  were  able  to  come  to  a  decision,  that  as  Browne 
was  offered  the  bet  with' a  fraudulent  motive,  his  vote  should  be  held  good.  It 
appeared  that  an  unscrupulous  non-elector  had  basely  betrayed  James  Browne 
into  the  business  expressly  in  order  to  invalidate  his  vote,  which  alone  induced 
the  committee  to  come  to  the  above  favorable  decision."  London  papers  of 
March,  1838. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  2$  I 

people  ought  to  appear  in  their  most  solemn  capacity,  that 
of  manifesting  their  integral  and  substantial  citizenship,  more 
crime  probably  is  committed  than  on  any  other.  An  English 
clergyman  of  late  strongly  denounced  the  corruption,  the 
drunkenness,  the  poisoned  state  of  the  public  mind,  and  the 
violation  of  truth  at  elections,  and  probably  with  good  reason.1 
In  many  places  in  the  United  States  we  all  know  that  drunk- 
enness is  frequent  at  elections.2  A  great  evil  is  the  disturb- 
ance of  the  poll,  or  the  besieging  it  so  that  none  except  of  one 
party  can  approach,  or  at  least  not  without  great  difficulty : 
the  falsification  of  elections  by  bringing  electors  of  other 
wards  or  places,  or  people  who  have  no  right  to  vote  at  all, 
causing  them  perhaps  to  commit  the  additional  crime  of  per- 
jury; the  falsification  of  returns  by  destroying  the  votes  of 
one  or  more  voters  [ballot-stuffing,  as  it  is  called] ;  the  an- 
noyance of  well-known  citizens  —  these  are  all  serious  and 
deplorable  offences.  Every  citizen  ought  to  feel  disposed  to 
prosecute  all  of  such  offences  that  are  at  all  punishable  by 
law.  To  do  this,  however,  he  ought  first  of  all  to  free  himself 
of  having  directly  or  indirectly  taken  part  in  any  election  mal- 
practice. The  time  may  come — it  has  perhaps  arrived — in 
which  a  society  for  the  promotion  and  maintaining  of  fairness 
and  justice  at  elections  should  be  formed.  As  it  is  an  object 
of  political  importance  itself,  yet  in  itself  of  no  partisan  color, 
there  could  be  no  objection  against  it ;  and  a  society  of  this 
sort  would  frequently  make  salutary  agreements  between  two 
parties  to  give  up  some  election  abuses  ;  while  attention  and 
discussion  would  be  drawn  to  these  important  subjects,  and 
better  laws  be  promoted. 


1  A  Sermon  preached  by  a  curate  at  Hounslow,  in  October,  1837. 

3  In  some  Swiss  cantons  all  disturbance,  noise,  drinking,  standing  in  large 
numbers  around  the  election-house,  are  prohibited.  According  to  a  law  of  De- 
cember 18,  1832,  of  the  Pays  de  Vaud,  against  Brigues,  that  is  ambitus,  the  elec- 
toral college  (election  judges)  have  the  right  to  order  any  tavern,  inn,  or  other 
public  house  to  be  closed  during  election-day,  and  to  order  all  customers  away 
if  they  see  fit.  The  law,  consisting  of  twenty-six  chief  points,  contains  some 
interesting  features.  Under  William  III.  a  statute  was  passed  against  giving 
beer  at  elections.  Trevor's  Life  of  William  III.,  vol.  ii.  p.  255. 


CHAPTER    II. 

Parties. — Has  any  free  Country  existed  without  Parties  ? — Can  a  free  Country 
possibly  exist  without  Parties? — Is  it  desirable  that  a  free  Country  should  exist 
without  Parties?  —  Historical  Parties  and  passing  ones.  —  Conservative  and 
Movement  Parties. — Characteristics  of  a  sound  Party. — Dangers  of  Party  Zeal 
and  factious  Passion. — Party  Signs. — Misunderstanding  of  Language  in  high 
Party  Spirit. — Ought  a  conscientious  Citizen  to  attach  himself  to  a  Party  ? — 
The  Law  of  Solon. — Independents. — Trimmers. 

X.  IF  I  have  felt  upon  some  occasions,  while  writing  this 
work,  more  deeply  impressed  with  the  solemnity  and  great- 
ness of  its  subject,  and  more  ardently  desired  that  my  pen 
might  be  guided  by  the  spirit  of  truth,  discernment,  and  the 
power  of  clothing  my  thoughts  with  accurate  and  appropriate 
language,  than  upon  others,  I  have  never  felt  more  so  than 
now  that  I  propose  to  write  upon  the  subject  of  parties.  Cato, 
when  he  stood  the  last  time  in  the  presence  of  judges,  ex- 
claimed, How  difficult  it  is  to  defend  ourselves  before  persons 
with  whom  we  have  not  lived !  But  it  is  more  difficult  still 
to  be  plainly  understood  by  contemporaries  upon  matters 
which  greatly  agitate  the  times.  To  mould  the  result  of  our 
experience  and  reflection  into  words  which  convey  all  we  are 
anxious  to  say  and  no  more,  and  to  avoid  the  danger  of  un- 
bidden associations,  is  difficult  indeed ;  yet  when  the  word  has 
been  uttered  with  due  consideration,  how  few  are  there  who 
endeavor  to  understand  it  in  any  other  sense  than  that  with 
which  accidental  association  in  the  individual  reader  happens 
to  invest  it !  I  premise  these  remarks  for  my  younger 
readers,  that  they  may  bestow  upon  this  subject  all  the  atten- 
tion which  its  urgent  importance  on  the  one  hand,  and  its 
many  dangers  on  the  other,  demand,  and  that  before  all  they 
may  avoid  the  drawing  of  hasty  conclusions  apparently  jus- 
tifying what  indeed  is  to  be  carefully  shunned  as  a  wasting 
disease  of  the  commonwealth. 
252 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


253 


XL  By  a  party  we  understand  a  number  of  citizens  who, 
for  some  period  and  not  momentarily,  act  in  unison  respect- 
ing some  principles,  interest,  or  measure,  by  lawful  means, 
keeping  therefore  within  the  bounds  of  the  fundamental  law 
and  for  the  real  or  sincerely  supposed  common  good  of  the 
whole  commonwealth.  If  either  of  these  latter  requisites  be 
wanting ;  if  that  body  of  citizens  act  by  unlawful  means  or 
for  sordid,  selfish  ends,  or  strive,  secretly  or  openly,  beyond 
the  fundamental  law — that  is,  if  they  no  longer  strive  for  a 
change  of  the  administration  or  of  some  laws,  but  for  a  change 
of  the  government  itself — they  are  called  a  faction.1  All  parties 
are  exposed  to  the  danger  of  passing  over  into  factions,  which 
if  carried  still  farther  may  become  conspiracies. 

Before  we  attentively  consider  the  various  bearings  of  this 
vast  subject,  it  will  be  well  briefly  to  answer  three  questions. 
First,  has  ever  any  free  country,  at  any  period  of  history,  existed 
for  any  length  of  time  without  parties?  Secondly,  can  we 
possibly  expect  any  free  country  to  exist  without  parties  ? 
And  thirdly,  is  it  desirable  that  a  free  country  should  exist 
without  parties  ?  Has  there  ever  existed  a  free  country  for 
any  length  of  time  without  parties  ?  This  is  a  question  of 
fact,  and  can  be  decided  by  history  alone;  and,  that  no  mis- 
understanding may  exist,  I  will  add  that  by  a  free  country  I 
mean  here  any  country  in  which  the  citizen,  according  to  the 
law  or  custom  of  the  land,  has  a  right  to  take,  and  does  take, 
a  more  or  less  direct  and  positive,  and  not  a  mere  indirect  or 
negative,  part  in  the  acts  of  government ;  in  short,  a  body 
politic  in  which  there  is  a  widely  diffused  political  action 
among  the  citizens  at  large.  After  this  explanation  I  avow 
that,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  goes,  I  know  of  no  instance  of  a 
free  state  without  parties.  Forms  may  deceive  ;  a  state  may 
have  a  republican  form,  for  instance,  yet  be  hemmed  in  by 
overwhelming  power,  like  the  republic  of  Cracow,  and  parties 
may  indeed  not  exist;  but  does  there  exist  there  any  free 


1  If  they  act  overtly  and  physically,  they  become  either  insurgents  or  rebels,  as 
the  case  may  be. 


254  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

political  action?  The  history  of  many  free  countries  exhibits 
brief  periods,  indeed,  in  which  common  and  imminent  danger, 
or  a  universal  and  pure  enthusiasm  produced  by  a  happy 
combination  of  circumstances,  quiets  all  existing  differences 
for  the  time ;  but  I  believe  that  there  never  existed  a  free 
country  actively  developing  within  its  bosom  constitutional 
law,  and  feeling  deeply  interested  in  the  great  problems  of 
right  and  public  justice,  in  which  there  were  not  also  parties. 
For  neither  in  the  physical  world  nor  in  the  moral  or  intel- 
lectual is  anything  great  to  be  obtained  without  struggle,  and 
where  there  is  struggle  there  must  be  two  sides,  two  parties. 
Indeed,  we  must  answer  at  once  the  second  question,  that  it 
is  impossible  for  civil  liberty  to  exist  without  parties.  Politics 
does  not  differ  in  this  respect  from  any  other  sphere  of  untram- 
melled action  whatsoever.  Where  there  is  free  action  of  what- 
ever sort,  political,  scientific,  or  in  the  fine  arts,  and  especially 
where  men  thus  situated  strive  to  obtain  some  common  end, 
to  establish  some  principle,  or  to  act  out  some  idea,  those  who 
hold  to  the  same  principles  will  naturally  and  must  neces- 
sarily unite  in  some  degree  and  combine  their  endeavors, 
strength,  and  energy.  Without  such  union  it  would  be  as 
impossible,  in  many  cases,  to  remove  some  impediment  in  the 
course  of  civilization,  or  to  introduce  some  truth  into  practical 
life,  as  it  would  be  to  remove  a  physical  obstacle  without  a 
union  of  several  forces.  Parties  exist  not  only  where  there  is 
political  liberty,  but,  as  was  just  observed,  wherever  there  is 
freedom  of  action.  Thus,  as  soon  as  an  absolute  monarch, 
with  a  superior  mind  and  iron  will,  ceases  to  force  all  around 
him  to  walk  in  his  prescribed  paths,  we  shall  find  divisions, 
parties,  factions  of  the  court.  We  may  lay  it  down,  then,  as 
a  principle,  that  in  the  same  degree  as  there  is  room  for  com- 
bined and  self-directing  action  in  any  sphere,  so  likewise  must 
parties  exist. 

Thirdly,  upon  many  grounds  it  is  desirable  that  parties 
should  exist.  Without  parties  there  could  be  no  loyal, 
steady,  lasting,  and  effective  opposition,  one  of  the  surest 
safeguards  of  public  peace,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  for  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  255 

want  of  which  parties  became  in  antiquity  and  the  middle 
ages  so  much  more  frequently  factions  than  in  modern  times 
in  those  nations  which  best  understand  the  practical  oper- 
ation of  civil  liberty.  Without  parties  many  of  the  wisest 
measures  could  never  be  carried,  and  many  of  the  best  in- 
tended measures  would  remain  harsh,  unmodified,  absolute  ; 
the  polity  of  a  free  commonwealth  would  greatly  lose  its 
proper  character.  Without  parties  well  understood,  restless, 
shallow,  ambitious  theorists,  the  mischievous  appendages  of 
modern  liberty,  would  worry  society  in  a  manner  which,  in 
many  cases,  would  lead  to  serious  reactions.  Every  vain, 
loud,  and  inexperienced  innovator  would  harass  society  far 
more  than  such  persons  are  now  capable  of  doing.  Lastly, 
the  freedom  of  action  in  which  civil  liberty  consists  must 
leave  a  great  degree  of  combination  at  the  option  of  the  citi- 
zens, which  liberty  will  naturally  be  made  use  of  in  many 
cases  by  men  misguided  either  by  error,  evil  design,  or  fanat- 
icism. How  then  are  we  to  counteract  them  otherwise  than 
by  counter-combination  ?  how  is  it  possible  to  displace  a 
vicious  administration  except  by  a  combination  of  efforts? 

Yet  let  us  always  and  at  every  stage  of  this  inquiry  re- 
member that  parties  themselves  are  exposed  and  expose 
others  to  much  danger.  This  consideration,  and  the  fact  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  they  are  both  unavoidable  and  useful, 
must  prompt  us  the  more  honestly,  manfully,  and  practically 
to  inquire  into  the  very  essence  of  the  matter,  so  that  the 
subject  may  become  the  more  and  more  justly  understood.1 

XII.  There  are  two  great  classes  of  parties — historical  and 
passing  ones.  By  historical  parties  I  understand  those  which 
are  founded  in  the  history  of  their  country  through  a  long 


1  In  this  respect  the  subject  of  parties  only  resembles  a  thousand  others,  for 
instance  that  of  power,  of  punishment,  of  all  the  primary  impulses,  such  as  the 
desire  of  property,  the  wish  to  convince  others  of  what  we  hold  to  be  true  our 
selves,  the  union  of  the  sexes,  the  partiality  for  our  kindred,  the  very  love  of  our- 
country,  nay,  the  first  physical  impulses,  of  eating  and  drinking:  all  are  un- 
avoidably necessary,  yet  expose  men  to  moral  or  physical  danger. 


256  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

series  of  years,  parties  which  adhere  to  certain  political  ideas, 
which  have  been  handed  down  from  generation  to  generation, 
developed  and  modified  by  repeated  practical  application,  and 
expanded  into  a  certain  system  and  doctrine,  having  taken 
root  in  the  practical  life  of  the  nation.  They  become  the 
more  especial  representatives  of  their  respective  ideas,  and  the 
nation  at  large  becomes  well  acquainted  with  their  actions  and 
operations,  not  their  professions  only;  the  nation  knows  how 
to  appreciate  them.  Such,  for  instance,  are  the  Tories  and 
Whigs  in  England.  It  is  a  great  advantage  for  a  free  state  if 
its  history  has  been  propitious  to  the  growth  of  such  parties. 
They  greatly  aid  in  the  steady  development  of  substantial 
liberty. 

Passing  parties,  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  formed  for 
momentary  purposes  only,  as  for  the  carrying  of  some  single 
measure,  or  merely  the  displacing  of  an  administration,  to 
which  species  coalitions  generally  belong ;  or  for  the  sole 
object  of  "getting  in,"  not  in  order  to  obtain  power  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  out  some  principles  or  plan,  but  only  for 
the  sake  of  the  power  and  emolument  itself.  It  is  one  of 
the  worst  political  accidents  if  the  parties  are  merely  divided 
into  "  ins"  and  "  outs."  They  can  hardly  ever  escape  be- 
coming factions.  There  are,  moreover,  two  traits  which 
generally,  and  especially  in  modern  times,  although  we  can 
discern  them  very  frequently  in  antiquity,  particularly  in 
Rome  and  Athens,  distinguish  one  or  the  other  party.  There 
are  those  that  adhere  to  what  exists,  who  strive  to  maintain 
and  preserve,  who  represent  the  necessary  stability  of  the 
state,  without  which  no  society  can  exist;  and  those  who 
look  forward,  desire  to  change,  improve,  and  develop ;  they 
represent  the  movement,  without  which  it  is,  on  the  other 
hand,  impossible  for  any  society  to  exist.  The  former  fre- 
quently carry  their  endeavors  too  far,  and  wish  to  preserve 
indiscriminately,  so  that  conservation  alone  becomes  the 
watchword.  But  that  which  is  bad,  inconvenient,  or  mis- 
chievous ought  not  to  be  retained;  and  Raumer,  the  historian, 
justly  observes  that  it  has  been  frequently  as  revolutionary  to 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


257 


preserve  as  to  destroy.  The  others  often  go  too  far  in  their 
turn,  disregarding  the  gradual  nature  of  all  development,  that 
it  is  always  necessary  and  unavoidable  for  one  generation 
to  grow  out  of  a  preceding  one,  and  they  desire  change  with- 
out experience  or  modification — change  for  its  own  sake. 
We  do  not  observe  these  two  distinctive  traits  in  politics 
only :  they  appear  in  religion,  in  science,  in  philosophy,  in 
taste  ;  they  appear  more  or  less  clearly  everywhere. 

XIII.  A  sound  party,  which  the  conscientious  citizen  may 
join,  ought  to  have  the  following  characteristics.  Its  prin- 
ciple, upon  which  it  exists  or  claims  to  act,  or  its  object, 
ought  to  be  an  enlarged  and  great  one,  a  noble  principle 
worthy  of  moving  masses;  its  numbers  ought  to  be,  if  pos- 
sible, large,  or  at  least  the  ground  on  which  it  is  formed 
ought  to  be  such  that  the  party  may  have  .the  power  of  be- 
coming national;  its  consistency  and  mutual  adherence  ought 
to  be  chiefly  a  moral  or  mental  one,  and  it  should  have  its 
strength  in  physical  organization ;  its  members  ought  to  feel, 
and  act  as  if  they  felt,  that  before  all  they  are  citizens  of  their 
country,  and  that  their  position  as  such  is  not  changed  by  the 
party,  consequently  that  the  party  does  not  treat  itself  as  if  it 
were  the  country,  or  a  sort  of  privileged  aristocracy  to  which 
the  others  are  to  be  made  passive  subjects  only,  and  that  it 
does  not  show  a  spirit  of  bitter  persecution  as  soon  as  a 
member  feels  himself  conscientiously  bound  to  dissent  on 
some  measure  from  the  prevailing  opinion. 

Without  the  first,  an  enlarged  principle  or  worthy  and  great 
object,  parties  become  only  the  supporters  or  promoters  of 
meanness,  intrigue,  or  cabals.1  All  paltriness  in  matters  of 

1  The  word  cabal,  as  is  well  known,  is  now  generally  believed,  according  to 
Hume,  ch.  65,  to  have  been  composed  of  the  letters  with  which  the  names  of  the 
five  dangerous  ministers  of  the  time  began, — namely,  Clifford,  Ashley,  Bucking- 
ham, Arlington,  and  Lauderdale.  (Burnet,  Own  Times,  an.  1672.)  Others 
derive  it  from  the  Hebrew  Cabala,  denoting  a  mysterious  philosophy  brought 
from  Egypt.  [It  is  certain  that  cabal  was  used  to  denote  a  faction  or  junto 
before  the  time  of  Charles  II.  It  was  borrowed  from  the  French,  who  derived 
it  from  Cabala.] 

VOL.  II.  17 


258  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

union  among  men  lowers  the  mind,  depresses  the  moral  stand- 
ard, and  in  politics  leads  to  factiousness.  The  second  is  like- 
wise important;  it  prevents,  in  a  great  degree,  intriguing;  for 
large  masses  cannot  easily  be  intrigued  with,  and,  as  Napo- 
leon said,  "  the  really  guilty  ones  are  the  intriguers  of  all  colors 
and  all  doctrines."1  Every  party  must  act  with  some  sort  of 
uniformity,  otherwise  its  object  of  united  action  would  be  lost; 
public  meetings  and  the  meeting  of  delegates,  as  well  as  a 
certain  mutual  support  in  what  is  considered  of  general  ad- 
vantage, and,  in  the  case  of  members  of  legislatures,  pre- 
paratory meetings  for  the  management  of  questions  of  great 
import,  are  indispensable,  and  have  at  all  times  been  held,  in 
ancient  and  in  modern.  In  fact,  without  them  very  little 
business  of  importance  or  advantage  would  be  transacted. 
But  nothing  is  more  to  be  shunned  than  regular  party  organ- 
izations, with  lists  of  admission  and  erasures  of  expelled 
members,  with  regular  party  assessments  and  distinct  party 
obligations,  with  absolutely  dependent  papers  dictated  to  by 
a  leading  paper,  which  is  servilely  re-echoed  by  the  other 
party  organs.  Parties  so  organized  are  factions,  or  stand  at 
any  moment  on  the  point  of  becoming  such,  and  gather 
strength  from  the  two  facts  that  they  are  removed  out  of  the 
common  politico-legal  operation  of  the  state,  and  yet  are  close 
societies,  so  that  they  easily  supersede  the  government.  They 
may  easily  become  what  the  fearful  French  clubs  were  during 
the  first  revolution  of  France  ;  and,  although  it  will  be  readily 
admitted  that  much  of  the  insane  cruelty  perpetrated  by  the 
Jacobin  club  was  owing  to  a  number  of  quite  peculiar  circum- 
stances, yet  no  one  can  study  well  the  history  of  those  clubs, 
especially  of  the  Jacobin  club,  without  perceiving  that  the 
dangers  of  close  parties  or  clubs  are  demonstrated  there  in 
fearful  consistency  and  glaring  light,  and  no  change  of  cir- 
cumstances could  prevent  great  evils  from  growing  out  of 
similar  institutions.  To  speak  briefly,  a  party  ought  not  to 


1  "  Les  vrais  coupables  sont  les  intrigans  de  toutes  les  couleurs  et  de  toutes 
les  doctrines."     Mem.  de  Sainte-Helene,  vol.  iii.  p.  30,  Paris  edit,  of  1824. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  259 

be  a  society,  lest  it  expose  its  members  to  all  the  dangers 
which  have  been  noticed  when  we  treated  of  societies,  more 
especially  of  trades-unions.  At  Athens  there  were  many 
political  clubs,  Iratpsiat,  not  without  sacramental  obligations. 
When  democratic  madness  raged  in  that  city,  we  cannot 
wonder  that  some  citizens  fled  to  this  last  hope.1  We  cannot 
treat  here  of  what  may  become  necessary  in  cases  of  utmost 
extremity.  No  principle  is  truer  than  that,  if  a  nation  were 
in  a  state  of  dissolution,  the  best  citizens  might  act  wisely  and 
rightly  in  forming  societies  to  administer  justice. 

XIV.  Let  us  now  consider  the  danger  to  which  all  party 
combinations  are  exposed,  so  that  we  may  the  better  avoid 
them. 

Every  individual  pursuing  with  earnestness  a  certain  object 
of  importance  is  exposed  to  the  error  of  pursuing  it  to  the 
exclusion  of  other  objects  equally  important,  of  becoming 
"one-sided."  This  is  the  case  in  all  spheres,  the  sciences, 
the  arts,  religion,  politics,  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  in  education, 
— in  short,  everywhere.  The  danger  naturally  increases  both 
with  the  degree  of  power  we  may  possess,  and  of  opposition 
which  may  be  offered  ;  for  the  one  stimulates  our  eagerness, 
the  other  lends  the  means  to  act  it  out.  Parties,  however, 
always  meet  with  opposition,  else  they  would  not  exist ;  and 
they  combine  the  endeavors,  energy,  and  powers  of  many, 
countenancing  one  another;  so  that  they  are  more  exposed 
to  the  error  of  one-sidedness  than  men  who  pursue  their 
object  individually,  with  whatever  eagerness. 

The  next  danger,  equally  great,  if  not  greater,  is  that  the 
individual  will  lose  his  moral  independence,  and  the  party 
become  too  close,  when  it  is  exposed  to  all  the  perils  which 
we  have  viewed  under  the  head  of  associations, — in  short, 
that  the  party  will  become  factions  ;  that  the  parties  foment 
the  spirit  of  dissension,  while  it  is  the  duty  of  every  citizen  to 
assuage  discord  and  allay  civil  strife  as  much  as  possible; 


1  Thucydides,  viii.  54. 


260  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

that  we  shall  deceive  ourselves  in  taking  the  opinion  of  our 
party  for  that  of  our  nation,  or  that  of  a  fraction  of  our  party 
or  a  mere  political  coterie1  for  the  opinion  of  the  whole  party; 
that  party  spirit  will  run  into  a  variety  of  channels,  such  as 
religious  distinction,  the  various  classes  of  society,  or  separate 
trades,  while  the  health  of  a  commonwealth  consists  greatly 
in  the  close  and  intimate  union  of  all  classes,  professions,  and 
employments;  that  our  own  judgment2  and  even  moral  feel- 
ing may  become  warped  and  distorted,  and  that  we  shall 
judge  of  those  things  by  which  alone  parties  can  be  truly 
measured,  such  as  justice,  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  country, 
truth,  right,  which  are  indeed  the  first  principles  upon  which 
all  politics  shall  move,  by  the  standard  derived  from  the  party, 
thus  making  that  which  ought  to  be  the  standard  the  thing 
to  be  measured,  and  that  which  ought  to  be  measured  the 
standard,  as  inflamed  sects  will  sometimes  measure  the  truth 
by  their  tenets,  not  their  tenets  by  the  truth.  The  danger  is 
that  we  shall  look  upon  the  party  as  the  end  and  object, 
striving  to  make  the  community  subservient  to  it,  while  that 
only  which  can  give  sense  and  meaning  to  a  party  is  the  com- 
munity, the  commonwealth,  the  country.  In  this  latter  re- 
spect we  are  all  apt  to  forget  the  primary  end  and  object,  as 
indeed  all  men  in  all  pursuits,  when  earnestly  striving  for 
some  object,  are  prone  to  forget  the  end  and  place  instead  of 
it  that  which  originally  was  but  the  means  to  obtain  it.  Gen- 


1  There  is  hardly  any  danger  which  besets  men  in  civilized  life,  and  especially 
those  in  the  higher  classes,  more  constantly  than  the  mistaking  of  coterie  talk  for 
public  opinion,  coterie  opinion  for  public  judgment.    Private  individuals,  authors, 
politicians,  statesmen,  and  monarchs  are  equally  exposed  to  it,  and  Charles  X. 
of  France  lost  his  crown  by  mistaking  a  court  coterie  for  the  national  party. 
Few  men,  indeed,  have  sufficient  sagacity  and  elevation  of  mind  to  withstand  the 
power  of  repetition  in  their  circle,  or  to  rise  above  it  and  see  life  and  reality 
untainted  by  it.     Observe  real  life,  and  do  not  neglect  signs  and  clear  tokens  or 
proofs  because  they  disagree  with  what  you  hear  around  yourself. 

2  Even  so  considerate  and  calm  a  man  as  Newton,  it  would  appear,  did  not 
withstand  party  acrimony  in  his  transactions  with  Flamsteed.     This  is  not  men- 
tioned to  justify  us,  inferior  to  him,  but  to  serve  as  a  still  more  significant 
beacon. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  26l 

erals  forget  the  object  of  the  war;  lawyers,  that  the  ultimate 
end  is  not  the  rescuing  of  a  criminal  but  the  doing  of  jus- 
tice. Pope  Paul  IV.  (Caraffa)  desired  assistance  from  the 
Protestants,  and  urged  the  Turks  to  attack  Naples  and  Sicily.1 
In  brief,  the  danger  is  that  we  forget  for  what  the  party  strug- 
gle is,  and  liken  it  to  a  war,  the  end  of  which  is  victory  in 
itself,  by  whatever  means  or  stratagems.  Lastly,  this  blind- 
ing party  zeal  may  pass  over  into  factious  passion  and  fury. 
Dumont,  in  his  Reminiscences  of  Mirabeau,  ch.  xviii.,  says 
of  Brissot — it  is  indifferent  for  the  present  purpose  whether 
with  perfect  correctness  or  not,  for  it  is  at  any  rate  a  correct 
picture  of  the  malady  of  which  we  speak — "  Brissot  was  one 
of  those  men  in  whom  party  spirit  was  much  stronger  than 
all  morals,  or  rather  who  saw  no  morals  except  in  the  party ; 
he  had  more  of  monastic  zeal  than  any  one  else ;  as  a  Capu- 
chin he  would  have  loved  his  vermin ;  as  a  Dominican  he 
would  have  burnt  heretics  ;  as  a  Roman  he  would  have  shown 
himself  not  unworthy  of  following  Cato  or  Regulus;  as  a 
French  republican  he  was  bent  on  destroying  the  monarchy, 
and  neither  disdained  to  calumniate  nor  to  persecute,  nor 
himself  to  perish  upon  the  scaffold,  so  that  he  obtained  his 
object." 

Considering  the  danger  of  fomenting  dissension,  we  ought 
ever  to  be  careful  not  to  let  party  distinction  and  animosity 
pass  over  into  private  life.  It  is  delightful  to  see  men  who 
rigorously  oppose  one  another  upon  conscientious  grounds 
remaining  in  a  strictly  gentlemanlike  or  perhaps  friendly  pri- 
vate intercourse,  a  circumstance  which  can  take  place  only 
where  there  is  great  liberty.  For  liberty  accustoms  men  to 
respect  the  opinion  of  others,  while  absolutism  or  want  of 
freedom  so  thoroughly  weans  men  from  this  noble  mutual 
justice  that  if  for  some  reason  dissension  does  break  out  it  is 

1  His  confessions  on  this  head  are  given  in  Bromato,  Vita  di  Paolo  IV.,  vol.  ii. 
p.  369,  cited  by  Ranke  (History  of  the  Popes,  ii.  184,  transl.).  The  pope  called 
upon  Suleiman  I.  to  give  up  his  wars  in  Hungary  and  to  throw  himself  with  all 
his  power  upon  Naples  and  Sicily.  This  was  done  to  strengthen  himself  against 
His  Most  Catholic  Majesty  of  Spain. 


262  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

invariably  vehement  and  inveterate,  and  every  opponent  is  at 
once  considered  as  an  enemy.  While  the  party  spirit  between 
the  Union  men  and  States'-right  party  ran  highest  in  Charles- 
ton, several  of  the  most  active  leaders  of  the  opposite  parties 
remained  on  terms  of  amity,  and  showed  themselves  to  be  so 
in  public.  , 

All  party  signs  are  to  be  deprecated,  except  it  comes  to  an 
extreme,  when  indeed  the  question  touches  no  longer  the 
subject  of  parties,  and  a  sign  is  taken  as  the  symbol  and  elo- 
quent pledge  of  the  struggle,  such  as  the  tricolor  in  France  in 
1830.  The  fool's  cap  and  beggar's  bag  of  the  Gueux  in  the 
Netherlands  did  great  service.  Signs  rouse  the  inert,  and 
commit  the  active  irreversibly;  they  pledge  and  compromise, 
and  are  therefore  useful  in  insurrections,  but  not  until  then. 
So  long  as  peace  can  be  maintained,  party  signs  are  much  to 
be  dreaded,  whether  they  consist  in  the  color  of  the  cap  dis- 
tinguishing the  theological  factions  at  Constantinople,  or  in 
the  Guelf's  wearing  the  plume  on  the  right  side  and  the 
Ghibelline's  wearing  it  on  the  left,1  or  in  the  "blue  and  buff" 
of  the  Whigs  in  the  times  of  Fox,  or  the  orange  opposed  to 
the  green  in  Ireland. 

Party  spirit  may  run  so  high  that  the  greatest  link  and  tie 
of  humanity,  language,  loses  its  very  essence,  and  people 
cease  to  understand  one  another,  when  even  the  best-intended 
words,  as  in  the  theological  controversies  of  religiously  ex- 
cited times,  are  unintentionally  yet  passionately  or  wilfully 
wronged,  misconstrued,  wrung  from  their  very  sense  ;  such  as 
Thucydides  says  was  the  case  in  Greece  during  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  "  when  the  received  value  of  names  imposed  for 
the  signification  of  things  was  changed  in  an  arbitrary  way; 
inconsiderate  boldness  being  counted  true-hearted  manliness ; 
provident  deliberation,  a  specious  fear;  modesty,  the  cloak  of 


1  The  distinction  of  party  signs  showed  itself  in  the  cutting  of  bread,  in  the 
wearing  of  the  girdle,  etc.  (Ranke,  communicating  it  from  a  relazione,  in  his 
Popes,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  250,  of  the  translation,  Amer.  ed.)  The  Chronicle  of 
Cologne  says  that  the  two  parties  distinguished  themselves  even  by  their  manner 
of  husbandly.  Biographical  Notices  of  B.  G.  Niebuhr,  vol.  ii.  p.  381. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  263 

cowardice;  to  be  cautious  in  everything,  to  be  lazy  in  every- 
thing. A  furious  suddenness  was  reputed  a  point  of  valor. 
To  re-advise  for  the  better  security  was  held  to  be  a  fair  pre- 
text for  tergiversation.  He  that  was  fierce  was  always  trusty; 
and  he  that  was  the  opposite  of  such  a  one  was  suspected. 
He  that  laid  a  snare,  if  it  took,  was  a  wise  man  ;  he  that 
could  find  out  the  trap  was  a  cleverer  man  than  he;  but  he  that 
had  been  so  provident  as  not  to  need  to  do  one  or  the  other 
was  said  to  be  a  dissolver  of  fellowships,  and  one  that  stood 
in  fear  of  his  adversary.  In  brief,  he  that  could  outstrip 
another  in  the  doing  of  an  evil  act,  or  that  could  persuade 
another  thereto  that  never  meant  it,  was  commended."  The 
vivid  description  of  that  excellent  historian  goes  on  much 
farther,  exhibiting  to  us  the  ripe  fruits  of  those  seeds  which 
all  of  us  carry  within  us  ;  and  if  I  have  previously  referred  to 
the  history  of  the  Jacobin  club  as  instructive  for  every  citizen, 
I  do  so  with  no  less  earnestness  to  this  whole  part  of  the 
Grecian  history  ;  I  urgently  refer  to  it  my  younger  readers.1 
It  is  very  true,  indeed,  that  our  danger  is  not  so  great  as  that 
of  ancient  times,  because  our  states  are  vaster,  our  race  is  less 
apt  to  be  moved  by  masses,  we  value  individuality  higher,  our 
religion,  so  long  as  it  is  unsullied  by  fanaticism,  is  of  a  temper- 
ing character,  and,  above  all,  we  act  through  representative 
governments.  Where  the  democracy  is  absolute,  and  the 
state  small, — the  one  indeed  requires  the  other, — it  is  difficult 


1  Thucydides,  iii.  70-85.  I  recollect  having  seen,  in  a  Madrid  paper  of  the 
year  1822,  this  passage  in  an  account  of  some  tumult  in  the  Spanish  capital: 
"The  infamous  ciy,  Long  live  our  country!  was  heard.''  Archbishop  Parker, 
"who  had  been  reckoned  moderate  in  his  proceedings  towards  Catholics,  com- 
plained of  what  he  called  'a  Machiavel  government;'  that  is,  of  the  queen's 
(Elizabeth's)  lenity  in  not  absolutely  rooting  them  out."  (Hallam,  Constitutional 
History,  vol.  i.  p.  191.)  The  note  which  Hallam  appends  to  that  page  gives  in- 
stances, if  indeed  they  were  needed,  of  the  truth  contained  in  the  remarks  of 
Thucydides  respecting  the  perversion  of  language  in  times  disordered  by  the  fury 
of  party,  and  which  are  but  too  applicable  to  all  patties  at  the  period  of  the  Refor- 
mation. In  the  first  French  revolution  the  words  virtue,  patriotism,  consistency, 
had  received  entirely  new  meanings,  as  the  word  Thorough  had  between  arch- 
bishop Laud  and  Lord  Strafford,  and  probably  among  their  whole  party. 


264  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

to  see  how  any  party  can  be  secure  against  breaking  out  into 
passion.  Let  us,  then,  upon  this  ground  among  so  many 
others,  value  and  foster  the  more  earnestly  our  representative 
system.  Yet,  despite  all  difference,  the  danger  still  exists; 
and  will  exist  so  long  as  men  on  the  one  hand  cherish  free- 
dom of  action,  and  on  the  other  are,  and  in  their  nature  ought 
to  be,  according  to  God's  will,  mental  and  moral  individuals, 
differing  therefore  in  their  dispositions,  and  so  long  as  they 
pursue  with  zeal  what  they  hold  to  be  true  or  right. 

XV.  Ought  a  well-meaning  citizen  to  attach  himself  to 
some  party,  and  to  act  with  it?  If  he  joins  a  party,  how  far 
ought  he  to  act  with  it?  When  ought  he  to  leave  his  party? 
These  are  questions  of  great  moment,  as  all  know  who  have 
practical  knowledge  of  the  politics  of  liberty. 

The  law  of  Solon,  according  to  which  a  man  who  stands 
neuter  in  time  of  sedition  is  punishable  with  "  atimia,"  or  loss 
of  civic  rights,  has  been  called  by  Plutarch  peculiar  and 
surprising.1  Solon,  even  though  he  may  have  erred  in  pro- 
curing the  passage  of  this  law,  must  nevertheless  have  had 
strong  reasons.  Undoubtedly  he  strove  by  this  very  law  to 


1  Plutarch,  Solon,  20;  Cicero,  ad  Att.,  10,  I;  Aulus  Gellius,  Noctes  Atticae, i. 
2,  c.  12 :  "  Solon  capita  sanxit,  si  qui  in  seditione  non  alterutrius  partis  fuisset." 
I  own  this  seems  to  me  to  be  one  of  those  many  laws  which  express  a  principle 
or  theory,  and  may  be  repeated  for  centuries,  but  of  which  a  man  acquainted 
with  the  practical  part  of  civil  liberty  cannot  easily  see  the  operation.  One  or 
the  other  party  engaged  in  the  sedition  must  be  victorious.  Suppose  it  is  that 
party  which  was  opposed  to  the  administration  in  power.  Can  we  imagine  the 
successful  party  to  begin  their  administration  with  indicting  all  citizens  who  did 
not  take  uparms  againstthem,  or  punishing  all  who  remained  neutral,  while  they 
leave  unpunished  those  who  fought  against  them  ?  But  if  it  is  expected  that 
they  will  punish  the  neutrals,  or  passive,  and  all  who  fought  against  them,  the 
law  must  needs  work  very  mischievously.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  the  law  of  Solon 
would,  if  acted  out,  forestall  every  amnesty,  with  which  peace  must  necessarily, 
begin  after  civil  commotions.  I  am  not  acquainted  with  a  case  of  .itimia  having 
been  inflicted  for  this  offence  of  neutrality.  When  Emeric  Tokeli  was  ap- 
pointed commander  of  the  Hungarian  insurgents  against  the  emperor  Leopold  I. 
in  1678,  he  proclaimed  that  he  would  suffer  no  neutrals.  Since  he  fought 
against  the  imperialists,  it  is  evident  that  he  meant  every  one  should  be  bound 
to  take  up  arms  with  him.  [Comp.  Grote's  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  190.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  26$ 

prevent  broils  and  tumults,  which,  it  has  been  observed  al- 
ready, must  be  frequent  in  small  democracies  if  any  excite- 
ment exists ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  probably  aware  of 
the  fact  that  nothing  favors  strife  and  political  turbulence 
more  positively  than  when  apathy  or  fear  of  mixing  in  the 
contest  keeps  the  large  mass  of  well-disposed  citizens  from 
taking  part  in  politics.  It  surrenders  the  whole  field  to  the 
restless  and  wicked,  who  certainly  will  try  to  occupy  it,  as 
they  always  have  done.  I  do  not  know  how  it  is  now,  but 
once  the  crime  of  murder  was  greatly  promoted  at  Havana 
by  the  circumstance  that  as  soon  as  the  cry  of  murder  was 
he.^rd  in  a  street,  every  one  hurried  away  as  fast  as  possible, 
tlu.t  he  might  not  become  a  witness  and  expose  himself  either 
to  the  revenge  of  the  murderer's  associates  or  the  dangers 
anj  sufferings  of  the  badly-conducted  trials  which  were  com- 
mon in  the  Spanish  colonies.  We  have  spoken  already  of  the 
general  obligation  of  voting  as  resting  on  every  one  who  has 
a  right  to  vote.  But  the  obligation  of  attaching  one's  self  to 
a  party  is  not  so  general,  although  I  believe  that  in  contests  of 
great  political  importance  it -allows  of  but  few  exceptions.  A 
r.jan  may  be  occupied  with  absorbing  subjects  lying  wholly 
out  of  the  sphere  of  politics,  or  he  may,  as  actually  will  hap- 
pen, expose  himself  and  his  family  to  danger  or  loss  by 
decidedly  joining  a  party.  Yet,  I  repeat,  these  are  but  ex- 
ceptions, and  upon  the  whole  it  strikes  me  that  the  rule  will 
hold,  that  a  citizen  ought,  in  times  of  great  political  danger, 
to  attach  himself  to  some  party  or  other,  if  he  can  possibly 
find  a  party  by  taking  part  in  which  he  does  not  do  violence 
to  his  conscience,  and  if  he  has  not  very  specific  reasons  for 
the  contrary.  There  are,  indeed,  some  men  who  are  naturally 
timid,  both  in  thought  and  in  action.  Their  character  is  such 
that  they  may  be  useful  members  of  society,  if  left  alone; 
they  are  conscientious,  and  will  not  knowingly  do  wrong,  but 
they  become  useless,  and  even  dangerous,  if  they  are  forced 
out  of  their  retired  position,  which  is  the  element  that  the 
whole  compound  of  their  temperament  requires.  These  two 
constitute  exceptions. 


266  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

XVI.  Respecting  the  relation  in  which  citizens  may  stand 
to  parties,  they  may  be  classified,  I  think,  under  the  following 
heads  :  apathists,  neutrals  or  independents,  party-members, 
partisans  or  zealots,  factionists,  and  trimmers. 

Of  apathists,  and  their  danger  in  free  countries,  we  have 
spoken.  If  we  understand  by  neutrals  or  independents  those 
citizens  who  do  not  attach  themselves  to  any  existing  and 
exacting  party,  and  do  not  consider  themselves  pledged  or  in 
any  way  bound  to  vote  with  it  on  all  those  questions  which 
in  themselves  are  indifferent  but  become  important  on  party 
grounds  only,  and  who  consider  themselves  perfectly  free  and 
disengaged  to  vote  for  whomever  they  think  best — I  speak  of 
citizens  at  large — they  form  a  highly  valuable  class  of  the 
community,  and  may  contribute  much  to  extricate  their 
country  from  undue  excitement  and  party  action.  But  it  must 
be  well  remembered  that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  any 
person  to  have  sufficient  opportunity  or  grasp  of  mind  to  judge 
thoroughly  and  conscientiously  upon  every  subject.  Those 
who  merely  call  themselves  independent  are  not  unfrequently 
influenced  by  ill-judging  vanity  ;  refusing  to  acknowledge  that 
due  influence  which  the  opinion  of  friends  and  the  aggregate 
opinion  of  that  body  of  men  whom  one  has  reason  to  trust 
should  always  exercise  over  a  rational  man.  The  develop- 
ments of  events,  of  laws,  and  of  institutions  reflect  themselves 
in  parties,  and  we  ought  not  to  set  up  our  stolid  self-suf- 
ficiency against  this  fact.  Of  course,  no  man  of  self-esteem 
will  consider  himself  so  bound  by  his  party  as  not  fully  to 
reserve  his  private  judgment,  to  strike  off  from  ballots,  for 
instance,  whatever  names  he  thinks  he  ought  conscientiously 
to  leave  out.  Nor  should  he  feel  himself  bound  to  stand  up 
as  a  defender  not  only  of  all  that  the  leaders  of  a  party  do, 
but  of  every  single  member,  and  of  his  private  life  as  well  as 
his  political  acts.  Excited  party-men  not  unfrequently  make 
this  demand;  but  this  is  party  zealotism,  and  is  as  injurious  to 
a  sound  state  bf  the  country  at  large  as  to  a  party  itself.  It 
weakens  of  necessity;  while  acts  rising  by  way  of  justice, 
generosity,  or  truth  above  the  party  never  fail  to  gain  great 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  26/ 

strength  for  the  party  in  the  end ;  for  they  gain  general  confi- 
dence, which  is  power.  Huskisson,  when  a  member  of  the 
cabinet,  went  so  far  as  to  oppose,  in  1822,  a  measure  brought 
forward  by  the  government  through  the  leading  minister  in 
the  commons  ;  and  he  opposed  it  successfully.  In  the  case  of 
the  East  Retford  Disfranchisement  Bill  he  likewise  opposed 
the  government  to  which  he  belonged.1  Very  frequently, 
however,  citizens  call  themselves  independent  in  order  to 
cover  political  vacillation,  from  weakness,  inconsistency  of 
temperament,  or  self-interest.  They  are  the  independent  men 
whom  Fox,  if  I  mistake  not,  humorously  defined  when  he 
said,  an  independent  man  is  a  man  you  can  never  depend 
upon.  The  latter,  those  who  fluctuate  between  courses  of 
action,  are  properly  called  trimmers,  a  term  taken  from  nau- 
tical terminology,  which  has  lost,  I  believe,  much  of  its  use 
since  the  times  of  Charles  II.  and  James  II.,  when  everybody 
who  was  attached  to  the  cause  of  royalty,  and  even  ready  to 
wink  at  much  abuse,  was  stigmatized  with  the  name  of  trim- 
mer as  soon  as  he  showed  himself  unwilling  to  support  and 
defend  all  the  atrocities  and  corruptions  of  the  court  party. 
Real  trimmers  are  to  be  shunned  in  politics  as  in  every  other 
sphere  of  action ;  for  they  are  lacking  in  perseverance  and 
manliness. 

The  remaining  important  questions  respecting  parties  will 
be  more  conveniently  treated  of  in  the  chapter  on  the  opposi- 
tion, which  comes  next  in  order. 


1  [Mr.  Huskisson  having  in  1828  voted  for  transference  of  the  franchise  of 
East  Retford  to  Birmingham,  which  the  government  opposed,  resigned  his  seat 
in  the  cabinet  on  that  account,  with  Lord  Palmerston  and  others.] 


CHAPTER    III. 

Opposition. — Government.  —  Administration.  —  What  is  a  lawful  Opposition. — 
A  well-understood  Opposition  the  essential  Safeguard  of  Liberty.  —  The  Op- 
position a  great  Institution  of  Modern  Times.  —  As  such  it  dates  from  the 
Times  of  Walpole  and  Pulteney.  —  It  is  lawful  to  oppose  the  Majority,  which 
is  not  always  right.  —  (Order  of  Sitting  in  Legislative  Assemblies.)  —  Public 
Opinion  and  General  Opinion. — Ethical  Rules  relating  to  Opposition  and  to 
Parties  in  general.  —  How  far  ought  a  Citizen  to  go  in  his  Opposition,  espe- 
cially in  times  of  War  ? — Coalitions. — Parties  formed  on  the  Ground  of  foreign 
National  Extraction. 

XVII.  GOVERNMENT,  we  have  seen,  is  that  establishment 
which  has  been  agreed  upon  in  order  to  obtain  the  ends  of 
the  state.  It  is  the  machinery  of  the  state.  We  understand 
by  government  chiefly  the  characteristic  and  fundamental  or- 
ganism of  the  jural  society,  through  which  it  acts  as  a  jural 
society,  including  in  monarchies  the  ruling  family,  inasmuch 
as  the  established  dynasty  is  considered  as  one  of  the  funda- 
mental and,  so  long  as  that  government  exists,  unchangeable 
features  of  the  state  machinery.  The  constitutional  monarch 
is  an  institution.  By  administration  we  understand  the  appli- 
cation of  those  characteristic  and  fundamental  principles  to 
the  occurrences  of  the  day,  and,  more  especially,  the  chief 
appliers  of  those  fundamental  principles ;  the  chief  officers — 
the  cabinet  ministers,  who  for  the  time  have  the  application, 
the  acting  out,  of  the  executive  laws  and  government  princi- 
ples as  they  understand  them,  in  their  hands.  Now,  this  ad- 
ministering of  government,  this  application  of  the  principles 
to  practical  cases,  may  not  only  be  carried  on  in  the  spirit  of 
wisdom,  justice,  conscientiousness,  and  soberness,  or  of  folly, 
injustice,  wickedness,  and  profligacy ;  but  the  best  and  calmest 
men  may  perfectly  agree  as  to  the  principles  of  government 
but  totally  differ  in  opinion  as  to  their  application  in  specific 
and  yet  highly  important  cases.  All  those  who  desire  a 
change  of  this  spirit  of  application,  and  consequently  of  the 
268 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  269 

chief  persons — officers  or  law-makers — whose  business  it  is  to 
make  this  application,  from  whatever  motive  their  desire  may 
arise,  and  who  unite  in  a  party  in  order  to  prevent,  by  united 
efforts,  the  administration  from  the  adopted  course  as  much 
as  possible,  in  order  to  dislodge  those  who  occupy  the  chief 
places,  so  as  to  place  in  their  stead  persons  of  their  own  views, 
are  called  the  opposition.  An  opposition  is  under  and  within 
the  fundamental  law,  in  England  against  the  minister,  for  in- 
stance Walpole,  in  America  against  the  president ;  but  if  in 
the  former  case  the  opposition  went  beyond  Walpole  and 
worked  against  George  the  First  or  the  Second,  as  the  Jacob- 
ites did,  or  if  in  the  latter  case  an  opposition  should  strive  to 
subvert  congress  or  the  constitution,  they  cease  to  be  oppo- 
sitions, and  become  factions,  treasonable  bodies,  or  insurgents, 
as  the  case  may  be.  Oppositions,  therefore,  are  lawful ;  they 
are  not  only  to  be  suffered,  but  they  are,  if  not  factions,  of  the 
greatest  usefulness  ;  and  when  the  government  itself  becomes 
rebellious  as  to  the  fundamental  law  within  and  traitorous  as 
to  the  relations  of  the  country  without,  as  for  instance  Charles 
II.  became  in  the  treaty  of  May  22,  1670,'  with  France,  oppo- 
sitions are  the  only  safeguards  to  rescue  a  nation.  Without 
well-understood,  lawful,  and  loyal  opposition,  that  support  of 
all  substantial  civil  liberty,  namely,  that  the  minority  be  pro- 
tected and  have  every  fair  chance  secured  to  them  of  con- 
verting the  majority,  would  be  either  a  mockery,  or  lead  to 
continual  violences ;  for  opinion  is  like  the  air,  harmless  and 
easy  if  allowed  freely  to  expand,  but  of  tremendous  power 
and  danger  if  compressed. 

XVIII.  Without  well-understood  opposition,  liberty  cannot 


1  The  treaty  of  Charles  with  France,  after  the  conversion  of  Charles  and 
James  to  Catholicism,  in  the  second  article  of  which  it  is  declared  that  the  king 
will  make  public  his  conversion,  and  receives  the  promise,  from  the  king  of 
France,  of  assistance  by  armed  force  in  the  carrying  out  of  this  design  in  Great 
Britain.  For  the  copy  of  the  original  of  this  second  article,  see  Life  of  William 
Lord  Russell,  i.  51,  ed.  3.  [Comp.  Hallam,  Const.  Hist.,  ii.  518.] 


2/O 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


co-exist  with  peace  and  order.1  Hence  the  many  sufferings 
of  the  republics  in  the  middle  ages.  Nor  is  any  state  safe 
which  excludes  lawful  opposition  and  treats  all  disagreement 
from  the  opinion  of  those  in  power  as  sedition  or  treason.2 
The  fact  is  well  known,  that  formerly  the  discharging  of  a 
minister  from  the  divan  of  the  Porte  was  always  accompanied 
at  least  with  banishment,  and  frequently  with  the  silken  cord: 
it  was  considered  natural  that  he  who  is  discontented  must 
become,  or  thereby  is  already,  a  traitor.  In  most  absolute 
monarchies,  the  displacement  of  a  minister  is  called  disgrace, 
and  not  unfrequently  accompanied  by  a  suggestion  not  to 
approach  the  capital  within  a  certain  circuit.  So  late  as  in 
1610,  when  after  the  assassination  of  Henry  IV.  the  imbecile 
French  cabal  had  resolved  to  change  all  the  political  princi- 
ples upon  which  that  great  king  had  conducted  his  govern- 
ment, Sully,  his  almost  equally  great  minister,  when  informed 
of  this  change,  said  to  his  wife,  "  If  I  am  wise,  I  shall  quietly 
resign  all  my  posts  and  employments,  withdraw  all  my  money, 
or  as  much  as  I  can,  with  part  of  it  purchase  some  strong 
castle  in  one  of  the  most  distant  provinces,  and  keep  the  re- 
mainder for  any  exigencies  that  may  happen."3  So,  absolute 
democracies  or  aristocracies  could  not  endure  opposition,  not 
even  the  passive  existence  of  those  who  were  known  to  belong 
to  the  opposite  side.  Banishment  followed  banishment.  Any 
administration  in  our  modern  representative  states,  which 
stigmatizes  ever)''  opposition  as  factious,  shows  that  it  is  either 
very  weak  or  factious  itself,  and  ought  not  to  be  borne  with 
by  the  mass  of  substantial  and  good  citizens. 


1  Mr.  Ellice  called  Sir  Robert  Peel,  in  a  speech  relating  to  Lord  Durham's 
mission  to  the  Canadas,  in  January,  1838,  if  the  papers  be  correct,  the  leader  of 
her  majesty's  opposition.  There  is  a  deeper  sense  in  this  than  that  of  mere  pleas- 
antry. Tlie  representative  government  of  a  free  country  is  not  complete  without 
a  lawful  opposition.  A  proper  lever  is  wanting. 

a  *  In  order  to  show  the  necessity  and  salutariness  of  opposition,  I  ought  to 
have  shown  historically  how  often  the  principles  of  right  and  liberty  have  been 
insisted  upon  and  carried  by  the  way  of  excellent  measures  by  the  opposition, 
whether  tory  or  whig.  There  must  then  be  some  classes  of  measures  which  can 
be  more  truly  viewed  by  the  opposition,  simply  because  it  is  not  in  power. 

3  Memoirs  of  Sully,  vol.  iii.  p.  260,  Lond.  edit,  of  1761. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  27 1 

As  to  the  history  of  this  great  institution,  for  thus  I  feel 
tempted  to  call  it,  I  believe  we  cannot  date  its  perfection  far- 
ther back  than  under  George  II.  against  Walpole,  after  the 
Jacobites  had  given  up  the  idea  of  restoring  the  Stuarts,  and 
when  Pulteney  (afterwards  Earl  Bath)  vigorously,  yet  not,  at 
times,  without  the  spirit  of  faction,  led  it.  There  existed,  in- 
deed, a  regular  opposition  against  William  III.,  but  it  was 
generally  more  or  less  revolutionary;  that  is,  it  was  in  the 
interest  of  the  Stuarts.  The  opposition  in  France  mixes  up 
frequently  the  two  revolutionary  parties  of  the  legitimists  and 
republicans,  which  is  unavoidable  so  soon  after  the  expulsion 
of  a  dynasty.1 

1  The  manner  in  which  members  of  legislative  bodies  place  themselves  is  not 
a  subject  without  importance  in  constitutional  legislative  police.  It  belongs  to 
the  external  arrangements  or  police  of  parliamentary  politics,  hence  to  politics 
proper;  yet  I  may  be  permitted  to  say  a  few  words  on  it  by  way  of  note.  The 
British  commons  sit  on  benches,  close  together,  in  rows  on  the  right  and  left  side  of 
the  speaker.  On  the  right  is  the  bench  usually  called  the  treasury  bench,  because 
the  ministers  take  their  seats  there  by  custom,  be  they  whig  or  tory.  The  admin- 
istration party,  therefore,  sils  always  on  the  right,  and  the  opposition  opposite  to 
them.  In  France  the  members,  likewise  at  liberty  to  choose  their  places,  ar- 
range themselves  according  to  party  colors.  The  seats  are  disposed  of  in  a  semi- 
circular form.  The  extreme  right  is  always  occupied  by  the  party  claiming  to  be 
the  most  royalist,  or,  as  is  the  case  now,  super-royalist,  that  is,  by  the  party  who 
are  for  the  old  Bourbons;  the  extreme  left,  by  those  who  claim  to  be  the  most 

J  m 

liberal,  or  by  republicans.  Between  them  we  have  the  right,  the  right  centre, 
the  centre,  the  left  centre,  and  the  left.  Of  whatever  party  the  administration 
may  be,  these  groups  do  not  change  their  places.  The  ministers  sit  on  distinct 
places  appropriated  to  them.  At  one  period  during  the  first  French  revolution  the 
Jacobins  occupied  the  upper  tiers,  and  were  therefore  called  the  Mountain  party, 
while  the  Girondists  occupied  the  lower  seats,  and  were  called  the  Valley.  The 
American  distribution  of  seats  differs  from  both  the  present  English  and  French 
arrangement.  Each  American  member  of  a  legislative  assembly  selects  any  one  of 
the  unappropriated  seats  which  he  likes,  and  keeps  it  throughout  the  session.  I 
know  of  no  exception  in  the  various  state  legislatures.  All  party  colors  are  mixed  ; 
administration  and  opposition  are  not  represented  to  the  eye.  Each  member  has  a 
desk,  with  writing-materials,  drawers,  etc.,  and  the  members  sit  in  arm-chairs. 
This  different  arrangement  may  have  originated  from  the  fact  that  at  the  period 
when  the  like  subjects  were  not  yet  settled  by  custom  there  was  such  unanimous 
spirit  respecting  the  administration  of  General  Washington  that  there  existed  no 
open,  compact  opposition.  At  present  the  disposal  of  the  seats  according  to  the 
choice  of  the  first  comer  has  been  adopted  in  most  of  the  standing  rules  of  the 
legislatures.  At  first  glance  it  might  appear  that  the  American  method  is  prefer- 


272  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

XIX.  If  there  were  any  more  truth  in  the  pretended  maxim 
that  the  majority  is  always  right,  and  that  it  is  the  foundation 
of  republican  liberty,  than  in  the  monarchical,  that  the  king 
can  do  no  wrong,  that  is,  if  it  were  anything  more  than  a 
political  fiction  to  lay  down  rigid  rules  for  the  control  of  legis- 
lative bodies  and  citizens  in  their  choice  of  measures,  every 
opposition  would  be  factious  or  treasonable  as  soon  as  the 
sense  of  the  majority  had  been  ascertained  and  an  administra- 
tion formed  accordingly.  We  have  seen  in  the  case  of  the 
trades-unions  that  the  majority  may  not  only  be  grievously 
wrong,  but  they  may  naturally  form  the  inferior  body,  and  be 
disposed  to  oppress  the  superior — in  that  case  the  most  skilled 
and  most  industrious.  Republican  liberty  lies  far  deeper  than 
in  a  maxim,  such  as  that  the  majority  is  always  right — a  posi- 
tion a  thousand  times  contradicted  by  history.  Republican 
liberty  consists,  among  other  things,  in  the  unrestrained  right 
of  the  minority,  of  a  fraction,  nay,  of  an  individual,  to  convert, 
if  it  can  be  done  by  lawful  means,  the  majority;  republican 
safety  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  measures  of  those  who  have 
the  power,  even  be  they  the  representatives  of  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority,  may  become  modified  by  opposition  ;  for  right, 
if  we  speak  of  any  continued  course  of  action,  is  never  abso- 
lutely on  one  side.  ,We  may  go  farther:  the  more  over- 
whelming a  majority  becomes,  the  more  necessary,  steady, 
yet  lawful,  opposition  may  become,  and  in  most  cases  actually 
does  become,  lest  government  approach  to  the  vortex  of  abso- 
lutism. The  history  of  all  civilization,  and  that  of  political 
is  not  excepted,  presents  hardly  any  other  picture  more  fre- 
quently, than  that  of  an  orderly  succession  of  changes  pro- 
duced by  minorities  hardly  visible  in  their  origin,  gradually 


able,  inasmuch  as  it  might  be  supposed  that  it  does  not  aid  at  least  in  increasing 
undue  parly  spirit;  but,  upon  the  whole,  the  English  arrangement  strikes  me  as 
far  the  best,  and  the  American  as  the  least  eligible.  The  sitting  dose  together, 
according  to  parties,  and  especially  without  desks,  is  a  decided  preventive  of 
those  interminable  speeches  with  which  the  smallest-minded  always  beset  assem- 
blies most,  while  the  expediting  of  business  is  much  promoted  by  sitting  close 
and  in  parties  together.  The  desks  are  objectionable,  and  ought  to  be  abolished. 
[At  present  seats  are  taken  more  or  less  by  lot.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


273 


swelling  in  number  and  power,  and  enlarging  in  thought, 
modified  by  experience,  and  ultimately  growing  into  a  major- 
ity, supplanting  a  former  one  which  has  been  gradually 
dwindling  into  a  minority.  A  majority  does  not  always  even 
indicate  public  opinion,  although  it  may  show  momentary 
general  opinion,  to  which  rumor  belongs.  By  public  opinion 
we  must  understand  that  opinion  of  the  community  which  has 
been  influenced  either  by  the  modifying  correction  of  time,  or 
the  talent  or  knowledge  of  those  who  are  peculiarly  able  to 
judge  upon  the  subject  in  question.  General  opinion  maybe 
and  very  often  has  been  egregiously  mistaken.  Error,  want 
of  information,  fear,  excitement,  revenge,  thirst  for  gain, 
pride,  superstition,  fanaticism,  false  shame — all  these  may  be 
common  to  most  or  all  members  of  a  community,  and  con- 
sequently influence  general  opinion,  and  mislead  entirely. 
Public  opinion  indicates  always  some  settled  more  or  less 
digested  opinion  respecting  subjects  which  involve  matters 
of  right,  the  true  appreciation  of  which  consists  in  the  due 
counterbalancing  of  a  number  of  considerations.  For  this 
reason  it  is  so  important  when  it  is  turned  towards  these  sub- 
jects ;  but  as  to  matters  of  knowledge  only  a  single  individual 
may,  and  often  has,  justly  set  up  his  own  thorough  knowl- 
edge against  the  whole  general  opinion  of  his  age  and  many 
antecedent  centuries.  It  might  perhaps  be  appropriately  ex- 
pressed thus,  that  by  general  opinion  we  mean  simply  the 
aggregate  opinion  of  many  individuals  singly  taken,  an  opin- 
ion which  is  general  to  many  individuals  ;  by  public  opinion 
we  understand  the  opinion  of  the  community  as  a  connected 
and  organized  body,  the  ultimate  result  of  mutually  modify- 
ing or  counterbalancing  opinions  of  men  who  as  the  members 
of  a  community  mutually  influence  and  depend  upon  one 
another.  But  eve-n  well-settled  and  clearly-pronounced  pub- 
lic opinion  may  be  erroneous,  and  greatly  so.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  it  was  public  opinion  at  Athens  that  she  should 
side  with  Philip.  Yet  Demosthenes  was  right.  Public,  at 
least  general  opinion,  it  was  that  cried  out,  Crucify,  crucify. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  will  have  appeared,  from  the  remarks 
VOL.  II.  18 


274  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

on  public  opinion  in  the  first  volume,  that  it  is  always  entitled 
to  the  greatest  respect,  and  that  a  citizen  ought  to  follow  it 
unless  he  have  distinct  and  powerful  reasons  for  not  doing  so ; 
and  that  indeed  he  makes  himself  a  very  annoying  member 
of  the  community,  if  he  opposes  it  from  supercilious  vanity 
or  wrong-headed  arrogance,  or  a  factious  member,  if  he  does 
so  from  sordid  interest  or  sinister  ambition.  A  means  of 
judging  with  a  degree  of  fairness  between  both  parties  is  to 
consider  them  as  if  both  were  recorded  on  the  pages  of  the 
past,  as  if  you  met  with  them  in  history ;  disentangle  your- 
self from  the  meshes  of  self-interest,  and  before  all  apply  the 
plain  yet  very  powerful  test  of  asking  yourself,  Would  you 
frankly  acknowledge  your  inmost  motives — for  which,  however, 
you  must  diligently  or  honestly  search — before  posterity? 

To  return  once  more  to  public  opinion.  We  have  first  to 
inquire  whether  the  subject  at  issue  is  one  on  which  there  can 
exist  any  public  opinion  at  all,  so  that  we  do  not  mistake 
general  opinion  for  public.  If  millions  believe  certain  state- 
ments touching  matters  of  fact,  of  which  I  have  undeniable 
evidence  contrary  to  the  general  belief;  if  I  live  among  peo- 
ple who  yet  judge  by  the  mere  appearance  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  and  who  believe  that  the  moon  is  larger  than  all  the 
stars,  or  who  pronounce  a  general  for  having  lost  a  battle  in- 
capable, or  perhaps  a  traitor,  while  I  may  have  the  undeniable 
knowledge  to  the  contrary,  or  am  perhaps  acquainted  with  the 
opinion  of  a  great  captain  who  pronounces  that  general  to 
have  shown  the  greatest  skill  and  talent  in  that  very  battle 
which  he  lost — in  all  these  cases  general  opinion  has  no  sort 
of  weight,  and  I  should  prostitute  my  mind,  perhaps  my  con- 
science, were  I  to  follow  it.  The  same  is  the  case  in  many 
trials.  There  may  be  a  very  general  opinion,  loudly,  clamor- 
ously expressed,  respecting  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
arraigned  person,  and  yet  the  juryman  before  whom  the  facts 
are  divulged  in  their  successive  order  and  in  their  true  bear- 
ing ought  to  pay  no  regard  to  any  opinion  of  any  person 
or  of  the  public  except  the  judge  only.  Nevertheless,  real 
public  opinion  is  carefully  and  respectfully  to  be  consulted,  for 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  275 

the  two  reasons,  first,  that  there  is  a  very  great  chance  that  if 
it  be  settled,  and,  of  course,  touches  a  subject  on  which  there 
can  exist  any  public  opinion,  it  is  upon  the  main  correct,  and 
if  not,  that  there  is  at  any  rate  much  to  be  learned  from  it ; 
secondly,  that  it  is  the  greatest,  mightiest  of  all  powers,  and 
therefore  not  to  be  slighted.  It  must  be  observed,  however, 
that  it  requires  tact  and  honest  observation  to  ascertain  public 
opinion.  Clamor  is  not  public  opinion.  The  organs  of  a 
nation,  of  whatever  kind  they  be,  for  instance  the  members 
of  legislatures,  the  public  press,  the  courts,  pronounce  some- 
times not  only  hastily,  but  repeatedly,  one  thing,  while  facts, 
carefully  observed,  show  at  the  same  time  that  public  opinion, 
the  settled  sentiment  of  the  people,  takes  its  current  in  an 
entirely  contrary  direction.  It  is  the  discovery  of  the  latter, 
and  the  acting  boldly  upon  it,  which  has  given  some  states- 
men so  great  a  power  in  executing  vast  designs,  apparently 
in  direct  contradiction  to  public  opinion,  because  opposed  to 
what  those  organs,  for  some  reason  or  other  misrepresenting 
public  opinion,  pronounced.  A  common  case  of  this  sort  is 
when  parliamentary  bodies  opposed  to  an  administration  are 
dissolved,  and  an  "appeal  to  the  people"  is  made,  who  by 
their  new  elections  show  that  they  side  with  the  administra- 
tion, and  that  the  former  therefore  misrepresented  public 
opinion.  Finally,  a  shrewd  statesman  may  know  that  though 
this  public  opinion  of  the  great  mass,  upon  which  he  is  de- 
sirous to  found  his  strength  against  what  he  conceives  to  be 
the  misrepresenters  of  public  opinion,  does  not  yet  exist,  the 
elements  for  it  are  there,  and  that  \twill  rise  and  support  him. 
This  it  was  that  Napoleon  meant  when  he  said  that  he  was 
often  obliged  to  act  against  all  those  who  could  express  or 
represent  public  opinion,  knowing  that  the  masses  would 
support  him. 

XX.  If  then  a  citizen  is  in  the  opposition — and  indeed  most 
of  the  ensuing  remarks  relate  to  parties  in  general,  whether  in 
or  out — he  ought  to  observe,  it  would  seem,  the  following  rules : 

The  moment  that  justice  is  sacrificed  to  party  interests,  the 


276  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

party  or  individual  so  doing  becomes  factious  ;  for  justice 
being  the  grand  object  of  the  law,  of  the  constitution,  of  the 
state  itself,  the  party  sets  itself  above  these,  and  makes  itself 
its  own  object,  while  a  party  can  have  no  right  to  exist  except 
so  far  as  it  is  formed  for  the  public  good.  In  denying  justice 
the  party  turns  into  a  faction.  No  party  consideration,  there- 
fore, ought  in  any  case  to  influence  votes  on  private  bills, 
especially  not  if  the  restitution  of  reputation  or  property  be 
in  question.  If  the  old  proverb,  Fiat  justitia  et  pereat  mun- 
dus,  has  any  meaning — and  why  else  has  it  been  handed  down 
so  many  centuries? — it  is  certainly  much  truer  still,  fiat  jus- 
titia et  pereant  partes. 

There  are  many  measures,  for  instance  appointments  for 
offices,  which  may  be  fairly  and  justly  influenced  by  party 
considerations,  provided  always  the  honesty  and  fitness  of  the 
applicant  be  kept  in  view.  We  have  seen  already  that  it  is 
ruinous  to  the  whole  state  if  persons  are  habitually  appointed 
without  regard  to  their  fitness.  As  to  appointments  of  broad 
utility  for  the  people  at  large,  and  not  merely  for  simple  ex- 
ecutive places,  party  considerations  ought  to  have  no  sway, 
for  it  is  the  public  service,  not  party  service,  which  is  the 
object.  Appointments  for  critical  transactions  of  great  mo- 
ment, for  scientific  tasks,  for  the  administration  of  justice, 
ought  to  be  influenced  by  party  considerations  only  when 
there  is  actually  a  suitable  choice  left,  which  is  not  very  fre- 
quently the  case.  It  gives  great  strength  to  a  party  if  it  rises 
above  itself  and  gives  a  frank  vote  on  the  mere  consideration 
of  public  utility,  nay,  even  of  rewarding  high  individual  worth, 
and  sees  only  the  honor  and  reputation  of  the  nation  at  large 
reflected  in  such  preference  on  account  of  talent  and  character. 

There  are  measures  which  are  of  public  utility,  nay,  of  pub- 
lic necessity,  and  which  an  honest  opposition  may  neverthe- 
less oppose  without  becoming  factious,  because  to  adopt  them 
would  give  new  vigor  to  an  administration  which  the  oppo- 
sition holds  to  be  ruinous  or  vicious.  One  of  these  cases  is 
the  common  one  of  supplies.  A  man  in  the  opposition  votes 
against  supplies,  not  because  he  means  to  say  that  they  ought 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


277 


not  to  be  passed,  but  simply  because  he  desires  to  deprive 
the  administration  of  the  means  of  getting  on.  But  if  the 
proposed  measure  is  one  of  broad  and  lasting  utility  to  the 
people,  and  would  materially  suffer,  or  even  be  only  endan- 
gered, from  not  being  passed  now,  it  is  factious  to  oppose  it 
though  its  passage  would  strengthen  the  administration.  If 
a  citizen  in  the  opposition  were  to  oppose  an  advantageous 
treaty,  in  order  to  prevent  an  administration  which  he  con- 
siders vicious  fro*m  gathering  new  popularity,  it  would  be 
highly  factious.  But  the  rule  does  not  merely  apply  to  the 
more  important  class  of  measures.  Suppose  an  opposition 
member  in  the  United  States  should  be  convinced  that  for  the 
essential  benefit  of  the  whole  the  decennial  census  ought  to 
be  connected  with  an  extensive  collection  of  statistics,  and 
that  this  could  not  be  executed  without  creating  some  new 
offices,  and  yet,  on  the  consideration  that  this  would  give  new 
strength  to  the  administration,  he  should  oppose  it;  such  an 
act  would  be  reprehensible.  The  great  question  how  far  an 
opposition  ought  not  only  to  yield,  after  war  has  once  been 
declared,  but  to  aid  patriotically  in  carrying  it  to  a  glorious 
end,  belongs  to  this  class  of  measures.  Wars  may  be  wicked, 
nay,  infamous  or  stupid;  they  may  be  undertaken  for  the 
very  purpose  of  distracting  public  opinion  and  turning  it 
against  popular  liberty;  or  they  may  be  undertaken  by  a 
large  majority  of  the  people,  and  yet  against  the  decided 
opinion  of  the  opposition.  Now,  I  believe  that  a  rule,  which 
allows  of  but  very  few  and  peculiar  exceptions,  is  this :  If 
your  nation  engages  in  the  war,  and  not  simply  a  preposter- 
ous administration,  against  your  opinion,  you  may  act  in  the 
relations  of  a  private  citizen  as  you  like,  provided  always  you 
do  in  no  sort  or  manner  aid  directly  or  indirectly  the  enemy, 
— although  a  patriotic  citizen  will  not  doubt  what  he  has  to 
do ;  but  if  you  are  a  representative  or  officer,  you  are  bound 
first  of  all  to  bring  the  war  to  a  happy  and  glorious  end,  and 
not  to  cripple  the  administration.  The  latter  would  be  trea- 
sonable. Remember  that  it  is  your  state,  your  nation,  that 
declares  and  fights  out  the  war,  not  this  or  that  minister; 


278  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

remember  that  the  honor  and  history  of  your  country  are 
engaged ;  that,  however  conscientious  you  may  be  in  your 
opposition,  you  may  err  after  all ;  that  you  cannot  oppose  the 
administration  without  strengthening  the  enemy  who  has  un- 
sheathed his  sword  against  your  kindred,  and  that,  whatever 
your  opinion  was  as  to  the  beginning  of  the  war,  all  consider- 
ations absolutely  cease  when  the  enemy  approaches  your  own 
country.1  A  traitor  is  he  who  will  not  gladly  defend  his  own 
country.  If  an  opposition  feels  really  and  conscientiously 
convinced  that  the  war  is  inexpedient,  let  them  follow  the  old 
Roman  rule :  treat  after  victory,  but  fight  until  then.  The 
English  history  from  the  times  of  Henry  VIII.  is  full  of  in- 
struction respecting  all  different  sorts  of  war,  but  mean,  imbe- 
cile as  the  government  of  Charles  II.  was,  I  suppose  no  one 
would  call  him  a  true  Englishman  who,  however  opposed  to 
his  corrupt  court,  should  have  embarrassed  the  administration 
after  De  Ruyter  had  swept  the  Thames  with  his  broom  on  the 
quarter-deck.  We  must  not  forget  that  nations  as  a  whole 
have  their  meaning  and  destiny;  not  the  individual  only. 

In  brief,  if  you  are  conscientiously  in  the  opposition,  annoy 
the  administration  as  much  as  you'  think  you  can  answer  for, 
but  do  not  harass  the  public  or  embarrass  public  service,  and 
do  not  forget,  while  you  make  a  distinction  between  the  ad- 
ministration which  you  believe  you  may  lawfully  oppose,  and 
public  service  on  account  of  which  you  claim  lawfully  ^to 
oppose  the  administration,  to  make  likewise  the  proper  dis- 
tinction between  your  opposition  and  the  public;  do  not  be- 
lieve that  everything  which  suits  your  party  is  on  that  account 
beneficial  to  the  public  because  you  believe  the  administration 
in  the  wrong.2 


1  *  Fox  went  altogether  beyond  the  proper  line  of  lawful  opposition  when,  in 
1792,  he  sent  Mr.  Adair,  as  his  representative  and  with  his  cipher,  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, there  to  frustrate  the  objects  for  which  the  minister  from  the  crown  was 
authorized  to  .treat.  He  succeeded  in  this  design,  and  did  actually  frustrate  the 
king's  minister  in  some  of  the  objects  of  his  negotiation.  This  was  justly  called 
treasonable  misdemeanor  at  least.  (Tomline,  Mem.  of  Pitt,  2d  edit.,  vol.  iii.  p. 
310,  etc.)  Fox  did  it  on  his  own  account.  The  party  did  not  know  it. 

*  [The  author  would  doubtless  limit  these  remarks  to  cases  of  expediency,  as 


POLITICAL   ETHICS. 


279 


XXI.  As  to  our  own  judgment  in  party  matters,  we  ought  in 
all  matters  of  expediency  to  yield  fairly  to  the  collected  opin- 
ion of  our  friends,  and  not  set  up  our  self-sufficiency  against 
them.1  If  it  comes  to  principles,  if,  after  careful  examination, 
we  believe  that  a  compromise  of  principle  is  demanded,  or 
that  our  party  has  become  factious,  we  must  either  act  for  our- 
selves in  the  respective  single  case,  or  entirely  abandon  the 
party,  all  the  clamor  about  deserters  and  traitors  to  the  con- 
trary ; — though  no  good  or  prudent  citizen  will  do  this  upon 
slight  grounds. 

The  remark  which  was  made,  that  a  party  ought  always  to 
take  a  broad  national  ground,  as  being  the  best  preventive  of 
pettishness  or  factiousness,  applies  especially  to  oppositions. 
In  studying  the  times  or  history,  we  sometimes  observe  little 
oppositions  which  remind  us  of  a  dog  tied  behind  a  fast- 
rolling  wagon.  The  animal  opposes  indeed,  but,  although  its 
four  feet  are  stiffly  set  against  the  wagon's  motion,  the  four 
horses  move  on  unconcerned  about  the  opposer  behind,  who 
is  obliged  to  follow,  and,  if  he  would  but  give  up  his  opposi- 


where  there  was  just  or  lawful  ground  for  war,  but  the  war  would  be  hurtful  to 
national  interests.  An  unjust  war,  like  any  other  unjust  transaction,  must  be 
opposed  by  all,  whether  in  the  opposition  or  on  the  side  of  the  party  in  power.] 

1  Lord  Durham  said  in  1837,  "I  have  already,  in  parliament,  proposed  house- 
hold suffrage  and  triennial  parliaments,  and  my  opinions  are  still  the  same.  But 
at  the  same  time  I  am  not  prepared  to  press  them  obstinately  against  those  of 
other  reformers ;  for,  though  I  will  not  yield  under  any  circumstances  whatever 
to  our  enemies,  yet  I  am  not  ashamed  to  say  that  when  true  and  real  reformers 
differ  from  me  I  give  way  to  their  particular  views.  As  to  vote  by  ballot,  you 
are  all  aware,  gentlemen,  that  considerable  difference  of  opinion  prevails  upon 
this  question.  Some  think  it  not  advisable,  and  somewhat  inconsistent  with  the 
practice  of  a  free  state;  but  I  tell  you  that  my  opinion  is  decidedly  in  favor  of 
the  ballot.  This  is  not  a  declaration  made  to  serve  a  momentary  purpose.  Those 
who  know  me  best  know  that  I  have  long  entertained  that  opinion,  and  that  I 
have  acted  upon  it.  ... 

"  Let  me  observe  that  when  I  alluded  to  the  subject  of  compromise  I  meant 
compromise  with  an  enemy,  not  that  fair  concession  which  may  and  must  occa- 
sionally take  place  with  a  friend.  There  is  no  real  reformer  but  will  yield  his 
opinion  on  minor  points  to  those  who  are  actuated  by  the  same  principles  with 
himself;  but  what  I  object  to  is  the  system  of  mutilating  and  compromising  to 
gain  an  enemy  who  cannot  be  conciliated." 


280  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

tion,  might  trot  comfortably  enough  between  the  wheels — nay, 
in  the  end  might  be  taken  up  perhaps  by  the  coachman,  on 
the  box.  In  short,  if  we  do  not  oppose  on  broad  grounds, 
we  expose  ourselves  to  that  fault  which  we  have  called  polit- 
ical grumbling,  or — what  is  equally  to  be  shunned — to  spend- 
ing the  force  of  an  opposition  in  merely  harassing  the  other 
party.  All  broad,  bold,  open,  straightforward,  and  perse- 
vering opposition  earns  esteem,  but  harassing  embitters  the 
opponent.  By  political  harassing  I  mean  all  opposition  for 
the  sake  of  annoying.  If  the  reduced  party  offers  the  annoy- 
ance, it  will  only  irritate  the  other  party  still  more  and  lead  it 
on  to  violence ;  if  the  reduced  party  suffers  the  annoyance,  it 
may  be  driven  on  to  desperation  ;  it  is  always  embittered.  In 
every  political  sphere,  not  only  among  parties,  spite,  annoy- 
ance, and  wilful  humiliation  are  as  much  to  be  shunned  as  in 
private  intercourse,  and  they  have  ruined  many  a  party,  class, 
or  government.  They  are  forms  of  revenge,  and  therefore, 
with  all  kinds  of  revenge,  totally  to  be  discarded. 

The  question  of  coalitions  of  parties  is  not  so  important  in 
an  ethical  point  of  view  as  in  a  merely  prudential.  If  parties 
believe  that  they  can  conscientiously  unite,  without  compro- 
mising principles  which  they  hold  and  have  ever  proclaimed 
to  be  essential, — for  without  this  they  amount  to  factious  con- 
spiracies,— there  is  of  course  no  objection  on  the  score  of 
morality.  But  it  must  be  observed  that  although  parties  at 
variance  as  to  essential  principles  may  unite  for  some  definite, 
well-understood,  and  publicly  proclaimed  end,  as  for  the  over- 
throw of  an  administration,  after  this  each  party  is  again  to 
stand  on  its  own  ground.  There  is  always  great  danger  of 
contamination  of  principle,  and  that  the  broad  moral  principle 
of  the  party  should  be  forgotten  or  overshadowed  in  the  ex- 
pediency of  the  case.  Coalitions  generally  arouse  distrust  in 
the  public  mind  against  the  coalescing  parties,  and  if  a 
coalition  has  been  formed  not  only  for  attack,  but  also  for 
continuance  after  the  dislodgment  of  the  administration,  it  is 
exceedingly  difficult  to  give  it  that  moral  strength  which  a 
pure  national  party  alone  can  have.  Coalitions  must,  in  their 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  28l 

nature,  be  in  most  cases  weak  after  they  come  into  power : 
it  is  easy  to  oppose  unitedly,  as  men  of  all  different  qualities 
may  easily  pull  down  a  house,  but  their  different  opinion, 
taste,  and  skill  would  appear  the  moment  that  they  came  to 
rebuild  it.  In  coalitions,  one  party  .is  generally  the  dupe  of 
the  other.  The  coalition  of  Fox  and  Lord  North  was  made 
to  last,  and  not  for  opposition  only;  the  coalition  of  part 
of  the  whigs  and  tories,  the  latter  then  generally  Jacobites, 
against  Walpole  was  such  that  a  compromise  of  principle 
seemed  evident,  and  the  public  very  generally  considered  it 
as  factious  on  that  ground.  The  late  coalition  in  France 
against  Count  Mole  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting  on  record 
as  for  the  mere  purpose  of  opposition.  It  united,  for  the  time, 
the  extreme  left  with  the  extreme  right,  republicans  with 
legitimists,  with  almost  all  intermediate  shades,  and  nearly  all 
the  many  ministers  whom  France  had  since  the  year  1830  and 
who  supplanted  one  another  in  the  various  changes  of  ad- 
ministration. Of  course,  no  one  could  believe  that  these 
many  fragments  could  keep  one  moment  together  after  their 
common  object,  the  displacement  of  the  administration,  should 
have  been  obtained.1 

XXII.  I  believe  I  ought  not  to  conclude  my  remarks  on 
this  subject  without  adding  a  word  on  parties  or  fractions  of 
parties  formed  on  the  ground  of  extraction  or  foreign  nation- 
ality, a  subject  of  importance  in  the  United  States.  If  a 
country  is  so  happily  situated  as  to  be  able  to  afford  a  ready 
reception  to  emigrants  from  distant  countries,  and  the  nation 
which  inhabits  it  so  liberally  disposed  as  to  offer  their  own 
citizenship,  in  its  fullest  and  almost  unlimited2  extent,  upon 

1  A  remarkable  coalition  was  that  in  Belgium  preceding  the  revolution,  by 
which  the  professed  unbelievers  united  with  the  ultra-Catholic  party.  However, 
this  has  happened  before,  as  for  instance  in  England,  even  when  persecutions 
were  going  on  for  heterodoxy. 

•  a  The  foreigner  by  birth  who  has  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  is  in 
every  way  whatsoever  equal  to  the  native  citizen,  except  that  the  constitution 
dees  not  allow  him  to  become  president  of  the  United  States  unless  he  was  a 
citizen  at  the  time  when  the  constitution  was  adopted. 


282        .  POLITICAL   ETHICS. 

easier  terms  than  those  of  the  naturalization  of  any  other 
country,  it  appears  to  me,  from  whatever  point  of  view  we 
may  take,  even  that  of  mere  national  courtesy  not  excepted, 
entirely  inadmissible  to  form  unions,  of  whatever  consistency 
they  may  be,  for  political  purposes  on  the  avowed  ground  of 
different  national  extraction.  Generally  speaking,  it  is  well,  I 
believe,  if  an  emigrant,  after  having  become  a  citizen,  abstains 
from  all  party  matters  proper,  though  he  ought  under  the 
general  obligation  of  the  citizen  conscientiously  to  vote,  and 
thus  may  usually  vote  with  a  party.  This,  however,  he  must 
decide  for  himself;  yet  it  strikes  me  that  no  choice  is  left  him 
as  to  the  other  point,  namely  that  of  forming  a  party  on  the 
distinction  of  birth.  He  must  decide  for  himself  whether  he 
will  accept  of  the  citizenship  or  prefer  to  remain  an  alien  : 
when  once,  however,  the  oath  is  taken,  he  is  bound  by  all 
moral  and  political  considerations  to  be,  act,  and  pass  him- 
self as  a  bona  fide  citizen  of  his  adopted  country,  and  not 
to  abuse  national  hospitality  in  so  glaring  a  manner  as  to 
throw  the  entirely  extraneous  element  of  foreign  national  feel- 
ing or  animosity  into  the  party  movements  and  excitements 
of  his  adopted  country.  It  strikes  me  as  a  very  great  derelic- 
tion of  duty,  and  as  a  high-handed  offence  against  true  and 
conscientious  allegiance — an  ill  return  for  liberal  laws.  There 
is  nothing  more  dangerous  to  a  country  than  the  dissension 
of  its  citizens  on  the  score  of  national  extraction.  We  have 
the  case  of  Canada  before  us.  The  Athenians  and  Romans 
would  hardly  have  hesitated  to  treat  such  combinations  as 
treasonable,  if  indeed  they  would  not  have  spurned  the  idea 
of  suffering  them  to  grow  into  any  sort  of  importance.  The 
spirit  of  exclusiveness  of  the  ancients,  according  to  which  all 
distant  foreigners  appeared  as  barbarians,  would  indeed  have 
been  sufficient  to  prevent  the  like  affiliations  on  the  basis  of 
foreign  nationality  together  with  the  enjoyment  of  full  citizen- 
ship ;  but,  though  our  religion  as  well  as  the  diffusion  of  a 
common  civilization  over  many  nations  teaches  us  far  different 
sentiments  regarding  foreigners,  I  still  believe  that  every  citi- 
zen of  a  free  country  should  cherish  his  own  citizenship  with 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  283 

sufficient  patriotism,  pride,  and  jealousy  to  prevent  him  from 
associating  the  names  of  foreign  countries,  however  noble  or 
endeared  to  him  they  may  be,  however  sacred  he  may  keep 
their  names  in  the  inmost  recess  of  his  soul,  with  affairs  pecu- 
liarly those  of  his  country.  There  is  no  just  middle  term, 
that  I  can  think  of,  between  an  alien  and  a  bona  fide  citizen 
joining  heart  and  hand  in  the  weal  and  woe  of  the  country 
whose  citizenship  he  has,  by  choice  and  not  by  force,  received. 
If  these  remarks  are  founded  in  truth,  it  is  clear  that  it  is 
equally  offensive  in  native  citizens  to  foment  this  improper 
spirit,  to  make  use  of  national  inclinations  and  dislikes  for 
party  purposes,  and  to  call  upon  those  adopted  citizens  as  the 
natives  of  foreign  countries  and  according  to  their  various 
nationalities.  Is  the  citizenship  of  a  free  country  so  light  a 
thing  that  it  can  be  changed  like  a  vestment  and  be  put  on 
temporarily  only  for  convenience'  sake,  so  that  under  it  the 
foreigner  remains  a  foreigner,  unchanged,  unaltered  by  the 
new  oath  of  allegiance  ?  We  ought  to  change  the  ancient 
saying,  "  the  sea  washes  off  all  evil,"  into  "  let  the  sea  wash 
off  all  difference."1  But  what  shall  we  say  of  those  native 
citizens  who  make  use  of  the  ignorance  or  criminal  levity  of 
the  lowest  portion  of  emigrants,  to  bring  them  to  the  polls 
long  before  the  law  permits  it,  and  who  make  these  poor 
beings  begin  their  career  in  the  new  country  which  they  mean 
to  adopt  with  a  flagrant  breach  of  its  sacred  laws,  with  a 
bribe  and  perjury?  That  they  fully  share  in  the  guilt  of  this 
treble  crime.  If  it  is  the  fundamental  law  of  a  country  that 
the  majority  of  the  lawful  votes  lawfully  polled  shall  be  the 
last  decision,  the  final  supreme  authority,  which  decides  and 
can  be  appealed  to,  it  amounts  to  a  contamination  of  the 
supreme  authority  when  we  corrupt  it  by  the  introduction  of 
any  foreign  element.  But  enough  was  said  on  this  subject 
when  we  treated  of  bribery. 


i'&i  TTUVTO  ravdpuKuv  /coxa.     Eurip.,  Iphig.  in  Taur.,  1193. 


X 

CHAPTER    IV. 

Public  Men. — Leaders. — Self-examination  before  a  Citizen  embarks  in  Public 
.JLife. —  Physical,  Moral,  and  Mental  Qualities  desirable  in  a  Public  Man. — 
Necessary  Knowledge  for  a  Public  Man.  —  Caution  in  entering  upon  Public 
Life. 

XXIII.  IN  all  free  countries  there  are  citizens  who,  owing 
to  the  influence  they  exercise  over  a  portion  of  their  fellow- 
citizens  and  in  guiding  or  impelling  the  public  mind,  have 
left  the  sphere  of  the  private  citizen  proper,  and  who  may  at 
times  actually  be  charged  with  public  offices,  but  need  not  be 
so,  while  yet  they  essentially  influence  the  politics  of  their 
state.  These  men  we  call  public  men,  and,  according  to  their 
influence,  leaders.  Their  influence  depends  upon  themselves 
and  upon  circumstances.  They  may  actually  rule,  and  yet  be 
not  officers  but  simply  public  men.  The  most  remarkable 
instance  is  probably  afforded  in  the  case  of  Pericles,  who 
swayed  the  destiny  of  Athens  for  upwards  of  forty  years,  and 
yet  was  but  a  public  man  or  leader.  Where  there  is  a  real 
active  political  life,  it  is  natural  that  there  are  public  men, 
more  or  less  influential,  or  important,  according  to  the  wider 
or  narrower  circle  of  the  respective  community  in  which  they 
move.  Every  county,  every  village,  even  every  ward  in  a 
large  city,  has  its  public  men.  From  these,  in  the  natural  and 
salutary  course  of  things,  are  generally  taken  those  citizens 
whom  the  public  of  free  states  charges  with  offices,  especially 
the  representatives  and  all  elective  officers. 

Now,  whenever  a  man  fails  in  his  calling,  mistakes  his 
powers,  and  deceives  himself  as  to  his  proper  strength  and 
natural  vocation,  bitter  disappointment,  perhaps  an  acrid  tem- 
per, and,  above  all,  the  despairing  consciousness  of  having 
failed  in  active  usefulness  and  in  gathering  the  harvest  of  a 
well-guided  life,  on-  the  one  hand,  v'th  a  more  or  less  direct 
284 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  285 

injury  to  the  community  on  the  other,  are  the  infallible  con- 
sequences. How  many  men  have  learned  with  sorrow,  in  thfc 
middle  of  life,  that  they  had  wholly  mistaken  their  powers, 
inclinations,  or  peculiar  strength  !  All  writers  upon  the  vari- 
ous professions  have  endeavored  to  exhibit  the  characteristics 
necessary  for  the  several  callings,  and  the  obstacles  unavoid- 
ably met  with  in  them,  so  that  the  aspirants  may  calmly 
examine  themselves  before  they  make  so  important  a  choice, 
which  must  very  powerfully  influence  their  peace  and  con- 
tentment through  life.  A  proper  self-examination  of  this  sort, 
however,  is  more  important  before  a  citizen  fairly  embarks  or 
suffers  himself  to  be  drawn  into  public  life,  than  when  he  con- 
templates entering  into  other  spheres  of  action.  For  of  all 
the  agents  which  may  prompt  a  citizen  to  do  this,  a  degree  of 
ambition  will  almost  always  be  one ;  and  bitter  indeed  is  the 
darkness  of  chill  neglect  which  follows  the  bright  dreams  of 
ambition.  The  acquisition  of  wealth  is  but  very  rarely  and 
by  way  of  exception  connected  with  politics  in  a  free  and 
comparatively  pure  country ;  yet  though  the  citizen,  when 
young,  may  have  no  desire  of  wealth,  the  years  may  come 
when  he  sees  his  former  companions  accumulating  wealth 
and  amply  providing  for  their  offspring,  and  when  he  regrets 
having  pursued  what  now  perhaps  appears  to  him  a  bauble. 
Success  in  politics  requires  a  peculiar  compound  of  tempera- 
ment, which  is  the  free  gift  of  nature  and  cannot  be  made 
at  will ;  which  does  not,  indeed,  insure  success,  but  without 
which  success  can  rarely  be  calculated  upon.  Politics  is  an 
exciting  pursuit,  and  whoever  is  accustomed  to  excitement 
finds  without  it  an  intolerable  void,  so  that,  once  accustomed 
to  excitement,  the  citizen  will  continually  return  to  it,  though 
he  is  conscious  that  he  ought  to  give  up  a  political  career  and 
that  it  is  not  his  proper  calling.  And,  finally,  the  freer  a 
country,  the  more  frequently  are  chances  offered  for  embark- 
ing in  politics.  Yet  a  man  who  was  not  destined  to  be  a 
public  man,  but  nevertheless  continually  obtrudes  himself  into 
this  sphere,  is  a  great  annoyance  to  a  free  community,  and 
may,  if  he  chances  to  obtain  an  influential  employment,  be- 


286  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

come  a  very  dangerous  and  injurious  member  of  a  political 
society  without  even  suspecting  it  himself,  through  his  mistake 
of  his  own  powers.  We  see,  then,  that  a  citizen  owes  it  to 
himself,  his  family,  and  his  community,  not  heedlessly  to  enter 
politics.  Every  man  is  a  valuable  member  of  the  community 
if  he  is  in  his  proper  place,  sphere,  and  utility ;  but  a  man 
who  might  have  pursued  the  profession  of  medicine  with  real 
delight  may  feel  himself  daily  disgusted  with  the  profession 
of  the  law,  and  may  do  much  harm  to  his  fellow-citizens ;  and 
vice  versa.  A  man  that  meets  with  constant  disappointment 
as  a  merchant,  or  misses  his  true  aim  of  life  as  a  clergyman, 
might  have  made  a  contented,  useful,  active  farmer,  contrib- 
uting his  essential  share  to  the  common  stock  of  national 
success.  Philip  III.  of  Spain,  it  is  reported,  exclaimed  in  an- 
guish, on  his  death-bed,  "  Oh  that  I  had  never  ruled !  that  I 
had  rather  been  the  poorest  man !"  Are  there  not  many  citi- 
zens who  in  the  secret  of  their  hearts  feel  something  similar 
respecting  their  pursuit  of  politics?1 

In  order  to  see  more  clearly  to  what  points  this  examination 
ought  to  be  directed,  it  will  be  serviceable  to  inquire  into  the 
most  necessary  qualities  of  a  public  man,  especially  of  a  leader, 
as  experience  suggests  them,  or  as  we  may  learn  what  they 
are  from  the  best  leaders  in  history.  Afterwards  we  may  make 
the  necessary  and  individual  deductions  from  this  image,  when 
we  look  at  the  more  reduced  spheres  of  various  classes  of 
public  men.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  no  one  can  hope 
for  success  who  does  not  combine  all  the  qualities  which  will 
be  exhibited.  Genius,  peculiar  circumstances,  may  become 
powerful  substitutes.  Zisca  commanded  his  army  when  blind. 
Nor  do  I  say  that  the  union  of  these  qualities  will  insure 


1  *  Many  consider  themselves,  nnd  are  considered  by  others,  most  capable, 
until  the  real  opportunity  of  showing  it  arrives,  when  at  once  it  is  seen  that  they 
seemed  to  be  worthy  of  power  only  so  long  as  they  were  out  of  it.  "  Omnium 
consensu  capax  imperil,  nisi  imperasset."  (Tacit.,  Hist.,  i.  29,  of  Galba.)  Out 
of  power  we  may  shine  by  speeches;  in  power  action  is  necessary,  not  single* 
actions,  but  substantial  action  throughout;  that  is,  we  must  have  sound  funda- 
mental or  main  ideas,  of  which  the  actions  are  but  the  overt  facts. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  287 

success ;  but  certain  it  is  that  without  the  conjunction  of 
many  or  most  of  them  a  citizen  cannot  calculate  upon  or  even 
hope  for  success.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  say  that  the  freer  a 
people  the  easier  they  will  be  the  judges  of  the  capacities 
required.  No  one  who  knows  the  least  of  the  operation  of 
politics  in  free  countries  will  assert  this.  A  man  must  have 
shown  himself  ready  in  some  sort  before  they  can  choose  him. 
Town  meetings  must  lead  to  parliament  or  congress. 

XXIV.  A  public  man  ought  to  be  of  a  strong  constitution, 
enjoy  a  free  flow  of  health,  and  have  naturally  sound  digestive 
organs  ;  for  the  excitement  and  labor  of  public  life,  especially 
parliamentary  excitement  and  long  speaking,  will  affect  even 
the  best ;  but  a  deranged  digestion  is  apt  to  deprive  memory 
of  its  full  retentiveness,  the  brain  of  its  easy  action,  and  to 
render  a  man  nervous,  and  nervously  sensitive.  But  a  ner- 
vous man  will  ruin  himself  if  he  meddles  with  politics,  unless, 
indeed,  he  confines  himself  to  writing.  He  ought  to  have  a 
fair  and  clear  memory,  or  he  will  be  continually  defeated  by 
surprise ;  exactness  of  mind,  a  natural  tact  of  observation,  of 
dissolving  whatever  appears  around  him  into  its  elements  and 
seizing  upon  what  constitutes  its  vital  principle;  and  that 
power  of  imagination  which  combines  what  is  separated  by 
time  or  space  and  grasps  and  seizes  upon  masses.  He  ought 
to  have  a  ready  eye  for  facts,  for  reality,  and  a  keen  mind  to 
understand  them  thoroughly  and  to  see  beyond  them — to 
divine.  One  of  the  greatest  minds  of  the  age  has  said,  He 
who  cannot  read  between  the  lines  of  a  book  cannot  under- 
stand a  great  work.  Well  may  it  be  said,  He  who  cannot  see 
between  facts  cannot  understand  a  great  nation  or  a  great  pe- 
riod, present  or  past,  be  he  statesman  or  historian.  A  leader 
ought  to  have  the  native  inventiveness  of  mind  and  elevation 
of  soul  which  together  produce  that  fecundity  of  which  Cicero 
speaks  when  he  says,  "  Periclem  censet  Socrates  uberem  et 
fecundum  fuisse."1  He  ought  to  have  that  noble  quality  of 


[But  Cicero,  Or.,  4,  15,  attributes  these  qualities  of  Pericles  to  the  instructions 


288  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

communicating  to  others  the  moral  sparks  of  his  inmost 
activity,  and  the  higher  he  rises  the  more  he  must  trust  in  his 
own  principles  and  purposes  and  freely  leave  to  others  their 
own  respective  departments  in  carrying  them  out.  Defeat 
must  not  deject  him ;  he  must  esteem  his  friends,  and  not 
reject  their  advice  with  obstinacy,  yet  be  constant  and  firm. 
He  must  be  cautious,  yet  have  the  courage  finally  and  de- 
cisively to  make  up  his  mind  and  boldly  to  act  accordingly, 
even  where  many  reasons  are  for  and  against  opposite  meas- 
ures. Let  him  be  liberal  in  opinion  and  expense  ;  a  man  of 
action,  and  of  contemplative  mind ;  love  his  kind,  and  be  free 
from  selfishness.  He  ought  to  be  of  a  naturally  confiding 
disposition,  and  not  of  a  suspicious  temper.  We  gain  confi- 
dence by  confiding.  He  will  be  deceived ;  yet  if  he  trusts  no 
one  he  will  lose  more,  or  rather  gain  nothing.  He  ought  to 
be  a  firm  friend,  and  be  of  that  temper  which  can  commune 
with  minds  in  a  sphere  above  the  temporary  questions  which 
divide  parties. 

A  leader  ought  to  be  a  man  of  untarnished  integrity  and 
tried  reputation ;  he  must  have  sufficient  ambition  to  impel 
him,  and  faith  in  those  whom  he  leads.  Men  cannot  for  any 
length  of  time  be  led  by  mere  imposition,  nor  can  imposition 
sufficiently  animate  the  leader.  People  soon  find  out  whether 
he  who  wants  their  support  despises  them  or  has  faith  in  them 
or  his  time.  He  ought  to  be  a  man  of  strong  nerve,  of  eleva- 
tion and  purity  of  soul,  rather  than  of  delicate  susceptibility; 
of  tenacity  of  purpose,  yet  esteem  for  the  opinion  of  others. 
He  must  know  that  his  best-meant  actions  will  be  misrepre- 
sented, and  that  a  thousand  annoyances  will  be  tried  to  dis- 
gust him.  Let  him  disregard  all  attacks  upon  his  motives 
and  his  character;  his  friends  will  take  care  of  that.  Pitt 
never  answered  a  single  one  of  the  thousand  slanders  levelled 
against  his  motives;  but  when  an  editor  accused  him  of 
speculating  in  the  stocks  while  minister  of  the  finances,  he 


of  Anaxagorns,  and  refers  to  Plato  (Ph.nedr.,  270,  A.),  where  Socrates  makes  a 
similar  remark.     Inventiveness  and  elevation  of  soul  are  not  referred  to.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  289 

promptly  brought  a  suit  of  slander  against  him.  A  public 
man  must  not  shrink  from  having  his  most  private  affairs 
scanned  and  misrepresented.  As  to  his  capacity,  let  him 
prove  it  by  works  and  actions,  not  by  words ;  it  is  the  only 
effectual  answer,  the  only  convincing  reply,  in  any  sphere 
whatever.  An  ungrateful  son  represented  Sophocles  as  in  his 
dotage  and  unfit  to  manage  his  affairs ;  Sophocles  read  his 
CEdipus  at  Colonos,  just  finished,  to  the  judges,  and  he  was 
carried  home  in  triumph.  Aristophanes  held  up  Socrates 
to  ridicule  in  the  theatre:  the  sage,  after  the  conclusion  of 
the  satiric  comedy,  is  said  to  have  risen  up  out  of  his  seat  in  the 
theatre,  that  strangers  to  him  might  have  a  view  of  his  person.1 
When  the  fate  of  sacred  music  depended  upon  the  sentence 
of  the  papal  committee,  of  which  the  strict  and  devoted 
Charles  Borromeo  was  a  member,  and  much  was  urged  to 
endanger  it,  Palestrina  composed  a  work,  on  the  manuscript 
of  which  are  found  the  words,  "  O  God,  enlighten  my  eyes," 
and  his  work  brought  victory  for  his  cause. 

The  public  man  must  be  a  man  of  no  timidity;  he  must  be 
able  to  speak  boldly  before  those  who  dislike  his  truth,  and 
he  must  have  courage  to  take  his  stand  decidedly.2  He  ought 


1  [For  the  first  anecdote  see  Plut.,  an  seni  ger.,  \  3,  p.  785,  c. ;  for  the  second, 
./EL,  Var.  Hist.,  ii.  13.     Both  need  better  vouchers.] 

2  As  a  striking  instance  of  self-knowledge,  not  indeed  otherwise  to  be  imitated, 
I  copy  the  following  passage  of  one  of  the  letters  of  Erasmus.   "  I  see  now,"  says 
he,  "  that  the  Germans  are  resolved  at  all  adventures  to  engage  me  in  the  affair 
of  Luther,  whether  I  will  or  not.     In  this  they  have  acted  foolishly,  and  have 
taken  the  surest  method  to  alienate  me  from  them  and  their  party.     Wherein 
could  I  have  assisted  Luther,  if  I  had  declared  myself  for  him  and  shared  the 
danger   along  with  him  ?     Only  thus  far,  that,  instead  of  one  man,  two  would 
have  perished.     I  cannot  conceive  what  he  means  by  writing  with  such  a  spirit: 
one  thing  I  know  too  well,  that  he  hath  brought  great  odium  upon  the  lovers  of 
literature.    It  is  true  that  he  hath  given  us  many  a  wholesome  doctrine  and  many 
a  good  counsel ;  and  I  wish  he  had  not  defeated  the  effect  of  them  by  his  intoler- 
able faults.     But  if  he  had  written  everything  in  the  most  unexceptionable  man- 
ner, I  had  no  inclination  to  die  for  the  sake  of  truth.     Every  man  hath  not  the 
courage  requisite  to  make  a  martyr ;  and  I  am  afraid  that,  if  I  were  put  to  the 
trial,  I  should  imitate  St.  Peter."     Jortin's  Life  of  Erasmus,  London,  1808,  vol. 
i.  p.  250. 

VOL.  II.  19 


290 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


to  be  a  man  who  can  resolutely  make  up  his  mind,  and, 
having  made  up  his  mind,  promptly  act ;  he  must  not  be  by 
natural  constitution  a  man  of  timid  hesitation  or  of  that  de- 
gree of  scrupulosity  which  prevents  one  from  finally  making 
up  his  mind.  When  young,  he  ought  to  be  careful  before 
he  compromises  himself;  at  the  same  time  he  must  know 
that  he  has  no  lever  for  whatever  energy  he  may  possess  until 
fairly  committed  to  some  great  principle.1  No  pilot  can  steer 
a  vessel  through  a  winding  channel  by  orders  from  the  shore ; 
he  must  join  his  danger  and  hope  with  those  of  the  crew. 
He  must  be  frank,  and  his  sympathies  must  be  those  of  the 
people  ;  without  it  they  do  not  understand  one  another ;  he 
must  be  of  enlarged  liberality,  yet  keep  out  of  debt,  and  com- 
mand respect  by  all  his  domestic  affairs ;  he  must  be  calm, 
and  in  all  the  excitement  around  him  be  able  to  seize  upon 
what  is  real  and  substantial,  and  separate  it  from  what  is  but 
spray  washing  over  the  deck.  He  must  be  active,  and  a  man 
of  business.  "  Par  negotiis  nee  supra,"  is  a  phrase  of  great 
import.  Clarendon,  no  friend  of  Hampden,  yet  describes  him 


1  Few  things  more  strengthen  the  action  of  a  man,  whether  in  politics  or  any 
other  sphere,  than  to  be  fairly  and  wholly  committed  to  some  great  principle. 
It  gives  a  steady  direction  and  consistency  to  all  the  single  actions,  promotes 
self-respect  and  character,  and  gives  efficiency  to  life,  while  in  the  public  it  in- 
spires steady  regard,  and  the  important  conviction,  that  the  individual  may  be 
relied  upon.  That  devotion  to  his  principles  alone,  which  the  public  can  judge 
of  only  by  a  series  of  actions,  will  bring  back  to  a  man  the  public  esteem  that 
may  have  left  him  for  a  time.  But  a  public  man,  as  in  truth  any  man  who  moves 
in  any  active  life,  cannot  take  too  much  care  to  avoid  committing  himself  too 
easily  in  regard  to  minor  points ;  for  this  must  produce  fluctuation.  This  danger 
is  best  avoided,  not  by  subtlety  or  intrigue,  but  by  silence — that  silence,  I  mean, 
which  is  broken  only  when  necessary.  There  are  many  garrulous  men  who 
daily  commit  themselves  either  upon  points  not  sufficiently  known  or  weighed,  or 
farther  than  they  intended  ;  they  then  must  retract,  or  modify — all  which  weakens. 
There  is  a  great  power  in  silence  ;  a  great  manliness  in  suffering  tl  e  actual  cases 
to  arrive,  as  the  judge  on  the  bench  does,  and  decide  when  fully  heard.  Still,  no 
man,  of  whatever  genius  in  his  respective  sphere,  can  avoid  committing  errors. 
If  such  is  the  case,  there  is  again  great  power  in  candor,  in  positively  and  frankly 
acknowledging  a  mistake.  Only  we  must  take  heed,  in  this  case  again,  to  be 
calm  and  considerate,  and  not  to  be  rash  in  pronouncing  judgment  upon  our 
own  error,  as  we  were  before  in  committing  it. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


291 


as  peculiarly  made  for  a  leader,  and  dwells  repeatedly  upon 
his  calmness  and  activity,  and  on  the  fact  that  he  was  "not 
to  be  tired  out."  Alexander  won  his  battles  because  he 
moved  briskly  about  on  horseback,  while  his  stately  enemy 
was  enthroned  on  a  scaffold  or  high  wagon,  that  all  soldiers 
might  see  him.  Neither  stately  speeches  nor  senatorial  man- 
tles can  lead  ;  Napoleon  was  never  so  much  himself  as  in  his 
gray  coat.  It  is  action  that  gains  respect  and  sways.  Exact- 
ness and  activity  have  given  to  many  a  citizen  an  influence 
far  superior  to  that  acquired  by  men  of  much  greater  capacity 
who  were  indolent.  A  public  man  must  be  a  man  of  veracity ; 
no  arguments  ever  so  conclusive  will  convince,  if  the  hearers 
first  of  all  do  not  believe  that  the  speaker  himself  believes  in 
them  ;  he  must  be  honest  in  money  matters  to  a  degree  of 
minute  scrupulosity;  he  must  be  ever  ready  to  retire,  content 
with  his  own  merit,  without  grumbling;  he  must  be  prepared 
to  meet  with  ingratitude,  as  every  one  must  who  follows 
him  or  serves  those  that  have  power.  "Let  him  be  a  man  of 
fervent  religious  veneration ;  without  it  the  busy  life,  prac- 
tical turmoil,  the  immundicity  through  which  he  must  wade, 
the  thousand  impurities  with  which  he  becomes  acquainted, 
will  infect  him  and  make  him  sordid.  His  religion  therefore 
must  be  of  that  true  and  genuine  kind  which  enlivens  and 
purifies,  and  rejoices  in  adoring  and  loving,  and  not  that 
unhappy  counterfeit  of  religion  which  benumbs  the  heart  by 
encompassing  it  with  dogmatic  bitterness  and  narrow  illiber- 
ality,  or  equally  unjust  and  unholy  fanatical  excitement.  His 
manners  ought  to  be  affable,  yet  never  cringing;  he  ought  at 
any  moment  to  disregard  his  comfort,  to  revere  justice,  and 
love  his  country. 

• 

XXV.  A  public  man  ought  always  to  know  well  the  ele- 
ments of  his  own  society,  be  it  small  or  large,  its  whole  public 
and  social  economy.  He  must  know  how  the  things  that  are, 
the  laws  and  customs,  operate,  and  how  they  become  such  as 
they  are.  The  history  of  the  institutions  of  his  country  is 
indispensable  for  him,  or  he  will  commit  a  thousand  errors  or 


292  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

dangerous  faults.  He  ought  especially  to  study  those  periods 
in  which  the  most  important  institutions  rose  to  their  highest 
action  or  showed  their  vigor  in  struggling  into  life.  In  brief, 
he  ought  to  know  the  constitutional  history  of  his  country 
well,  and  if  a  nation  has  branched  out  from  another  at  a  time 
when  the  latter  had  already  many  settled  and  important  insti- 
tutions, as  our  nation  from  the  British,  he  must  connect  the 
study  of  these  latter  with  it.  To  these  he  ought  to  add  the 
study  of  Greece,  especially  of  Athens,  and  of  Rome,  because 
they  were  great  nations,  belong  to  the  past,  afford  an  undis- 
turbed study,  and  unite  with  the  glory  of  their  rise  and  high 
civilization  the  pointed  lessons  of  their  decay  and  ruin. 

A  public  man,  acting  in  a  wide  or  elevated  sphere,  will  de- 
rive great  benefit  from  the  minute  and  deep  study  of  some 
great  man  who  with  few  means  produced  vast  results,  to 
whom  he  feels  especial  inclination.  If  he  feels  attracted  by 
the  peculiar  character  of  a  man  such  as  Washington,  Chat- 
ham, De  Witt,  Sully,  and  has  the  means  of  carefully  tracing 
his  character  and  actions,  he  will  invigorate  his  soul  and 
enlarge  his  mind  by  penetrating  them  and  making  them  his 
own  more  and  more.  Fortunate  will  it  be  if,  in  addition  to 
this,  the  literature  of  his  own  country  furnishes  him  with  a 
truly  great  poet,  who  has  exercised  a  vast  influence  upon  his 
nation  and  thereby  shows  that  the  vigor  of  his  mind  knew 
how  to  seize  upon  the  vital  principles  of  man's  life  in  general 
and  of  his  nation  in  particular.  The  English  and  Americans 
are  peculiarly  fortunate  in  their  Shakspeare.  A  public  man 
cannot  read  him  too  much.  Not  that  he  should  learn  par- 
ticular lessons  of  public  action  in  specific  cases  from  this 
great  poet,  although  even  as  to  this  point  he  furnishes  golden 
passages  which  in  times  of  need  will  suddenly  rise  up  in  the 
mind  of  one  who  is  familiarized  with  his  immortal  works. 
But  the  reasons  why  I  would  recommend  the  ever-repeated 
perusal  of  his  unrivalled  poems  are  of  greater  extent.  There 
is  so  vast  a  stage  of  action  in  his  works,  such  a  quintessence 
of  all  human  life,  such  a  vigorous  delineation  of  character  and 
such  depth  of  observation,  such  an  exuberance  of  thought,  of 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


293 


subtle  penetration,  and  endless  variety  of  sentiment,  all  the  dif- 
ferently combined  motives  of  the  infinite  multitude  of  human 
individualities  are  so  impartially  viewed  and  given  from  a 
point  so  high  above  them,  vulgarity  is  drawn  so  truly,  and 
human  greatness,  joy,  and  misery  are  presented  with  such 
loftiness,  that  his  works  are  like  a  concentration  of  all  that  is 
essential  in  the  active  life  of  men,  of  what  ephemerally  passes 
or  historically  lasts,  so  that  no  one  can  penetrate  into  his 
works  without  having  his  mind  invigorated  and  enlarged  and 
his  vision  made  keener  as  well  as  loftier.1 

XXVI.  Every  one,  therefore,  before  he  embarks  voluntarily 


1  There  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  Las  Cases,  containing  Napoleon's  opinion 
of  the  poet  Corneille  and  the  influence  which  so  great  a  poet  exercises  on  a 
nation.  Napoleon  was  then  emperor,  and  ended  with  the  words,  "  Yes,  gentle- 
men, were  he  living  now  I  should  make  him  prince."  Though  he  probably 
would  not  have  done  so,  it  sufficiently  shows  in  what  manner  he  viewed  a  great 
dramatic  poet.  Las  Cases,  vol.  ii.  p.  344,  Paris  ed.  of  1824. 

The  passage  of  Mackintosh's  pamphlet,  A  Discourse  on  the  Study  of  the  Law 
of  Nature  and  Nations,  in  which  he  defends  Grotius  and  speaks  of  his  quoting 
poets  and  orators,  deserves  here  to  be  mentioned.  "  He  was  not,"  says  Sir 
James  Mackintosh,  "  of  such  a  stupid  and  servile  cast  of  mind  as  to  quote  the 
opinions  of  poets  and  orators,  of  historians  and  philosophers,  as  those  of  judges 
from  whose  decision  there  is  no  appeal.  He  quotes  them,  as  he  tells  us  himself, 
as  witnesses  whose  conspiring  testimony,  mightily  strengthened  by  their  discord- 
ance on  almost  every  other  subject,  is  a  conclusive  proof  of  the  unanimity  of  the 
whole  human  race  on  the  great  rules  of  duty  and  the  fundamental  principles  of 
morals.  On  such  matters  poets  and  orators  are  the  most  unexceptionable  of  all 
witnesses,  for  they  address  themselves  to  the  general  feeling  and  sympathies  of 
mankind  ;  they  are  neither  warped  by  system  nor  perverted  by  sophistry ;  they 
can  attain  none  of  their  objects,  they  can  neither  please  nor  persuade,  if  they 
dwell  on  moral  sentiments  not  in  unison  with  those  of  their  reader:  no  system 
of  moral  philosophy  can  surely  disregard  the  general  feelings  of  human  nature 
and  the  according  judgments  of  all  ages  and  nations.  But  where  are  those  feel- 
ings and  that  judgment  recorded  and  observed  ?  In  those  very  writings  which 
Grotius  is  gravely  blamed  for  having  quoted.  The  usages  and  laws  of  nations, 
the  events  of  history,  the  opinions  of  philosophers,  the  sentiments  of  orators  and 
poets,  as  well  as  the  observations  of  common  life,  are,  in  truth,  the  materials  out 
of  which  the  science  of  morality  is  formed;  and  those  who  neglect  them  are 
justly  chargeable  with  a  vain  attempt  to  philosophize  without  regard  to  fact  and 
experience,  the  sole  foundations  of  all  true  philosophy. 


294  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

m  the  rough  and  rolling  vessel  of  politics,  or  suffers  himself 
to  be  imperceptibly  drawn  into  the  currents  of  public  life, 
ought  to  ask  himself  whether  he  be  willing  or  able,  according 
to  his  mental  and  bodily  frame,  to  make  all  the  sacrifices 
which  he  assuredly  will  be  called  upon  to  make,  and  whether 
public  life  might  not  become  to  him  a  continued  chafing  and 
disturbance  of  mind;  whether  other  pursuits  would  not  suit 
his  particular  temperament,  constitution,  and  taste  far  better, 
and  afford  him  that  superior  repose  which  our  souls  always 
derive  from  continued  useful  action  blessed  with  success,  or 
from  mental  activity  which  is  peculiarly  their  own,  and  in 
which  we  feel  we  are  completely  what  we  were  intended  to 
be.  There  are  some  men  so  framed  as  to  be  strong,  original, 
acute,  and  bold  in  the  stillness  of  retirement,  and  to  be  capa- 
ble of  sending  forth  from  thence  many  works  of  extensive 
and  essential  influence,  affecting  whole  ages ;  or  so  organized 
that  they  are  of  substantial  usefulness  in  all  the  varied  social 
relations  of  their  community,  while  unconnected  with  politics; 
but  so  soon  as  they  are  brought  into  contact  with  the  con- 
crete dealings  political  life  involves,  where  things  must  needs 
be  taken  in  mass,  they  shrink  and  lose  their  vigor. 

Yet  it  may  be  asked,  how  is  it  possible  to  know  before 
trial  whether  we  are  calculated  for  public  life  or  not  ?  The 
only  rule,  it  seems,  that  can  be  given  respecting  this  sub- 
ject, is,  first,  that  a  citizen,  doing  all  acts  to  which  he  thinks 
active  public  spirit  should  prompt  him,  should  allow  public 
opinion  to  concentrate  upon  him,  that  he  should  let  public 
opinion  seek  him,  and  not  himself  seek  public  opinion  for 
single  employments  or  elevations,  and  that  he  should  follow 
this  rule  throughout  life,  which  guards  even  established  public 
men  against  many  errors ;  and,  secondly,  that  having  once 
begun  his  public  career,  he  should  be  exceedingly  cautious 
before  he  commits  himself  too  much,  while  he  has  a  fair 
earnest  of  public  life  and  still  is  not  yet  so  deeply  affected  by 
its  peculiar  character  that  a  retreat  would  be  too  difficult. 


BOOK    VI. 
CHAPTER    I. 

Extra-constitutional  Meetings. — Their  Necessity. — The  Representative. — Sum- 
mary of  his  Duties. — He  is  the  guardian  of  the  public  Treasures. — When 
ought  he  to  vote  liberally  ? — The  framing  of  Laws. — Legislation  upon  the 
Principle  of  mutual  Accommodation. — Importance  of  a  gentlemanly  Character 
for  the  Representative. — Instruction. — History  and  the  various  Constitutions 
show  that  the  Right  of  Instruction  has  been  claimed  and  disclaimed  as  pro- 
moting and  as  injurious  to  Liberty,  according  to  the  Circumstances  of  the 
Times. — The  Representative  Government  is  not  a  mere  Substitution  for  direct 
Democracy. — Essential  character  of  the  Representative  Government. — The 
different  characteristic  Principles  of  Ancient  Slates,  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
Modern  States. — Nationalization  of  States ;  Socialization  of  Population. — 
National  Representation  the  great  Feature  of  Modern  Times. — Difference  be- 
tween Deputative  and  Representative  Systems. — Oath  in  New  Jersey  and  the 
Netherlands  to  promote  Public  Welfare. — How  does  the  Representative  faith- 
fully represent  ? — Advantages  of  Representative  Government. — Objections  to 
the  doctrine  of  Instruction. — Instruction  belongs  to  the  Deputative  System. 

I.  THE  true  and  easy  operation  of  a  representative  govern- 
ment, and,  still  more,  the  entire  realization  of  national  civil 
liberty,  that  is,  of  civil  liberty  as  appertaining  to  a  national 
state, — not  to  a  city-state,  of  which  presently  more, — depends  in 
a  very  great  measure  upon  those  many  extra-constitutional,  not 
unconstitutional,  meetings,  in  which  the  citizens  either  unite 
their  scattered  means  for  the  obtaining  of  some  common  end, 
social  in  general,  or  political  in  particular,  or  express  their 
opinion  in  definite  resolutions  upon  some  important  point  be- 
fore the  people.  These  meetings  may  be  entirely  unofficial ; 
sometimes  they  are  semi-official,  at  others  they  are  conven- 
tions of  delegates,  sent  by  the  people,  and  yet  they  proceed 
altogether  from  the  spontaneous  action  of  society,  without 
being  called  into  existence  by  the  prescribed  rules  of  the 
constitutional  law.  No  nation  can  hope  for  substantial  civil 
liberty  before  it  is  well  acquainted  with  this  important  social 

295 


296  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

agent,  so  indispensable  for  modern,  that  is  national,  liberty. 
Many  attempts  at  liberty  have  failed,  because  the  people  had 
no  idea  of  these  free  extra-constitutional  meetings,  and  ex- 
pected constitutions  to  operate  without  them.  In  these  meet- 
ings society  frequently  acts  as  such,  separate  from  the  state, 
for  instance  when  they  consist  of  members  sent  for  industrial, 
or,  as  we  have  lately  seen,  for  scientific  purposes,  from  vari- 
ous countries  ;  sometimes  they  are  greatly  abused  and  made 
the  seat  of  party  excitement ;  but,  generally  speaking,  it  is 
undeniable  that  they  are  at  once  the  generators  of  that  interior 
power  which  makes  the  machine  of  a  constitutional  govern- 
ment move  and  work  in  a  national  spirit,  and  the  safety-valves 
through  which  the  superabundant  volume  of  that  power 
escapes,  when  otherwise  it  would  cause  fearful  explosions. 

If  we  comprehend  under  these  meetings  all  those  which 
are  composed  either  of  the  people  themselves,  or  of  delegates 
having  an  extra-constitutional  character,  we  shall  see  at  once 
that  they  are  of  great  importance  in  order  to  direct  public 
attention  to  subjects  of  magnitude,  to  test  the  opinion  of  the 
community,  to  inform  persons  at  a  distance,  representatives  or 
the  administration,  for  instance,  of  the  state  of  public  opinion 
on  certain  measures,  whether  yet  depending  or  adopted ;  to 
resolve  upon  and  adopt  petitions ;  to  encourage  individuals 
or  bodies  of  men  in  arduous  undertakings  requiring  the 
moral  support  of  well-expressed  public  approbation  ;  to  effect 
a  union  with  others,  striving  for  the  same  ends;  to  disseminate 
knowledge  by  way  of  reports  of  committees ;  to  form  socie- 
ties for  charitable  purposes  or  the  melioration  of  laws  or 
institutions;  to  sanction  by4he  spontaneous  expression  of  the 
opinion  of  the  community 'measures  not  strictly  agreeing  with 
the  letter  of  the  law,  but  enforced  by  necessity ;  to  call  upon 
the  services  of  individuals  who  otherwise  would  not  feel  war- 
ranted to  appear  before  the  public  and  invite  its  attention,  or 
feel  authorized  to  interfere  with  a  subject  not  strictly  lying 
within  their  proper  sphere  of  action ;  to  concert  upon  more 
or  less  extensive  measures  of  public  utility,  and  whatever  else 
their  object  may  be.  It  does  not  seem,  however,  necessary 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


297 


to  dwell  upon  them  particularly 'with  reference  to  political 
ethics,  except  that,  as  they  are  necessary  and  salutary  if  freely 
and  calmly  operating,  it  becomes  the  greater  dereliction  of 
duty  in  influential  men  to  use  them  for  selfish  ends,  so  that 
the  country,  instead  of  reaping  the  benefits  of  a  steady  opera- 
tion of  social  agents  from  them,  is  exposed  to  all  the  feverish 
and  withering  effects  of  passionate,  fluctuating,  and  wild  agi- 
tation. A  citizen  of  probity  ought  to  remember  two  things  : 
first,  that  he  deceives  himself  who  feels  flattered  by  the  ex- 
citing agitation  which  he  has  been  able  to  produce — for  it  is 
frequently  very  easy  to  produce  this  effect,  and  the  easier  the 
less  proud  we  should  feel  of  those  upon  whom  excitement 
has  been  produced.  It  is  the  calm  and  substantial  action — 
action  which  bears  within  it  the  genial  power  of  vivifying  the 
seeds  of  action  in  others — of  which  alone  a  true  man  feels 
proud.  Secondly,  that  the  extra-constitutional  meetings  re- 
semble in  their  necessity  and  usefulness,  and  at  the  same 
time  in  their  possible  abuse,  other  primary  agents  of  society 
and  of  nature :  they  are  salutary,  if  in  their  proper  path ; 
fearful,  if  in  irregular  licentiousness. 

Those  who  are  not  personally  acquainted  with  the  practical 
operations  and  necessities  of  civil  liberty  are  apt  to  consider 
all  popular  meetings  as  so  many  deviations  and  exceptions 
from  the  regular  government,  and  ask,  where  is  the  guarantee 
against  their  abuse  ?  The  guarantees  against  the  abuse  are 
varied,  manifold,  and  mutually  connected  ;  to  a  great  extent 
they  consist  in  mutual  modification.  An  absolute  guarantee 
exists  against  their  abuse  no  more  than  against  that  of  any 
primary  vast  principle.  Great  as  the  principle  of  modern 
hereditary  monarchy  is,  and  forming  and  having  formed  one 
of  the  agents  of  modern  European  civilization  as  it  does,  where 
is  the  final  guarantee  against  the  chances  of  birth,  of  contract- 
edness  of  mind,  or  weakness  of  conscience,  except  in  the 
mutual  modification  of  a  number  of  other  political  agents  ? 
The  sun  warms  and  enlivens,  but  we  have  no  guarantee 
against  all  the  injury  he  may  do,  and  actually  does  in  a 
thousand  instances,  in  parching  the  soil  or  breeding  fever. 


298  POLITICAL  ETHICS, 

The  citizen  ought  to  keep  in  mind  that  unnecessary  meet- 
ings either  excite  and  stir  uselessly,  and  therefore  injuriously, 
or  lessen  the  interest  in  public  meetings,  which  is  equally  un- 
desirable, and  may  be  injurious  to  public  liberty ;  and  that,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  is  unbecoming  a  free  man,  who  values  his 
liberty,  to  be  prevented  by  civil  indolence  from  taking  those 
measures  which  through  public  meetings  would  produce 
demonstrations  of  public  sentiment  sufficient  to  arrest  danger, 
pusillanimity,  or  civil  immorality.  If  a  citizen  is  sent  as  a 
delegate  to  a  meeting  for  a  specific  end,  especially  political, 
he  must  be  the  more  careful  not  to  transgress  the  lines 
which  we  have  endeavored  to  ascertain  as  the  proper  limits  of 
party  movements,  the  more  definite  the  end  is  for  which  he 
has  been  sent,  and  the  more  decidedly  he  has  been  sent, 
perhaps,  on  party  grounds ;  in  brief,  the  more  avowedly  the 
end  of  the  meeting  is  one  of  a  party  character,  the  more 
imperative  becomes  caution  against  being  betrayed  into  fac- 
tiousness.1 

II.  Before  we  proceed  to  consider  the  citizen  in  office, 
having  viewed  him  in  his  capacity  as  an  individual  member 
of  the  state,  we  have  to  examine  him  in  one  of  the  most  im- 


1  The  pamphlet  is  one  of  the  great  agents  of  modern  liberty,  and  of  the  greatest 
usefulness,  in  nations  who  value  it.  Some  English  pamphlets  have  acquired  his- 
torical importance.  They  are  excellent  vehicles  for  certain  communications,  but 
they  do  not  dispense  with  the  public  meeting.  The  public  meeting  is  always 
necessary  for  action.  Nations  who  neglect  the  public  meeting  and  rely  on  the 
pamphlet  alone  for  discussion  of  subjects  of  the  deepest  interest  will  not  come  to 
energetic  action.  Dumont  goes  so  far  as  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  parties 
which  multiply  pamphlets  weaken  their  power  and  hold  on  the  public:  they  ac- 
custom themselves  to  talk  instead  of  acting.  I  counted  in  the  publishers'  cata- 
logue of  1838,  sent  me  from  Germany,  one  hundred  and  thirty  writings,  more  or 
less  voluminous,  on  the  question  of  the  archbishop  of  Cologne.  In  the  United 
States  there  is  a  deluge  of  pamphlets,  but  on  a  thousand  different  and  very  fre- 
quently wholly  uninteresting  subjects.  The  unfortunate  fashion  of  asking  every 
one  that  delivers  some  public  speech  or  other  for  a  copy,  and  to  print  it — a 
fashion  so  common  that  it  is  no  longer  any  honor,  while  its  omission  conveys 
a  reflection — deprives  the  American  public  of  all  courage  to  look  at  anything 
issued  in  pamphlet  form. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


299 


portant  stations  in  which  he  can  be  placed,  a  position  pecu- 
liarly belonging  to  modern  civilization — namely,  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  his  fellow-citizens,  that  is,  as  elected  by  a  number 
of  them  to  share  in  and  contribute  to  the  legislation  of  their 
jural  society  or  state.  On  what  he  ought  to  legislate,  and 
how  he  ought  to  do  it,  are  questions  to  be  answered  by  the 
science  of  politics,  and  involve  in  fact  the  whole  subject  of 
legislation,  political  society,  social  and  public  economy,  and 
can  of  course  not  be  expected  to  be  developed  here,  nor  in- 
deed in  any  work,  with  specific  reference  to  the  representative. 
In  general,  it  is  his  duty  to  make  himself  acquainted  to  the 
best  of  his  ability  with  all  the  subjects  essentially  affecting 
public  welfare,  and  especially  affecting  that  portion  of  the 
society  which  he  represents.  On  1,he  other  hand,  it  appears 
manifest  that  all  the  general  rules  given  in  the  preceding 
pages  as  applying  to  the  conduct  of  the  citizens  in  general  or 
of  public  men  in  particular  receive  additional  force  if  viewed 
in  connection  with  the  representative ;  for  he  stands  not  for 
himself  alone  ;  his  conduct,  influenced  by  and  reflecting  in 
a  great  degree  the  general  temper  of  the  society  which  he 
represents,  strongly  influences  it  in  turn.  All  his  responsi- 
bilities as  a  man  and  citizen  are  infinitely  multiplied,  as  are 
likewise,  in  many  cases,  his  temptations — for  instance,  in  party 
matters  the  temptation  to  transgress  the  proper  line  between 
party  and  faction.  Yet  it  may  not  be  without  some  profit 
if  we  reconsider  or  point  out  in  particular  a  few  principles  of 
especial  importance  regarding  the  representative;  after  which 
I  propose  to  inquire  into  the  important  question  of  instruc- 
tion, which  involves  that  of  the  essential  character  of  the 
representative. 

Perhaps  we  may  sum  up  the  most  important  points  in  the 
following  manner: 

Justice,  truth,  and  disinterestedness  are  with  him  above 
every  other  consideration,  and  lend  far  greater  strength  than 
their  dereliction  ever  can  do. 

The  true  representative  is  in  the  service  of  the  public :  he 
is  sent  neither  for  his  own  ambition  or  gain,  nor  for  his  party, 


300  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

neither  to  serve  exclusively  a  certain  privileged  class,  nor 
a  single  division  of  the  nation  according  to  occupation  or 
interest. 

Liberty  demands  for  him  ample  freedom  of  speech :  hence 
his  conscience  alone  must  in  most  cases  regulate  the  use  which 
he  makes  of  this  great  liberty  of  speaking  before  his  nation, 
both  as  to  the  time  which  he  occupies  and  takes  from  the 
furtherance  of  other  business,  and  as  regards  either  the  prin- 
ciples or  views  he  may  thereby  disseminate  among  the  people 
at  large,  the  standard  of  his  respective  assembly,  which  he 
may  thus  contribute  to  raise  or  lower,  and  the  character  of 
individuals  which  he  may  injure.  No  representative  ought 
ever  to  speak  except  for  the  furtherance  of  that  business  which 
is  actually  before  the  houee ;  and  then  always  to  the  point.1 
There  is  no  real,  no  masterly,  eloquence  except  that  which  is 
strictly  to  the  point.  Demosthenes,  Cicero,  Chatham,  Burke, 
Foy — I  abstain  from  mentioning  living  orators — amply  prove 
it,8  and  their  best  passages  most  so.  Habitual,  loose,  prolix, 


1  *  Simple  as  the  following  rule  may  be,  it  is  of  very  great  importance  both  to 
the  community  and  to  your  own  influence  : 

Speak  never  unless  there  is  an  especial  reason  for  it,  and  this  can  consist  only 
in  this : 

That  you  know  the  subject,  or  some  part  of  it,  thoroughly,  or  better  than  any 
one  else ; 

That  you  are  universally  expected  to  speak,  and  silence  would  be  misconstrued; 

To  justify  your  own  vote,  to  the  community; 

To  repel  an  attack  upon  yourself  if  very  marked  or  peculiar,  upon  a  particular 
friend,  upon  your  constituents  or  part  of  country; 

To  explain  ; 

If  your  constituents  are  the  particular  subject.  At  least,  in  such  case,  if  all  that 
is  to  be  said  has  been  said  and  well  said,  you  ought  to  rise  and  say  so,  and  that 
you  mean  to  vote  one  way  or  the  other.  It  is  decent  towards  your  constituents. 

To  talk  against  time  may  be  an  excusable  artifice  for  some  high  purpose,  but 
it  is  very  rarely  so. 

If  you  are  known  to  speak  only  if  you  have  anything  to  say,  you  derive  great 
influence  from  this  fact  alone. 

But  to  speak  for  two  or  three  hours  solely  to  have  your  voice  heard  is  folly. 

8  The  more  active  men's  thoughts  are  on  a  subject  which  engages  their  atten- 
tion, and  the  better  it  is  understood,  the  plainer,  simpler,  and  more  forcible  are 
the  discourses  respecting  it,  in  books  as  well  as  in  speeches,  on  religious  as  well 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


301 


and  low  speaking,  without  the  nerve  of  thought  and  high 
sentiment,  has  a  very  decided  and  injurious  effect  upon  the 
public  at  large.  Every  man  who  is  really  filled  with  his  object, 
that  is,  whose  soul  and  life  belong  to  it,  and  who,  therefore, 
acts  for  it,  is  brief-spoken.  Soldiers,  physicians,  ministers, 
Christians,  who  are  what  they  are  wholly  and  thoroughly,  act, 
and  do  not  talk  much  of  their  action. 

The  honesty  of  the  representative,  applied  to  money  mat- 
ters, comprehends  care  with  regard  to  himself  individually 
that  he  propose  or  vote  for  or  against  no  measure  on  account 
of  any  individual  advantage,  direct  or  indirect,  out  of  the 
money  of  the  people.  According  to  the  peculiar  development 
which  the  representative  system  has  taken  in  the  European 
race  since  the  middle  ages,  he  is  and  ought  to  be  the  especial 
guardian  of  the  public  money.  Waste  in  governments  is  not 
only  oppressive  to  those  from  whom  alone  the  money  can 
come  for  any  length  of  time  and  to  any  amount — the  people; 
it  is  not  only  a  great  injustice,  but  wastefulness  is  immoral 
in  its  character.  It  leads  the  government  from  its  true  end 
and  object,  begets  a  desire  for  wealth  without  labor,  and  thus 
trains  men  in  corruption,  to  the  destruction  of  public  spirit, 
independence,  and  virtue.  Monarchies  and  republics  are 


as  on  political  matters.  Not  that  I  undervalue,  in  any  degree,  true  eloquence : 
I  hold  ready,  striking,  and  elevated  eloquence  as  one  of  the  very  noblest  mani- 
festations of  the  human  mind  ;  but  it  is  this  very  eloquence  which  suffers  and  is 
stifled  by  a  flowing  style,  tasteless  disquisitions,  or  far-fetched  comparisons.  How 
simple  are  Demosthenes  and  Chatham !  Any  one  who  has  read  the  speeches  of 
the  deputies  composing  the  estates  at  the  beginning  of  the  modern  age  will  have 
observed  how  unwieldy  and  pointless  their  words  are,  and — what  is  indeed  a 
necessary  consequence — how  obscure  they  leave  the  main  subject.  To  give 
but  one  instance,  I  would  refer  to  the  French  diet  of  1593,  of  which  Raumer 
gives  contemporary  accounts  in  his  already  quoted  History,  etc.,  vol.  i.,  towards 
the  end.  The  Old  Testament,  and  natural  history  and  philosophy  as  then  under- 
stood, are  ransacked  before  an  idea  is  expressed,  such  as  that  the  third  estate, 
though  inferior  to  clergy  and  nobility,  still  forms  part  of  the  state.  The  history 
of  British  eloquence,  as  it  may  be  gathered  from  various  historical  works,  and  on 
which  it  is  high  time  that  we  should  be  furnished  with  a  thorough  and  philo- 
sophical treatise,  shows  the  same  progress,  namely,  that  the  simplicity  and  truth 
of  eloquence  increase  together. 


302  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

equally  bound  to  shun  wastefulness.  A  nobility  feeding  and 
feasting  upon  the  money  of  the  people  recklessly  squandered 
away  by  a  corrupt  court,  like  that  of  Charles  IV.  of  Spain, 
Charles  II.  of  England,  or  Louis  XV.  of  France,  is  as  dan- 
gerous as  the  Athenian  demagogue  or  Roman  seducer  of 
the  people  who  distributed  the  public  treasure  among  the 
populace. 

Yet  parsimony  is  not  saving,  but  waste  in  disguise,  in  all 
human  affairs,  in  public  not  less  than  in  private.  Jealous 
of  all  public  expenditure  to  a  degree  of  rigidness,  the  repre- 
sentative ought  ever  to  be  liberal  first  of  all  in  every  case  of 
justice,  which  ranks  above  all  things,  and  surely  above  the 
popularity  of  the  representative  and  the  disposition  of  his 
constituents.  Indeed,  giving  every  one  his  due  cannot  be 
called  liberality.  Therefore,  the  representative  must  readily 
vote  for  the  discharge  of  all  debts  of  the  public  to  individuals, 
and  punctiliously  for  the  fulfilment  of  all  engagements  for 
which  public  faith  stands  pledged.  The  force  of  the  law 
which  binds  the  intercourse  "between  citizen  and  citizen  ought 
to  be  felt  most  imperatively  when  the  question  is  one  of  en- 
gagements between  the  state  or  any  part  of  it  on  the  one 
hand,  and  individuals  or  other  states  on  the  other.  Prudence, 
happily,  coincides  here  with  justice  ;  for  nothing  opens  greater 
resources  for  a  state  in  a  thousand  different  ways  than  unde- 
viating  justice  and  honesty  in  all  its  engagements.  If  repre- 
sentatives would  consider  how  small  the  amount  of  the  state's 
just  dues  become,  when  one  compares  the  public  means  for 
paying  them  with  the  public  gain  obtained  by  the  act  of  jus- 
tice, they,  would  never  hesitate  to  vote  frankly  and  readily  for 
the  discharge  of  any  honest  debt.  History  furnishes  abundant 
examples  both  of  encouragement  and  of  warning. 

The  representative  ought  liberally  to  give  his  vote  for  all 
expenditures,  commensurate  to  the  means  of  his  society,  for 
the  essential  promotion  of  education,  that  is  for  the  elevation 
and  extension  of  knowledge,  and  for  promoting  the  elevation 
of  mind,  be  this  by  way  of  diffused  knowledge  or  the  promo- 
tion of  discovery  and  of  the  arts.  He  ought  liberally  to  vote 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


303 


for  all  improvement  of  intercommunication,1  if  it  cannot  be 
obtained  by  private  means ;  for  appropriations  demanded  by 
the  needs  of  administration,  public  justice,  and  public  security. 
The  representative  ought  readily  to  vote  for  what  is  due  to 
faithful  and  efficient  service,  according  to  the  general  standard 
of  reward  in  the  community  at  the  period  in  which  he  lives. 
One  of  the  main  objects  of  all  calm  and  settled  governments 
must  be  to  render  justice  as  purely  and  effectually  and  to 
protect  society  within  and  without  as  powerfully  as  possible, 
and,  in  striving  for  these  objects,  to  press  as  little  upon  the 
people  as  possible  :  these  ends  are  accomplished,  not  by  con- 
triving that  the  citizens  shall  pay  little  or  less  than  is  neces- 
sary (which  indeed  makes  a  very  expensive  government),  but 
that  they  shall  receive  the  fullest  possible  equivalent  for  the 
justly  decreed  and  levied  taxes  which  they  pay.  There  were 
few,  and  frequently  no,  systems  of  constant  taxation  in  the 
middle  ages ;  every  free  and  elevated  nation  at  present  has 
many.  Yet  our  present  governments  in  the  end  are  cheaper 
than  those  of  the  middle  ages.  If,  for  instance,  the  regular 
administration  of  justice  by  sufficiently  paid  judges  demands 
a  greater  outlay  than  irregular  justice  dealt  out  occasionally 
by  officers  appointed  likewise  for  other  purposes,  as  for  the 
executive  and  military  command  of  a  county,  which  was  fre- 
quently the  case  in  the  middle  ages,  we  must  not  forget  the 
immense  gain  of  the  people  in  the  rise  of  property  and  value 
of  labor,  effected  by  regular  and  systematic  law  courts. 

In  framing  or  voting  for  a  law,  the  representative  ought  to 
consider  well  whether  the  law,  intended  as  it  is  to  be  general, 
rests  on  a  general  principle  and  is  not  a  mere  expedient;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  how  it  will  operate,  together  with  its  gen- 
eral principle  upon,  or  by  means  of,  the  given  circumstances 
of  the  society  for  which  the  law  alone  is  calculated  :  yet  he 
ought  never  to  introduce  a  law  for  its  supposed  philosophical 
principle  alone,  which  is  but  a  misnomer;  for  no  law  is  philo- 


1  [Qu-  by  incorporations  only,  or  by  money  grants  to  private  individuals  or 
companies  ?] 


304 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


sophical  which  does  not  grow  out  of  the  given  circumstances 
— out  of  that  society  for  which  it  is  calculated.  They  are  but 
the  productions  of  the  brain.  Locke's  constitution  for  South 
Carolina,  and  the  first  French  republican  constitution  (the 
second  in  number  of  the  many  constitutions  which  that  coun- 
try has  witnessed  since  the  first  revolution),  are  illustrations. 
A  wise  law  must  have  these  two  requisites:  it  must  be  called 
for  by  the  circumstances,  and  must  consist  in  a  just  principle 
judiciously  applied  to  these  circumstances,  which  implies 
that  it  be  harmoniously  applied  to  the  whole  state  system 
and  do  not  jar  with  it.  The  representative  ought  to  test  the 
bill  upon  all  imaginable  adverse  grounds  ;  for  he  may  rest 
assured  that,  in  the  endless  variety  of  combined  cases  which 
practical  life  daily  offers,  all  the  weak  or  mischievous  points 
of  the  law  will  some  time  or  other  come  into  play  or  develop 
themselves.  In  finally  making  up  his  mind  as  to  all  that  is 
urged  for  and  against  a  general  law,  it  is  average  justice  which 
must  guide  him.  In  this  consists  one  of  the  great  differences 
between  the  legislator  and  the  judge,  who  must  not  decide 
by  average  justice  but  deal  out  specific  justice.  Finally,  the 
representative  ought  on  no  account  to  change  partially  or 
entirely  an  organic  law  of  the  state  in  order  to  suit  a  particu- 
lar and  momentary  end,  whatever  the  excitement  or  strong 
desire  of  the  moment  may  be.  To  do  so  is  the  worst  of  all 
legislation,  even  if  not  against  the  solemn  oath  of  the  law- 
making  department. 

The  representative,  like  every  public  man,  must  prove  in 
all  his  acts  that  he  is  actuated  by  public  spirit,  by  patriot- 
ism, leading  him  not  only  to  self-denial,  but  also  controlling 
him  in  all  the  wider  circles  of  his  political  activity.  He 
ought  to  obey  the  law  which  prevails  throughout  the  uni- 
verse, that  the  greater,  wider  interest  prevail  over  the  lesser 
and  narrower.  The  interest  of  the  country  or  of  the  state 
must  be  preferred  to  that  of  the  province;  that  of  the  prov- 
ince to  that  of  a  county ;  that  of  a  county  to  that  of  the 
town  ;  that  of  the  town  to  that  of  a  street ;  that  of  the  street 
to  that  of  a  house ;  that  of  the  whole  house  to  that  of  an 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


305 


individual  in  it ;  that  of  our  whole  family  to  that  of  ourselves 
individually. 

The  fact  that  every  law  ought  to  have  the  nerve  of  a  gen- 
eral principle,  that  it  ought  to  stand  the  test  of  general  con- 
sideration, even  though  it  be  a  private  bill  or  a  bill  directly 
affecting  but  a  part  of  the  community,  prevents,  if  conscien- 
tiously acted  upon,  that  public  calamity  of  legislation  arising 
out  of  the  mutual  accommodation  of  separate  and  selfish 
interests,  which  on  a  gigantic  and  enormous  scale  was  acted 
out  when  the  Roman  triumvirs  made  the  grand  compromise 
of  their  proscription-list,  and  which  is  always  in  principle 
equally  immoral.  It  is,  as  we  shall  see  more  fully  below, 
directly  opposed  to  the  true  representative  principle,  and  was 
one  of  the  great  difficulties  in  the  way  of  safe  politics  in  the 
states  of  the  middle  ages.  In  a  limited  degree  it  is  unfortu- 
nately still  acted  upon  in  some  legislatures,  and  has  received 
in  one  of  the  American  states  the  vulgar  but  not  unmeaning 
name  of  log-rolling,  because  when  the  people  clear  the  abo- 
riginal forests  they  unite  their  labor  in  removing  each  other's 
heavy  logs.  The  simile  of  this  union  of  labor  truly  applies 
to  the  mutual  support  in  the  state,  but  the  comparison  of  the 
log  with  a  bill  to  be  passed  is  seriously  vicious.  It  was  an 
awful  log-rolling  of  this  character  indeed  when,  as  alluded 
to,  Antony,  Octavius,  and  Lepidus  united  and  gave  up  each 
other's  friends  and  their  common  country.  In  principle,  all 
political  log-rolling  amounts,  more  or  less,  to  conspiracy. 

The  representatives  are  deeply  interested  in  always  support- 
ing the  character  of  the  true  gentleman.  Whatever  the  ap- 
parent sacrifice  for  the  moment  may  be,  they  will  greatly  gain 
in  the  end  by  it :  their  example  strongly  affects  the  manners 
and  intercourse  of  the  community,  and  large  and  gentleman- 
like conduct  in  all  transactions  of  life  is  of  moral  and  polit- 
ical importance,  as  has  been  mentioned  before.  The  whole 
character,  efficiency,  and  wise  action  of  a  deliberative  assem- 
bly depend  in  a  very  great  degree  upon  the  habitual  gentle- 
manlike conduct  and  intercourse  of  its  members.  Decorum 
in  the  speech  and  manners  of  legislative  assemblies  has  the 
VOL.  II.  20 


306  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

same  important  bearing  on  their  dignity,  their  self-respect, 
and,  consequently,  on  the  respect  paid  by  others  to  their  manly 
action  and  moral  deportment,  which  universal  decorous  habits 
of  a  nation  in  dress  and  domestic  life  have  on  a  universal  feel- 
ing of  independence,  self-respect,  and  political  dignity.  Per- 
sonalities, therefore,  are  usually  against  order  in  these  assem- 
blies j1  nor  will  a  member  be  apt  to  resort  to  them  who  values 
even  his  own  influence.  It  is  generally  one  of  the  greatest 
advantages  which  a  member  can  throw  into  the  hands  of  an 
opponent,  if  he  deals  in  personalities  and  the  other  does  not 
retort  on  him,  but  shows  his  respect  to  the  assembly  by  an 
unruffled  reply. 

Lastly,  the  representative  must  be  the  true  representative 
of  his  constituents.  What  is  the  entire  meaning  of  this  ex- 
pression ?  It  is  the  answer  to  this  question  which  will  occupy 
our  attention  on  the  following  pages. 

III.  According  to  the  natural  order  of  the  subject,  I  ought 
to  treat  first  of  pledges,  and  then  of  the  right  of  instruction ; 


1  Hence  very  properly  it  is  out  of  order  in  the  British  parliament  and  in  all 
American  legislatures  and  congress  to  speak  of  a  member  by  name.  The  rules 
of  order  can,  however,  carry  decorum  too  far;  especially  if  the  order  is  that 
members  must  appear,  or  at  least  speak,  in  a  particular  dress.  This  is  against  all 
business-like  debating,  and  leads  to  that  unfortunate  custom  of  reading  prepared 
discourse  after  discourse  without  any  reference  of  one  to  another.  Louis  XVIII. 
dwells  on  the  importance  of  his  prescription  of  the  robe  in  which  alone  the  depu- 
ties were  allowed  to  speak.  He  was  right  from  his  point  of  view  ;  it  was  to 
restrain  genuine  debate  ;  but  where  real  liberty  and  conformable  legislation  is 
the  object,  the  matter  assumes  a  different  aspect.  It  is  for  business  these  assem- 
blies meet,  and  not  for  parade ;  and  no  one  can  have  seen  the  former  French 
chamber  of  deputies — I  do  not  know  the  precise  character  of  their  present  trans- 
actions—and the  British  commons,  without  perceiving  at  once  that  legislative 
debating  is  wholly  a  natural,  genuine  thing  with  the  latter,  which  it  had  not  yet 
become  with  the  former.  As  to  the  members  keeping  their  hats  on,  as  the  British 
commons  do,  and  the  members  of  congress  did  until  1837,  unless  speaking,  a 
certain  taste  of  course  can  alone  decide.  I  confess,  I  rather  liked  it ;  it  showed 
the  business  style  of  the  house  ;  and  there  is  history  in  it,  as  well  in  the  case  of  the 
English  parliament  in  particular,  as  that  in  general  the  cap,  the  hat,  and  to  remain 
covered,  have  always  been  with  the  western  race,  from  the  times  of  the  middle 
ages,  the  emblems  and  evidences  of  liberty  and  independence. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


307 


but  the  latter  involves  a  discussion  of  the  true  character  of 
representative  governments,  and  many  points  which  materially 
serve  in  solving  the  question  of  pledges,  so  that  it  will  be 
advisable  to  treat  of  instruction  first. 

By  instruction  of  a  representative  we  understand,  in  the 
politics  of  representative  governments,  his  being  directed  by 
his  constituents,  subsequent  to  his  election,  to  vote  on  a 
question  yet  depending,  in  a  manner  pointed  out  to  him ;  or 
the  command  over  the  vote  of  a  representative  by  his  con- 
stituents. The  relations  of  representatives  to  those  who  elect 
them  are  different,  and  the  subject  of  instruction  has  been 
viewed  accordingly.  If  a  political  body,  organized  and  be- 
longing itself  to  the  government,  elect  representatives,  as  is 
the  case  with  the  senators  of  the  United  States,  who  are 
elected  by  the  state  legislatures,  instructions  are  held  by 
many  to  have  mandatory  power;  that  is,  they  must  be  obeyed. 
If  the  constituents,  it  is  farther  maintained  by  some,  are  the 
people  themselves,  and  the  convening  of  them,  except  at  the 
election,  is  not  regular  or  in  forms  prescribed  by  law,  the 
instruction  can  have  no  mandatory  power,  but  ought  to  be 
unreservedly  obeyed  as  soon  as  the  representative  is  con- 
vinced that  the  instruction  expresses  the  opinion  of  the 
majority  of  his  constituents. 

I  shall  treat  of  the  subject  in  as  far  as  it  relates  to  the 
United  States  senators  separately,  and  first  view  the  matter  in 
general. 

Before  we  proceed,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  divest  the 
question  of  all  the  undue  associations  that  generally  cling  to 
every  subject  which  has  strongly  and  in  opposite  directions 
interested  large  numbers.  The  most  important  of  these  is 
the  belief  of  many  persons  that  an  adherence  to  the  doctrine 
of  instruction  is  naturally  coupled  with  a  warm  affection  for 
general  liberty,  and  that  those  who  disclaim  the  doctrine  be- 
long necessarily  to  that  class  of  men  who  habitually  distrust 
the  masses  or  are  shy  of  general  liberty.  It  is  easy  to  be  ex- 
plained why  this  view  should  be  prevalent  now  on  account  of 
the  late  history  of  this  doctrine  ;  yet  the  view  is  unfounded, 


308  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

as  can  be  shown  from  history.  It  was  the  very  instructions 
received  by  the  members  of  the  mediaeval  estates  which  pre- 
vented the  nations,  with  the  exception  of  England,  from  rising 
to  general  civil  liberty ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  second 
republican  constitution  of  France,  of  1795,  surely  not  want- 
ing in  democratic  spirit,  contains  the  following  paragraph 
(§  52) :  "The  members  of  the  legislative  body  are  not  repre- 
sentatives of  the  departments  which  have  elected  them,  but 
of  the  whole  nation,  and  no  specific  instruction  shall  be  given 
them."  The  same  expression  is  to  be  found  almost  verbatim 
in  the  constitution  of  the  Cisalpine  republic  of  1797.  In  all 
the  constitutions  established  under  the  dictatorship  of  Na- 
poleon, the  terms  national  representative  and  national  repre- 
sentation are  carefully  avoided  ;  and  when  he  was  greatly 
dissatisfied  with  the  deputies,  convoked,  in  consequence  of  his 
disastrous  campaigns,  in  1813,  after  they  had  been  disregarded 
during  his  imperial  reign,  he  said  to  a  deputation  of  them, 
"And  who  are  you?  Not  the  representatives  of  the  nation, 
but  the  deputies  of  the  departments."1  On  the  other  hand, 
again,  we  find  in  article  ninth  of  the  constitution  or  "  Edict" 
of  the  grand  duchy  of  Hesse,  of  1820 — an  instrument  which 
no  reader  of  Anglican  views  would  consider  liberal — that  no 
member  of  the  first  or  second  chamber  can  exercise  his  vote 
by  proxy,  or  receive  instructions  for  his  vote.2  So  has  the 
constitution  of  the  Batavian  republic,  of  1805,  by  which  Na- 


1  It  was  on  the  same  occasion,  January  I,  1814,  that  Napoleon  strikingly  ex- 
pressed the  view  he  took  of  his  whole  position  :  "  You  strive,  in  your  address, 
to  sever  the  sovereign  from  the  nation.  I  alone  am  the  true  representative  of  the 
nation,  for  who  of  you  would  be  able  to  take  upon  himself  this  burden  ?  The 
throne  is  a  thing  of  wood  covered  with  velvet;  only  he  who  occupies  it  gives 
meaning  to  it,"  etc.  I  have  heretofore  remarked  that  Napoleon  was  the  French 
democracy  grown  into  monarchy;  his  power  rested,  like  that  of  the  Roman  em- 
perors, upon  popular  absolutism.  See  the  end  of  book  second.  How  different 
from  this  avowal  is  the  British  expression,  "The  queen  is  an  institution." 

a  The  prescribed  oath,  taken  by  every  deputy,  runs  thus :  "  I  swear  fidelity  to 
the  grand  duke,  obedience  to  the  law,  punctual  observance  of  the  constitution, 
and  to  further  the  common  weal  only,  in  the  meeting  of  the  deputies,  according 
to  my  own  best  conviction,  uninfluenced  by  any  charge"  (instruction). 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


309 


poleon,  having  crowned  himself  as  emperor  of  the  French, 
made  that  state  approach  more  nearly  to  monarchy,  for  which 
he  had  destined  it,  the  following  provision  (Art.  23):  "Their 
high  mightinesses  (that  is,  the  representatives)  vote  singly 
according  to  their  personal  opinion,  without  mandate  or  in- 
structions received  from  the  departments.  They  are  in  no 
manner  answerable  to  the  departmental  meetings  for  their 
conduct  in  the  hall  of  their  high  mightinesses."  The  anxiety 
to  sever  the  representative  from  his  constituents  is  here  evi- 
dent. Lastly,  I  may  mention  here  the  bill  of  rights,  preceding 
the  constitution  of  North  Carolina,  adopted  in  1776.  Article 
eighteenth  of  that  bill  says,  "  That  the  people  have  a  right  to 
assemble  together,  to  consult  for  the  common  good,  to  instruct 
their  representatives,  and  to  apply  to  the  legislature  for  redress 
of  grievances."  But  what,  according  to  the  public  law  of  that 
state,  this  instruction  precisely  is  is  not  clear ;  for  the  legis- 
lature of  North  Carolina  passed,  in  1838,  certain  resolutions 
with  reference  to  the  votes  to  be  given  by  her  senators  in 
congress  on  a  question  of  importance  then  pending ;  and 
when  the  senators  asked  whether  they  should  consider  these 
resolutions  as  instructions,  the  legislature  passed  a  resolution 
declaring  that  they  had  spoken  clearly  enough,  and  declining 
any  more  distinct  or  mandatory  instruction. 

In  short,  if  we  peruse  the  one  hundred  and  thirty  or  forty 
written  constitutions,  more  especially  so  called,  which  the 
European  race  has  produced,  we  shall  find  that  instruction 
has  been  declared  inadmissible  sometimes  because  the  power- 
holders  granting  the  constitution  were  afraid  of  too  direct  a 
connection  between  the  representative  and  his  constituents, 
sometimes  because  the  people  establishing  the  constitution 
felt  that  it  was  impossible  otherwise  largely  to  protect  civil 
liberty  and  give  it  that  guarantee  which  advanced  political 
civilization  and  national  liberty  demand.  Adherence  to  the 
doctrine  of  instruction,  therefore,  is  of  itself  in  no  way  a 
sign  of  liberal  politics.  Instruction  has  been  claimed  and 
disclaimed  on  entirely  opposite  grounds,  according  to  the 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  time. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

IV.  The  doctrine  of  instruction,  as  it  is  now  presented  by 
its  advocates  in  the  United  States,  may  be  stated  thus :  The 
representative  ought,  as  far  as  he  is  able,  truly  to  represent  the 
wishes  of  his  constituents,  and  if  on  any  important  question 
the  views  and  desires  of  the  majority  of  his  constituents  are 
made  known  to  him  in  any  manner  which  convinces  him  that 
it  is  really  the  voice  of  the  majority,  he  ought  either  to  obey, 
or,  if  he  cannot  conscientiously  do  so,  to  resign.  An  attempt 
is  thus  made  to  give  to  the  representative  a  character  between 
that  of  a  representative  and  a  deputy,  the  difference  between 
whom  we  shall  presently  consider  more  accurately.  The 
chief  arguments  urged  in  favor  of  the  above  doctrine,  and  in 
fact,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  extends,  the  only  ones,  are  these  : 
That,  could  the  people  meet,  as  in  ancient  times,  in  the  mar- 
ket, they  would  act  for  themselves,  each  according  to  his 
interest  and  views,  and  that  now,  when  the  number  of  inhab- 
itants or  extent  of  country  prevents  them  from  meeting  in  a 
general  and  primary  assembly,  it  is  clear  that  those  who  are 
sent  for  the  mere  sake  of  expediting  the  business,  instead  of 
the  people's  convening  themselves,  must  speak  as  the  people 
themselves  would  have  spoken.  The  representatives  are  the 
speaking-trumpets  of  their  constituents,  and  nothing  more. 
Secondly,  which  in  fact  is  but  the  above  in  other  terms,  the 
representative  is  the  servant  of  his  constituents ;  and  how  can 
he  be  called  a  servant  if  he  does  not  their  will  ?  See  Tucker's 
Blackstone,  Appendix,  192,  et  seq.,  where  Judge  Tucker 
quotes  with  entire  approbation  a  passage  from  Burgh's  Polit- 
ical Disquisitions,  from  which  it  appears  that  both  of  them 
had  in  mind,  when  speaking  of  popular  liberty,  what  was 
called  in  the  first  part  of  this  work  democratic  absolutism, 
seeking  for  the  essence  of  liberty  in  the  entirely  unrestrained 
execution  of  the  will  of  the  people,  which  is  in  practice,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  of  the  multitude  or  the  majority;  but  not  in 
guarantees,  checks,  and  organic  laws,  controlling  the  will  of 
the  supreme  power,  whoever  may  be  its  holder.  The  ques- 
tion does  not,  indeed,  seem  to  be  solved,  according  to  their 
own  argument,  in  this  manner ;  for  the  term  people  is  in  this 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  31  \ 

case,  as  in  so  many  others,  taken  in  different  meanings  in  the 
same  argument.  First,  when  it  is  maintained  that  the  repre- 
sentative is  the  representative  of  the  people,  the  word  is  used 
as  meaning  the  aggregate  of  all  men  of  a  certain  society  ;  a 
groundwork  is  thus  obtained  for  the  right  of  instruction ;  but 
when  it  comes  to  the  most  important  point  of  the  right  of  in- 
struction, namely  the  guidance  of  the  individual  representa- 
tive, the  word  people  does  not  mean  any  longer  the  aggregate 
of  all  the  citizens  as  imagined  in  the  agora,  but  the  small  part 
only  who  elected  the  particular  representative.  If  the  repre- 
sentative is  merely  a  speaking-trumpet  of  the  people  who  can 
no  longer  assemble,  it  appears  to  me  perfectly  clear  that  con- 
sistency would  actually  demand  that  he  should  speak  say 
three  hours  for  a  measure  and  one  against  it,  if  he  has  been 
elected  by  six  thousand  votes  against  two  thousand,  for  these 
two  thousand  would  or  might  have  spoken  in  the  general 
assembly  and  laid  their  views  before  the  assembly.  I  beg  to 
observe  that  this  is  not  advanced  in  a  sportive  sense  but 
gravely.  If  we  are  to  have  absolute  democracy  with  agents 
who  do  not  speak  for  the  minority,  this  minority  loses  all  the 
right  which  it  had  in  the  primary  assembly. 

Those  who  build  the  theory  of  instruction  upon  the  fact 
that  the  representatives  are  the  servants  of  the  people,  do  not 
inform  us  who  are  meant  by  the  people,  whether  the  voters 
only,  that  is  the'majority  of  the  voters,  or  the  people  at  large, 
of  whom  many  may  not  have  the  right  to  vote  but  certainly 
are  members  of  the  state  and  ought  to  be  represented,  for  in- 
stance where  freeholders  or  householders  alone  possess  the 
elective  franchise. 

Now,  at  no  time  has  the  doctrine  been  maintained  that 
the  laws  of  the  assembled  citizens  should  be  adopted  accord- 
ing to  a  balance  and  calculation  of  the  individual  and  selfish 
interests  of  each  individual ;  but,  the  frequent  practice  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding,  it  has  always  been  maintained" 
that  even  when  the  citizens  assembled  in  the  agora  they 
were  expected  to  judge  of  general  measures  with  reference 
to  general  welfare,  according  to  the  light  which  they  might 


312 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


receive  then  and  there.  The  contrary  has  always  been  con- 
sidered as  detestable  meanness,  or  even  selfish  treason,  and 
acts  of  egotism  were  positively  punished  in  Athens  on  the 
ground  of  egotism.  The  more  corrupt  the  times  in  those 
republics  founded  upon  direct  and  absolute  democracy  were, 
the  more  frequent  and  loud  we  find  the  demagogues  in  their 
protestations  that  they  act  for  the  public  benefit  only.  Where 
has  there  ever  yet  been  a  man  who  recommended  a  measure 
except  on  the  real  or  pretended  ground  of  public,  that  is  gen- 
eral, benefit  ?  If  the  Athenian  citizen  had  not  been  expected 
to  vote  with  reference  to  this  public  and  general  advantage, 
but  with  reference  to  his  tribe,  section,  or  street,  I  do  not  see 
where  we  can  stop  until  we  come  down  to  the  individual  him- 
self; and  what  becomes  of  public  spirit,  country,  and  all  that 
is  good  and  glorious  in  political  life  ?  No  people  ever  were 
farther  from  such  views  than  the  ancients.  But  if  the  repre- 
sentative has  to  obey  the  so-called  instruction  of  the  people, 
that  is  the  instruction  of  the  majority  of  voters,  which  may 
indeed  be  a  small  minority  of  the  people,  the  result  would  be 
far  worse  than  the  one  resulting  from  absolute  democracy 
founded  upon  mere  individual  selfisnness ;  because  in  the 
ancient  forum  each  voter  heard  at  least  what  was  urged  for 
and  against  the  subject  in  question,  not  indeed  elicited  by 
debate  or  deliberation  proper,  but  at  least  in  the  various  dis- 
courses delivered  to  them ;  while  in  our  case,  if  instruction  is 
believed  to  be  absolute,  the  vote  cannot  be  affected  by  the 
light  which  may  be  thrown  upon  the  matter,  and  a  repre- 
sentative instructed  to  vote  against  war,  because  it  would  ruin 
the  wealth  of  his  manufacturing  or  commercial  constituents, 
would  have  no  right  to  vote  for  war,  though  he  had  become 
convinced,  since  he  met  in  the  assembly  of  the  representatives, 
that  war  alone  might  save  the  country  from  servitude  or  dis- 
grace. The  citizen  in  the  agora  of  the  ancient  city-state  would 
have  had,  in  a  corresponding  case,  the  enviable  privilege  of 
voting  patriotically  for  a  war  which  he  nevertheless  knew 
would  make  him  individually  a  poor  man,  or  expose  the  quar- 
ter of  the  city  in  which  he  happened  to  live  to  fearful  ravages. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


313 


V.  If  we  resort  to  representatives  only  because  we  cannot 
any  longer  meet  in  the  agora  ourselves,  the  whole  represen- 
tative system  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  second-hand 
contrivance,  something  which  may  be  good  enough  and  with 
which  we  must  put  up,  since  unfortunately  we  cannot  any 
longer  have  the  true  and  essential  thing  itself,  the  ancient 
pure,  real,  and  visible  market-democracy;  a  political  pis-aller 
at  best ;  something  indirect  and  circuitous. 

Yet  in  reality  the  representative  system  is  a  flower  of  civil- 
ization, such  as  neither  antiquity  nor  the  middle  ages  either 
enjoyed  or  conceived  of,  something  direct  and  positive  in 
itself,  an  institution  having  its  own  full,  distinct,  and  inde- 
pendent character,  the  excellence  of  which  is  not  to  be  meas- 
ured by  asking  how  closely  it  may  approach  to  something 
beyond  it,  which  would  be  the  best  thing  could  we  but  have 
it,  but  which  for  some  reason  or  other  we  must  needs  resolve 
to  give  up  forever.  The  representative  system  seems  to  me  one 
of  the  very  greatest  of  the  political  institutions  that  adorn  the 
pages  of  the  history  of  civilization,  for  through  it  alone  can 
be  obtained  real  civil  liberty,  broad,  extensive  national  lib- 
erty, founded  upon  equally  extensive  political  societies,  and 
not  on  narrow  city-communities. 

We  might  ask,  indeed,  Why  not  return  to  the  ancient  state 
of  things?  Why  not  split  into  a  number  of  city-states  again? 
If  direct  democracy  is  the  only  political  truth,  and  the  other 
systems  but  approximations  to  it,  more  or  less  successful  sem- 
blances of  this  truth,  why  do  we  not  strive  for  this  real  good, 
and  why  are  we  satisfied  with  shadows  ?  Increased  popula- 
tion in  modern  times  cannot  be  the  chief  reason  which  pre- 
vents us  from  doing  so.  Very  few  parts  of  the  United  States, 
for  instance,  are  now  as  peopled  as  Etruria,  Sicily,  Greece, 
the  Greek  colonies,  and  Phoenicia  were,  when  all  these  regions 
were  divided  into  numberless  independent  states,  working  out 
in  their  way  and  according  to  the  proper  means  of  their  time 
their  own  task  of  civilization.  Perhaps  we  are  answered,  It 
might  be  done,  but  it  cannot  be  done,  because  the  people  will 
not  do  it.  And  why  not  ?  Why  should  they  dread  the  idea 


314  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  shivering  their  society  into  numerous  parcels  in  the  manner 
of  the  ancients,  and  why  could  they  not  do  it,  even  should 
they  attempt  it?  Because  their  feeling,  sympathy,  and  very 
instinct  prevent  it;  not  the  accidental  taste  of  the  time,  but 
the  very  genius  and  character,  the  moving  principle  of  modern 
times  prevents  it.  Because  the  people  have  tasted  the  sweets 
and  securities,  the  mutual  support  and  mutual  elevation,  which 
modern  political  society,  enlarged  as  it  is  yet  forming  one  or- 
ganized and  united  thing  throughout, — the  social  guarantee 
which  the  modern  state  alone  affords,  and  can  afford ;  and 
because  this  political  form,  a  nationalized  society  and  social- 
ized population,  stands  pn  an  enlarged  and  broad  foundation, 
is  the  essential  form  of  our  times  independent  of  the  denser  or 
sparser  population,  and  is  the  only  form  which  can  satisfy  the 
many  high,  great,  and  noble  demands  which,  in  the  course  of 
civilization,  men  have  come  to  urge  in  our  present  period — 
demands  never  made  in  ancient  times  or  the  middle  ages. 

The  free  ancient  states  have  been  spoken  of  in  the  first  part 
of  this  work.  We  observed  that  their  character  designated 
them  essentially  as  city-states,  and  that  their  liberty  consisted 
mainly  in  the  equal  participation  of  each  citizen  in  govern- 
ment, not  in  the  broad  protection  of  the  individual  and  his 
peculiar  individual  rights.  The  ancients  knew  of  no  nations, 
in  the  modern  acceptation  of  the  term.  There  were  tribes 
and  races,  coalesced  or  superinduced  one  upon  the  other; 
there  existed  vast  empires,  but  they  were  only  annexations 
of  countries  over  which  one  victorious  tribe — the  Mede,  the 
Persian,  the  Arab — ruled,  without  fusing  the  many  discordant 
components  into  one  society,  one  organized  thing,  one  nation 
which  should  be  animated  and  impelled,  in  some  respect  or 
other,  by  one  moral  agent,  one  vital  social  principle,  or  im- 
pulse extending  through  all  parts  and  through  a  series  of 
periods.  [In  fact,  the  Median,  Persian,  and  Arabic  political 
forms  themselves  arose  out  of  some  coalescence  of  earlier 
tribes  of  blood-relations  under  one  government,  and  that 
not  without  the  help  of  force.] 

In  the  middle  ages,  again,  we  find  no  state,  if  we  give  to  that 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


315 


word  the  sense  in  which  we  generally  take  it,  that  is,  a  clearly 
organized,  enlarged  political  society,  until  after  the  time  when 
the  free  cities  had  raised  themselves  into  existence.  In  the 
earlier  times  of  the  middle  ages  there  was  but  a  concatenation, 
and  frequently  hardly  anything  more  than  a  co-existence,  of 
numberless  almost  independent  communities,  a  feature  which, 
though  gradually  vanishing,  continued  to  appear  down  to  the 
beginning  of  modern  history.  Everything  in  the  middle  ages 
had  a  tendency  to  individual  and  isolated  independence,  a 
condition  of  things  most  necessary  in  the  course  of  civiliza- 
tion, but  below  our  broad  civil  liberty.  The  castles,  cities, 
bishoprics,  republics,  communities,  or  whatever  the  character 
of  the  various  independent  groups  and  clusters  was,  were  not 
strictly  socialized  with  one  another,  that  is,  they  had  not 
grown  into  one  comprehensive  society ;  one  active  political 
system  did  not  pervade  and  unite  the  whole,  though  in  most 
cases  the  various  independent  bodies  were  founded  upon  the 
same  principle.  The  various  populations  had  not,  properly 
speaking,  become  nationalized.1  This  spirit  of  establishing 
independent  circles  was  not  territorial,  but  any  mass  of  men 
united  for  some  permanent  purpose  was  forthwith  incor- 
porated, with  rights  and  prescribed  actions  peculiarly  its  own. 
Every  trade,  profession,  or  occupation,  even  dishonorable 
occupations 2  formed  separate  corporations.  I  do  not  say  that 


1  I  beg  the  reader  to  keep  in  mind  that  I  mean  by  nationalization  of  the 
populations  the  growing  of  a  people,  which  did  not  exist  in  the  strictly  feudal 
times,  and  by  nationalization  of  governments,  something  entirely  different  from 
mere  centralization  of  government.     Centralization  is  the  convergence  of  all 
the  rays  of  power  into  one  central  point;  nationalization  is  the  diffusion  of 
the  same  life-blood  through  a  system  of  arteries,  throughout  a   body  politic ; 
indeed,  it  is  the  growing  of  the  body  politic  as  such,  morally  and  thoroughly 
cemented,  out  of  a  mass  otherwise  uncememed.    The  following  sections,  I  trust, 
will  make  the  subject  clearer  than  it  will  appear  at  the  present  stage  to  those 
unversed  in  the  history  of  the  periods  touched  upon. 

2  Prostitutes  were  frequently  incorporated.      There  is  a  curious    passage  in 
Thourel's  Histoire  de  Geneve  depuis  son  Origine  jusqu'a  nos  Jours,  1833,  relating 
to  the  women  of  the  town  before  the  Reformation  :  "  Pour  que  suivant  1'ancienne 
coustume  ces  pecheresses  soyent  mieux  dirigees,  elles  pourront  eslire  et  se  con- 
stituer  une  reine,  laquelle  prestera  serment  en  leurs  mains,  sur  les  saints  evan- 


316  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

these  corporations  are  necessarily  hostile  to  general  liberty, 
nor  that  they  have  not  been  at  times  too  much  abandoned  in 
the  modern  era.  We  have  not  to  investigate  this  subject  here. 
But  such  as  the  corporations  show  themselves  in  the  middle 
ages,  they  evidently  belong  to  the  general  spirit  of  forming 
little  independent  circles  and  appearing  each  to  every  other 
as  one  separate  whole  only — circles  which  are  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree  approximations  to  sovereignties. 

These  independent  territories  were  indeed,  in  many  cases, 
in  contact  with  one  another,  but  not  joined ;  connected,  but 
not  united.  It  is  the  characteristic  trait  of  the  feudal  times. 
Indeed,  at  one  time  there  was  such  a  total  dissolution  into 
unconnected  baronies,  jarring  or  in  open  hostility  with  one 
another,  that  an  event  like  the  crusades,  animating  and  im- 
pelling once  more  whole  masses  with  one  and  the  same  idea, 
became  in  the  opinion  of  some  great  historians  a  real  blessing 
to  the  Western  world.1 


giles,  d'exercer  le  dit  emploi  bien  et  fidelement  de  tout  son  pouvoir,  sans  affection 
ni  haine." 

1  The  crusades,  though  much  deplored  by  some,  for  instance  Sismondi,  are 
nevertheless  held  by  many  of  the  calmest  historians  to  have  been  one  of  the  most 
powerful  means  by  which  Providence  has  rescued  the  Western  world  from  bar- 
barity and  led  it  on  in  its  amazing  career  of  civilization.  Heeren,  the  historian, 
places  them  in  this  light  at  the  beginning  of  his  essay  on  the  Political  Conse- 
quences of  the  Reformation  (translation,  Oxford,  1836),  in  dwelling  on  the  new 
impulse  they  gave  to  the  mental  life  of  Europe,  the  great  political  changes  which 
they  produced  in  Europe  itself;  though  their  immediate  object  was  no  more  ob- 
tained than  that  for  which  Columbus  started  into  unknown  seas.  Abel  Remusat, 
the  French  Orientalist,  among  others,  has  well  traced  the  intercourse  of  Euro- 
peans with  Asiatic  princes,  which,  relighting  as  it  did  the  ardor  for  knowledge, 
was  first  of  all  brought  about  by  the  contact  of  the  West  and  East  during  the 
crusades.  (See  Memoires  sur  les  Relations  politiques  des  Princes  Chretiens  avec 
les  Empereurs  Mongols.)  The  discovery  of  America  is  doubly  connected  with 
the  crusaders, — internally  and  externally  :  the  first,  because  that  indomitable  desire 
of  discovery,  adventure,  enlargement  of  knowledge,  and  of  striving  physically 
and  mentally  beyond  the  known  limits,  that  peculiar  longing  for  the  distant, 
which  characterizes  the  period  of  maritime  discoveries,  standing  in  close  connec- 
tion with  the  information  continually  brought  from  the  East,  was  first  of  all 
caused  by  the  crusades;  the  latter,  because  the  great  Columbus  was  actually  in 
search  of  the  Zipangi  of  Marco  Polo,  when  he  stumbled  on  America  because  it 
lay  across  his  way. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


317 


While  these  many  separate  districts,  in  the  course  of  civil- 
ization, could  not  withstand  the  gradual  and  growing  social- 
ization, and  were  forced  into  closer  contact,  they  met  together, 
nevertheless,  in  a  very  great  degree  as  separate  elements,  with 
s  parate  interes's  and  desires,  separate  rights,  privileges,  char- 
te  s.  The  estates  of  the  middle  ages  consisted  of  deputies, 
strictly  instructed,  limited,  and  fettered;  sending  for  new  in- 
stru.tions  on  each  new  question  which  might  turn  up;  jeal- 
ously, often  hostilely,  extorting  from  one  another  ;  granting 
and  demanding,  like  separate  sovereigns ;  little  concerned 
about  the  advantage  of  the  other  parties  or  general  justice  and 
universal  fairness ;  treating  as  now  a  congress  of  plenipoten- 
tiaries, sent  from  various  independent  nations  would  do,  but 
upon  no  broad  or  social  and  mutual  principle :  thus,  Guizot 
observes  that  "  the  cortes,  like  the  states-general  of  France, 
have  been  an  accident  in  history,  and  never  a  system,  never  a 
political  organization  or  regular  means  of  government ;" — only 
we  must  give  a  correct  sense  to  the  term  "  accident  in  his- 
tory." *  In  the  feudal  times  we  have  many  independent 


1  The  term  Accident  is  so  totally  denied  by  some,  and,  again,  superficial  ob- 
servers please  themselves  so  much  in  ascribing  the  vastest  historical  phenomena 
to  accident,  that  I  believe  an  explanation  of  this  term  is  not  undeserving  the 
brief  space  of  a  note. 

If  we  call  accident  a  fact  which  has  been  produced  by  causes  wholly  extraneous 
to  a  subject  but  which  materially  influence  the  latter,  we  may  certainly  say  that 
a  man  died  by  accident  if  his  skull  was  broken  by  a  tile  which  the  violence  of 
the  wind  tore  from  a  roof,  in  contradistinction  to  a  death  which  is  the  neces- 
sary consequence  of  causes  in  the  system  of  man  in  general  or  of  this  individual  in 
particular.  In  the  highest  point  of  view  there  are  no  accidents,  inasmuch  as  we 
imagine  Providence  overruling  the  universe  in  all  its  elements.  In  a  historical 
point  of  view  there  are  few  accidents,  far  less  than  many  superficial  observers 
imagine,  who  ascribe  wars  to  momentary  indispositions  of  monarchs  and  the 
like.  Yet  there  are  certainly  accidents  of  momentous  importance.  That  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  was  shot  in  the  battle  at  Liitzen  was,  historically  speaking,  an 
accident;  for  it  was  a  fact  brought  about  by  causes  not  founded  in  or  growing 
out  of  the  necessary  development  of  society.  There  was  no  connection  between 
the  social  state  of  Europe  and  the  pistol  from  which  the  ball  was  fired.  Yet  this 
accident  was  [seemingly]  of  the  most  momentous  consequences  for  all  civilized 
mankind.  How  differently,  in  all  probability,  would  history  have  turned  out  had 
Gustavus  Adolphus  lived  to  make  himself  Protestant  emperor  of  Germany !  Bui 


318  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

authorities,  but  not  public  authorities ;  royal  power  itself  is, 
down  to  the  times  of  Louis  XI.  in  France,  and  of  Isabella 
in  Spain,  but  an  isolated  feudal  power.  There  were  in  France 
pays  d"obeissance-le-roi,  pays  dcs  barons,  and  pays  hors  fobeis- 
sance-le-roi.  Much  of  this  is,  doubtless,  to  be  ascribed  to 
baronial  arrogance  and  lawlessness,  but  this  very  baronial 
arrogance  is  a  thing  peculiar  to  those  times,  at  least  in  its 
extent  and  prevalence.  We  find  in  the  middle  ages  power 
enough,  but  not  public  power;  an  infinity  of  institutions,  but 
not  public  institutions;  numberless  chartered  and  frequently 
highly  valuable  privileges,  but  not  what  we  now  term  public 
law.  We  have,  in  brief,  as  indicated  already,  separate  yet 
clustered  independence,  not  individual  yet  public  liberty. 

Civil  liberty,  something  very  different  from  feudal  independ- 
ence, became  established  only  in  the  same  degree  in  which 
these  many  separate  groups  united  into  a  society,  these  isolated 
parts  into  nations,  and  in  which  the  deputies  of  the  separate 
estates  were  transformed  into  national  representatives — a 
career  in  the  history  of  civilization  in  which  England  long 
preceded  all  other  nations,  and  for  the  want  of  which  other 
countries,  such  as  Germany,  Italy,  France,  and  Spain,  failed 
so  long  to  obtain  liberty,  or  fail  to  this  day  to  enjoy  it.  For, 
though  the  British  parliament,  having  grown  into  a  national 
body,  a  body  that  belonged  to  and  represented  political  society 
at  large,  was  also  for  that  reason,  in  periods  when  civil  liberty 
was  yet  but  indistinctly  felt  and  seen,  more  subservient  to  the 


when  some  superficial  writers  tell  us  that  the  Reformation  was  caused  by  the  ac- 
cident that  a  bungling  seller  of  indulgences,  Tetzel,  happened  to  meet  with  so 
fiery  a  man  as  Luther,  they  show  how  little  they  know  of  mankind,  society, 
and  the  connection  of  social  phenomena.  The  Reformation  must  have  not  only 
taken  place,  but  pretty  much  at  that  period,  though  neither  a  Tetzel  nor  a 
Luther  had  ever  lived.  The  estates,  therefore,  were  very  far  from  being  acci- 
dents ;  they  were  most  necessary  and  natural  phenomena  in  the  course  of  the 
social  development  of  civilized  mankind;  but  we  might  call  them  accidents  with 
reference  to  the  effects  which  some  of  them  hnd  in  producing  national  represen- 
tation, because  they  arose  out  of  causes  which  had  nothing  to  do  directly  with  a 
nationnl  representation,  but  on  the  contrary  were  founded  upor  an  opposite  prin- 
ciple, that  of  chartered,  insulated  independence. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

monarch,  as  for  instance  under  Henry  VIII.,  than  the  deputies 
of  estates  in  other  countries,  for  instance  in  Spain,  might  have 
proved,  still  the  broad  foundation  of  civil  liberty  was  laid ; 
and  when  the  period  of  absorbing  centralization  of  power 
arrived  for  the  continent  of  Europe,  the  British  alone  of  all 
were  able  to  withstand  it,  though  they  had  monarchs  as  wise, 
and  wiser,  and  as  much  disposed  for  centralization,  for  instance 
Elizabeth,  as  much  so  as  Ferdinand  the  Catholic  or  Philip  II. 
in  Spain,  or  Louis  XI.  and  Louis  XIV.  in  France.  Prescott 
even  distinctly  says  that  the  extraordinary  power  committed 
to  the  commons  in  Castile  was  unfavorable  to  their  liberties.1 
The  reason  is,  as  I  said  before,  these  independent  territories 
prevented  the  growth  of  a  foundation  for  national  representa- 
tion, and  that  broad,  mutual  support  in  the  cause  of  liberty, 
which  cannot  be  built  upon  any  other  foundation  ;  and  when 
the  time  came  that  the  many  loosely  connected  political  par- 
cels grew  into  one  real  body  politic,  a  firmly  knit  political 
society, — which  process  all  nations  had  to  follow,  because  their 
languages,  laws,  literatures,  and,  with  many,  their  churches, 
necessarily  became  national, — there  was  no  other  large  power 
left  but  the  general  government,  the  monarch.  It  will  always 
remain  a  characteristic  and  peculiar  feature  of  British  liberty 
that  England  passed  over  from  the  feudal  independence  of 
estates  or  single  communities  to  national  and  public  liberty, 
without  the  intermediate  process  of  entire  concentration  of 
power ;  or  that,  at  any  rate,  the  attempt  at  it — under  the  Tu- 
dors,  who  did  it  judiciously,  and  under  the  Stuarts,  who  did  it 
injudiciously — did  not  succeed,  but  led  at  once  to  determined 
resistance.  On  the  continent  of  Europe  power  was  firmly 
concentrated,  or  where  this  did  not  take  place,  on  account  of 


1  History  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  page  50,  Introduction.  I  would  like- 
wise refer  to  pages  60  and  80  of  the  same  Introduction,  as  in  fact  to  the  whole 
of  it.  The  reader  finds  there  repeated  proofs  of  the  important  fact  that  it  was 
owing  to  the  want  of  nationalization  of  the  deputies  that  Castile  and  Aragon, 
whose  estates  enjoyed  greater  liberties  than  those  of  any  other  extensive  coun- 
tries in  the  middle  ages,  did  not  obtain  modern  civil  liberty,  and  are  now  in  such 
painful  travail  to  give  birth  to  it. 


320 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


the  imbecility  of  government,  not  of  the  resistance  of  the 
people,  as  in  Spain,  a  state  of  things  still  worse,  that  of 
planless  interference,  a  restless  and  aimless  despotism,  was 
the  consequence. 

It  was,  therefore,  an  immense  step  made  in  the  cause  of 
French  liberty,  and  indeed  the  one  from  which  it  dates,  that 
in  1789,  at  the  convocation  of  the  estates  under  Necker,  after 
very  protracted  debates  on  the  question  whether  the  "cahiers" 
(instructions)  of  the  deputies  should  be  considered  absolutely 
binding, — while  many  of  the  nobility  desired  to  join  the  third 
estate,  but  scrupulously  doubted  whether  they  were  not  bound 
to  adhere  to  their  instructions  as  members  of  another  estate, 
— at  length  the  deputies  declared  themselves  representatives, 
and  the  estates  changed  into  a  national  representation. 

It  does  not  belong  to  our  present  inquiry  to  show  how 
truly  fortunate  England  was,  that  amid  circumstances  fre- 
quently disastrous  in  their  immediate  effect,  yet  beneficial  in 
breaking  the  power  of  the  barons  and  producing  national 
representation,  this  prodigious  civil  change  did  not  fuse  all 
estates  into  one  chamber,  but  suffered  the  idea  of  estates  so 
far  to  continue  as  to  assign  a  separate  house  to  the  high  no- 
bility, from  which  fact  the  highly  important  political  institu- 
tion of  two  houses,  or  the  bi-cameral  system,  arose.  Any  one 
who  wishes  to  convince  himself  of  the  actual  misery — we 
cannot  call  it  otherwise — attending  all  the  debates,  if  such 
they  can  be  termed,  of  the  feudal  estates,  where  the  necessity 
of  a  national  system  began  strongly  to  be  felt,  but  was  pre- 
vented by  the  relations  of  the  deputies  to  their  principals, 
must  read  the  detailed  accounts  of  the  French  estates,  or  of 
the  diets  of  *the  German  empire. 

The  great  change  of  the  British  deputy  into  a  national 
representative  was  consummated  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
especially  when  the  old  law,  requiring  members  of  parliament 
to  be  resident  burgesses  to  make  the  elections  valid,  fell  into 
entire  disuse.  Hallam  (Constitutional  History,  i.  362)  says, 
of  a  debate  on  the  proposed  abolition  of  the  law  in  1571, 
"  This  is  a  remarkable  and  perhaps  the  earliest  assertion  of  an 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


321 


important  constitutional  principle,  that  each  member  of  the 
house  of  commons  is  deputed  to  serve  not  only  for  his  con- 
stituents, but  for  the  whole  kingdom  ;  a  principle  which  marks 
the  distinction  between  a  modern  English  parliament  and  such 
deputations  of  the  estates  as  were  assembled  in  several  conti- 
nental kingdoms  ;  a  principle  to  which  the  house  of  commons 
is  indebted  for  its  weight  and  dignity,  as  well  as  its  beneficial 
efficiency,  and  which  none  but  the  servile  worshippers  of  the 
populace  are  ever  found  to  gainsay."  Here  I  have  only  to 
observe  that  not  only  worshippers  of  the  populace  gainsay  it, 
but  persons  of  the  opposite  character  likewise,  because  op- 
posed in  their  'whole  view  to  modern  popular  liberty,  which 
they  see  well  is  so  closely  connected  with  broad,  national 
representation.  Niebuhr,  in  one  of  his  letters,  written  in 
1808,  says  of  Mirabeau,  of  whom  he  has  just  spoken  in  high 
terms,  "Assuredly  he  is  likewise  innocent  of  the  terrible  idea 
of  a  general  representation"  ("  schreckliche  Idee  der  allge- 
meinen  Representation. "  Biographical  Notices,  vol.  ii.  p.  72.) 
Both  the  licentious  demagogue  and  he  who  fondly  clings  to 
the  past  age  of  corporative  separation  and  the  consequent 
systems  of  mere  deputations  are  right,  each  in  his  way,  in 
opposing  the  vast  principle  of  national  representation.1 

VI.  It  appears  then,  and  I  confidently  state,  that  every  page 
of  history  will  furnish  to  the  student  ample  evidence  of  the 
fact  that  ancient  politics  was  characteristically  city  politics  ; 
that  a  leading  political  trait  of  the  feudal  times  was  a  number 
of  almost  independent  power-holders  under  a  suzerain,  defy- 
ing, and  extorting  from,  one  another;  and  that  the  prominent 


1  With  reference  to  various  subjects  touched  upon  in  the  previous  section,  as 
well  as  in  several  antecedent  passages  of  this  work,  I  would  recommend  to  the 
reader  the  perusal  or  reperusal  of  the  concluding  chapters  of  Sismondi's  History 
of  the  Italian  Republics  in  the  Middle  Ages,  beginning  with  chapter  126.  The 
historian  gives  in  them  so  lucid  a  view  of  his  opinions  upon  a  variety  of  subjects 
connected  with  ancient  and  modern  liberty,  and  his  opinions  are  entitled  to  so 
much  respect,  that  attentive  reflection  upon  them  must  be  fruitful  to  the  reader^ 
even  though  he  should  differ  in  some  points,  as  in  fact  the  writer  of  these  lines 
does,  from  the  philosophical  historian. 
VOL.  II.  21 


322 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


feature  of  political  activity  in  modern  times  consists  in  the 
endeavors  to  establish  broad  civil  liberty,  guarantees,  checks, 
and  justice,  on  extensive  national  grounds,  not  on  accidental 
specific  grants.  Hence  the  universal  establishment  of  consti- 
tutions so  peculiar  to  our  times.  The  European  race  has  only 
stepped  over  the  threshold  of  this  third  period,  having  in 
many  cases  as  yet  to  struggle  against  centralization  of  yower, 
which  frequently  was  nevertheless  necessary  in  order  to  an- 
nihilate feudal  baronies.  Our  modern  civil  liberty  demands 
justice  broadly  diffused  throughout  a  state,  not  chartered  or 
wrung  from  some  one  contesting  it,  obtained  separately  and  in 
a  variety  of  degrees  by  the  different  communities ;  it  demands 
the  broad  guarantee  of  society,  not  the  specific  and  chartered 
ones  of  essentially  independent  corporations.  An  instance 
will  serve  as  illustration.  Where  do  we  expect  a  firmer  guar- 
antee of  the  free  exercise  of  religion,  or  for  Protestantism  in 
particular? — in  modern  France,  where  society  at  large  has 
pronounced  by  the  constitution  that  every  man  shall  be  al- 
lowed peaceably  to  exercise  his  religion,  or  after  the  wars  of 
the  League,  when  the  edict  of  Nantes  granted  to  the  Protest- 
ants a  number  of  fortified  places  exclusively,  and  the  right  to 
keep  armed  men  ?  Where  do  we  expect  less  hardship  and 
burden  ?  from  a  general  taxation  as  in  our  states,  or  from  the 
separate  and  tenaciously  contested  grants  or  even  immunities 
and  exemptions  in  the  middle  ages?  In  short,  where  is  there 
more  justice,  more  knowledge,  more  action,  and  higher  act- 
ivity, and  greater  impulse — in  our  bodies  politic  or  socialized 
states,  or  in  the  many  smaller  or  larger  circles  in  the  middle 
ages  ? 

These  enlarged  societies,  however,  cannot  obtain  or  guar- 
antee liberty,  except  by  representation,  and  their  representation 
must  be  social,  national,  that  is,  it  must  represent  not  only  the 
separate  component  parts  but  the  totality  of  society  as  one 
organized  whole.  The  representation  itself  must  form  a  faith- 
ful organ  of  the  entire  and  unbroken  society,  which,  to  repeat, 
is  not  an  agglomeration  of  severed  atoms,  but  a  union  of  parts 
belonging  to  one  organic  whole. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


323 


It  is  by  this  representative  system  alone  that  mutual  sup- 
port, mutual  reliance,  mutual  protection,  and  mutual  elevation 
can  be  effected,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  constitute  the  envia- 
ble trait  of  modern  times.  The  representatives  must'in  order 
to  be  the  true  representatives  of  society,  which  is  one  organ- 
ized, living  thing,  with  nerves  and  arteries  of  life  ramified 
throughout,  represent  this  whole  society  as  such  ;  they  again 
form  one  whole  organ,  and  though  there  are  only  a  few  con- 
stitutions which  actually  impose  an  oath  upon  every  repre- 
sentative "  not  to  assent  to  any  law,  vote,  or  proceeding  which 
shall  appear  to  him  injurious  to  the  public  welfare"  (Constitu- 
tion of  New  Jersey,  adopted  in  1777,  par.  23),  or  that  "to  the 
best  of  his  power  he  will  contribute  to  the  advancement  of  the 
public  welfare,  without  swerving  from  it  on  account  of  indi- 
vidual or  provincial  interest"  (Constitution  of  the  Netherlands, 
of  1815,  par.  84),  yet  is  not  this  oath  written  in  every  man's 
heart,  is  it  not  actually  imposed  in  our  times  upon  every  honest 
man  by  plain  common  sense  ? 

And  here  it  ought  to  be  observed  that  the  above  oath  quoted 
from  the  Constitution  of  the  Netherlands  is  imposed  upon  the 
members  of  the  states-general,  who  are  nevertheless  elected 
by  the  provincial  estates,  corresponding  to  the  former  sover- 
eign provinces1  of  the  United  Provinces. 

VII.  The  representative  of  modern  times,  therefore,  differs 
materially  from  the  deputy  of  the  feudal  estates.  Yet  shall 
he  not  represent  the  sense  and  sentiment  of  his  constituents? 


1  The  United  Provinces  formed,  as  is  well  known,  a  confederacy  of  sovereign 
states,  which  sent  deputations,  not  representatives,  to  the  States-General,  not 
very  unlike  the  Swiss  confederacy  of  the  present  day,  though  even  less  cemented, 
I  believe,  than  these,  according  to  the  law.  The  confederacy  of  the  Netherlands, 
which  furnishes  such  a  noble  chapter  to  the  history  of  the  world,  could  not  act 
with  enough  of  social  organic  power,  because  it  did  not  abandon  the  feudal 
idea  of  deputies  and  rise  to  a  representation.  The  confederacy  rapidly  sank  in 
power  and  consideration.  On  the  restoration  of  the  independence  of  the  Low 
Countries,  after  having  formed  part  of  the  French  empire,  we  find,  therefore,  in 
the  constitution,  the  following  paragraph  as  the  first  of  the  division  on  the  States- 
General  :  "  The  States-General  represent  the  nation."  Par.  77. 


324 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


He  must  emphatically  do  so,  not  as  a  deputy  of  a  separate 
feudal  body,  representing  their  limited  or  perhaps  selfish  de- 
sires, but  representing  them  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  state,  as 
a  living  limb  of  the  whole  body  politic.  That  the  body  of 
representatives  may  form  a  real  representation  of  the  whole, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  wishes  and  views  of  all  parts  shall  have 
an  organ.  The  representative  is  not  appointed  by  a  few,  as  a 
deputy,  or  minister  to  carry  certain  points,  but  he  is  elected 
by  the  concurrence  of  voices  of  his  fellow-citizens  for  the 
pledges  which  his  constituents  find  in  his  whole  life:  he  is 
elected  because  his  constituents  believe  that  his  views,  princi- 
ples, and  sympathies  are  identified  with  their  own,  and  because 
he  will  speak  and  act  as  the  organ  of  their  public  opinion,  not 
as  the  instructed  deputy  who  shall  wring  advantages  from  the 
others.  If  it  were  so,  he  should  receive  instructions  before- 
hand. But  he  represents  his  constituents  fully  and  wholly, 
that  is,  as  a  body  connected  with  the  whole,  whose  entire 
public  opinion,  thus  brought  together  from  various  parts,  mu- 
tually modifying  one  another,  and  insuring  the  prevalence  01 
general  justice  and  fairness,  passes  over  through  these  various 
organs  into  the  public  will  of  the  whole,  which  is  into  law. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  representative  is  bound  by 
these  two  great  duties,  arising  out  of  the  essence  of  the  repre- 
sentative system  itself.  On  the  one  hand  he  must  represent 
as  closely  and  as  conscientiously  as  possible  the  interests  and 
opinion  of  the  whole  district  which  sends  him.  He  does  not 
only  represent  the  majority  of  his  voters,  but  the  minority 
likewise ;  otherwise  insufferable  party  aristocracy  would  be  at 
once  established ;  and  if  the  election  has  chiefly  turned  upon 
some  prominent  measure,  and  he  be  elected  by  a  very  small 
majority  of  a  large  number  of  voters,  he  is  in  conscience 
bound  to  allow  to  the  views  of  his  minority  a  very  different 
weight  in  his  judgment  from  what  he  would  be  called  upon 
to  do  had  he  been  elected  by  an  overwhelming  majority.  He 
is  farther  the  representative  of  the  more  especial  interests  of 
all  the  non-voters  of  his  district,  of  the  men  without  votes, 
of  the  women,  the  children,  for  they  are  all  component  and 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  325 

essential  parts  of  the  community  which  he  represents  for  the 
purpose  of  finally  making  up  public  opinion,  and  law.  On 
the  other  hand;  he  is  bound  to  represent  his  community,  not 
as  a  detached  part,  independent  in  the  feudal  sense,  but  as  a 
living  limb  of  his  state  or  nation,  and  hence  bound  to  allow 
the  public  opinion  of  the  whole  its  due  influence  in  modifying 
the  opinion  which  he  has  brought  from  his  particular  section. 
Else  why  should  he  be  sent  to  commune  with  the  other  repre- 
sentatives ?  Why  should  debates  precede  the  passing  of 
bills?  Why,  in  particular,  should,  in  cases  of  joint  appoint- 
ment, a  difference  of  opinion  be  permitted  ?  If  they  are  the 
deputies  of  their  respective  constituent  circle  only,  this  would 
amount  to  absurdity.  In  France  the  elective  franchise  is 
comparatively  much  restricted.  On  an  average  each  depart- 
ment has  but  two  thousand  two  hundred  electors,  each  com- 
mune but  five.  Is  the  representative  sent  to  represent  these 
five  men  in  each  commune  only,  or  all  men,  women,  children, 
and  even  property  ?  The  French  representative,  the  moment 
that  he  is  elected,  is  the  national  representative,  whether  he 
be  elected  by  many  or  by  few. 

That  in  all  the  business  which  has  exclusive  reference  to 
his  section,  or  to  individuals  in  it,  the  representative  is  the 
peculiar  and  proper  servant  of  the  public,  and  must  give  his 
whole  time  and  exertion  to  their  benefit,  and  serve  them,  to 
the  best  of  his  ability,  and  conscientiously,  in  endeavoring  to 
obtain  all  that  is  right  and  fair,  is  evident. 

We  see,  then,  that  all  that  is  sacred  in  civil  liberty  makes 
political  society  equally  interested  in  the  two  following  points: 
The  representative  ought  frequently  to  give  his  trust  back  to 
the  people,  and  pass  the  trial  of  election,  so  that  he  may  re- 
main the  true  representative  of  his  constituents  and  of  his 
community.  The  word  frequent  is  of  course  a  relative  term, 
and  must  receive  its  true  meaning  from  a  variety  of  circum- 
stances ;  for  there  are  as  many  evils  in  unnecessarily  fre- 
quent elections  as  there  are  in  those  which  occur  at  too  long 
intervals.  Secondly,  the  true  character  of  a  representative 
government  does  not  admit  of  mandatory  instructions  to  the 


326  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

representative,  for  it  makes  at  once  of  the  representative  a 
mere  deputy,  who  ought  to  have  his  instructions  from  the 
beginning.  But  in  this  case  he  ceases  to  be  the  representative 
of  the  people,  and  becomes  a  mere  plenipotentiary  either  of  a 
party  or  corporation.  Yet  it  is  true,  again,  that  real  public 
opinion  and  public  will  can  only  be  elicited  by  the  closest 
possible  attention  of  each  representative  to  the  interests  and 
desires  of  his  constituents  and  community ;  he  therefore  will 
cheerfully  be  influenced  by  petitions,  resolutions,  or  any  other 
information  from  his  constituents,  a  circumstance  of  the 
greatest  and  especial  importance  in  monarchies,  in  which  the 
influence  of  the  crown  must  always  be  great  and  the  repre- 
sentative is  easily  seduced  from  the  people.  But  it  would  be 
a  serious  mistake  to  believe  that  special  instructions  are  the 
best  guarantee  of  the  people  against  the  seductions  of  the 
crown.  Special  instructions  fetter  as  often  as  they  lend 
power,  and  the  crown,  or  indeed  any  powerful  executive,  of 
whatever  name,  can  be  effectually  opposed  only  by  free, 
united,  broad,  national  opposition.  The  history  of  England,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  that  of  the  continental  estates,  on  the  other, 
prove  this  fact  most  abundantly.  There  are  several  other 
considerations  against  binding  representatives  by  instructions, 
especially  in  states  where  there  exist  written  constitutions, 
which  will  presently  be  given. 

For  the  present  I  would  sum  up  the  previous  remarks  thus: 
The  true  representative  is  bound  to  represent  his  constituents 
closely,  honesty,  and  patriotically:  closely,  so  that  by  the 
union  and  mutual  modification  of  the  opinion  of  all  parts 
strictly  represented  a  true  opinion  of  the  whole  may  be  formed; 
honestly,  so  that  he  neither  meanly  nor  weakly  desert  his 
constituents,  nor  basely  obey  the  dictates  of  passing  passion 
or  excitement  in  the  district  from  which  he  comes ;  and, 
lastly,  patriotically,  so  that  he  can  sacrifice  his  own  advan- 
tage or  that  of  any  part  of  the  state  to  the  benefit  and  ad- 
vancement of  the  whole  state. 

These  principles  will  lead  to  the  rule,  which  I  believe  will 
be  admitted  to  be  correct,  that  the  representative,  constitu- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  327 

tionally  elected  for  a  fixed  terra,  as  he  is  bound  to  maintain 
the  fundamental  law  in  every  way,  is  also,  in  his  own  case, 
not  to  infringe  it  by  receiving  specific  mandatory  instructions, 
since  the  constitution  does  not  acknowledge  them ;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  will  feel  obliged,  in  order  to  maintain  close 
representation  inviolate,  to  resign  as  soon  as  he  is  convinced 
that  the  public  opinion  of  his  district  decidedly  differs  from 
his,  not  on  a  single  measure,  but  on  a  continued  course  of 
actions  and  series  of  views  respecting  important  political  sub- 
jects, and  that  they  would  differ  had  they  all  the  knowledge 
which  he  has  acquired  in  the  necessary  contact  with  the  other 
organs  of  the  public  opinion  of  his  state.  The  representative 
must  feel  convinced  that  he  differs  seriously  and  permanently, 
and  that  the  difference  does  not  arise  from  any  sudden  and  ex- 
cited change  in  his  constituents ;  for  in  the  latter  case  it  is  one 
of  the  very  objects  of  the  constitution,  which  says  that  he  shall 
be  elected  for  such  a  term,  to  avoid  sudden  and  passionate 
changes.  If  one  or  the  other  be  neglected,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  essential  character  of  a  representative  government  is 
seriously  impaired. 

VIII.  The  meaning  of  a  representative  government,  it  ap- 
pears, then,  is  very  different  from  and  far  nobler  than  a  mere 
approach  to  something  we  cannot  obtain,  the  government  of 
the  people  in  the  forum,  or  the  ecclesia,  to  use  the  Athenian 
term.  It  has  a  great,  a  deep  meaning  of  its  own,  and  from 
what  has  been  observed  in  the  first  part  of  this  work,  when 
we  considered  the  nature  of  power  and  the  necessity  of  its 
restriction,  in  whose  hands  soever  it  may  be  lodged,  as  well 
as  from  the  remarks  just  made,  it  will  sufficiently  appear  that 
the  following  are  among  the  vast  advantages  which  we  obtain 
by  this  institution  which  the  historian,  it  may  be  ventured  to 
affirm,  will  always  consider  with  reverence  and  rejoicing. 

Masses  are  always  impetuous.  I  do  not  speak  of  the 
rabble  or  mob  ;  I  speak  of  every  mass,  high,  low,  or  mixed, 
as  such.  Every  one  of  us  is  impetuous  as  soon  as  he  belongs 
to  a  mass.  The  reason  is  simple  :  so  long  as  we  belong  to  a 


328  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

mass,  brought  together  by  the  same  impulse,  desire,  or  in- 
terest, each  individual  has  but  that  one  object  in  view,  else 
he  would  not  have  joined  or  been  drawn  into  that  mass  which 
strives  for  it.1  The  moment  we  are  singled  out  to  act  for 
the  mass,  that  moment  one  of  two  things  must  happen:  either 
responsibility  is  lawfully  thrown  upon  us  by  the  process  of 
some  appointment  or  election,  when  we  feel  at  once  the  ne- 
cessity of  circumspection  and  moderation,  because  we  act  for 
others,  and  are  answerable  for  the  consequences ;  or  some 
reason  or  other,  arising  out  of  the  impulse  or  excitement  of 
the  agitated  mass  itself,  devolves  the  duty  of  leader  upon  us. 
The  leadership,  thus  acquired,  depends  upon  the  impulse  itself, 
and  we  feel  naturally  tempted  to  lead  on  the  mass  in  this  im- 
pulse, for  every  one  is  careful  to  maintain  that  foundation 
upon  which  his  power  or  authority  rests.  Now,  as  masses 
cannot  in  most  cases  act  directly,  but  must  have  leaders  of 
some  sort  or  other,  these  become,  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  the  rulers  or  leaders  of  the  unmitigated  masses.  But 
by  the  representative  system  we  obtain  these  two  advantages : 
we  restrict  the  impulse  which  is  inherent  in  the  mass  as  such, 
and  must  be  restricted,  because  every  power-holder  needs  a 
check  ;  and  we  avoid  being  ruled  by  one  leader,  as  the  Athe- 
nians always  were  in  the  later  portion  of  their  history.  We, 
the  people,  therefore,  are  not  absent  from  the  legislative  halls 
only  because,  for  local  reasons,  we  cannot  be  there,  but  be- 
cause we  ought  not  to  be  there  as  a  people,  as  a  mass,  for  the 
same  reason  that  in  monarchies  the  king  is  not  allowed  to  be 
present  in  the  halls  of  justice,  or  as  the  legislators  cannot 
debate  in  the  presence  of  the  monarch.  In  both  cases  the 
reason  is  the  same.  The  prince,  that  is,  the  power-holder  (be 
he  the  people  or  the  monarch),  must  be  limited  and  circum- 
scribed by  law,  especially  in  republics,  because,  as  we  have 


1  [In  a  note  Dr.  Lieber  corrects  what  he  says  in  the  text,  adding  that  "  masses 
are  impetuous  for  two  reasons.  I.  They  feel  they  are  not  organized,  and  their 
action  therefore  is  insecure;  they  are  hasty,  anxious.  2.  Masses  cannot  be 
reasoned  with,  nor  can  the  members  reason  with  one  another.  That  which  is 
bold,  violent,  striking,  alone  can  obtain  attention  and  command."] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  329 

seen  in  Part  First,  the  power  of  the  people  is  never  a  theory, 
as  that  of  a  monarch  frequently  is,  but  irresistible  reality;  that 
is,  for  the  same  reason  that  the  power-holder  must  not  sit  in 
judgment,  his  presence  must  not  overawe  the  legislature. 

It  was  right  that  all  the  commons  were  silent  when  Charles 
I.  went  to  them  on  January  4th,  1642,  to  demand  Pym  and 
the  four  other  members  from  among  them ;  and  it  was  right 
for  the.  British  judge  to  tell  the  king  that  he  must  not  come 
into  court. 

The  government  of  a  free  state  must  act  out  public  opinion. 
To  do  this,  two  things  are  necessary :  first,  it  must  know 
public  opinion,  and,  secondly,  its  action  must  be  the  regular 
action  of  society,  not  an  irregular  series  of  accidental  im- 
pulses. Public  opinion,  however,  can  be  ascertained  by  the 
sifting  process  of  a  representative  system  only.  Otherwise, 
general,  momentary  opinion,  rumor,  even  whim,  will  rule,  in- 
stead of  true,  settled  public  opinion.  The  representative  must 
truly  obey  public  opinion,  not  momentary  impulse,  excite- 
ment, panic,  fear,  revenge,  spite,  or  fanaticism — all  of  which 
may  seize  and  have  seized  masses  because  they  seize  upon 
the  individuals  composing  them.1  The  representative,  stand- 
ing at  a  distance,  being  separated  from  the  crowd,  feels,  in 
many  cases  at  least,  the  necessity  of  calm  reflection  and  of 
opposition  to  the  sweeping  .current  of  excitement. 


1  "  I  did  not  obey  your  instructions  :  No.  I  conformed  to  the  instructions  of 
truth  and  nature,  and  maintained  your  interest,  against  your  opinions,  with  a 
constancy  that  became  me.  A  representative  worthy  of  you  ought  to  be  a  per- 
son of  stability.  I  am  to  look,  indeed,  to  your  opinions ;  but  to  such  opinions 
as  you  and  I  must  have  five  years  hence.  I  was  not  to  look  to  the  flash  of  the 
day.  I  knew  that  you  chose  me,  in  my  place,  along  with  others,  to  be  a  pillar 
of  the  state,  and  not  a  weathercock  on  the  top  of  the  edifice,  exalted  for  my 
levity  and  versatility,  and  of  no  use  but  to  indicate  the  shiftings  of  every  fashion? 
able  gale.  Would  to  God  the  value  of  my  sentiments  on  Ireland  and  on  America 
had  been  at  this  day  a  subject  of  doubt  and  discussion !  No  matter  what  my 
sufferings  had  been,  so  that  this  kingdom  had  kept  the  authority  I  wished  to 
maintain  by  a  grave  foresight  and  by  an  equitable  temperance  in  the  use  of  its 
power."  Burke,  in  his  Speech  to  the  Electors  of  Bristol  in  1780.  It  will  be 
well  for  the  American  reader  to  consider  what  the  instructions  were  he  consid- 
erately disregarded. 


330 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


All  unmeditated  action  in  politics  is  dangerous,  because  it 
is  power,  for  unrestricted  power,  be  it  physical,  mental,  or 
moral,  is  hazardous  and  dangerous.  But  not  only  this  ;  im- 
petuous and  direct  action,  mischievous  as  it  may  be  at  the 
moment,  is  apt  suddenly  to  lose  its  hold  again.  It  is  the 
gradual  but  well-directed  action,  in  almost  all  cases,  which  is 
certain.  The  British  house  of  commons,  which  at  present  has 
in  reality  the  appointment  of  ministers,  acts  much  more  safely 
and  powerfully  than  when  in  1641,  and  on  some  other  occa- 
sions, it  aimed  at  direct  appointment.  It  may  safely  be  said 
that  upon  the  whole  the  commons  have  an  infinitely  stronger 
influence  over  the  ministers  now  than  they  would  have  were 
the  appointment  thrown  upon  them.  . 

Masses  are  swayed  by  gratitude  or  the  imposing  pageantry 
of  power,  and,  enraptured  or  bewildered,  grant  away  their 
rights  ;  the  representative  acts  for  others,  and  is  cautious,  pro- 
vided only  there  are  sufficient  means  to  make  him  always  a 
true  representative. 

By  a  representative  government  alone  we  can  arrive  at 
political  truth. 

By  it  alone,  deliberation,  debate,  which  neither  absolute 
democracy  on  the  one  hand  nor  instructed  deputations  on  the 
other  admit  of,  becomes  possible ;  and  debate,  whatever  its 
frequent  abuses  may  be,  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  civil 
liberty.  Frequently,  indeed,  precious  time  is  wasted  by  point- 
less speeches  of  unreasonable  length  ;  but  we  must  not  forget 
the  mass  of  political  information  which  thus  is  daily  thrown 
among  the  public.  Frequently  members  will  be  infatuated  by 
party  spirit,  so  that  they  will  not  listen  to  truth ;  but  we  ought 
to  remember  that  debate  also,  in  many  cases,  prevents  them 
from  becoming  so  infatuated.  Debate,  well  guided,  is  an 
indispensable  palladium  of  civil  liberty.  Instruction  would 
make,  and  unfortunately  has  made,  out  of  deliberative  assem- 
blies, assemblies  without  freedom  of  deliberation  and  without 
freedom  of  thought,  which  is  a  tyranny  with  painful  conse- 
quences. Indeed,  directing  men  to  vote  one  way  or  the  other, 
in  a  case  in  which  it  is  nevertheless  maintained  that  previous 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  33! 

inquiry  ought  to  guide,  is  repugnant  to  all  respect  for  truth 
and  for  conscience.  Napoleon,  so  it  is  said,  directed  at  times 
courts-martial  to  find  persons  guilty  before  the  trial  had  com- 
menced. It  may  not  be  true ;  but  what  does  every  reader  feel 
in  reading  it  ? 

By  the  representative  system  alone  we  can  act  upon  the 
salutary  principle  of  the  majority,  the  social  principle,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  unanimity  principle  or  principle  of  feudal 
independency.  On  this  point  presently  more. 

By  the  representative  system,  that  is,  by  a  representation 
gathered  from  the  whole  society,  upon  uniform  and  extensive 
principles  proportionally  applied  to  that  society,  we  alone  are 
able  to  gather  public  opinion.  The  deputy  system  does  not 
aim  at  arriving  at  the  public  opinion  of  the  state ;  it  merely 
strives  to  redress  single  "  grievances."  Hence  it  could  happen 
and  be  tolerated  that  the  deputation  from  one  city  represented 
many  cities,  that  of  Salamanca,  for  instance,  about  a  hun- 
dred places,  from  which  it  received  their  various  instructions 
and  acted  accordingly.  To  have  the  "grievances"  redressed 
was  the  main  business  of  the  deputy ;  to  have  public  opinion 
gathered  and  acted  out  is  the  essence  of  representation. 

By  the  representative  system  alone  can  be  secured  publicity 
of  governmental  action,  which  cannot  be  done  in  absolute  un- 
represented democracies,  because  there  cannot  be  there  real 
debates.  By  the  representative  government  alone  the  exten- 
sion of  a  political  society  can  be  united  with  substantial  public 
liberty;  the  necessary  energy  of  a  government  with  its  equally 
necessary  control ;  and  by  it  alone  we  can  safely  steer  be- 
tween the  fanaticism  of  theorists  and  unprincipled  expediency 
— one  of  the  great  objects  of  good  government. 

IX.  From  the  foregoing  remarks  it  will  appear,  therefore, 
how  little  those  writers  on  politics  have  penetrated  into  the 
essence  and  real  meaning  of  the  representative  principle,  who 
consider  it  as  the  main  problem  to  unite  the  extension  of 
states  with  the  ultimate  rule  and  sway  of  the  multitude  alone, 
as  ascertained  by  a  census.  The  true  and  difficult  object  in 


332  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

politics,  as  everywhere  where  men  have  to  act,  is  to  secure  by 
wise,  that  is  by  safe  and  appropriate,  means,  the  discovery  of 
truth  and  the  empire  of  mind  over  matter,  chance,  force,  and 
bulk.  The  mere  number  of  itself  does  no  more  guarantee 
truth  than  the  chance  of  birth.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
an  overwhelming  majority  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth 
believe  that  the  sun  moves  and  not  the  earth,  or  that  the 
chief  object  in  punishing  offenders  is  to  deter  others  by  the 
acuteness  of  suffering  inflicted  upon  the  former.  Yet  both 
opinions  are  equally  wrong :  and  we  justly  prefer  to  adopt 
the  opinion  of  those  comparatively  few  whom  we  have  good 
reason  to  believe  well  acquainted  with  the  truth,  the  opinion 
of  countless  millions  to  the  contrary.  Few,  indeed,  of  all 
the  men  that  people  our  globe  believe  in  one  God,  spiritual, 
omnipotent,  and  omniscient ;  yet  we  hold  fast  to  the  belief 
in  him.  Suppose,  however,  that  we  had  agreed  that  the 
opinion  of  the  mere  number  should  sway,  that  is,  as  we 
termed  it,  the  general  opinion,  and  not  the  public  opinion, 
which  is,  I  repeat,  the  opinion  of  society  as  an  organized 
thing,  settled  and  influenced  by  the  knowledge  of  those  who 
best  understand  the  respective  subject,  their  views  and  conclu- 
sions having  been  likewise  influenced  and  modified  both  by 
the  action  of  society  upon  them  in  forming  their  views  and  in 
receiving  them — suppose  we  had  agreed  to  this  abstract 
principle,  we  should  be  still  as  far  from  the  ultimate  object  as 
before.  For  if  the  mere  theorist  says  that  each  man  shall 
vote,  and  that  nothing  shall  be  law  unless  directly  voted  for 
by  the  majority  of  all  the  individual  men  composing  the  re- 
spective political  society,  the  question  arises  at  once,  Who 
are  these  men  that  must  have  the  right?  Shall  women  vote? 
and  if  not,  why?  Shall  children  vote  ?  and  if  not,  upon  what 
abstract  ground  do  we  decide  that  the  twenty-first  year,  for 
instance,  shall  mark  the  distinction  between  the  mature  and 
the  immature  intellect  ?  Many  a  youth  is  wiser  at  twenty 
than  other  persons  at  fifty  years  of  age,  as  our  daily  expe- 
rience proves.  Nay,  more,  how  is  it  that  the  principle  of 
maturity  of  mind  is  suddenly  added  to  the  theory  which 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


333 


nevertheless  was  originally  founded  upon  the  principle  of 
number  alone? 

James  Harrington,  the  celebrated  author  of  the  Oceana, 
which  was  published  during  the  protectorate  and  intended  to 
be  the  image  of  a  pure  republic,  provides  in  that  work  that 
the  people  shall  elect  a  senate,  and  this  senate  the  highest 
officers  with  a  strategus  at  the  head.  The  senate  alone  has 
the  right  of  proposing  laws,  on  each  of  which  the  people  vote 
and  adopt  or  reject  it  accordingly.  This  is  the  idea  upon 
which  the  right  of  direct  and  binding  instruction  is  demanded, 
carried  out  consistently.  Not  to  regard,  however,  the  utter 
impracticability  of  this  constitution,  it  would  nowise  guarantee 
the  ascertaining  of  true  public  opinion,  for  reasons  given 
above. 

It  is  a  universal  law,  pervading  all  physical  and  intellectual 
creation,  so  far  as  human  observation  and  experience  reach, 
without  one  exception,  that  the  higher  or  nobler  the  thing, 
being,  or  object  to  be  produced  or  obtained,  the  longer 
and  more  varied  is  the  chain  of  processes,  and  the  more  or- 
ganic are  these  processes, by  which  it  has  been  matured;  and 
the  lower  the  thing  or  creature,  the  more  it  is  determined 
by  agents  from  without;  the  higher  it  is,  the  more  active 
becomes  its  own  organization  within.  A  mushroom  starts 
into  existence  perfect,  within  a  few  hours,  so  soon  as  the 
necessary  agents  from  without  exist,  but  it  takes  a  long 
time  and  requires  a  variety  of  processes,  one  connected  with 
the  other,  before  the  flower  of  the  magnolia  adorns  the  rich 
foliage  of  its  noble  tree.  The  infusory  animal  detaches  part 
of  its  body,  and  a  new  being  moves  quickly  for  itself,  but  il 
requires  a  long  time  before  man's  body  and  mind  arrive  at 
maturity;  and  before  he  comes  into  existence  as  a  detached 
individual  he  has  undergone  a  long  series  of  the  most  wonder- 
ful processes  and  transformations  in  order  to  become  suffi- 
ciently matured  for  parturition.  The  same  principle  obtains 
in  the  intellectual  and  political  world.  For  a  gross  nation, 
gross  despotism,  perhaps  determined  by  gross  chance  or  the 
equally  gross  principle  of  mere  force,  may  suffice.  The  little 


334 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


of  opin  on  which  exists  in  a  tribe  on  the  pampas  of  America 
or  the  steppes  of  the  East  is  easily  ascertained.  The  signal 
is  given,  the  men  assemble,  a  proposition  is  made,  assent  or 
dissent  is  expressed,  and  the  whole  process  is  at  an  end ;  but 
the  public  opinion  of  an  extensive,  civilized,  and  organized 
society  is  neither  so  rapidly  generated  nor  so  rapidly  ascer- 
tained. The  farther  society  advances,  the  higher  it  rises,  the 
more  organic  must  be  the  process  by  which  it  is  ascertained, 
and  stripped  of  casual  adhesion  due  to  prejudice,  interest,  or 
excitement;  and  this  organic  process  for  producing  the  flower 
of  public  opinion  upon  the  many-branched  tree  of  society  is 
effected,  so  it  seems  to  me,  by  the  representative  system.  In 
this  consists  its  highest  meaning,  and  as  such  it  has  a  high 
value  of  its  own,  not  a  mere  relative  one  by  way  of  approxi- 
mation to  something  beyond  our  reach — a  value  which  we 
shall  honor  and  cherish  the  more,  the  better  we  become 
acquainted  with  the  true  spirit  of  past  ages  and  the  occur- 
rences of  the  day,  and  which  will  the  more  inspire  us  with' 
an  ardent  desire  to  cultivate,  perfect,  and  expand,  not  to  stint 
and  cripple  it,  the  more  we  penetrate  its  essence. 

X.  If  the  doctrine  of  instruction  be  right,  I  hold  it  to  be 
evident  that  it  is  entirely  inconsistent  to  allow  an  instructed 
member,  who  disagrees  with  his  instruction,  to  resign  before 
he  has  voted.  He  who  acts  the  part  of  a  deputy  or  pleni- 
potentiary is  bound  first  to  vote  according  to  instruction,  and 
then  he  may  ask  leave  to  resign ;  otherwise  his  constituents 
lose  unjustly  their  vote  or  share  of  influence  upon  final  action. 
Such  action  would  have  been  expected  of  every  deputy  in  the 
middle  ages,  and  to  this  day  would  be  expected  of  an  ambas- 
sador, who  may  conscientiously  do  thus  because  he  is. nothing 
but  an  agent  sent  for  the  very  purpose  of  voting,  if  any  voting 
is  to  be  done,  in  a  prescribed  way  ;  but  who  is  a  representative 
in  no  real  sense  of  the  word,  and  is  only  so  called  because  he 
resembles  one  in  the  outward  form.  But  what  honorable  and 
independent  man  would  degrade  himself  so  low  as  to  defile 
his  lips  by  a  vote  against  his  conscience  and  judgment,  when 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


335 


he  was  sent — under  oath — to  vote  according  to  truth,  to  the 
fulness  of  conscience  and  the  best  of  his  judgment  ?  If  repre- 
sentatives are  nothing  but  deputed  officers,  why  would  it  be 
considered  an  outrageous  act  of  immorality  if  a  representative 
coming  from  a  manufacturing  or  agricultural  district  were  to 
take  money  for  defending  the  interests  committed  to  him,  as 
the  lawyer  does,  and  as  the  deputies  in  the  middle  ages  fre- 
quently did,  or  as  to  this  day  advocates  do  when  sent  by  some 
corporation  or  society  to  the  bar  of  the  commons  ?  No  one 
finds  fault  with  them.  If  we  have  the  right  bindingly  to  in- 
struct after  the  election,  we  have  likewise  a  right  to  elect  on 
condition  of  certain  instructions,  and  may  exact  "  elective 
capitulations,"  as  the  conditions  were  called  upon  which  the 
German  electors  used  to  elect  the  emperor.  Suppose  our 
electors  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  were  either  to 
agree  upon  such  an  elective  capitulation  before  the  election,  or 
to  send  him  instructions  after  election :  would  not  the  whole 
people  scorn  the  idea,  or  consider  it  as  a  most  arrant  con- 
spiracy ?  Yet  this  is  quite  imaginable,  and  there  is  not  one 
argument  brought  in  favor  of  instruction  of  representatives 
which  would  not  apply  to  the  assumed  case.  If  the  doctrine 
of  instruction  is  sound,  it  is  but  the  legitimate  inference  that 
the  constituents  should  have  also  the  right  to  recall  their 
representative,  as  the  deputies  of  the  former  estates  were  fre- 
quently recalled.  Yet  why  do  the  constitutions  of  representa- 
tive governments  nowhere  give  this  very  important  power,  but 
universally  prescribe  the  term  for  which  a  representative  is  to 
be  elected,  which  was  rarely  done  in  the  ancient  estates  and 
only  where  they  approached  the  representative  system  ?  Be- 
cause it  has  been  universally  felt  that  a  representative  differs 
in  character  from  the  deputy.1  We  may  go  farther :  if  the 


1  One  of  the  senators  of  the  United  States,  from  Virginia,  who  was  instructed 
to  vote  for  the  well-known  expunging  resolution,  says,  indeed,  in  his  letter  of 
February  27,  1836,  to  the  legislature  of  Virginia,  when  declining  to  comply  with 
their  behest,  "  I  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  if  you  had,  as  the  accredited 
organs  of  the  people,  addressed  me  a  request  to  vacate  my  seat  in  the  senate, 
your  request  would  have  had  with  me  the  force  of  law  :  not  a  day  or  an  hour 


336  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

representative  is  the  mere  agent  acting  under  instruction  of 
those  who  unfortunately  cannot  be  present  themselves,  I 
maintain  that  not  only  ought  the  constituents  to  have  a  right 
to  recall  him,  but  they  ought  to  have  the  undeniable  right  of 
vetoing  his  vote,  as  was  actually  proposed  by  some  theorizing 
politician  in  the  French  constituent  assembly.  He  was  perfectly 
consistent,  if  he  believed  the  representatives  to  be  assembled 
there  merely  because  all  France  could  not  be  present.  The  veto 
of  the  supreme  executive  upon  any  treaty  signed  by  a  plenipo- 
tentiary is  now  universally  acknowledged,  and  the  same  ought 
to  hold  good  if  our  representatives  are  but  plenipotentiaries.1 

It  is  said  the  representative  is  elected  by  his  constituents, 
he  is  their  servant,  and  must  do  their  bidding,  "  otherwise  it 
is  a  confined  aristocracy,  in  which  the  people  have  nothing 
more  to  do  than  to  choose  their  rulers,  over  whose  proceed- 
ings, however  despotic  and  repugnant  to  the  nature  and  prin- 
ciples of  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  state,  they  have  no 
control."2  If  this  be  true,  the  Americans  live  most  assuredly 
under  a  confined  monarchy,  for  no  president  would  obey  an 
instruction;  nor  would  this  absence  of  all  confidence  be  in 
the  slightest  degree  a  guarantee  against  despotic  proceedings. 

A  mere  term  has  considerably  misled  in  this  inquiry,  as  in 
so  many  others.  The  representative  is  called  a  servant  of  the 
people ;  so  is  the  president  of  the  United  States  called,  and 
he  frequently  calls  himself,  a  servant  of  the  people ;  but  the 
word  "  servant,"  from  the  servus  servorum,  as  the  pope  signs 
himself,  down  to  the  menial  negro,  is  used  in  very  dififerent 


could  I  desire  to  remain  in  the  senate  beyond  that  hour  wherein  I  came  to  be 
informed  that  it  was  the  settled  wish  of  the  people  of  Virginia  that  I  should 
retire  from  their  service."  This  is  introducing  a  very  extraordinary  and  serious 
power,  of  which  the  constitution  knows  nothing,  if  it  mean  that  in  instructing 
the  legislature  really  expresses  the  "  settled  wish  of  the  people."  How  can  we 
know  that  they  do  ?  They  were  not  elected,  according  to  the  constitution,  to 
express  such  an  opinion. 

1  [For  this,  which  is  not  universally  acknowledged  in  regard  to  treaties  con- 
cluded according  to  full  powers  and  secret  instructions  both,  see  Wheaton, 
Elements,  part  iii.  2,  §|  257-263.] 

a  Tucker's  Blackstone,  Appendix,  p.  193. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


337 


meanings.  It  may  signify  one  that  serves  another,  labors  for 
him,  or  one  that  mechanically  does  as  he  is  bid  to  do.  It  is 
always  considered  an  honor  to  be  a  representative,  but  there 
is  no  honor  in  doing  the  bidding  of  any  one,  people  or  mon- 
arch, without  individual  independence.  The  representative 
system  requires  not  only  men  of  talent,  but  of  manly  inde- 
pendence ;  liberty  is  not  efficiently  served  by  menials,  or  by 
men  who  do  not  think  independently  and  who  shrink  from 
speaking  and  voting  in  candor  and  conscience.  The  doctrine 
of  instruction  greatly  favors  hypocrisy,  for  cases  have  occurred 
when  representatives,  seeing  that  measures  upon  which  they 
stood  compromised  were  fast  losing  ground,  sent  home  to  be 
instructed  to  vote  contrary  to  the  votes  formerly  given  by 
them.1  Where  there  is  a  constitution — and  properly  speaking 
there  is  a  constitution  that  is  fundamental  law  wherever  there 
are  representatives — but  especially  where  there  is  a  written 
constitution,  upon  which  the  representative  takes  his  oath,  the 
right  of  instruction  becomes  especially  incongruous,  for  the 
representative  is  a  guardian  and  trustee  of  and  under  the  con- 
stitution upon  oath — that  constitution  which  is  far  above  him 
and  his  constituents.  It  cannot  be  maintained  that  if  he  is 
instructed  to  do  what  he  holds  to  be  contrary  to  the  constitu- 
tion— as  when  the  Virginia  senators  were  instructed  by  their 
legislature  to  vote  for  the  renowned  expunging  resolution — 
the  very  fact  that  his  own  constituents,  the  very  makers  of  his 
authority,  view  it  differently,  shows  him  that  he  must  yield. 
The  legislature  of  South  Carolina  elects  the  supreme  judges 
of  the  state;  the  judge  takes  the  oath  upon  the  constitu- 
tion, and  may  be  called  upon  not  only  to  act  dissentingly  from 
the  legislature  which  actually  made  him,  but  as  judge  may 
declare  a  law  which  it  has  passed  unconstitutional.  How  is 
this,  if  the  relation  of  the  electors  and  the  elected  neces- 
sarily creates  the  relation  of  master  and  servant,  ordainer  and 

1  It  is  a  well-known  anecdote,  that  John  Wilkes,  with  whom  the  modern  his- 
tory of  the  instruction  question  may  be  said  to  begin,  when  asked  how  it  was 
possible  to  allow  his  judgment  to  be  fettered  by  such  a  rabble  as  had  instructed 
him,  answered,  "  Oh,  as  to  that,  I  always  take  care  to  write  my  own  instructions.'* 
VOL.  II.  22 


338  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

obeyer?     How  is  it  in  the  militia,  where  officers  are  elected 
by  the  rank  and  file  ? 

The  advocates  of  the  right  of  instruction  appear  to  forget 
one  fact,  which  seems  to  me  very  weighty.  Among  other 
political  guarantees  we  have  constitutions,  fundamental  laws, 
we  have  representatives,  and  fixed  periods  for  renewed  elec- 
tions, for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  community,  for  the 
continuity  of  views  and  opinions  for  a  certain  space  of  time  in 
the  legislation  of  the  country ;  and  we  have  laws  to  secure 
that  manner  of  election  by  which  the  state  hopes  to  secure 
best  the  rights  of  all  citizens, — that  is,  impartial  elections 
and  certainty  of  election.  Whatever  the  representative,  thus 
elected  by  the  organic  law  of  the  state,  does,  he  does  consti- 
tutionally, so  long  as  he  remains  within  the  strict  sphere  of  the 
constitution.  But  suddenly  we  have  an  extra-constitutional 
interference;  men  hold  a  meeting  unappointed  by  law,  unguar- 
anteed as  to  its  regularity,  and  they  assume  not  to  select -an 
organ  of  legislation  but  something  far  more,  to  bid  this  organ 
already  elected  to  legislate  one  way  or  the  other.  In  Virginia, 
cases  have  actually  occurred  when  papers  were  carried  to  the 
constituents  to  sign  their  names  whether  for  or  against  the 
proposed  instruction.  The  minority  may  be  deeply  interested 
in  not  having  the  member  instructed  thus  extra-constitution- 
ally  ;  they  are  wronged  out  of  their  right ;  it  becomes  tyran- 
nical ex  parte  legislation.  The  right  of  instruction  may  be 
easily  made  use  of  by  skilfully  seizing  upon  some  excitement 
to  "  instruct  a  representative  out  of  his  seat,"  who  may  be  dis- 
agreeable to  some  of  his  party.  And,  in  general,  it  is  highly 
dangerous  to  allow  any  man  or  any  number  of  men  or  any 
authority  to  arrogate  power  not  strictly  laid  down  by  the  law. 
It  is  incompatible  with  all  civil  liberty.  Binding  and  com- 
manding instruction  seems  to  me  to  loosen  the  very  founda- 
tion-stones of  true  essential  modern  liberty  in  its  broad,  noble, 
and  elevated  character,  because  it  defeats  one  of  the  essential 
features  of  the  representative  system,  without  which  modern 
liberty  cannot  exist.  -Washington  was  averse  to  positive 
instruction.  (Sparks's  Writings  of  Washington,  i.  491.) 


CHAPTER    II. 

The  Subject  of  Instruction  with  particular  Reference  to  the  United  States. — The 
ancient  Articles  of  Confederation  founded  upon  the  Deputative  System. — The 
Articles  of  Confederation  compared  to  the  Constitution  of  the  former  United 
Provinces  of  the  Netherlands,  the  Swiss  Act  of  Mediation,  the  present  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  the  Germanic  Confederacy. — The  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States  boldly  changed  the  former  deputative  character  of 
the  Confederacy  into  a  representative  one. — Senators  are  not  Ambassadors. — In 
Leagues  the  strongest  Member  of  those  on  terms  of  parity  according  to  the 
letter  must  sway. — Hegemony  in  Greece,  Phoenicia,  the  Low  Countries,  etc. 
— Relation  of  the  State  Legislatures  to  the  respective  Senators  elected  by  them. 
— The  History  of  Instruction  in  modern  times,  as  connected  with  the  Repre- 
sentative System. 

XI.  IN  order  to  show  completely  the  relation  of  moral  re- 
sponsibility in  which  I  hold  a  representative*  to  stand  to  his 
constituents,  it  will  be  necessary  to  treat  of  the  subject  of 
Pledges.  Before  we  proceed  to  it,  however,  I  must  say  a  few 
words  on  the  right  of  instruction,  with  peculiar  reference  to 
the  relation  in  which  the  senators  of  the  United  States  stand 
to  the  several  legislatures  by  which  they  are  elected. 

Very  rarely  indeed  has  the  doctrine  of  instruction  been 
acted  upon  in  the  United  States  by  the  primitive  constituents 
of  a  representative  in  congress.  The  whole  discussion  as  a 
practical  question  seems  to  have  reference  to  the  senators  ex- 
clusively, and  the  reason  can  easily  be  perceived.  As  to  the 
representatives  the  case  is  too  clear ;  they  are  real  representa- 
tives of  the  people,  not  deputies,  forming  a  national  represen- 
tation, not  states-general ;  and  whatever  the  theory  may  be,  or 
jealousy  or  love  of  power  may  prompt  some  to  assert,  sound 
instinct,  produced  by  long  valuable  political  tradition  in  the 
Anglican  race,  and  good  common  sense  require  the  people 
at  large  to  view  their  representative  only  in  the  light  of  a 
representative  and  not  in  that  of  a  circumscribed  or  fettered 
deputy.  It  is  different  with  regard  to  the  senators;  their 

339 


340  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

election,  as  well  as  the  formation  of  the  senate,  differs  mate- 
rially from  that  of  the  representatives,  and  it  is  necessary, 
therefore,  that  we  should  ascertain  the  precise  character  of  the 
senate  of  the  United  States.  Thus  alone  we  shall  be  able  to 
judge  correctly  of  the  right  of  instructing  its  members. 

The  confederacy  of  the  United  States  under  the  ancient 
Articles  of  Confederation  of  1778  was  nothing  more  than  a 
league  of  entirely  independent  states  (politically  independent 
though  united  by  feeling  and  sympathy),  connected  only  by 
whatever  might  be  agreed  upon  by  their  deputations,  accord- 
ing to  certain  principles  primarily  adopted  by  the  states ; 
without  any  system  or  government  proper ;  resembling  the 
union  of  the  former  United  Provinces  of  the  Netherlands,  or 
of  the  Swiss  Cantons  [under  the  Constitution  of  1815].  In 
some  respects  the  American  Confederacy  was  a  closer  union, 
in  others  it  was  a  looser  one,  but,  if  I  mistake  not,  congress 
had  the  nature  and  character  of  states-general,  and  nothing 
else.  The  members  of  congress  were  deputies,  and  no  more. 
This  appears  clearly  from  the  Articles  of  Confederation  them- 
selves, and,  among  other  points,  from  these :  The  states 
appoint  the  delegates  as  they  think  best,  and  may  recall  them 
in  order  to  send  others  (art.  5,1);  their  number  is  left  to  the 
option  of  the  states,  although  for  the  sake  of  expedition  of 
business  and  for  other  reasons  the  minimum  of  two,  which 
became  the  prototype  for  the  later  number  of  senators  under 
our  present  constitution,  and  the  maximum  of  seven,  were 
fixed  (5,  2);  each  state  was  to  maintain  her  delegation,  be- 
cause she  alone  was  interested  in  it  (5,  3);  each  state -was  to 
have  but  one  vote,  as  a  matter  of  course,  according  to  the 
common  principle  in  the  feudal  estates  applicable  to  commu- 
nities, professions,  provinces,  classes,  and  estates,  because  the 
deputies  represented  their  respective  primaries  as  a  whole,  and 
only  them.  If  the  deputies  of  any  state  were  equally  divided, 
the  state  lost  the  vote.  Upon  all  the  material  points  of  the 
confederacy  nine  assenting  states  were  necessary  (9,  §  6). 

Let  us  compare  these  features  with  the  corresponding  ones 
in  the  most  prominent  confederacies  of  modern  times.  The 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


341 


Netherlands,  as  I  mentioned  before,  never  elevated  themselves 
to  broad  social  or  national  representation;  their  governments, 
provincial  or  general,  never  became  enlarged  social  govern- 
ments, but  remained  chains  of  more  or  less  connected  inde- 
pendent communities ;  even  the  single  cities  had  supreme  or 
"sovereign  rights,"  of  which  it  was  a  natural  consequence  on 
the  one  hand  that  no  resolution  of  the  provincial  states  was 
considered  binding  unless  it  passed  by  unanimous  concurrence, 
and  on  the  other  hand  that  the  utmost  inequality  of  represen- 
tation existed  :  the  cities  formed  the  powerful  aristocracy,  the 
farmers  were  almost  entirely  disregarded.1  The  reader  will  re- 
member an  instance  I  mentioned,  when  speaking  of  the  love  of 
power,  in  the  first  part  of  this  work.  We  must  always  keep  in 
mind  that  the  principle  of  the  feudal  times  was  mutual  exaction 
of  liberty,  or  at  least  separate  conquest  of  liberty ;  the  motto, 
get  as  much  as  you  can,  without  reference  to  proportion,  to 
general  fairness,  to  common  welfare.  The  principle  of  modern 
liberty,  of  socialized  states,  is  public  liberty,  public,  that  is, 
common  and  mutual  guarantee,  public  check,  universal  jus- 
tice. The  oath  of  fidelity  by  the  stadtholder  and  soldiers  was 
taken  to  the  "  confederate  states  of  the  Low  Countries,  that 
is,  to  the  higher  and  the  inferior  orders  of  nobles,  and  to  the 
magistrates  of  the  towns  of  Holland,"  etc.  Nothing  can  show 
more  clearly  the  difference  which  I  have  endeavored  to  ex- 


1  In  addition  to  the  striking  instance  alluded  to,  I  will  mention  here  that  in  the 
province  of  Holland  the  independent  communities  of  the  province  were  repre- 
sented by  nineteen  deputies  chosen  out  of  the  nobility,  the  senators,  and  magis- 
trates (that  is,  city  authorities) ;  the  nobles  having  but  one  voice,  the  cities 
eighteen.  The  farmers,  who  bore  the  heaviest  public  burden,  were  neglected. 
Amsterdam  had  but  one  single  voice  in  the  states,  and  the  smallest  city  in  the 
province  likewise.  I  believe  the  constitutional  history  of  no  state  after  that  of 
Great  Britain  is  so  instructive  to  an  American  as  that  of  the  United  Provinces, 
such  as  we  may  learn  it  from  Basnage,  Annales  '  des  Provinces  Unies  depuis  la 
Negotiation  pour  la  Paix  de  Munster,  avec  la  Description  historique  de  leur 
Gouvernement.  The  ancient  cortes  of  Castile  excluded  many  old  cities,  and 
would  not  readmit  their  deputies,  after  they  had  omitted  to  send  them,  and  Pres- 
cott  justly  says  they  "  imprudently"  excluded  the  old  cities,  because,  as  I  ob- 
served before,  it  was  an  additional  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  formation  of  a 
national  or  social  representation. 


342  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

hibit  between  the  feudal  principle  of  independence,  with  the 
consequent  deputative  system,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
modern  social  states-principle  of  civil  liberty  and  civil  guar- 
antee, with  the  consequent  representative  system,  on  the 
other.  The  effects  of  this  system  were  consistent ;  the  states- 
general  of  the  United  Provinces  could  decide  upon  war  and 
peace,  treaties  of  commerce,  and  all  taxes  and  impost,  by 
unanimous  concurrence  only. 

I  have  on  a  former  occasion  briefly  touched  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  unanimity  and  majority  in  voting;  we  shall  now  be 
able  to  understand  what  otherwise  appears  so  absurd,  that  a 
single  man  should  have  had  the  right  of  vetoing  the  proce- 
dure of  an  assembly,  as  it  is  frequently  expressed,  in  the  old 
estates.  The  expression  is  not  accurate.  The  term  veto  ex- 
presses the  idea  of  nullifying  the  action  of  some  united  body; 
but  the  old  deputies  were  not  such  ;  unanimity  was  with  them 
as  natural,  according  to  the  principle  which  gave  them  exist- 
ence, as  it  is  now  with  a  congress  (of  ambassadors ;  each  party 
is  bound  only  so  far  as  it  has  assented,  because  entirely  inde- 
pendent ;  so  that  defeating  a  general  result  by  a  single  dissent 
was  as  little  a  veto  with  those  ancient  estates  as  it  would  be 
with  ambassadors  at  present.  If  the  principle  of  unanimity 
was,  nevertheless,  in  many  minor  cases  abandoned,  it  was 
because  the  mere  furtherance  of  business  required  it.  But 
the  principle  appears  more  or  less  in  all  the  most  important 
estates  (cortes,  diets,  etc.)  in  the  middle  ages,  strongly  at  first, 
and  the  less  so  the  more  the  various  countries  became  national- 
ized and  the  interest  of  the  different  parts  began  more  and 
more  to  affect  one  another.  The  salutary  majority  principle 
could  only  become  known  and  well  introduced  with  the  com- 
plete victory  of  representation  over  deputation. 

The  Grand  Pensionary  of  Holland,  the  chief  officer  of  the 
chief  province,  and,  indeed,  virtually,  the  executive  and  chief 
magistrate  of  the  whole  United  Provinces,  took  place  after 
the  deputies,  because  the  latter  represented  independences, 
corporations  with  "  sovereign  rights."  The  members  of  the 
states-general  came  to  no  resolution  without  instruction  and 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


343 


specific  authorization  from  home;  the  provinces  sent  two 
or  more  members  at  pleasure,  but  the  votes  were  given  by 
provinces,  not  by  the  single  voices  of  members ;  the  time  of 
service  for  deputies  was  differently  regulated  in  the  various 
provinces,  as  if  it  were  a  matter  of  utter  indifference  to  the 
states-general ;  some  were  chosen  even  for  life.1  I  have  men- 
tioned already  the  amended  constitution  of  the  Netherlands 
of  1815,  which  declares  each  member  of  the  states-general  to 
be  a  national  representative,  and  gives  him,  consequently,  a 
vote  belonging  to  his  moral,  individual  self  as  representative, 
not  to  his  deputed  authority  as  a  mere  deputy,  nor  depending 
on  instructions,  and  settles  their  number,  though  they  are 
elected,  as  formerly,  by  the  provincial  states.  (Constitution 
of  the  Netherlands,  §  83.) 

The  Swiss  Act  of  Mediation  (of  February  19,  1803),  di- 
gested under  the  direct  influence  of  Napoleon,2  in  order  to 
abolish  the  democratic  concentrated  government  then  lately 
established  in  imitation  of  France,  ordains  that  each  canton 
shall  send  one  deputy  to  the  general  congress  (Tagsatzung), 
that  they  shall  have  definite  instructions  and  powers  of  attor- 
ney, and  shall  not  vote  against  their  instructions.  (Ch.  20, 
tit.  i,  §§  25,  26.)  And  by  the  Swiss  Act  of  Union  of  August 
7,  1815,  it  is  ordained  that  congress  (Tagsatzung)  shall  consist 
of  "ambassadors  from  the  sovereign  estates,"  meaning  the 
cantons.  They  are  the  ambassadors  of  the  twenty-two  can- 
tons and  are  bound  to  vote  by  their  instructions.  Each  canton 
has  one  voice.  Three-fourths  of  the  votes  are  necessary  for 
war  or  peace,  treaties,  and  some  important  internal  affairs. 
(Act  of*Union,  §  8.)  Lastly,  let  us  throw  a  glance  at  the 


1  The  deputy  is  the  special  agent  or  ambassador  of  the  body  which  sends  him ; 
he  has  no  general  character  as  a  member  of  one  common  system,  as  the  repre- 
sentative has.     What  did  it  matter  to  the  powers  assembled  in  the  congress  of 
Vienna  whether  the  minister  of  one  or  the  other  was  recalled  and  another  sent  ? 
The  case  of  the  deputy  is  similar. 

2  Napoleon,  in  the  days  of  his  greatest  power,  called  himself  emperor  of  the 
French,  king  of  Italy  (not  of  the  Italians),  protector  of  the  Rhenish  Confederacy, 
and  Mediator  of  Switzerland. 


344  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

present  Germanic  confederacy  [1838].  If  ever  a  government 
unfolded  itself  under  most  unfortunate  circumstances,  it  was  the 
former  Germanic  empire,  which  had  all  the  vices  and  organic 
defects  of  an  elective  monarchy,  with  this  evil  superadded,  that 
while  in  other  countries  the  nobles  were  reduced  and  national 
monarchy  rose,  the  nobles  in  Germany  reduced  the  emperor 
and  made  themselves  independent,  while  the  subjects  lost  the 
advantages  which  they  would  have  derived  from  a  national 
government.  The  imperial  monarchy  had  the  effect  of  pro- 
ducing the  independence  of  all  the  princes  and  petty  states  of 
the  empire,  and  the  consequent  exposure  and  humiliation  of 
Germany.  Napoleon  consolidated  them  considerably;  and 
when  he  fell,  the  German  princes  felt  that  a  union  of  some 
sort  or  other  was  deeply  founded  in  the  spirit  of  the  nation 
and  called  for  upon  the  score  of  common  safety;  consequently 
the  Germanic  Act  of  Union  of  1815  was  adopted  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna.  The  Germanic  confederacy  is  a  league  of 
princes  and  states,  who  send  ambassadors  to  the  diet,  which 
ambassadors,  of  course,  act  by  regular  instruction ;  the  mem- 
bers vote  in  two  different  ways,  either  in  the  "  closer  meeting," 
in  which  the  larger  Germanic  powers  have  each  one  vote,  but 
three,  four,  or  five  together  of  the  petty  states  only  one ;  or 
the}'-  vote  in  "  plenum,"  some  states,  as  Austria,  Prussia,  etc., 
having  four  votes,  others  three,  two,  and  each  member  of  the 
Union  at  least  one.  Austria  has  the  permanent  precedency. 
This  brief  exhibition  alone  will  suffice  to  show  its  unnational, 
unrepresentative  character,  in  which  the  people  at  large  have 
indeed  little  interest,  as  to  their  advantage.  The  Act  of  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine  (of  July  12,  1 806),  under  the*  protec- 
torship of  Napoleon,  needs  not  to  be  mentioned  here :  it  was 
a  mere  league  of  princes.1 


1  [The  present  constitution  of  the  latest  German  empire,  framed  in  1870,  says 
of  the  Reichstag,  or  house  elected  by  direct  vote  of  the  people,  that  the  members 
"  are  representatives  of  the  people  as  a  whole,  and  not  bound  to  commissions 
and  instructions."  (Art.  29.)  It  is  otherwise  with  the  Bundesrath,  or  Federal 
Council.  Art.  7.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  345 

XII.  How  much  superior,  how  lofty  and  great,  appears  our 
federal  constitution,  the  very  first  in  history  in  which  the  bold 
attempt  has  been  made  of  substituting  the  representative  sys- 
tem for  the  deputative  in  a  confederation,  thus  adapting  it  to 
the  necessary  tendency  of  modern  public  liberty,  and  securing 
those  advantages  which  such  a  system  alone  can  possibly 
guarantee!  As^a  federal  charter,  it  is  a  matchless  monument 
in  history — matchless,  indeed,  despite  the  faults  which  it  may 
be  supposed  to  have  on  general  grounds,  for  it  is  the  work 
of  men,  and  some  of  which  it  is  not  difficult  now  to  discover; 
yet  the  historian,  without  blind  or  slavish  idolatry,  cannot 
help  frequently  gazing  with  reverence  at  this  grand  fabric, 
built  upon  such  simple  principles  and  on  so  vast  a  scale. 

That  the  deputative  character  of  the  ancient  congress  was 
boldly  and  grandly  transformed  into  a  representative,  we  see 
from  the  constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  especially  I 
beg  the  reader  to  compare  the  following  points  with  those 
of  the  Act  of  Confederation  which  I  cited -above  in  order  to 
prove  the  deputative  character  of  the  ancient  congress. 

First  of  all  the  constitution  establishes  an  entire  govern- 
ment with  separate  and  regular  branches,  and  it  establishes 
not  only  a  separate  legislative  branch,  but  this  branch  on  the 
principle  of  two  chambers  which  belongs  to  the  representative 
system ;  it  separates  from  "  congress"  the  executive,  elected 
by  the  people  of  all  the  states  at  large,  and  unlike  an  execu- 
tive committee  of  deputies  chosen  from  among  themselves, 
such  as  the  former  "  committee  of  the  states."  (Articles  of 
Confederation,  §  5.) 

The  first  paragraph  of  the  "  constitution"  (no  longer  called 
articles  of  confederation)  establishes  a  house  of  representa- 
tives (no  longer  mere  delegates).  (Art.  I,  sect.  I,  §  I.) 

The  time  for  which  the  senators  and  representatives  are 
elected  is  fixed.  (Art  I,  sect.  2,  §  I,  sect.  3,  §  I.) 

The  number  of  senators  to  be  sent  from  each  state  is  fixed, 
yet  one  individual  vote  is  constitutionally  secured  to  each 
senator.  They  vote  personally  or  individually,  not  deputa- 
tively  [and  an  organic  character  is  given  to  the  senate  as  a 


346  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

whole  by  the  provision  that  one-third  is  renewed  every  second 
year].  (Ibid.) 

Congress  may  make  all  elective  regulations,  except  as  to 
the  places  of  choosing  senators.  (Art.  I,  sect.  4,  §  I.) 

Each  house  is  to  judge  of  the  election  returns  and  qualifi- 
cations of  its  own  members,  which  is  incompatible  with  depu- 
tations. (Art.  I,  sect.  5,  §  I.) 

A  majority  of  each  house  forms  a  quorum.     (Ibid.) 

Each  house  may  punish  its  members  for  disorderly  be- 
havior, and  even  expel  a  member  by  two-thirds  of  the  votes. 
(Art.  i,  sect.  5,  §  2.) 

The  yeas  and  nays  may  be  easily  demanded,  that  is,  it  is  in 
the  power  of  one-fifth  of  those  present  to  throw  each  member 
upon  his  individual  responsibility  and  representative  character. 
(Art.  i,  sect.  5,  §  3.) 

Senators  and  representatives  are  compensated  out  of  the 
treasury  of  the  United  States  (Art.  i,  sect.  6,  §  i),  and  not 
paid  by  the  bodies  who  send  them. 

Congress  legislates  for  the  people  of  the  United  States,  not 
for  the  states  separately.  If  a  tax  is  levied  it  is  upon  the  people ; 
the  quotas  are  not  sent  to  the  state  legislatures ;  which  must 
have  been  done  upon  the  feudal  deputative  principle. 

Let  us  now  see  what  is  the  true  respective  character  of  the 
senate  and  the  house  of  representatives,  according  to  the  con- 
stitution. What  is  their  difference  ?  The  senators  have  fre- 
quently been  called  the  ambassadors  or  ministers  of  the  states. 
It  is  an  unbefitting  term.  He  would  be  but  a  poor  ambas- 
sador who  is  not  instructed  beforehand,  and  cannot  be  re- 
called at  any  moment,  but  is  appointed  for  a  definite  period 
of  six  years,  and  who  joins  a  body  of  co-ambassadors,  presided 
over,  not  by  a  member  elected  from  among  themselves  and 
by  rapid  rotation,  as  was  the  case  in  the  freest  of  the  former 
estates,  but  by  an  officer  in  the  origin  of  his  authority  wholly 
extraneous  to  the  senate — an  officer  who  does  not  come  from 
a  particular  state,  but  from  the  people  at  large,  like  the  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  The  constitution  thus  links  the 
senate,  coming  from  the  states  as  such,  to  the  general  system 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


347 


of  government,  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  But  a  body  of  am- 
bassadors must  be  wholly  independent,  or  it  has  no  meaning. 
How  could  a  body  of  independent  ambassadors  possibly  form, 
not  the  supreme  body  of  some  confederation,  but  an  integrant 
and  permanent  part  of  a  continuous  regular  government  of 
a  union  ?  The  constitution  gives  one  separate  vote  to  each 
senator,  even,  though  the  two  senators  from  one  state  dis- 
agree, which  is  inconsistent  with  the  function  of  a  deputy  and 
an  ambassador,  being  strictly  and  wholly  representative.  For, 
besides  the  moral  importance  and  influence  upon  society  of 
seeing  the  two  senatorial  colleagues  vote  openly,  even  if  op- 
posed to  one  another,  the  subject  becomes  still  more  impor- 
tant in  those  cases  in  which  two-thirds  of  the  votes  are 
required,  as  in  impeachments  of  the  president  of  the  United 
States  or  of  any  other  officer,  or  in  cases  when  treaties  with 
foreign  powers  are  submitted  to  the  senate  (Art.  I,  sect.  3,  §  6, 
Art.  2,  sect.  2,  §  2),  or  in  all  cases  where  pluralities  only  and 
not  majorities  are  required,  and  finally  in  all  cases  in  which  the 
two  respective  senators  are  opposed  to  each  other  and  one 
happens  to  be  absent,  which  of  course  must  frequently  happen. 

The  senate,  moreover,  is  a  deliberative  assembly  in  its  very 
nature ;  but  ambassadors  do  not  freely  deliberate,  they  only 
negotiate ;  they  try  to  persuade  others  to  agree  to  subjects 
already  settled  in  their  mind,  and  for  which  they  are  particu- 
larly sent. 

The  representative  character  of  the  senators,  therefore,  is 
incontrovertible,  yet  they  differ  from  the  members  of  the 
house  of  representatives.  The  problem  of  the  framers  was 
to  unite  the  representative  system,  without  which,  as  I  shall 
presently  show,  we  must  have  been  exposed  to  great  disorder, 
with  the  system  of  a  confederacy.  If  I  do  not  misunderstand 
the  history  of  our  constitution,  the  true  character  of  the  sen- 
ator and  representative  of  the  United  States  is  that  the  senator 
is  the  representative,  but  not  the  deputy,  of  his  state  as  such, 
that  is  as  a  political  society  of  itself,  yet  a  member  of  a  union; 
in  which  capacity  of  course  all  members,  that  is,  states,  are 
equal,  and  for  which  reason  an  equal  number  of  these  state 


348  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

representatives  is  fixed  for  all ;  and  the  members  of  the  house 
of  representatives  are  the  direct  representatives  of  the  people, 
hence  they  are,  injustice,  apportioned  according  to  the  popu- 
lation all  over  the  land.  That  those  from  one  state  will  act 
in  many  instances  unitedly  is  natural,  for  the  interest  and 
public  opinion  of  their  constituents  will  lead  them  to  do  so ; 
yet  that  they  do  not  do  so  in  a  thousand  cases,  and  ought  not 
to  do  so,  we  all  know.  I  hold  it  to  be  a  principle  of  the  last 
importance,  that  the  representative  in  congress  is  a  national 
representative,  not  only  for  the  general  reasons  urged  in  pre- 
vious passages,  but  also  for  one  which  relates  to  confeder- 
acies in  particular.  If  this  position  of  ours  is  correct,  it 
appears  that  it  is  not  acting  upon  the  true  principle  of  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  if  members  of  the  house  of 
representatives  of  congress  are  elected  by  general  state  tickets, 
as  [was  formerly]  done  in  four  states,  and  not  by  separate 
district  tickets.  The  states  as  states  are  already  represented 
by  the  senators.1 

XIII.  Wherever  mere  leagues  or  confederations  on  the 
deputative  principle  are  formed,  and  where  the  states  meet 
as  absolutely  equal,  or  on  terms  of  parity  according  to  the 
letter  of  the  compact,  without  the  mediating  representative 
principle,  inequality  in  fact,  notwithstanding  parity  in  terms, 
must  exist;  that  is,  in  the  natural  course  of  things  the  most 
powerful  must  necessarily  sway  where  individuals  as  separate 
individuals  meet.  He  that  is  the  strongest  governs.  There 
is  not  one  exception  in  history.  The  Greeks  could  not  help 
leaguing  together ;  their  whole  national  spirit,  always  more 
powerful  than  single  institutions  or  laws,  led  them  to  it ;  com- 
mon language,  religion,  extraction,  recollections,  and  similar 
laws,  were  so  many  ties  counteracting  governmental  sepafa- 
tions.  But,  as  they  had  no  representative  system  ramifying  like 


1  [Since  Dr.  Lieber  wrote  this,  a  general  law  passed  by  congress  in  1842 
provided  for  a  common  plan  of  election  in  all  the  states.  This  requires  that 
election  shall  be  by  districts,  choosing  one  congressman  each,  and  it  overthrew 
the  general  ticket  system  of  five  states.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  349 

a  nervous  system  through  the  whole,  one  state  or  the  other, 
Athens,  Lacedaemon,  or  Thebes,  must  needs  have  the  sway, 
or  supremacy— the  hegemony,  as  they  called  it.  The  Am- 
phictyonic  council  was  a  general  institution  indeed,  and  not 
without  some  occasional  influence,  but  it  consisted  of  ambas- 
sadors or  deputies  only ;  it  was  a  general  institution  in  which 
most  of  the  Greeks — as  tribes  and  not  as  city-states — had 
a  share,  but,  strictly  speaking,  not  a  national  one,1 — frailer  still 
than  the  American  confederacy  under  the  ancient  Articles. 
A  large  part  of  Greek  national  history,  therefore,  is  one  con- 
tinued struggle  of  this  inward  yearning  for  union,  or  impulse 
of  native  national  sympathy,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  struggle 
for  and  against  the  preponderance — the  hegemony — on  the 
other ;  a  struggle  of  great  bitterness.  For  tribes  and  states 
follow  in  this  respect  the  same  law  which  regulates  the  inter- 
course of  private  individuals ;  that  is,  the  more  sympathy  or 
natural  relations  tend  towards  union,  the  more  bitter  will  be 
the  conflict  if  this  inner  urgency  is  counteracted  by  external 
separation.  In  the  confederacy  of  the  independent  Phoenician 
cities,  Tyre,  Sidon,  or  some  one  of  the  richest  and  most  power- 
ful had  the  hegemony.  A  similar  phenomenon  is  observable 
in  the  ancient  Hansa,  in  the  old  city-union  in  the  South  of 
Germany  and  in  Northern  Italy,  in  Catalonia,  and  wherever 
we  may  direct  our  attention.  When  the  Low  Countries  sepa- 
rated from  Spain,  the  seven  provinces,  each  independent  and 
sovereign,  confederated,  and  Holland,  the  strongest,  neces- 
sarily obtained  the  hegemony — so  decidedly  indeed  that  a 
citizen  like  De  Witt,  pensioner  of  Holland,  became  the  virtual 
regent  and  ruler  of  the  United  Provinces,  and  one  of  the  most 
influential  European  statesmen  of  his  age.  The  Swiss  cantons 
have  formed  a  confederacy  in  the  ancient  style,  and  Bern 
sways  in  a  considerable  degree;  while  the  Germanic  states 
formed  a  confederacy,  in  which  Austria  and  Prussia  had  the 
controlling  influence ;  and  however  daring  and  fruitless  it  may 

1  F.  W.  Tittmann  on  the  Union  of  the  Amphictyons  (in  German),  Berlin,  1812. 
[E.  A.  Freeman,  History  of  Federal  Governments,  vol.  i.,  London  and  Cam- 
bridge, 1863.] 


350 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


generally  be  in  politics  to  deal  in  suppositions  as  to  that 
which  might  or  would  have  been  the  case,  I  believe  that  there 
can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  that,  if  our  former  confederation 
had  continued  to  exist  upon  its  ancient  articles,  New  York 
must  by  this  time  have  been  in  possession  of  the  American 
hegemony,  or,  what  is  more  likely,  repeated  wars  for  the 
American  hegemony  between  such  states  as  Virginia,  which 
was  indeed  wellnigh  obtaining  it  or  may  be  said  to  have 
possessed  it  already  in  a  degree,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  York, 
must  have  disturbed  our  social  system.  We  have  only  to 
imagine  the  election  of  representatives  for  congress  all  over 
the  Union  to  proceed  by  a  "  general  ticket"  throughout  each 
respective  state,  to  see  at  once  the  consequences.  Pennsyl- 
vania and  New  York,  or  New  York  and  Ohio,  leagued  to- 
gether, would  almost  infallibly  sway  the  whole  congress. 

It  is  on  this  point  in  particular  that  our  constitution  appears 
to  me  deserving  of  our  deepest  veneration  and  gratitude.  By 
introducing  the  representative  system,  that  is, proportional  and 
social  representation,  and  not  representation  of  the  states  as 
corporate  bodies  alone,  by  nationalizing  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, all  struggle  for  the  hegemony  which  drowned  the 
glory  of  Greece  in  the  torrents  of  the  Peloponnesian  war 
was  avoided.  Am  I  not  justified,  then,  in  calling  the  framing 
and  adoption  of  the  constitution  a  great  historical  act  ? 

XIV.  It  will  now  be  easy  for  us  to  view  the  question  of 
senatorial  instruction  in  its  true  light.  The  legislatures  of  the 
different  states  elect  the  senators  of  their  respective  states. 
This  is  admitted;  the  constitution  commands  it.  But  we  have 
seen  already,  in  the  case  of  the  presidential  election  and  in 
that  of  judges  or  militia  officers,  that  election  alone  constitutes 
no  sort  of  foundation  for  the  right  of  instruction.  This  right, 
if  it  exists,  must  be  proved  on  distinct  grounds.  The  dif- 
ferent state  legislatures  elect  the  senators  in  virtue  of  a  com- 
mon constitution.  The  constitution  does  not  say  that  the 
senators  are  their  ambassadors;  and  the  legislatures  have  no 
more  right  to  issue  mandatory  instructions  than  the  electors 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


351 


of  the  president  of  the  United  States  have  to  instruct  the 
president,  or  than  a  state  governor  has  who  may  have  ap- 
pointed a  senator  to  fill  a  sudden  vacancy.  If  he  is  elected 
directly  by  the  people,  as  he  is  in  all  the  states  at  present, 
such  a  governor  stands  in  the  relation  of  an  intermediate 
party  between  the  people  and  the  senator  whom  he  thus  ap- 
points. But  who  would  tolerate  it  if  the  governor  should 
undertake  to  instruct  ? 

The  legislatures  are  bound  to  elect  for  six  years  ;  they  have 
no  right  given  them  to  recall  the  senators,  which  at  the  time 
of  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  was  demanded  in  one  or 
two  cases,  but  largely  overruled.  We  all  know  perfectly  well, 
however,  that  the  right  of  instruction  amounts  in  almost  all 
cases  of  real  importance,  that  is,  when  the  instructed  differs 
in  opinion  from  his  instructors,  to  a  virtual  recall ;  for  if  both 
parties  agree,  the  instruction  can  have  value  only  by  way  of 
moral  weight.  The  legislatures  have  sworn  to  maintain  the 
constitution,  and  must  not  arrogate  so  important  a  power  as 
to  interfere  with  and  virtually  to  abrogate  one  of  its  most 
important  provisions — nay,  to  blot  out  one  of  its  leading  fea- 
tures. The  constitution  gives  no  right  to  recall  the  resisting 
senator ;  but  what  does  the  right  of  instruction  amount  to,  if 
there  be  no  means  of  enforcing  it  ?  It  is  answered,  the  in- 
structed senator  is  morally  bound  to  obey  or  to  resign.  If  he 
is  morally  bound,  and  not  constitutionally,  it  follows  that  he 
likewise  has  to  judge  of  the  case.  The  right  of  instruction 
is  said  to  be  implied  in  the  idea  of  representation.  Does  im- 
plication differ  in  this  case  from  construction  ?  Is,  not,  then 
the  right  which  the  state  legislatures  assume  in  instructing  a 
constructive  right,  and  dangerous  to  civil  liberty  ?  That  ac- 
cording to  my  view  it  does  not  follow  from  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  representation  has  been  seen.  Below  are  instances 
to  show  that  this  feature — election  of  senators  for  six  years, — 
would  be  totally  erased  from  the  constitution  if  mandatory 
instruction  were  introduced  l 


1  The  following  is  a  passage  of  the  speech  of  Senator  Southard  [of  New  Jersey] 
in  the  senate  of  the  United  States  on  February  22,  1835  : 


352 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


The  constitution  of  the  United  States  has  introduced  the 
system  of  two  houses,  so  justly  dear  to  the  whole  Anglican 
race  as  one  of  the  happiest  expedients  which  has  been  adopted 
by  all  nations  that  follow  in  their  path  of  political  civilization. 
But  what  is  the  true  meaning  of  this  system  of  two  houses  ? 
It  is  a  political  guarantee,  a  check,  and  one  of  peculiarly  beau- 
tiful operation.  Masses,  we  observed,  are  impetuous;  houses 
of  representatives  likewise  as  masses  become  impetuous.  It 
is  important,  therefore,  to  have  two  houses  so  organized  that 
they  will  not  be  easily  swayed  by  the  same  impetuosity, — in 
other  words,  that  the  two  houses  be  founded  upon  different 
principles.  If  not,  as  is  the  case  in  the  present  Belgian  con- 
stitution, according  to  which  the  senate  is  elected  by  the 
representatives  from  among  themselves,  little  more  than  the 


"  It  may,  it  often  does,  happen  that  the  political  character  of  the  legislature  is 
frequently  changed.  Upon  this  theory  there  must  be  a  new  senator  upon  every 
change.  In  Rhode  Island,  if  I  recollect  correctly,  the  changes  have  been  such 
that  she  might  have  had,  nay,  ought  to  have  had,  six  senators  in  two  years.  So 
in  Ohio  :  last  year  she  instructed  her  senators  :  one  of  them  disobeyed ;  if  he  had 
resigned,  the  present  legislature,  which  is  of  a  different  political  aspect,  would 
have  instructed  his  successor,  and  we  should  have  had  two  new  senators  upon 
the  floor,  and  the  state  had  five  in  a  little  more  than  one  year.  The  rebellious 
one  of  last  year  might  have  been  restored ;  unless  indeed  the  legislature  should, 
as  they  ought  under  such  circumstances,  spurn  him  from  their  confidence  for  his 
servility,  as  destitute  of  that  moral  courage  and  independence  of  character  with- 
out which  a  public  agent  is  a  public  curse.  The  history  of  my  own  state  is  not 
destitute  of  facts  to  illustrate  this  doctrine.  The  changes  which  have  taken  place 
in  the  political  parties  there  since  1824  would  have  given  to  us  some  six  or  eight 
different  members,  and  this  resulting  from  no  versatility  or  changeableness  in  the 
character  of  her  people.  The  number  of  our  counties  is  small — only  fourteen. 
The  parties  throughout  the  state  have  long  been  nearly  balanced.  In  several 
of  the  counties  the  change  of  a  few  votes,  or  the  neglect  of  a  small  number  to 
attend  the  polls,  would  not  only  give  a  new  representative  in  the  legislature,  but 
change  its  political  character;  a  little  more  than  one  hundred  votes,  in  one  or 
two  of  several  counties,  would  have  changed  the  late  instructions.  There  are,  I 
believe,  about  twenty  members  of  the  majority  who  hold  their  seats  by  an  aver- 
age of  not  more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  votes  ;  some  of  them  by  less  than 
one  hundred.  Suppose  there  should  be  a  small  alteration  of  opinion,  resulting 
from  some  general  or  local  cause ;  the  political  aspect  will  be  changed.  Shall 
the  legislature  again  instruct,  drive  the  recently  elected  senator  from  his  seat  be- 
fore he  has  had  time  to  become  familiar  with  it,  and  restore  the  one  whose  office 
is  about  expiring?" 


POLITICAL   ETHICS.  35  3 

outward  form  of  the  bicameral  system  is  obtained.  Now,  if 
our  representatives  come  fresh  from  the  people  at  short  inter- 
vals, and  the  state  legislatures,  coming  from  the  same  people 
at  equally  short  intervals,  undertake  to  instruct  the  senators, 
who  are  elected  for  six  years,  the  system  of  two  houses  as  a 
guarantee,  most  wisely  established,  is- evidently  destroyed,  and 
we  have  upon  all  important  questions  but  one  house,  though 
sitting  in  two  different  places  ;  only  two  bureaux,  as  the  French 
would  call  it,  of  the  same  body. 

It  has  been  objected,  however,  Suppose  that  the  representa- 
tives or  senators  should  really  vote  against  the  dearest  interests 
of  their  constituents ;  in  fact,  I  have  heard  it  asked,  what 
should  we  do  if  our  representatives  should  vote  for  a  law 
directly  in  contradiction  to  the  fundamental  law?  All  I  would 
answer  is,  Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  the  representatives  will 
not  vote  for  such  a  law  but  should  be  instructed  to  do  so  ? 
One  is  as  imaginable  as  the  other.  These  are  extravagant 
suppositions,  against  which  no  human  system  can  provide, 
and  the  victorious  power  of  public  opinion,  under  which  the 
representative  emphatically  stands,  is  altogether  forgotten.  A 
thousand  similar  suppositions  might  be  made  respecting  the 
ultimate  point  of  any  constitutional  institution.  The  British 
monarch  can  make  an  unlimited  number  of  peers,  and  when, 
under  Walpole's  ministry,  the  earl  of  Sunderland  proposed  to 
close  the  list  of  peers  forever,  the  commons  most  strenuously 
opposed  depriving  the  crown  of  this  prerogative,  and  to  the 
objection  that  the  crown  might  make  a  hundred  peers  in  one 
creation,  gave  answer  that  the  responsible  minister  stands 
under  public  opinion — that  many  things  which  migJit  be  done 
nevertheless  cannot  be  done.  Our  congress  has  the  right  of 
expelling  any  member  by  two-thirds  of  the  votes  :  suppose 
the  members  should  league  together  to  expel  in  the  regular 
way  the  representatives  of  a  certain  district.  All  this  might 
be  done,  but  it  cannot  be  done  unless  public  opinion  sinks  so 
low  as  to  permit  it.  There  is  no  form,  no  guarantee,  which 
can  protect  a  degraded  people ;  no  senate  could  protect  under 
a  Tiberius,  for  all  were  degraded. 
VOL.  II.  23 


354  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

Another  objection  is,  that  although  it  be  admitted  that  a 
constant  recurrence  to  the  right  of  instruction  would  deprive 
a  parliamentary  body  of  its  deliberative  character,  yet  it  will 
be  resorted  to  only  in  cases  of  extremity.  This,  however,  is 
by  no  means  so  very  certain  ;  custom  and  repetition  might 
soon  reduce  the  representative  system  to  one  of  mere  depu- 
ties. But  let  us  admit  even  that  this  would  not  probably  be 
the  case,  all  guarantees  and  checks  are  most  impprtant  when 
cases  of  magnitude  arrive ;  they  exist  for  that  very  purpose. 
The  most  varied  and  even  opposite  forms  are  frequently  indif- 
ferent in  the  common  run  of  cases ;  but  when  the  periods  of 
difficulty  arrive  it  is  the  very  time  they  must  show  their  es- 
sence. We  try  the  wisdom  of  a  political  law  of  importance 
not  by  common  cases  but  by  great  emergencies.  The  trial 
by  jury  is  not  of  so  great  importance  for  the  punishment  of 
petty  thefts;  other  forms  of  trial  might  sometimes  be  even 
preferable;  but  when  difficulties  arrive,  when  power  of  office 
and  public  opinion,  resentment  of  the  judge  and  unbiassed 
fairness,  struggle  with  one  another,  then  the  trial  by  jury  must 
show  whether  it  is  justly  held  dear  by  the  Anglican  race  or 
not. 

I  know  full  well  that  it  would  be  trying  to  see  a  senator 
perseveringly  vote  against  what,  according  to  the  existing 
opinion,  seems  to  be  decidedly  the  general  opinion  of  the 
state,  without  having  the  power  to  correct  him  according  to 
the  doctrine  of  instruction  adopted  by  some  states.  But  let 
us  weigh  well  whether  it  is  not  one  of  the  very  objects  of  the 
constitution  which  orders  him  to  be  elected  for  six  years,  that 
upon  occasions  he  should  not  quickly  follow  a  sudden  turn 
in  the  opinion  at  home ;  and,  above  all,  whether,  however 
wrong  or  obstinate  he  may  be,  it  is  not  upon  the  whole  infi- 
nitely better  to  suffer  this  passing  and  specific  evil  than  to 
suffer  the  subversion  of  the  representative  character  of  the 
senate — of  the  constitution  itself.  Is  there  no  such  necessity 
in  politics  as  moral  restriction,  and  manly  suffering  of  an  evil 
in  order  to  avoid  a  still  greater  one  ?  We  must  ask  again, 
has  public  opinion  no  ultimate  force  in  a  free  country  ?  I  be- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


355 


lieve  that  no  senator  could  possibly  withstand  for  any  length 
of  time  the  course  of  settled  public  opinion  if  opposed  to  his 
course  of  action ;  though  he  may,  as  has  often  happened, 
oppose  the  drift  of  general  opinion  on  specific,  single  meas- 
ures. He  lias,  in  my  opinion,  received  his  peculiar  authority 
by  the  constitution,  among  other  reasons,  for  the  very  reason 
that  he  may  do  so.  When  is  it  that  a  senator  is  generally  in- 
structed, or  that  this  whole  subject  becomes  important?  Not 
when  he  agrees  with  the  instructions,  nor  when  he  flagrantly 
abandons  his  former  course  upon  which  he  was  elected.  He 
cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  frequently  dare  to  do  so.  He 
knows  too  well  that  his  character  would  be  gone  forever.  In- 
struction, then,  becomes  important  generally  in  those  cases  in 
which  not  the  senator  but  the  opinion  at  home  has1  suddenly 
changed  since  his  election.  Is  it  not  for  these  very  cases  that 
the  constitution  grants  him  a  term  of  six  years,  while  it  grants 
only  the  brief  period  of  two  years  to  the  representatives  ?  Is 
jiot  the  claim  to  the  right  of  instruction  by  the  state  legisla- 
tures the  old  desire  of  power  for  more  power,  which  steals  so 
easily  upon  all  of  us,  and  to  check  which  is  one  of  the  objects 
of  fixed  fundamental  laws  ? 

I  do  not  believe  that  it  has  ever  been  maintained,  even  in 
impassioned  controversy,  that  the  legislatures  would  have  the 
right  to  instruct  when  the  senate  was  sitting  as  a  high  court 
of  impeachment.  There  seems  to  be  something  so  revolting 
in  the  case,  reminding  so  directly  of  the  worst  cases  under 
the  Stuarts,  when  the  judges  were  distinctly  told  by  the  court 
how  to  sentence,  that  I  do  not  believe  the  right  of  instruction 
has  ever  been  claimed  for  these  cases.  But  why  not?  Be- 
cause the  senators  sit  as  judges,  and  because  to  judge  without 
trial,  that  is,  to  judge  without  conscientious  conformity  of 
the  judgment  to  what  appears  upon  trial  and  with  regard  to 
something  else,  is  felt  at  once  by  every  one  to  be  the  highest 
iniquity.  But  is  it  less  unwise  to  legislate  on  any  other 
grounds  except  the  information  brought  to  us  by  the  debate, 
than  it  is  iniquitous  to  judge  except  upon  the  information 
brought  to  us  by  the  trial  ?  Does  not  a  single  legislature  by 


356  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

instruction  assume  to  legislate  for  the  Union,  because  it  directs 
the  vote  of  one  who  still  continues  to  enjoy  by  the  constitu- 
tion the  character  and  influence  of  a  legislative  representative; 
— thus  assuming  to  decide  the  case,  while  the  other  unin- 
structed  senators  continue  to  be  influenced  by  the  debate  and 
the  opinion  of  society  at  large  as  elicited  by  the  deliberation? 
Upon 'the  general  ground  upon  which  the  state  legislatures 
claim  to  instruct  senators  in  legislative  business  the  respective 
governors  might  claim,  and,  in  my  opinion,  with  much  more 
plausible  right,  to  instruct  the  senators  upon  executive  busi- 
ness ;  for  the  governors,  especially  where  they  are  elected  by 
the  people  directly,  are  the  true  representatives  of  the  people 
for  all  executive  business.  Yet  this  has  never  been  claimed. 

In  giving  these  my  views,  I  am  well  aware  that  I  have  ex- 
pressed myself  directly  against  what  some  distinguished  men 
have  stated  as  their  deliberate  opinion,  men  in  intellect  and 
experience  much  superior  to  me.  Yet  the  opinions  of  other 
great  men  support  the  views  here  given,  and  I  believe  it  is 
not  difficult  to  see  that  the  former  may  have  erred,  as  every 
one  is  apt  to  err,  by  regarding  the  opposite  of  wrong  to  be 
right.1  If  we  have  to  combat  one  evil  we  are  apt  to  go  too 
far  on  the  other  side.  If  there  were  not  a  corrective  process 
in  the  course  of  time,  and  if  succeeding  generations  should 
not  take  deeper  and  more  enlarged  views,  no  advance  of  civil- 
ization would  be  possible,  and  we  should  become  Chinese, 
looking  back  to  their  Confucius  and  Mencius  as  unalterable 
types.  Not  Plato,  but  Truth. 

XV.  It  is  evident  from  the  previous  remarks  that  the  sub- 
ject of  instruction  could  not  become  matter  of  discussion  so 
long  as  the  system  of  deputation  existed;  for  this  was  founded 
upon  it.  But  when  the  deputies  had  changed  into  representa- 


1  *  The  great,  although  natural,  mistake  of  continental  liberals  towards  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  of  Americans  after  them,  was  this,  that  they  thought 
that  the  establishment  of  liberty  consisted  in  the  transmission  of  the  assumed 
powers  and  rights  of  the  despot  to  the  people.  Liberty  consists  in  something 
essentially  different. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS, 


357 


tives,  and  the  British  parliament  had  gradually  become  more 
and  more  distinctly  acknowledged  as  the  national  representa- 
tion, it  was  natural  likewise  that  the  precise  relation  in  which 
a  representative,  though  national,  still  continues  to  stand  to 
his  particular  constituency,  and  his  obligation  to  represent 
their  especial  wishes,  should  become  matter  of  earnest  dis- 
cussion. I  believe  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  this'more 
earnest  discussion  must  be  dated,  as  already  mentioned,  from 
the  time  when  John  Wilkes  was  elected  by  the  Westminster 
constituents,  and  more  especially  from  Mr.  Burke's  speeches 
to  the  electors  at  Bristol  in  November,  1774.  Mr.  Burke,  as 
we  have  seen,  maintains  that  the  imperative  duty  of  the 
British  representative  requires  him  to  attend  to  all  the  in- 
terests and  desires  of  his  constituents  to  his  utmost  power, 
but  likewise  to  vote  to  the  utmost  of  his  conscience  as  the 
broad  national  interest  demands,  even  should  he  go  against 
the  supposed  or  actually  expressed  wishes  of  the  majority  of 
his  constituent-voters.  The  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
America,  as  well  as  the  whole  spirit  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
led  many  reflecting  men  to  inquire,  among  other  subjects, 
into  the  precise  character  of  a  representative.  The  British 
commons  were,  as  is  we'll  known,  under  the  almost  total  sway 
of  the  aristocracy  of  the  land,  and  far  from  representing  in 
many  cases  the  people  at  large.  In  addition  to  this  sway,  the 
powerful  influence  of  the  crown,  and  the  protracted  period  of 
seven  years  for  which  a  member  of  the  commons  is  elected, 
since  the  passing  of  the  septennial  bill  in  1716,  were  causes 
tending  to  separate  the  interests  of  the  members  of  the  house 
of  commons  from  the  great  mass  of  the  people.  Thes*  con- 
siderations, and  the  erroneous  idea  that  the  whole  meaning 
of  the  representative  government  was  that  of  an  expedient 
and  substitute  for  the  meeting  in  the  forum,  made  necessary 
by  increased  population,  prevailing  among  most  liberally  edu- 
cated men  towards  the  end  of  the  last  century,  led  many  of 
the  prominent  English  advocates  of  parliamentary  reform  to 
the  opposite  of  the  evil  of  which  they  complained,  as  is  nearly 
always  the  case  during  the  first  period  of  opposition  to  a  deep- 


358  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

rooted  error  or  other  evil.  Men  like  Burgh,  in  his  Political 
Disquisitions,  and  Major  John  Cartwright  asserted  that  the 
representative  is  (and  they  actually  called  him  so)  "  the  legis- 
latprial  attorney"  of  his  constituents :  at  least  this  is  the  ex- 
pression of  Cartwright — thus  reducing  the  representative  to  a 
mere  deputy  of  the  feudal  ages.  The  cause  of  this  error  is 
now  easily  seen.  These  men,  whenever  they  spoke  of  liberty, 
had  in  mind  what  was  called  in  the  first  part  of  the  present 
work  democratic  absolutism.  Their  error,  which  was  natural 
in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  has,  I  hope,  been  exhibited. 
A  collection  of  "  legislatorial  attorneys"  would  be  far  worse 
than  an  "  ecclesia"  of  the  ancient  absolute  democracy,  as  we 
have  seen,  because  in  the  latter  the  individual  voting  for  him- 
self alone  may  be  influenced  by  the  demands  of  the  public  wel- 
fare, which  the  former  cannot  be,  bound,  mind  and  conscience, 
as  he  is  by  his  instruction  and  power  of  attorney.  Indeed, 
there  is  some  contradiction  in  the  term  legislatorial  attorney, 
for  a  legislator  must  needs  weigh  and  reflect,  and  shape  his 
course  according  to  weighty  considerations,  even  were  he  to 
legislate  merely  according  to  interested  views.  In  the  middle 
ages  the  instructions  were  no  contradiction,  for  in  most  cases 
the  deputies  were  not  legislators  proper,  not  at  all  so  if  we 
compare  their  functions  with  those  of  our  representative 
bodies  ;  they  assembled  chiefly  for  the  granting  of  subsidies, 
acknowledging  laws  or  persons,  or  exacting  franchises.  It  is 
now  amply  settled  that  the  British  member  of  parliament  is 
the  representative  of  the  .nation.1 


1  As  Tate  as  1837,  the  radical  member  for  Leeds,  being  applied  to  by  the  secre- 
tary of  the  Leeds  Committee  for  giving  relief  to  certain  people  of  Leeds,  said  in 
his  answer — if  the  papers  reported  correctly — that  he  was  the  representative  of 
England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland,  and  not  of  the  borough  of  Leeds,  and  that  he 
could  not  provide  for  all  the  needy  of  the  realm.  (London  Ledger,  October 
1837.)  Hume  gives  a  few  remarks  on  instruction,  with  particular  reference  to 
the  then  existing  British  system  of  representation,  in  a  note  appended  to  Essay 
IV.  of  his  Moral,  Political,  and  Literary  Essays.  The  fourth  Essay  is  on  the 
Principles  of  Government.  These  Essays  were  published  in  1792,  after  Mr. 
Burke,  therefore,  had  treated  of  the  subject.  Hume's  remarks,  however,  are 
quite  passing  only. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  359 

In  France,  as  we  have  seen  already,  the  opposite  course 
took  place :  liberty  became  closely  allied  with  the  defeat  of 
specific  instructions  and  the  elevation  of  the  deputy  to  the 
dignity  of  a  national  representative ;  and  in  the  many  phases 
through  which  the  cause  of  liberty  has  passed  in  that  country 
during  the  last  half-century  the  representative  was  always  re- 
pressed into  a  deputy  whenever  the  cause  of  absolute  power 
was  in  the  ascendant.  When  Louis  XVIII.  returned  to 
France  in  1814  the  name  of  deputy  was  retained,  as  it  well 
agreed  with  the  general  spirit  of  the  charter  promulgated  by 
him — an  instrument  which  cautiously  granted  the  least  de- 
gree of  liberty  compatible  with  the  urgent  demands  of  the 
nation,  and  with  the  necessity  on  the  part  of  the  Bourbons  of 
creating  some  sort  of  support  for  themselves.  When  in  1830 
the  charter  was  amended,  and  the  power  of  the  chamber  of 
deputies  greatly  increased,  the  name  was  not  changed  ;  but 
the  present  French  deputy  is  essentially  and  avowedly  a 
national  representative,  not  a  departmental  deputy. 

In  the  United  States  the  subject  of  instruction  has  become 
especially  interesting  on  account  of  the  senators.  Many  state 
legislatures  have  passed  resolutions  "to  instruct  the  senators 
and  request  the  representatives"  to  oppose  or  promote  certain 
measures ;  but  many  senators  have  likewise  resisted,  and  of 
course,  as  there  is  no  power  conferred  by  the  constitution  to 
remove  a  non-complying  senator,  have  done  so  successfully. 
Indeed,  instruction  by  legislatures  cannot  be  said  to  have  as 
yet  assumed  any  higher  authority  than  that  of  very  distinct 
and  implicit  information,  to  which  of  course  the  senator  is 
bound  in  strict  conscience  to  pay  the  highest  regard,  as  a 
governor,  elected  by  the  people,  would  pay  due  regard  to 
powerful  petitions  or  resolutions  of  powerful  and  respectable 
meetings  in  cases  of  great  emergency,  but  would  not  receive 
instructions.  In  the  state  of  Virginia  alone  it  is  considered 
by  many  that  the  right  of  instruction  has,  in  a  sort,  become 
common  law  of  the  state  ;  that  is,  a  citizen  accepting  the 
senatorial  chair  might  be  considered  as  having  accepted  it  on 
the  implied  condition  of  acknowledging  instruction,  provided 


360  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

always  this  citizen  have  not  during  his  previous  life  candidly 
and  openly  expressed  his  opinion,  or  distinctly,  previously  to 
his  election,  to  the  contrary.  Yet  even  in  Virginia  the  diffi- 
culty is  by  no  means  removed  which  must  forever  arise  out 
of  the  contradiction  which  necessarily  lies  in  instruction  in 
America,  for  the  two  simple  reasons  that  the  so-called  right 
of  instruction,  though  of  organic  and  fundamental  importance, 
is  merely  implied,  nowhere  granted,  hence  is  without  means 
for  its  enforcement,  and  consequently  unsubstantial;  and  that 
a  senator,  who  must  be  supposed  to  be  a  conscientious  man 
and  hence  feel  the  sacred  obligations  of  oaths,  takes  a  solemn 
oath  upon  a  distinct  law  and  instrument,  called  the  constitu- 
tion, which  is  above  him,  legislature,  and  all,  as  much  as  the 
law  of  nature  and  God  is  above  king  and  subject.  This  plainly 
appeared  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Watkins  Leigh,  in  1836,  as  men- 
tioned above.  The  argument  of  his  letter  is  this  :  "  I  fully 
acknowledge  the  right  of  instruction,  but  only  within  the  con- 
stitution, by  which  all  of  us  are  primitively  bound.  If,  there- 
fore, you  instruct  me  against  the  constitution,  I  cannot  obey 
without  perjuring  myself."  Mr.  Leigh  did  not  resign,  yet,  as 
he  himself  informs  us  in  his  letter,  he  was  the  citizen  who 
in  1812  drew  up  the  resolutions  by  which  the  legislature  of 
Virginia  endeavored  to  establish  the  right  of  instruction,  and 
he  endeavors  to  show  that  those  resolutions  do  not  apply  to 
his  case  in  i836.z  The  legislature  in  such  cases  of  course 


1  It  is  not  easy  to  say  what  is  the  precise  doctrine  at  present  of  Virginia,  how- 
ever simple  the  subject  may  appear  at  first  glance.  Mr.  Leigh  says  in  the  letter 
above  cited  that  "the  resolutions  of  the  legislature  in  1812  were  the  work  of  his 
own  hands  without  assistance  from  any  other  person  whatever,  and  drawn  up  (as 
he  but  too  well  remembers)  with  a  haste  which  in  his  own  apprehension  at  the 
time  materially  impaired  its  value."  However,  he  says  that  upon  a  recent  and 
careful  review  he  finds  no  reason  to  retract  or  modify  anything.  Yet  these  very 
resolutions  were  assumed  and  quoted  in  1836  as  the  rules  upon  which  Mr.  Leigh 
was  instructed,  and  by  him  as  supporting  him  in  not  obeying  the  instructions. 
The  instructions  of  1836  state  that  they  merely  "  reassert"  the  right,  which  "  sur- 
prises" Mr.  Leigh.  No  one  who  knows  the  high  integrity  of  this  gentleman  will 
entertain  for  a  moment  any  doubt  that  he  expresses  his  real  sentiments.  I  will 
sub/oin  one  of  the  resolutions  of  1836,  because  it  seems  to  me  very  strongly  to 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  361 

answers,  What  is  instruction,  if  not  to  guide  you  when  we 
differ?  When  we  agree,  there  is  ho  necessity  for  it;  now,  this 
is  a  case  of  disagreement  because  we  do  not  believe  that  what 
we  demand  is  against  the  constitution.  It  amounts  in  these 
cases,  indeed,  precisely  to  the  same  dispute  which  has  fre- 
quently occurred  in  the  Catholic  church,  when  a  person  ac- 
knowledged the  infallibility  of  the  pope  upon  all  matters  upon 
which  the  decision  belonged  to  him,  matters  of  doctrine  under 
the  dogma  of  the  church,  but  denied  that  the  specific  subject 
under  question  belonged  to  this  class  ;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  pope  declared  that  his  infallibility  would  amount  to 
nothing  if  it  was  not  he  himself  who  should  determine  whether 
this  was  a  case  within  his  competence  to  decide  or  not.  The 
dispute  of  the  Roman  curia  and  the  Jansenists  turned  upon 
this  very  point.  It  is  worthy  of  observation  that  if  the  Vir- 
ginia theory  of  instruction  were  adopted  the  senate  would  be 
a  more  changeable  body  than  the  house  of  representatives, 
because  many  state  legislatures  are  changed  every  year,  at 
least  in  their  lower  branch ;  and  if  they  instruct  accordingly 
the  senate  is  also  changed  yearly,  and  thus  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  features  of  our  constitution  would  be  annihilated. 
From  what  has  been  stated  before,  it  must  clearly  appear 
that  the  author,  in  his  humble  judgment,  considers  the  Vir- 
ginia doctrine  unwarranted,  inconsistent,  and  unconstitutional. 
Yet  it  is  necessary  for  the  reader  to  inform  himself  thoroughly 
upon  the  subject;  and  I  believe  that  the  chief  periods  during 
which  the  subject  of  instruction  was  most  discussed  and  be- 
came more  and  more  settled  in  Virginia  are  when  the  Bank 


show  how  boldly  men  must  always  act  in  politics  if  they  abandon  the  safe  rule 
of  law  and  constitution.  It  runs  thus  :  "  That  after  the  solemn  and  now  repeated 
expression  of  the  opinion  of  the  general  assembly  on  the  right  of  instruction  and 
the  duty  of  obedience  thereto,  no  man  ought  henceforth  to  accept  or  retain  the 
appointment  of  senator  of  the  United  States  from  Virginia  who  does  not  hold 
himself  bound  to  obey  such  instructions  or  to  resign  the  trust  with  which  he  is 
clothed."  If  all  legislatures  make  similar  proclamations,  an  entirely  new  pro- 
vision is  evidently  added  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  without  pur- 
suing the  constitutionally  prescribed  course.  Power,  and  nothing  but  arrogated 
power,  would  in  that  case  have  changed  the  constitution. 


362  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

of  the  United  States  was  chartered  in  1791,  when  the  renewal 
of  the  charter  was  discussed  in  congress  in  iSii,1  and  when 
the  Virginia  senators  in  1836  were  instructed  to  vote  for  the 
before-mentioned  expunging  resolution,  upon  which  occasion 
one  of  the  senators  declined  to  give  the  vote  required,  but  re- 
signed, while  the  other  declined  both  the  vote  and  the  resig- 
nation, on  the  ground,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  instruction 
was  against  the  constitution.  I  must  refer  to  the  debates, 
resolutions,  and  letters  relating  to  the  subject. 


1  See  Mr.  Giles,  senator  from  Virginia,  on  this  occasion,  against  instruction,  in 
the  Legislative  and  Documentary  History  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  Clarke 
and  Hall,  Washington,  1832;  and  the  resolutions  of  the  Virginia  legislature, 
passed  in  February,  1812,  drawn  up,  March  2,  1836,  by  Mr.  Leigh.  There  is  no 
point  at  which  arrogation  of  power  can  stop.  Although  Mr.  Watkins  Leigh  is 
the  author  of  these  resolutions,  he  quoted  them  in  his  own  defence  for  not  com- 
plying with  the  instruction  in  1836,  but  without  effect  upon  the  legislature  :  on  the 
contrary,  they  passed  very  strong  resolutions  against  "the  two  several  letters  of 
Benjamin  Watkins  Leigh,"  in  December,  1836.  (See  Niles's  Register.)  Sev- 
eral of  the  debates  on  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  as 
published  by  congress,  contain  interesting  passages  respecting  this  subject. 
There  is  a  series  of  articles  against  instruction  by  Mr.  Hopkinson,  of  Philadelphia, 
Circuit  Judge  of  the  United  States,  of  great  merit,  and  for  instructions,  by  an 
author  with  whose  name  I  am  unacquainted,  in  several  numbers  of  the  Literary 
Messenger,  published  at  Richmond,  Virginia,  of  the  year  1837.  The  judge  de- 
livered likewise  a  speech  against  instruction  on  the  floor  of  congress,  in  1812. 
The  Federalist  (especially  the  remarks  of  Mr.  Madison)  is  of  course  to  be  con- 
sulted. It  will  sound,  I  allow,  strange  if  an  author  refers  his  reader  to  a  work 
which  is  not  yet  published  and  with  the  contents  of  which  he  is  entirely  unac- 
quainted, and  yet  I  cannot  but  refer  to  the  Madison  Papers,  now  printing  by  con- 
gress; for  I  cannot  doubt  that  they  must  contain  much  valuable  matter  bearing 
upon  the  point  of  our  discussion,  since  they  contain  the  debates  of  the  constituent 
congress  on  the  constitution  then  forming,  and  I  humbly  yet  confidently  hope  that 
they  will  support  the  arguments  of  the  text,  especially  the  chief  one,  that  it 
was  the  very  intention  of  the  constituent  congress  to  superinduce  the  repre- 
sentative system  upon  the  former  deputative,  as  established  in  the  Articles  of 
Confederation. 


CHAPTER    III. 

Responsibility  of  the  Representative. — Pledges. — Implied  and  positive,  general 
and  specific  Pledges. — Are  Pledges  moral,  and  consistent  with  general  Liberty 
and  Justice  ? — When  are  they  so  ? — Pledges  originated  with  the  Court  Party 
and  Aristocracy. — Strong  Power  of  Implied  Pledges. — Breaking  Implied 
Pledges,  and  throwing  one's  self  upon  the  Constituents  by  Resignation. — 
Duties  of  Presiding  Officers  of  deliberative  Assemblies ;  Speakers. 

XVI.  WE  have  found  that  one  of  the  most  essential  results 
of  a  well-regulated  and  truly  representative  government  is 
the  security  and  protection  of  public  liberty,  that  is,  of  civil 
liberty  as  appertaining  to  and  extending  over  the  whole  state, 
the  whole  jural  society  as  one  organic  thing,  and  not  as  a 
loosely  connected  chain  of  separate  independences.  This 
broad,  extensive  public  liberty  consists,  together  with  the 
protection  of  all  essential  individual — or,  as  we  have  called 
them  previously,  primordial — rights,  in  the  sway  of  public 
opinion,  and  its  regular  passing  over,  by  a  safe  and  organic 
process,  into  public  will — that  is,  law.  This  public  opinion 
which  becomes  public  will  is  the  well-ascertained  and  clearly- 
settled  opinion  of  the  whole  jural. society  or  state,  sifted  and 
freed  from  the  adhesions  of  momentary  excitement,  of  sordid 
and  local  selfishness,  and  of  the  tyrannical  dictation  of  one  part 
of  society  over  the  rest.  The  elements  of  which  this  supreme 
public  opinion  is  formed  are  the  opinions  of  the  several  parts 
of  that  society,  closely  and  truly  represented  or  enunciated 
by  their  respective  representatives,  gathered  according  to  an 
even,  fair,  and  proportionate  distribution  over  the  whole  of 
the  society,  upon  principles  which  appear  to  that  particular 
society  the  best  adapted  for  collecting  the  opinion  of  the 
whole,  and  modified  by  mutual  influence  according  to  the 
main  and  fundamental  principle  upon  which  all  legislation  and 
execution  rest,  that  is,  general  justice  and  public  welfare.  An 
additional  and  equally  important  feature  of  the  representative 

363 


364  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

government  is  that  civil  liberty  requires  that  no  one  should 
finally  act  in  any  matters  of  the  state  without  responsibility : 
where  this  principle  is  abandoned,  there  is  absolutism.  As 
the  prince;,  therefore,  in  constitutional  or  representative  mon- 
archies cannot  dictate  laws  at  will,  although  he  be,  within  the 
constitution  and  as  long  as  it  lasts,  personally  irresponsible, 
so  does  public  liberty  on  the  other  hand,  and  especially  in 
republics,  where  the  people  are  the  acknowledged  powqr- 
holders,  require  that  they  do  not  dictate  directly  their  laws 
upon  no  responsibility,  which  would  constitute  democratic 
absolutism,  but  through  responsible  intermediate  persons — 
the  representatives ;  although  the  people,  as  the  monarch  in 
the  previous  case,  are  irresponsible  in  their  suffrage  for  repre- 
sentatives. The  representative  who  has  received  these  con- 
stitutionally— not  morally — irresponsible  suffrages  is  bound 
in  all  his  actions,  so  soon  as  elected,  by  the  constitution  of 
the  land,  and  is  responsible  to  the  people,  who  pronounce 
upon  him  by  their  next  election,  but  not  in  each  single  case 
in  which  he  votes;  for  this  last  would  establish  at  once  direct 
dictation  of  the  power-holder  and  defeat  one  of  the  main 
objects  of  representative  government. 

The  representative,  then,  must  represent  his  constituents 
closely,  under  the  mediating  and  uniting  influence  of  general 
welfare,  and  hold  himself  responsible  to  the  people.  These 
considerations,  I  think,  will  lead  us  safely  in  discussing  the 
subject  of  pledges. 

XVII.  Representative  pledges  are  assurances  or  gages  given 
by  a  candidate  respecting  his  future  course  as  a  representative, 
should  he  be  elected.  They  may  be  implied  or  positive,  and 
the  latter  may  be  general  or  specific.  Frequently  it  is  impos- 
sible for  the  electors  to  have  a  sufficiently  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  candidate's  views  respecting  subjects  of  great  impor- 
tance in  their  estimation.  Meetings  therefore  will  propound, 
through  committees,  certain  questions,  which  the  candidate 
is  required  to  answer,  and  on  which  the  suffrages  of  the 
querist  are  made  to  depend.  Since  the  representative  is  bound 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  365 

in  duty  to  discharge  his  office  with  strict  honesty,  a  perfect 
understanding  between  the  constituents  and  himself  is  impor- 
tant, and,  in  order  to  give  him  the  necessary  weight  in  his 
elevated  position,  indispensable.  So  long,  therefore,  as  the 
pledges  touch  principles  and  views  they  are  right;  but  the 
sacred  duty  of  the  representative — and  he  has  none  so  sacred 
as  this — to  do  all  he  can  for  the  public  benefit  according  to 
his  best  judgment,  which  consists  of  the  opinion  of  his  con- 
stituents brought  along  with  him,  but  enlightened  and  regu- 
lated by  the  contact  with  that  of  other  parts,  represented  and 
pronounced  by  his  fellow-representatives,  must  prevent  him 
from  giving  pledges  as  to  any  definite  measures  or  laws,  for  in 
this  case  he  robs  other  citizens  of  their  undoubted  right  to 
state  their  opinion  through  their  representative  and  ask  a 
proper  share  of  influence  upon  the  opinion  of  the  legislative 
body  for  it  before  the  law  be  finally  passed. 

There  are  times  of  the  utmost  exigency  in  which  everything 
seems  to  turn  upon  one  measure  which  for  years  has  been 
discussed  by  the  nation  at  large  and  as  to  which  a  candidate 
is  undoubtedly  authorized  to  give  a  more  definite  pledge  than 
is  compatible  with  his  duty  in  common  cases.  Such  a  one  I 
take  to  have  existed  when,  in  1832,  the  question  in  England 
was  reform  or  not  reform.  Yet  here  again  it  would  have  been 
very  presumptuous  in  a  candidate  to  promise  that  he  would 
only  vote  for  such  or  such  minute  details  as  might  be  laid 
before  him  on  the  hustings.  Every  one  sees  that  pledges  of 
detailed  laws  are  nothing  less  than  antecedent  instruction,  so 
that  they  would  amount  to  a  bargaining  for  votes,  and  would 
raise  party  power  and  exclusion  very  high ;  because  a  voter 
might  desire  to  vote  fora  candidate  on  account  of  one  pledge, 
but  not  of  others.  Definite  pledges,  therefore,  either  beyond 
principles  or  great  outlines  of  important  broad  measures 
which  had  long  been  before  the  people  and  had  formed  per- 
haps  for  periods  broad  party  distinctions,  would  at  once  defeat 
the  object  of  representative  government,  and  cannot  be  given 
by  an  honest  citizen  who  religiously  loves  his  country;  but 
they  are  as  a  matter  of  course  very  readily  proffered  by  dema- 


366  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

gogues,  the  fawning  courtiers  of  the  people,  just  as  some 
judges  were  ever  ready  to  inform  James  I.  how  they  would 
give  judgment  in  such  or  such  a  case  should  it  be  brought 
before  them. 

Pledges,  like  instructions,  have  often  been  believed  to  be 
necessarily  connected  with  the  popular  or  liberal  cause,  but 
history  shows  the  fact  to  be  very  different.  Pledges  to  the 
court  and  ministers  were  formerly  common,  and  Lord 
Brougham  showed  in  parliament  that  ministerial  and  aristo- 
cratic pledges  were  common  and  customary  at  the  time  when 
one  lord  would  return  ten  or  fifteen  members,  and  that  no 
pledges  were  exacted  on  the  popular  side,  but  that  they  did  not 
originate,  as  had  been  stated,  with  the  reform  of  parliament 
in  1832.'  Lord  Brougham  is  decidedly  opposed  to  pledges, 
as  highly  injurious  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  the  necessary 
character  of  a  member  of  the  commons  as  a  representative 
of  the  nation.  I  subjoin  the  opinion  of  a  gentleman  who  has 
distinguished  himself  alike  for  sound  thought  and  liberal  feel- 
ing, and  who  was  foremost  in  the  cause  of  reform.2  There  are 


1  Hansard,  xxx.,  page  590,  debate  of  August  17,  1835. — James  II.,  desirous 
to  have  his  decreed  "  liberty  of  conscience"  sanctioned  by  the  parliament  to  be 
assembled,  sent,  in  1687,  military  officers,  civil  officers,  priests,  and  laymen  of 
influence,  into  various  counties,  to  obtain  pledges  of  certain  persons  that  if 
elected  they  would  vote  for  the  king's  measure.  "  The  most  general  answer 
appears  to  have  been  that,  if  chosen  to  serve  in  parliament,  the  individuals  to 
whom  the  questions  were  put  would  vote  according  to  their  consciences,  after 
hearing  the  reasons  on  both  sides;  that  they  could  not  promise  to  vote  in  a  man- 
ner which  their  own  judgment  after  discussion  might  condemn;  that  if  they 
entered  into  so  unbecoming  an  engagement  they  might  incur  the  displeasure  of 
the  house  of  commons  for  betraying  its  privileges;  and  that  they  would  justly 
merit  condemnation  from  all  good  men  for  disabling  themselves  from  performing 
the  duty  of  faithful  subjects  by  the  honest  declaration  of  their  judgment  on  those 
arduous  affairs  on  which  they  were  to  advise  and  aid  the  king."  Mackintosh, 
Review  of  the  Causes  of  the  Revolution  in  1688,  chapter  vi. 

"  Mr.  Macauhy,  in  the  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Leeds  Political  Union,  in 
August,  1832,  quoted  in  a  previous  passage,  where  I  treated  of  Canvassing,  says, 
"I  wish  to  add  a  few  words  touching  a  question  which  has  lately  been  much 
canvassed, — I  mean  the  question  of  the  Pledges.  In  this  letter,  and  in  every 
letter  which  I  have  written  to  my  friends  at  Leeds,  I  have  plainly  declared  my 
opinions.  But  I  think  it,  at  this  juncture,  my  duty  to  declare  that  I  will  give  NO 


POLITICAL  ETHICS,  367 

several  striking  instances  of  manly  resistance  against  pledges. 
A  near  connection  of  Lord  Brougham's  resigned  his  place 


1  LEDGKS.  I  will  not  bind  myself  to  make  or  to  support  any  particular  motion. 
I  will  state  as  shortly  as  I  can  some  of  the  reasons  which  have  induced  me  to  form 
this  determination.  The  great  beauty  of  the  representative  system  is  that  it 
unites  the  advantages  of  popular  control  with  the  advantage  arising  from  a  division 
of  labor  :  just  as  a  physician  understands  medicine  better  than  an  ordinary  man 
— just  as  a  shoemaker  makes  shoes  better  than  an  ordinary  man — a  person  whose 
life  is  passed  in  transacting  affairs  of  state  becomes  a  better  statesman  than  an 
ordinary  man.  In  politics,  as  well  as  every  other  department  of  life,  the  public 
ought  to  have  the  means  of  checking  those  who  serve  it.  If  a  man  finds  that  he 
derives  no  benefit  from  the  prescription  of  his  physician,  he  calls  in  another;  if 
his  shoes  do  not  fit  him,  he  changes  his  shoemaker ;  if  his  representatives  mis- 
govern him,  he  can  discard  them  at  the  next  election  :  but  when  he  has  called 
in  a  physician  of  whom  he  hears  a  good  report,  and  whose  general  practice  he 
believes  to  be  judicious,  it  would  be  absurd  in  him  to  tie  down  that  physician  to 
order  particular  pills  and  particular  draughts;  while  he  continues  to  be  a  cus- 
tomer of  a  shoemaker,  it  would  be  absurd  in  him  to  sit  by  and  meet  every  motion 
of  that  shoemaker's  hand  ;  and  in  the  same  manner  it  would,  I  think,  be  absurd 
in  him  to  require  positive  pledges  aTid  to  exact  daily  and  hourly  obedience  from 
his  representative.  My  opinion  is  that  electors  ought  at  first  to  choose  cautiously, 
then  to  confide  liberally;  and  when  the  term  for  which  they  have  selected  their 
member  has  expired,  to  review  his  conduct  equitably  and  to  pronounce  on  the 
whole  taken  together. 

"  Consider,  too,  that  the  business  of  a  member  of  parliament  is  the  pursuit, 
not  of  speculative  truth,  but  of  practical  good;  and  that  though,  in  speculation, 
every  truth  is  consistent  with  every  other  truth,  yet  in  practice  one  good  measure 
may  be  incompatible  with  another.  It  is  often  absolutely  necessary  to  bear  with 
a  lesser  evil  in  order  to  get  rid  of  a  greater.  For  example,  I  think  the  corn-laws 
an  evil;  but  if  there  had  been  in  this  parliament  a  hundred  or  a  hundred  and 
fifty  members  absolutely  bound  by  pledges  to  attempt  the  abolition  of  the  corn- 
laws,  there  would  have  been  a  division  in  the  ranks  of  the  reformers;  the  lories 
would  have  triumphed;  and  I  verily  believe  that,  at  the  moment  at  which  I  am 
writing,  Lord  John  Russell's  bill  would  have  been  lost,  and  the  duke  of  Welling- 
ton would  have  been  prime  minister.  Such  cases  may  and  will  occur  again. 
Some  such  cases  I  can,  I  think,  distinctly  foresee.  I  conceive,  therefore,  that  it 
is  the  true  wisdom  of  electors  to  choose  a  representative  whom  they  believe  to  be 
honest  and  enlightened,  and,  having  chosen  him,  to  leave  him  a  large  discretion. 
When  his  term  expires — when  he  again  presents  himself  before  them— it  will  be 
their  duty  to  take  a  general  survey  of  his  conduct,  and  to  consider  whether  he 
have  or  have  not  pursued  that  course  which  has,  under  all  the  circumstances, 
most  tended  to  promote  the  public  good.  .  ,, 

"  If  the  people  of  Leeds  think  fit  to  repose  in  me  that  confidence  which  is 
necessary  to  the  proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of  a  representative,  1  hope  that  I 


368  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

because  he  would  give  no  pledges,  though  he  agreed  with  his 
constituents  on  all  points  on  which  they  asked  pledges.1 

XVIII.  Implied  pledges,  for  the  reason  that  they  are  im- 
plied, have  a  very  strong  power,  as  they  necessarily  have 
everywhere  with  a  gentleman.  Implied  pledges  are  derived 
from  the  life  of  the  individual,  his  professed  principles,  his 
habitual  siding  with  one  or  the  other  party,  or  from  some 
definite  action  which  may  justly  induce  the  voters  to  believe 
that  it  indicates  some  distinct  view  or  other.  The  implied 
party  pledge  can  never  go  farther,  as  must  clearly  appear  from 
what  was  stated  on  parties  as  well  as  on  the  general  character 
of  pledges,  than  the  broad  civil  principles  and  views  upon 
which  the  party  is  avowedly  built;  they  cannot  bind  the  indi- 
vidual to  vote  on  all  important  occasions  blindly  with  the 
party.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  just  these  highly  important 
occasions  on  which  the  citizen  may  feel  himself  conscien- 
tiously bound  to  leave  the  party.  Suppose  a  member  has 
been  elected  as  a  member  of  one  party,  and  after  his  election 
the  question  of  war  or  peace,  and,  as  he  believes,  dishonor 
and  misfortune,  comes  up.  His  party  votes  against  war, 
which  he  conscientiously  believes  to  be  necessary  for  the 
country.  In  this  case  he  cannot  be  considered  as  being 
bound  by  an  implied  or  moral  pledge  to  his  constituents  to 
vote  against  the  war,  for  the  great  pledge  of  public  welfare 


shall  not  abuse  it.  If  it  be  their  pleasure  to  fetter  their  members  by  positive 
promises,  it  is  in  their  power  to  do  so.  I  can  only  say  that  on  such  terms  I  can- 
not conscientiously  serve  them." 

I  ought  to  refer  the  reader  back  to  the  passage  previously  quoted,  because  part 
of  it  very  slrongly  bears  upon  the  present  point. 

1  The  scene  which  happened  when  Mr.  Poulett  Thomson  was  nominated  at 
Manchester,  England,  in  1835,  as  reported  in  the  London  papers  of  the  time,  is 
sufficiently  characteristic  and  instructive.  The  candidate  underwent  a  long  and 
detailed  public  examination  which  he  sustained  with  dignity  and  apparent  hon- 
esty, without  binding  his  conscience,  by  absolute  pledges.  The  account  was 
copied  into  the  American  papers,  for  instance  the  National  Gazette,  Philadelphia, 
of  June,  1835. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  369 

stands  first ;  nor  ought  he  to  resign  before  voting,  for  it  may 
be  very  important  in  his  conscientious  opinion  for  the  country 
that  he  should  give  his  vote.  In  these  cases,  however,  in 
which  he  changes  but  his  constituents  do  not,  it  will  be 
honorable,  honest,  and  gentlemanlike  to  throw  himself  upon 
the  judgment  of  his  constituents  by  a  resignation,  as  of  course 
also  it  will  be  in  those  cases  in  which  the  representative  has 
knowingly  broken  the  implied  pledge  on  grounds  of  un- 
avoidable urgency.  Sir  Robert  Peel  justly  resigned  his  seat 
for  the  university  of  Oxford,  February  4,  1829,  because  he  had 
determined  to  introduce  measures  for  the  relief  of  the  Roman 
Catholics,  while  previously,  and  before  matters  assumed  so 
dark  an  aspect  of  threatening  civil  war  in  Ireland — as  Lord 
Wellington  at  least  confessed  in  the  lords — he  had  always 
strenuously  opposed  Catholic  emancipation,  and  he  knew  per- 
fectly well  that  of  all  bodies  in  the  world  the  university  of 
Oxford  would  probably  be  the  very  last  to  send  a  member 
who  should  profess  liberal  principles  towards  the  Catholics.1 
The  implied  pledge  seems  to  me  to  require  the  tenderest 
regard. 

XIX.  A  subject  which  demands  the  faithful  attention  of 
the  representative,  wherever  the  modern  representative  system 
exists,  is  the  interpretation  of  the  fundamental  law,  and  its 
construction  in  those  cases  for  which  it  does  not  specifically 
provide,  but  which  nevertheless  must  be  judged  by  that  in- 
strument. In  the  ancient  deputative  system,  the  deputy  being 
directly  occupied  with  the  advantage  of  his  corporation  and 
of  the  estate  to  which  it  belonged,  the  case  was  not  so  diffi- 
cult. Charters  or  other  fundamental  laws  might  be  inter- 


1  When  Sir  Francis  Burdett,  elected  as  a  whig,  openly  became  a  tory  in  1837, 
he  resigned  his  seat,  at  the  request  of  some  of  his  constituents,  to  stand  a  new 
election  at  Westminster,  and,  by  the  great  exertion  of  the  tories,  was  re-elected 
against  Mr.  Leader.  Had  he  not  done  so,  it  is  evident  that  he  must  have  lost 
all  power,  influence,  and  consideration,  for  it  would  have  been  a  palpable  deser- 
tion and  betrayal  of  his  constituents.  * 
VOL.  II.  24 


370  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

preted  with  much  ease  by  them,  as  by  special  attorneys,  by 
lawyers  in  their  special  pleading.  The  case  is  very  different, 
however,  where  public  liberty  is  sought  for  with  a  legislation 
based  upon  public  spirit,  and  where  the  representative  is 
bound  to  understand  and  interpret — for  whatever  consists  in 
human  words  must  be  interpreted — the  constitution,  as  the 
conscientious  representative  of  the  whole  society.  It  was  at 
this  stage  of  my  work  that  I  originally  intended  to  give  my 
views  of  interpretation  and  construction,  but,  as  I  have  indi- 
cated in  the  preface,  my  remarks  increased  to  such  an  extent, 
without  the  possibility  of  curtailing  them  so  as  not  to  injure 
the  clearness  of  the  subject,  that  I  resolved  to  follow  the  ad- 
vice of  publishing  them  separately.1  I  consider,  however,  the 
subject  of  interpretation  so  closely  connected  with  political 
ethics,  not  indeed  in  its  distinct  rules,  but  in  their  faithful 
application,  that  I  feel  bound  to  refer  the  reader  to  the  work 
alluded  to,  as  to  a  complement  of  this  work. 

XX.  The  experience  of  all  constitutional  countries  has 
amply  shown — what  every  one  who  has  ever  been  a  member 
of  a  deliberative  assembly  with  power  to  decree  is  fully  con- 
vinced of — that  no  such  assembly  can  in  the  least  degree  ap- 
proach the  object  for  which  it  meets,  if  considerable  power  be 
not  given  to  its  presiding  officer,  especially  when  it  consists 
of  many  members,  like  the  British  commons  or  the  French 
deputies,  who  amount  to  nearly  six  hundred.  The  history  of 
the  first  French  revolution  proves  the  lamentable  conse- 
quences of  a  want  of  knowledge  in  managing  the  debates 
and  rules  of  order,  as  I  have  stated  before;  and  Dumont, 
teh  judicious  and  experienced  author  of  the  Reminiscences 
of  Mirabeau  and  of  the  two  first  legislative  assemblies,  enu- 
merates among  the  nine  chief  causes  of  the  unfortunate  turn 
taken  by  the  French  revolution  as  the  third,  "  the  bad  mode 


1  Legal  and  Political  Hermeneutics,  or  Principles  of  Interpretation  and  Con- 
struction in  Law  and  Politics,  with  Remarks  on  Precedents  and  Authorities.  2d 
edition,  Boston,  1839. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


371 


of  deliberating;"1  in  which  opinion  every  one  who  knows 
the  details  must  readily  agree  with  him.  The  importance  of 
judicious  parliamentary  debating  has  been  spoken  of:  here  it 
must  be  observed  that  the  chief  part  of  this  vitally  important 
subject  is  formed  by  the  rules  to  be  enforced  by  the  speaker, 
to  which  many  other  important  duties  are  generally  added, 
especially  that  of  appointing  committees.  Even  if  a  speaker 
had  no  other  duty  and  power  than  that  of  granting  the  floor 
by  "  catching  the  eye  of  a  risen  member,  " — and  he  or  some 
individual  must  needs  have  this  power, — and  that  of  appoint- 
ing committees,  his  power  must  be  very  great  indeed,  and 
may  be  very  outrageously  abused  to  the  detriment  of  all  fair- 
ness and  free  representation.  The  presiding  member  who  has 
the  power  held  by  the  American  and  English  speakers — that 
of  the  presiding  lord  on  the  woolsack  is  considerably  less — 
must  always  remember  that  he  holds  one  of  the  most  exalted 
stations ;  he  presides  over  arid  in  a  measure  guides  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  whole  nation  ;  to  whatever  party  he  may  have 
belonged,  the  moment  he  is  elected  he  ought  to  remember 
the  words  of  Louis  XII.,  who  had  been  duke  of  Orleans,  when 
he  became  king :  "  The  king  of  France  must  not  revenge  the 
injuries  done  to  the  duke  of  Orleans  ;"  for  as  the  whole  repre- 
sentative organism  is  the  nation's,  so  is  the  speaker  emphat- 
ically a  national  officer ;  upon  him  rests  in  a  great  measure 
the  whole  operation  of  the  representative  system ;  he  may 
promote  a  free  hearing  of  all  parties,  for  which  they  are  sent 
there,  if  he  do  his  duty,  or  debar  it  by  injustice.  A.  speaker 
ought  to  remember  that  he  is  speaker  of  the  whole  house, 
that  is,  of  the  whole  representation  of  the  whole  nation,  and 
not  of  a  party;  that  in  giving  an  opportunity  of  speaking, 
therefore,  and  in  appointing  upon  committees,  justice  and  fair- 
ness ought  always  to  guide  him,  as  in  all  other  acts  done  by 
the  authority  of  his  chair.  The  more  necessary  the  great  and 
discretionary  power  is  which  he  exercises,  the  more  is  he 


1  Souvenirs  sur  Mirabeau,  ouvrage  posthume  publi6  par  J.  L.  Duval,  Brussels, 
1822,  chapter  xvii. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

bound  morally  to  exercise  as  a  true  citizen,  justly,  judiciously, 
and  patriotically.1 

1  The  rtglements  of  the  various  legislative  bodies  on  the  continent,  as  the 
French  call  all  that  part  of  our  parliamentary  law  and  usage  which  relates  to  the 
internal  management  of  the  house  itself,  are  interesting  on  this  account.  It  is  by 
far  the  best  reglement,  here  as  in  so  many  other  cases,  if  public  opinion  is  so 
strong  that  it  prevents  the  speaker  from  widely  swerving  from  his  duties.  Long 
custom  and  the  conviction  that  strict  justice  in  the  speaker  is  to  the  advantage  of 
all  cause  the  speaker  of  the  British  commons  to  act,  upon  the  whole,  with  great 
justice  and  high-minded  impartiality. 


BOOK    VII. 
CHAPTER    I. 

Executive  Officers. — Difficulty  of  controlling  them. — Their  Interference  with  Elec- 
tions :  in  Athens,  Rome,  France,  England,  the  United  States. — Plato's  Opinion 
of  the  Duties  of  Officers.— Post-Office.— The  Chief  Executive  Officer.— Confi- 
dential Officers. — Official  Interpretation  of  Constitutions  and  Laws. — The  Veto. 
— Ancient  and  Modern  Veto. — Absolute,  suspensive,  and  conditional  Vetoes. 
— Privilege  of  Pardoning  in  Monarchies;  in  Republics. — Danger  and  Diffi- 
culty in  Republics. — For  what  purpose  is  it  granted  ? — Rules  which  ought  to 
be  observed  in  making  use  of  the  Power  of  Pardoning. 

I.  "  How  can  a  man  serve  the  public  ?  When  out  of  office, 
his  sole  object  is  to  attain  it ;  and  when  he  has  attained  it,  his 
only  anxiety  is  to  keep  it.  In  his  unprincipled  dread  of  losing 
his  place  he  will  readily  go  all  lengths."  These  words  sound 
as  if  they  were  taken  from  a  modern  debate  or  a  discussion  in 
our  papers  of  recent  date,  yet  they  were  spoken  two  thousand 
five  hundred  years  ago  by  the  greatest  sage  of  a  people  at  the 
other  end  of  the  world,  utterly  independent  in  its  whole  civil- 
ization upon  the  western,  Caucasian  race  to  which  we  belong; 
they  are  the  words  of  the  Chinese  sage  Confucius,1  in  which  I 
have  substituted  only  the  word  public  for  that  of  prince, — not 
an  illegitimate  substitution ;  for  even  the  Chinese  acknowl- 
edge in  their  laws,  their  classical  works,  and  in  the  prayers 
offered  up  by  the  emperor,  that  he  is  the  vicegerent  of  heaven 
for  the  maintaining  of  justice,  order,  morality ;  in  short,  for 
the  benefit  of  the  people. 

The  Greeks  found  the  same  difficulty  of  controlling  their 
executive  officers.  Their  whole  history  testifies  to  the  fact. 
It  is  shown  also  by  the  constant,  generally  annual,  rotation 

1  Lun-yu,  Conversations  and  Sayings  of  Confucius,  recorded  by  his  Disciples, 
chap.  17,  sect.  1 6,  quoted  from  Davis's  "  The  Chinese."  [Lun-yu  has  been 
translated  by  Schott,  1830.] 

373 


374  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

in  office,  and  the  drawing  of  lots  in  some  cities  for  offices  and 
magistracies ;  by  the  very  extensive  system  of  checks,  which, 
in  Athens  for  instance,  was  carried  out  into  the  minutest  de- 
tails, as  the  reader  may  see  in  Boeckh's  Public  Economy,  book 
ii.  8;  by  the  repeated  and  periodical  inquiry  not  only  into  the 
accounts  of  officers,  but  into  the  whole  administration  of  their 
office — the  euftbvrj,  which  the  Greeks  valued  very  highly,  and 
upon  the  absence  of  which  in  the  Lacedaemonian  council 
Aristotle  animadverts  (Politics,  ii.  9 ;) — and  by  the  Athenian 
nomophylakes,  the  office  intended  for  the  purpose  of  control- 
ling the  officers.  And  to  mention  no  other  of  the  many  laws, 
institutions,  and  events  which  prove  the  fact,  we  actually  meet 
with  insurrections  of  the  people  against  the -officers,  who, 
it  was  believed,  had  established  themselves  as  a  party  and 
become  an  unlawful  oligarchy,  such  as  that  of  the  Thes- 
pians mentioned  in  Thucydides,  book  vi.  95.  Comp.  also 
Aristot,  Pol.  vi.  7,  19. 

The  whole  Roman  history  is  one  continued  commentary 
on  the  difficulty  and  danger  to  be  encountered  in  the  solution 
of  the  grave  political  problem,  how  to  give  sufficient  power 
to  the  officers,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  them  from 
arrogating  more,  and  uniting  into  a  formidable  aristocracy  of 
placemen. 

Modern  monarchies  and  republics  offer  no  different  spec- 
tacle. The  crown  or  executive  has  the  command  over  the 
legion  of  executive  officers,  and  must  have  it  in  a  high  degree, 
for  otherwise  no  government  would  be  able  to  obtain  its  end; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  this  influence  is  abused  for  purposes 
separate  from  the  interests  of  the  state,  or  directly  hostile  to 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  and  to  the  very  objects  for  which 
alone  the  whole  government  is  established,  and  for  which  the 
different  officers  have  received  authority  under  and  within  the 
same.  Every  chief  executive  officer  of  whatever  name,  king, 
president,  or  consul,  and  every  subaltern  under  them, — indeed, 
every  one  that  has  power, — feels,  when  opposed,  the  desire 
rise  in  his  bosom  to  carry  his  point  and  to  interrupt  the  steady 
course  of  law  by  the  "  per  speciale  mandatum  regis,"  by  which 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


375 


the  Stuarts  would  have  set  at  nought  all  British  liberty,  had 
they  been  suffered  to  do  it.  The  whole  struggle  for  civil 
liberty  in  England  turns  upon  what  the  commons  thought 
undue  influence  of  the  executive  in  setting  aside  acts  of  par- 
liaments, despite  special  acts  of  parliaments  against  this 
license  and  against  the  boldly  arrogated  influence  and  direc- 
tion of  elections  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  which  forms  a 
peculiar  difficulty  in  all  representative  governments.1 

In  France,  to  speak  but  of  the  latest  times,  we  find  that  the 
first  charge  against  Polignac,  when  impeached  after  the  July 
revolution  of  1830,  was  that  of  having  unconstitutionally  inter- 
fered with  the  freedom  of  election,  by  sending  circulars  to  all 
public  functionaries,  requiring  them  to  vote  for  the  ministerial 
candidates,  in  addition  to  which,  written  evidence  was  ex- 
hibited showing  that  places  and  offices  had  been  promised  in 
return  for  votes.2 

In  the  United  States  we  find  in  the  report  made  by  a  com- 
mittee sent  in  1839  by  congress  to  the  city  of  New  York,  to 
inquire  into  certain  affairs  connected  with  the  custom  officers 
of  that  city,  that  they  had  been  assessed,  not  indeed  by  au- 
thority, in  proportion  to  their  salaries  to  furnish  contributions 
towards  election  expenses.  Nor  is  it  possible  here  to  pass 
over  in  silence  the  open  interference  of  the  office-holders  with 
the  election  laws  of  the  state,  which  occurred  in  the  state  of 
Maryland  in  the  year  1836. 

II.  The  difficulty  then  has  been  felt  at  all  times  and  in  all 
governments,  but  in  some  respects  it  greatly  increases  with 
the  establishment  and  firmer  securing  of  modern  liberty,  such 
as  it  has  been  characterized  in  the  previous  book.  A  govern- 
ment whose  only  object  is  security  and  justice,  not  liberty, 


1  It  is  perhaps  not  useless  for  me  to  refer  here,  among  the  many  authors  and 
collections  relating  to  this  point,  to  Brodie's  British  Empire,  vol.  i.  p.  113,  et 
seq.,  and,  indeed,  to  the  whole  of  his  Introduction  ;  the  reader  will  find  there 
and  in  Hallam's  Constitutional  History  all  the  necessary  references  carefully 
collected. 

2  English  Annual  Register  of  1830,  published  in  1831,  p.  224. 


376 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


has  to  watch  over  the  honesty,  efficiency,  and  obedience  of 
the  officers  only ;  but  where  the  additional  and  highly  impor- 
tant object  of  government  is  the  security  and  protection  of 
liberty,  the  people  have  a  right  to  watch  over  the  officers  that 
they  do  not  interfere  with  it,  especially  with  the  elections,  the 
primary  means  by  which  we  endeavor  to  secure  it.  If  the 
officers  paid  by  the  state  to  serve  as  agents  of  the  government 
interfere  with  it,  this  virtually  amounts  to  conspiring  against 
one  of  the  greatest  of  state  objects :  it  is  a  capital  usurpation. 
We  have  seen  that  the  very  idea  of  modern  liberty — state- 
liberty  as  contradistinguished  to  feudal  corporation  liberty — 
requires  enlarged  societies  and  continuous  and  systematic 
governments.  These  again  require  a  large  number  of  officers 
well  united  into  one  coherent  system,  and  thus,  of  course,  ex- 
pose society  in  the  same  degree  to  the  danger  of  seeing  those 
who  were  intended  to  be  the  mere  agents  of  the  law  and  gov- 
ernment becoming  the  masters  or  leaders,  secure  in  their 
places,  from  which  it  may  become  the  highest  interest  of 
society  to  dislodge  them.  There  is  no  single  and  absolute 
principle,  however,  by  strict  adherence  to  which  we  may  be 
sure  to  avoid  all  difficulty,  as  by  the  fixed  operation  of  a 
machine.  The  contrary  has  been  often  erroneously  supposed. 
The  Greeks  at  length  threw  aside  all  consideration  of  talent 
and  peculiar  moral  fitness,  and  resorted  to  the  lot.1  The  state, 
as  was  natural,  rapidly  declined,  and  bribery  and  dishonesty  be- 
came the  order  of  the  day.  Incessant  rotation  begets  evils  as 
great  as  the  danger  intended  to  be  avoided  by  it.  It  prevents 
any  one  from  making  himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  his 
official  duties,  deprives  society  of  the  service  of  many  most 
qualified  persons,  and,  by  holding  out  a  hope  to  the  least 
qualified  to  have  their  turn  of  office,  begets  a  general  greedi- 
ness and  thirst  for  it,  and  a  mean  anxiety  for  salary  among 
those  who  either  are  unfit  or  indisposed  for  any  steady,  regu- 
lar, and  laborious  trade  or  profession, — to  the  exclusion  of 


1  [The  author  seems  to  think  the  lot  universal  in  Greece,  but  it  belonged  to 
extreme  democracy,  and  became  more  common  with  time ;  but  even  at  Athens 
sundry  officers  were  chosen  by  cAtrofonia.'] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


377 


those  to  whom  an  office  no  longer  affords  any  inducement, 
either  by  way  of  remuneration  or  honor,  to  interrupt  their 
own  proper  pursuits.  Thus  the  government  sinks  gradually 
more  and  more,  and  becomes  the  most  expensive  of  all ;  for 
t  ere  is  nothing  more  expensive  than  to  feed  indolence  and 
incapacity,  while  a  state  loses  just  so  much  in  nerve  and 
healthiness  as  the  desire  to  obtain  money  without  labor  in- 
creases, and  as  offices  are  bestowed  for  other  reasons  than 
merit  and  capacity.  The  more  an  officer  knows  that  he  does 
not  stand  upon  his  own  merit  and  capacity,  so  much  the  more 
dependent  he  feels  himself  to  be  upon  his  employers,  and  con- 
siders himself  their  tool  and  servant,  not  the  public's,  a  mere 
party  follower  whom  good  luck  has  thrown  into  a  good  berth, 
of  which,  therefore,  he  must  make  the  best  while  the  time 
lasts.  Want  of  high-toned  honor,  genuine  love  of  liberty 
and  country,  ready  devotion  to  her  best  interests,  whole  and 
entire,  and  pride  of  his  citizenship,  must  give  way  to  a  spirit 
of  dishonor  and  dishonesty;  he  sinks  from  a  citizen  of  his 
country  to  a  lackey  of  his  party ;  from  a  deserving  citizen  who 
is  conscious  that  the  workman  is  worthy  of  his  hire,  to  a  pil- 
fering or  blood-sucking  slave.  The  system  of  throwing  all 
appointments  into  the  hands  of  the  people  affords  no  certain 
guarantee  in  itself;  for  if  the  general  spirit  of  honor  and  lib- 
erty is  depressed,  this  system  will  only  make  of  every  idler  a 
petty  demagogue,  hurrying  on  general  decay.  The  system 
of  mutual  check  and  periodical  inquiry — of  the  last  impor- 
tance, and  far  too  much  neglected  in  many  modern  states — is 
still  not  sufficient  alone  to  guard  against  the  danger;  witness 
its  little  utility  in  Athens.  We  must  acknowledge,  then,  that 
in  addition  to  wise  laws  relating  to  the  tenure  of  offices,  to  the 
real  responsibility  of  those  who  hold  them,  and  to  the  power 
of  appointment  and  removal,  conscientious  discharge  of  official 
duties  and  jealous  watching  over  them  on  the  part  of  the 
people  are  of  the  highest  importance,  and  cannot  be  dispensed 
with,  whatever  laws  or  principles  we  may  resort  to.  It  is  the 
error  of  those  who  fail  in  experience,  or  take  but  superficial 
views  of  the  affairs  of  men,  to  believe  that  a  sort  of  govern- 


378  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

ment  machine  can  be  possibly  invented,  or  some  principle  be 
discovered,  which  must  operate  exactly,  independently  of  the 
character  of  its  agents.  Were  it  so,  man  would  no  longer  be 
the  moral  being  which  his  Creator  made  him.  The  science 
of  politics  has  to  treat  of  the  laws  and  principles  by  which 
men  will  be  most  likely  to  secure  a  discharge  of  official  ac- 
tions consentaneous  to  the  constitution  and  the  objects  of  the 
state ;  it  is  for  political  ethics  to  consider  the  duties  of  official 
men,  and  impress  them  upon  the  citizen.  Let  us  keep  strictly 
in  our  mind  that  as  the  great  problem  of  our  times  is  to  unite 
civil  liberty  with  extensive,  socialized  states,  which  as  we 
have  seen  is  to  be  obtained  by  the  representative  system,  so 
it  is  one  of  the  more  important  of  our  problems  to  make  a 
large  number  of  officers  compatible  with  civil  liberty — a 
problem  the  solution  of  which  we  can  hardly  say  has  as  yet 
fairly  begun,  and  which,  like  every  great  political  problem, 
cannot  be  solved  by  merely  proclaiming  and  inconsiderately 
carrying  through  some  apparently  very  simple  and  sym- 
metrical theory,  but  must  be  solved  by  results  obtained  by 
lofty  views  applied  with  careful  observation,  conscientious 
love  of  truth,  and  wise  consideration  of  all  the  given  circum- 
stances, and  of  the  gradual  development  of  the  many  relations 
which  constitute  the  state.1 

III.  All  those  duties  and  principles  which  are  most  impor- 
tant respecting  executive  officers  are  so  simple,  so  clear  and 


1  If  we  study  history  with  that  spirit  of  truth  which  alone  makes  it  a  wise  in- 
structor, we  shall  find  that  no  men  have  been  greater  benefactors  to  their  coun- 
tries or  times  than  those  whose  moral  and  intellectual  loftiness  led  them  to  adopt 
great  and  elevated  principles,  and  whose  comprehensive  and  penetrating  mind 
enabled  them  to  apply  them  wisely  for  the  whole  of  society,  who,  therefore,  even 
while  they  struggled  actively  and  zealously  against  obstacles,  comprehended, 
nevertheless,  in  their  true  and  ultimate  object  the  whole;  and  that  none  have 
done  more  injury  than  those  men  who,  possessed  of  a  narrow  mind,  were  never- 
theless placed  in  high  stations,  either  by  birth  or  circumstances,  and  whose  con- 
fined intellect  made  them  settle  upon  some  general  theses  and  adore  them  with 
obstinate  idolatry  without  regard  to  reality.  Some  of  the  prominent  actors  in  the 
French  revolution,  and  James  II.  of  England,  are  instances  of  the  latter ;  Henry 
IV.  of  France,  and  Washington,  of  the  former. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


379 


evident,  that  they  are  hardly  ever  denied  by  word  of  mouth ; 
yet  it  is  very  different  if  we  consider  men's  actions.  We  must 
pay,  then,  some  attention  to  points  which  otherwise  it  would 
be  gratuitous  in  an  author  to  touch.  Though  truisms,  they 
must  be  repeated. 

Cicero  says  in  his  Offices,  "  Those  who  design  to  be  par- 
takers in  the  government  should  be  sure  to  remember  those 
two  precepts  of  Plato  :  first,  to  make  the  safety  and  interest 
of  their  citizens  the  great  aim  and  design  of  all  their  thoughts 
and  endeavors,  without  ever  considering  their  own  personal 
advantage ;  and  secondly,  to  take  care  of  the  whole  collective 
body  of  the  republic  so  as  not  to  serve  the  interest  of  any 
one  party  to  the  prejudice  or  neglect  of  all  the  rest:  for  the 
government  of  a  state  is  much  like  the  office  of  a  guardian  or 
trustee,  which  should  always  be  managed  for  the  good  of  the 
pupil,  and  not  of  the  persons  to  whom  he  is  intrusted ;  and 
those  men  who,  whilst  they  take  care  of  one  part  of  the  citi- 
zens, neglect  or  disregard  another,  do  but  occasion  sedition 
and  discord."  (Offices,  i.  25.)  No  one  dares  to  deny  the 
truth  of  these  words,  yet  thousands  act  in  opposition  to  them. 

The  officer  is  the  officer  of  the  government  which  is  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people,  and  "  by  the  word  people  is  signified  a 
community  taken  as  a  whole;  but  an  oligarchy  means  only 
a  party."  (Athejiagoras  in  Thucydides,  vi.  39.) 

From  this  fundamental  truth  it  naturally  follows  that  the 
officer  must  not  abuse  his  position  for  his  own  interest  or  that 
of  his  friends  or  party,  nor  to  the  injury  or  detriment  of  the 
people,  and  he  must  conscientiously  strive  to  obtain  the  ob- 
ject for  which  he  is  appointed,  that  is,  first,  to  act  according 
to  the  true  spirit  of  the  laws,  and  secondly,  to  do  as  much 
essential  service  to  the  public  as  he  can.  Respecting  the  first 
point,  dishonesty,  as  well  as  the  pampering  of  any  passion  or 
lust,  is  wholly  and  essentially  against  the  oath,  nay,  the  very 
sense,  of  office.  No  charge  has  ever  been  held  more  odious 
than  that  of  official  filching  or  robbing  on  a  large  scale.  We 
have  sufficiently  considered  this  subject  under  the  head  of 
Honesty.  The  officer  acts  equally  against  this  fundamental 


380  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

principle  when  he  supports  matters  personal  to  himself  by 
official  power,  be  this  on  a  small  scale  in  an  underling,  or 
on  a  large  scale  by  designating  those  who  oppose  him  as  op- 
ponents to  the  public  welfare.  Parties  are  very  apt  to  con- 
found these  two  points  which  are  yet  distinct :  they  frequently 
go  so  far  as  to  stigmatize  every  one  who  is  not  the  open, 
active  friend  of  their  leader  as  not  only  hostile  to  him  but  to 
the  public  at  large.  The  ministerialists  under  George  III.  of 
England  and  Charles  X.  of  France  called  themselves  the 
king's  friends,  and  Mr.  O'Connell,  on  the  accession  of  Vic- 
toria, wrote  a  letter  to  Ireland  to  form  a  party  to  be  called  the 
queen's  friends.  In  the  United  States  those  who  oppose  the 
administration,  or  only  a  single  measure,  have  been  repeatedly 
termed  enemies  of  the  constitution. 

As  an  officer  is  grossly  dishonest  who  uses  official  informa- 
tion for  his  own  pecuniary  advantage,  or  furnishes  early  in- 
formation to  his  personal  or  political  friends,  so  is  he  likewise 
grossly  dishonest  who  uses  the  power  and  influence,  or  even 
the  means  which  he  obtains  through  his  well-earned  salary, 
for  party  purposes,  especially  for  elections.  This  the  laws 
and  political  procedures  of  all  free  nations  corroborate.  Of 
all  usurpations  one  of  the  most  odious  and  unwarranted  is 
an  oligarchy  of  place-holders,  men  who  use  the  very  means 
granted  them  by  the  people  against  them — for  they  use  their 
power  against  the  people  as  soon  as  they  interfere  with  the 
free  operation  of  elections,  whether  this  be  by  influence  before- 
hand, or  by  making  themselves  active  at  the  polls.  I  have 
seen  in  the  United  States  sheriffs,  who  have  no  official  busi- 
ness at  the  polls  as  they  have  in  England,  taking  a  most 
offensive  part  in  "  bringing  up"  voters,  and  other  procedures. 
It  is  surprising  that  all  the  world  agrees  to  set  down  a  man  as 
an  offender  who  uses  a  power  of  attorney  for  his  own  benefit 
or  against  his  employer,  and  yet  that  the  officer,  under  oath 
to  keep  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  having  received  his  office, 
directly  or  indirectly,  only  for  the  intended  benefit  of  his  em- 
ployers, should  not  be  considered  such  when  he  does  the 
same  thing.  All  political  deliberations  in  the  army  or  navy 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  381 

are  justly  looked  upon  by  free  nations  with  a  jealous  eye,  and 
in  most  nations  are  punishable  acts ;  but  so  ought  likewise 
the  executive  officer  to  be  disfranchised  as  long  as  he  holds 
his  office,  and  where  this  is  not  the  law  he  ought  in  common 
decency  to  abstain  from  such  arrant  political  interference. 
Still  more  odious  and  intolerable  it  becomes  if  whole  institu- 
tions, established  for  the  convenience  or  protection  of  the 
people,  are  made  use  of  to  serve  the  partial  interests  of  those 
who  happen  to  have  authority  over  them.  There  is  no  insti- 
tution more  necessary  for  modern  civilization,  more  directly 
for  the  convenience  and  necessary  wants  of  the  people,  and 
the  officers  of  which  ought  to  consider  the  performance  of  its 
duties  more  religiously  sacred,  because  it  exists  by  tfust  and 
confidence  alone,  than  the  post-office.  And  yet  this  offers  a 
most  wide-spread  means  of  usurped  influence,  and  of  seriously 
injuring  some  of  the  most  essential  interests  of  the  citizen. 
In  several  countries  this  sacred  agent  of  European  and  Amer- 
ican civilization  has  been  shamelessly  abused  by  its  officers 
for  prying  into  the  political  sentiments  or  plans  of  the  citizens ; 
and  the  large  and  peculiarly  well  organized,  affiliated,  and  dif- 
fused body  of  postmasters  has  been  made  subservient  to  the 
administration,  thus  superinducing  a  usurping  government 
upon  that  granted  by  law,  which  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  for 
the  citizens  to  shake  off.1 

IV.  The  duties  of  a  superior  or  chief  executive  officei 
necessarily  embrace  those  of  the  citizen  and  of  the  subordi- 
nate officers  in  general,  but  the  higher  he  stands,  the  more 
imperious  are  the  claims  of  duty  upon  him :  especially  is  this 
true  of  the  chief  magistrate,  for  he  must  be  in  many  cases 
the  last  resort,  upon  whom  the  ultimate  decision  depends. 
As  regards  his  more  particular  actions  I  propose  to  consider 


1  *  It  is  to  be  considered  whether  the  post-office  ought  not  to  be  made  inde- 
pendent. What  has  the  postmaster  to  do  with  the  cabinet  ?  I  have  written  an 
article  for  the  New  York  Review  on  the  subject,  at  the  suggestion  of  Senator 
Preston.  May,  1841. 


382  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

them  in  the  following  order: — his  appointment  of  officers, 
and  discharging  them,  the  use  he  makes  of  his  personal  in- 
fluence and  power  in  the  legislation  of  the  country,  before  a 
bill  comes  fairly  before  him  for  approval,  and  the  conformity 
of  his  actions  to  the  spirit  of  the  laws  and  their  interpreta- 
tion, which  is  closely  connected  with  the  legitimate  use  which 
he  ought  to  make  of  peculiar  privileges,  for  instance  of  the 
power  of  pardoning. 

As  to  the  pervading  and  general  principle  of  his  conduct, 
he,  before  all,  ought  to  realize  in  his  actions  the  great  end  and 
object  of  the  state,  that  is,  justice;  truth  and  justice  on  the 
one  hand,  prudence  and  wisdom  on  the  other,  ought  to  be  to 
him  what  the  light  and  heat  of  the  sun  on  the  one  hand,  and 
care  and  foresight  on  the  other,  are  to  the  husbandman. 
When  Charles  V.  had  cited  Luther  before  the  diet  at  Worms, 
and  many  high  prelates  importuned  the  emperor  not  to  keep 
his  promise  of  safe-conduct  to  the  heretic,  the  youthful  mon- 
arch exclaimed,  "  If  faith  and  truth  are  banished  from  all  the 
world,  they  must  find  with  me  a  refuge." 

The  chief  magistrate  is  the  magistrate  of  the  state,  of  the 
whole.  He  cannot  too  frequently  represent  this  to  his  mind ; 
not  only  in  order  to  avoid  acts  of  injustice  and  low  partiality 
(do  we  not  expect  the  same  of  every  mayor,  captain,  school- 
master, or  father  of  a  family  ?),  but  also  in  order  to  shape  his 
course  and  guide  the  government.  All  the  science  of  ruling, 
in  whatever  narrow  or  extensive  sphere,  resolves  itself  into 
aiding  the  society  over  which  we  rule,  and  not  part  of  that 
society  merely,  in  obtaining  its  greatest  and  highest  end ; 
all  the  art  of  ruling  resolves  itself  into  reconciling,  through 
lofty  principles,  the  opposites,  mediating  contrasts,  and  making 
all  parts,  however  opposed  to  one  another,  move  towards  the 
same  great  and  common  goal.  We  rule,  when  we  seize  upon 
the  principle  of  life  in  each  component  part  and  make  it  aid 
and  support  every  other  part ;  we  only  conquer  or  destroy 
when  we  oppress  or  suppress  one  part  by  the  help  of  another. 

It  has  been  mentioned  several  times  how  baneful  it  is  for  a 
country  if,  in  the  appointment  of  officers,  no  regard  is  paid  to 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


383 


capacity;  still  worse  if  moral  unfitness  is  disregarded,  and 
men  with  tainted  or  actually  wrecked  reputation,  disowned  by 
the  society  of  the  honest,  are  seen  clothed  with  public  office, 
to  the  detriment  of  that  public  moral  feeling  without  which 
political  vigor  and  the  necessary  buoyancy  of  civic  spirit  can- 
not exist.  Republics  and  monarchies  are  equally  interested 
in  the  appointment  of  fit  and  honorable  persons.1  If  capacity 
for  office  no  longer  constitutes  a  title  for  office,  general  cor- 
ruption and  universal  public  robbery  follow,  while  the  affairs 
of  the  commonwealth,  conducted  by  imbecile  men,  are  neg- 
lected, and  a  state  of  things  is  produced  against  which  excited 
party  passion  may  be  blind  at  the  time,  but  which  never  fails 
to  produce  melancholy  and  universally  felt  consequences  for 
the  next  generation. 

That  a  chief  officer  will  prefer  a  citizen  of  his  own  party  if 
he  has  the  choice,  is  clear ;  he  is  in  many  cases  bound  to  do 
so ;  but,  as  has  been  remarked  already,  to  appoint  a  less  fit 
person  because  he  is  one  of  our  party,  when  a  fit  person  might 
have  been  found  of  different  political  opinions, — only  he  must 
not  be  a  zealot  of  his  party, — is  placing  the  party  above  the 
public.  Those  officers  who  have  to  advise  the  chief  magistrate, 
or  who  fill  offices  the  faithful  execution  of  which  requires  an 


1  General  Washington's  views  respecting  appointments  are  given  in  his  own 
words  in  Sparks's  Writings  of  George  Washington,  vol.  i.  p.  455.  It  is  true  that 
Washington  had  to  contend  with  no  party;  but  there  would  have  been  parties 
under  almost  any  other  mortal.  I  cannot  forbear  giving  here  Montesquieu's 
impressive  words  respecting  the  court-government  of  Louis  XV.,  for  the  French 
government,  after  the  injudicious  total  severance  of  the  government  from  the 
people,  destroyed  institutions  and  was  embodied  in  the  personality  of  the  mon- 
arch. Montesquieu's  words  apply  likewise  to  the  Roman  history,  and  partially, 
mutatis  mutandis,  to  some  existing  states  as  well :  "  L' ambition  dans  Poisivite,  la 
bassesse  dans  1'orgueil,  le  desir  de  s'enrichir  sans  travail,  1'aversion  pour  la  verite, 
la  flatterie,  la  trahison,  la  perfidie,  1'abandon  de  tous  ses  engagements,  le  mepris 
des  devoirs  du  citoyen,  la  crainte  de  la  vertu  du  prince,  I'esp6rance  de  ses  fai- 
blesses,  et  plus  que  tout  cela,  le  ridicule  perpetuel  jette  sur  la  vertu,  forment,  je 
crois,  le  caractere  du  plus  grand  nombre  des  courtisans.  Or  il  est  tres-malaise 
que  la  plupart  des  principaux  d'un  etat  soient  mal-honne'tes  gens,  et  que  les  infe- 
rieurs  soient  gens  de  bien;  que  ceux-la  soient  trompeurs,  et  que  ceux-ci  consentent 
\  n'etre  que  dupes  " 


384  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

indispensable  agreement  of  political  principles  as  well  as  of 
views  and  dispositions  with  those  of  the  chief  executive  offi- 
cer, in  short,  confidential  officers,  must,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
change  with  a  change  of  the  administration ;  but  it  produces 
very  evil  consequences  if  it  comes  to  be  considered  that  a 
change  of  the  administration  is  the  signal  of  a  universal  turn- 
ing out  of  office,  and  if  every  minor  officer  is  declared  to  be  a 
confidential  one.  Such  a  procedure  produces  a  general  thirst 
for  office  and  consequent  subserviency  in  the  party  that  is  to 
come  in ;  it  engenders  a  spirit  of  spoliation,  and  makes  the 
office  to  be  considered  a  spoil  won  by  victory,  so  that  the 
public  service,  the  people,  are  forgotten ;  and  when  the  party 
is  in,  it  makes  the  office-holders  fearful  to  act  openly  as  just 
citizens  in  their  simple  and  primary  civil  duties.  A  degree  of 
political  recklessness  is  necessarily  diffused  in  the  state,  and 
if  it  is  not  low  sordidness  which  prompts  to  these  actions,  it  is 
the  political  bigotry  which  declares  every  one  dissenting  in 
opinion  to  be  opposed  to  public  welfare,  or  even  destitute  of 
honesty.  James  II.,  when  heedlessly  rushing  on  in  his  mad 
career  of  projected  absolutism,  after  the  fashion  of  Louis  XIV., 
declared  (in  1686,  to  Lord  Rochester,  Clarendon  Correspond- 
ence, ii.  117,  and  other  works)  that  no  one  should  retain  an 
office  who  was  not  "  of  his  (the  king's)  opinion."  He  must 
have  no  other  interest  but  what  he  acknowledges,  supports, 
and  promotes.  A  compact  and  subservient  body  with  official 
subordination  is  thus  formed ;  an  aristocracy  of  officers,  far 
worse  than  an  aristocracy  of  birth,  is  thus  produced,  and  a 
number  of  citizens  are  led  meanly  to  betray ^their  best  rights 
for  fear  of  losing  their  posts ;  in  short,  the  saying  of  Confu- 
cius placed  at  the  head  of  this  chapter  becomes  amply  veri- 
fied. The  French  lately  felt  it  with  the  greatest  indignation 
that  some  of  the  officers  were  turned  out  because  they  had 
voted  against  the  Mole  ministry  in  1839.  I  repeat,  all  confi- 
dential officers  ought  to  be  changed  if  a  different  party  comes 
into  the  administration ;  but  it  is  vicious  to  make  all  subaltern 
officers,  for  instance,  those  of  the  custom-house,  confidential, 
that  is,  to  compel  them  to  assist  the  administration,  beyond 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  385 

what  the  public  service  demands  of  them  in  their  respective 
places.1 


1  There  are  some  passages  of  interest  with  reference  to  this  subject  in  the  late 
.  speeches  of  Lord  Russell  and  Sir  Robert  Peel  on  the  vote  of  confidence  respect- 
ing the  administration  of  Ireland,  in  April,  1839.  I  ought  to  add  that  the  whole 
question  of  discharging  officers,  which  is  important  already  but  will  grow  in 
magnitude  with  the  increased  demand  of  liberty  and  increased  extent  of  states, 
is  very  differently  viewed  on  the  continent  of  Europe  and  by  the  Anglican  race. 
In  Germany  and  France  there  is  such  an  immense  number  of  government  officers, 
and  government  employment  offers  so  regular  and  steady  a  career,  that  numbers 
choose  it  as  their  regular  profession,  for  which  in  not  a  few  countries  regular 
preparatory  studies  are  demanded.  The  officers  form  a  hierarchy,  and  calculate 
upon  regular  promotion  as  the  reward  of  honesty  and  talent,  precisely  in  the  same 
way  that  with  us  or  in  England  an  individual  chooses  the  army  or  navy  for  his 
profession.  It  is  evident  that  where  this  state  of  things  exists,  the  question  of 
the  power  of  discharge  is  of  vital  interest  to  thousands,  and  it  has  been  held  that 
no  officer  ought  to  be  discharged  without  inquiry  and  giving  reasons;  especially 
is  it  so  where  there  is  no  public  liberty.  In  these  latter  countries  honor,  title, 
consequence,  support,  and  future  promotion  depend  upon  the  office.  To  be  dis- 
charged is  disgrace  and  ruin,  as  it  is  for  the  mandarin  to  be  struck  from  the  list. 
In  brief,  in  those  countries  discharge  without  reason  or  sufficient  inquiry  is  con- 
sidered as  exceedingly  tyrannical.  With  the  Anglican  race  the  question  assumes 
a  totally  different  aspect,  for  two  reasons  :  first,  the  number  of  general  government 
officers  is  comparatively  small,  and  many  officers  have  retained  their  civil  charac- 
ter; citizens  fill  the  office  for  a  time  and  leave  it  again;  secondly,  since  civil 
liberty  exists  with  them  on  a  large  scale,  changes  of  administrations  have  hap- 
pened more  frequently.  These  changes,  however,  have  required  several  further 
changes  in  the  officers,  so  that  on  the  one  hand  it  is  no  disgrace  to  be  turned  out, 
on  the  other  hand  the  offices,  being  few  in  number  and  insecure,  are  not  calcu- 
lated upon  as  a  regular  profession — there  is  no  officer-hierarchy.  The  latter  is  a 
necessary  effect  of  centralization  of  government  power,  the  prominent  feature  of 
the  European  continental  history  of  the  last  century,  and  will  and  must  vanish 
again  with  it.  Yet  I  do  not  say  that  the  question  is  solved  ;  it  will  form  one  of 
the  most  interesting  questions  of  politics  to  ascertain  how  a  sufficiently  free  power 
of  discharging  in  the  executive — which  in  free  countries  must  exist — is  to  be 
united  with  that  degree  of  security  for  the  officer  which  shall  protect  him  against 
executive  tyranny.  It  forms  a  very  different  question.  In  monarchies,  which  are 
not  free,  the  security  of  the  officer  against  being  turned  out  without  some  legal  pro- 
cedure is,  not  without  reason,  considered  as  a  sort  of  guarantee  against  ministerial 
and  monarchical  despotism.  Free  nations  want  far  different  guarantees,  and, 
though  the  question  of  appointment  and  dischnrge  ahvnys  remains  an  important 
one,  it  never  can  acquire  with  them  that  grave  importance  which,  to  judge  from 
various  works,  it  has  acquired  on  the  European  continent,  where,  as  I  have  said 
already,  the  only  remnant  of  public  life  is  the  service  in  government  office. 
Since  the  above  was  written,  the  speeches  of  Sir  Robert  Peel  and  the  duke  of 
VOL.  II.  25 


3 86  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

The  executive  has  repeatedly  endeavored  to  influence  the 
votes  of  the  legislative  body  by  open  declaration  of  his  senti- 
ments, or  he  has  beforehand  declared  that  he  would  use  his 
authority  of  non-approval  if  such  or  such  a  bill  should  be 
passed.  The  constitution  cannot  prohibit  such  declarations,  or, 
if  it  did,  could  effect  nothing,  because  there  would  be  always 
means  enough  to  evade  the  prohibition;  but  such  acts  of  an 
executive  are  certainly  directly  against  the  spirit  of  a  truly 
constitutional  country,  where  legislation  must  be  as  free  and 
unfettered  as  possible  until  it  comes  to  be  connected  with  the 
executive  by  his  approval  or  rejection.  The  English  are  at 
present  peculiarly  jealous  of  perfectly  untrammelled  debate, 
and  it  would  lead  to  very  serious  consequences  should  now  a 
member  of  either  house  make  a  declaration  similar  to  that  of 
earl  Temple  in  the  lords,  that  the  king  would  consider  every 
one  his  enemy  who  would  vote  for  the  East  India  Company 
bill  brought  in  by  the  coalition  ministry.1 


Wellington,  on  May  13  and  14,  1839,  to  explain  their  proposed  change  of  some 
ladies  of  the  court  of  Victoria  which  led  to  a  failure  of  Sir  Robert's  attempt  to 
construct  an  administration,  have  reached  us.  They  are  not  without  interest 
respecting  one  of  the  most  important  points  in  constitutional  monarchy.  They 
touch  upon  a  question  which  will  become  more  important  every  year. 

1  *  This  was  in  December,  1783.  Fox  and  his  friends  were  vehement  against 
''secret  influence,"  "secret  cabal;"  and  Mr.  Baker,  seconded  by  Lord  Maitland, 
proposed  the  following  motion  in  the  commons :  "  That  it  is  now  necessary  to 
declare  that  to  report  any  opinion  or  pretended  opinion  of  his  majesty  upon  any 
bill  or  other  proceeding  depending  in  either  house  of  parliament,  with  a  view  to 
influence  the  votes  of  the  members,  is  a  high  crime  and  misdemeanor,  derogatory 
to  the  honor  of  the  crown,  a  breach  of  the  fundamental  privileges  of  parliament, 
and  subversive  of  the  constitution  of  the  country."  William  Pitt  warded  it  off. 
(Tomline,  Memoirs  of  Pitt,  vol.  ii.  p.  225.)  The  clamor  against  the  use  of  the 
king's  name  in  this  affair  was,  however,  so  great  that  Lord  Temple  gave  back 
the  seals  he  had  received  three  days  before.  (Tomline,  as  above,  p.  231.)  The 
letter  which  George  III.  wrote  on  March  20,  1785,  to  Pitt,  after  he  had  laid  his 
plan  of  a  reform  of  parliament  before  the  king,  who  was  unfriendly  to  the  meas- 
ure, is  worthy  of  tbe  reflection  of  any  chief  magistrate.  George  states  that  he 
should  think  it  ,very  base  in  him  to  influence  members  upon  so  momentous  a 
question,  and  that  he  should  think  very  ill  of  any  man  who  would  vote  on  such 
a  question  biassed  by  friendship.  He  moreover  declares  that  he  never  had  given 
,his  opinion,  nor  should  he  do  so  before  parliament  had  discussed  it.  (Tomline, 
:.as  above,  vol.  ii.  p.  40.) 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  387 

The  earliest  period  when  the  principle  that  the  executive 
should  not  influence  debates  by  declaring  his  decision  before- 
hand came  to  be  more  particularly  discussed,  or  at  least  when 
it  was  stated  that  despite  such  a  declaration  debate  on  the 
respective  subject  is  not  useless,  because  the  executive  may 
be  induced  by  that  very  debate  on  the  strength  of  the  vote 
to  yield,  is  probably  that  period  when  Charles  II.  opened 
several  parliaments  by  declaring  that  he  would  grant  all 
reasonable  demands,  but  that  they  must  not  touch  the  hered- 
itary succession  (that  is,  exclude  his  brother  James),  and  the 
tories  told  the  whigs  that  all  their  attempts  to  exclude  James 
were  useless,  since  the  king  would  never  concur ;  whereupon 
the  whigs  answered  that  kings  had  often  yielded,  and  that  at 
any  rate  the  houses  must  do  what  they  consider  their  duty, 
and  leave  it  to  others  to  do  theirs.  They  justly  observed  that 
constitutionally  no  person  can  know  the  king's  mind  or  be 
charged  to  declare  it  upon  a  subject  which  has  not  yet  been 
brought  constitutionally  before  him;  that,  therefore,  all  these 
declarations  of  his  intended  veto  are  but  surmises  or  sus- 
picions, not  sufficient  to  be  made  by  the  houses  the  founda- 
tions of  actions  of  the  highest  magnitude. 

Declarations  not  unlike  this  have  been  made  in  congress; 
at  least,  members  believed,  and  in  fact  known,  to  be  personal 
friends  of  the  executive  have  declared  that  it  was  useless  to 
debate  on  a  certain  subject,  because  the  executive  would  veto 
the  bill  if  it  should  pass.  This  is  as  much  against  parlia- 
mentary dignity  and  decorum  as  against  true  constitutional 
spirit.  One  of  the  great  objects  of  constitutions  is  to  secure 
independent  action  to  various  branches,  and  to  produce  by  a 
union  of  all  a  well-poised  result.  These  gentlemen  could  not 
have  considered  what  frightful  consequences  might  ensue 
from  this  incipient  abuse.  If  it  were  carried  out  with  any  de- 
gree of  consistency,  it  would  soon  virtually  deprive  the  legis- 
lature of  its  initiative  power,  and  make  it  a  body  which  has 
only  to  confirm  or  reject  .measures  proposed  by  the  adminis- 
tration ;  and  in  whatever  degree  it  might  be  acknowledged,  it 
would  effectually  forestall  all  necessary  reforms,  to  which,  for 


388  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  time  being,  the  majority  as  well  as  the  executive  were 
known  to  be  opposed — all  those  "  annual  motions"  which 
have  in  most  cases  succeeded  by  dint  of  unconquerable  per- 
severance. Who  does  not  know  that  it  is  frequently  of  the 
greatest  importance  first  of  all  to  start  the  discussion  on  a 
subject  at  large  in  the  country  by  a  debate  in  the  house? 
Those  who  made  that  unconstitutional  declaration  forgot  that 
a  house  of  representatives  is  very  different  from  a  body  of 
mere  deputies.  The  house  of  representatives  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  organ  of  public  opinion,  with  the  power  of  making 
it  public  law,  and  it  is  one  of  its  most  important  functions 
that  it  represents  public  opinion  also  in  this,  that  the  incipient 
nucleus  of  a  minority,  nay,  individual  opinion,  may  grow  into 
the  opinion  of  a  majority,  if  it  have  the  internal  strength  of 
truth  and  be  supported  by  perseverance.  Whether  the  execu- 
tive shall  veto  or  not  must  remain  to  be  seen,  after  he  is 
acquainted  with  the  arguments  and  with  the  greater  or  smaller 
majority  which  carried  a  bill.  Still  worse  is  it  if  the  chief 
officer  endeavors  personally  to  influence  elections  by  requests 
or  threats.  Charles  X.  sent  letters  signed  by  himself  to  the 
various  officers  to  inform  them  how  to  vote,  and  that  the  min- 
isters were  acting  in  his  spirit.  If  this  were  suffered,  it  would 
of  course  destroy  all  constitutional  responsibility  of  ministers 
and  all  check  upon  the  monarch.  It  is  held  that  the  British 
monarch  cannot  give  personal  instructions.  If  it  is  inad- 
missible in  the  subaltern  officer  to  influence  elections,  it  is 
evidently  a  far  greater  dereliction  of  duty  in  a  chief  magis- 
trate. Nor  does  it  add  to  his  strength,  for  every  movement 
beyond  the  limits  of  constitutional  law  and  propriety  betrays 
weakness,  lowers  him  in  the  eye  of  the  people,  and  will  ulti- 
mately recoil  upon  him. 

V.  I  have  shown  on  another  occasion1  that  it  is  absolutely 


1  Legal  and  Political  Hermeneutics,  where  the  reader  will  find  also  some 
remarks  on  the  subject  of  Precedents,  which  is  of  much  interest  in  executive 
questions. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  389 

impossible  for  the  human  mind  to  devise  any  written  law 
which  can  possibly  provide  for  all  cases,  or  the  sense  of  which 
may  not  be  stretched  or  narrowed  according;  to  the  inter- 

o 

preter's  disposition.  As  the  interpretation  of  the  chief  magis- 
trate is  of  the  last  importance,  it  is  equally  important  that  he 
should  never  abandon  the  two  main  props  of  all  sound  inter- 
pretation, without  which  the  most  liberal  constitution  may  be 
made  to  mean  the  most  servile  things,  and  the  wisest  pro- 
vision maybe  made  to  cover  the  most  selfish  designs; — I 
mean  good  faith  and  common  sense.  These  must  be  the 
main  guides  in  the  interpretation  of  the  constitution,  of  the 
laws  which  he  is  charged  to  execute,  and  of  the  privileges 
bestowed  by  the  former  upon  him:  he  must  fairly  interpret 
according  to  the  spirit  of  the  law  and  constitution,  of  con- 
stitutional and  representative  liberty  in  general,  and  of  the 
genius  and  history  of  his  people  in  particular.  The  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  gives  the  right  of  nominating  officers 
to  the  president,  but  the  senate  of  the  United  States  must  con- 
firm the  nomination,  except  in  the  case  of  inferior  officers, 
where  by  law  the  full  appointment  is  vested  in  the  president 
or  some  other  chief  officer.  The  president,  several  years  ago, 
nominated  a  person  to  a  certain  office,  but  the  senate  declined 
approving  the  appointment.  The  moment  the  senate  had 
adjourned,  the  same  person  was  re-nominated,  and  when  the 
senate  met  again  the  new  nomination  was  laid  before  them. 
This  was  certainly  not  in  the  spirit  of  the  constitution,  which 
can  have  no  other  meaning  than  that  there  shall  be  a  check 
upon  the  presidential  nominations,  and  that  if  some  nomi- 
nated person  is  rejected  some  other  should  be  chosen ;  else 
of  what  use  could  be  the  whole  provision  ?  Yet  the  act  of 
the  president  was  in  conformity  with  the  letter  or  form  of  the 
law.  The  constituent  people  of  Texas,  who  adopted  their 
constitution  soon  after  this  event,  seem  to  have  taken  counsel 
in  it,  for  they  added  a  provision  to  their  constitution  that  the 
chief  magistrate  shall  have  no  power  to  re-appoint  a  person 
rejected  by  the  senate. 


390  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

• 

The  executive  veto,  absolute,  conditional,  or  suspensive,1 
that  is  the  necessity  of  concurrence  on  the  part  of  the  chief 
executive  or  monarch  in  a  bill  before  it  becomes  law,  and 
consequently  his  power  to  deny  his  concurrence,  is  a  point 
of  much  importance  in  political  law.  It  has  misled  many 
writers  and  politicians,  that  they  treated  of  the  veto  as  a 
separate  privilege,  a  prerogative  which  seemed  to  be  given 
directly  to  interfere  with  the  acts  of  another  branch,  as  the 
veto  of  the  Roman  tribunes  in  many  cases  actually  was,  for 
their  specific  sanction  was  not  necessary  to  make  a  bill  a  law; 
they  had  the  power  of  the  intercession  or  veto  as  such  ;  they 
were  not  asked  to  approve,  but  they  had  the  prerogative  of 
interposing  in  other  cases  as  well  as  with  reference  to  laws  ; 
they  could  veto,  that  is,  stop  the  farther  procedure  in  the 
comitia,  they  could  suspend  the  administration  of  justice,  the 
execution  of  a  sentence,  and  could  interfere  even  with  the 
procedures  of  the  consuls.  Indeed,  the  origin  and  essence  of 
the  tribunitial  power  was  an  interference  with  a  particular  act 
of  a  consul  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  a  man  of  the  plebs  or 
common  people.  It  is  different  with  us:  according  to  modern 
constitutional  law,  it  is  believed  necessary  that  the  executive 
should  have  a  concurrent  authority  in  making  laws,  partly  in 
order  to  prevent  the  absolute  tyranny  of  the  legislature,  of 
which  history  gives  many  instances,  partly  to  pledge  the  ex- 
ecutive to  the  execution  of  the  laws  by  securing  his  consent 
to  their  enactment;  to  prevent  him  also  from  becoming  a 
mere  committee,  as  it  were,  of  the  legislature,  and  for  various 


1  An  absolute  veto  is  possessed,  in  theory,  by  the  king  of  England ;  a  suspen- 
sive veto  by  the  king  of  Norway.  If  he  declines  concurring,  the  same  bill  may 
be  proposed  by  the  next  storthing  (parliament)  ;  if  the  king  declines  again,  and 
if  the  next  storthing  after  passes  the  same  bill,  it  becomes  thereby  a  law  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  king.  This  provision  belongs  to  the  constitution  of  1814  : 
in  1824  the  king  desired  such  an  alteration  of  the  constitution  as  would  give  him 
an  absolute  veto,  but  the  Norwegians  repeatedly  declined.  The  president  of  the 
United  States  has  a  conditional  veto :  if  he  declines  concurring,  the  senate  and 
representatives  may  repass  the  bill  by  a  majority  of  two-thirds,  whereby  the  bill 
becomes  law ;  but  whatever  has  happened  in  one  congress,  which  lasts  two 
years,  can  in  no  wise  affect  the  next. 


POLITICAL   ETHICS. 


391 


other  reasons.  This  constitutional  concurrence  will  be  found, 
upon  thorough  inquiry,  to  belong  to  those  main  constitutional 
discoveries  characteristic  of  modern  times,  and  to  those  polit- 
ical guarantees  which  are  peculiar  to  civil  liberty.  For  it  is 
very  clear  that  without  it  the  executive  either  loses  all  energy 
or  is  at  war  with  the  legislature;  in  either  case  factions  must 
decide,  and  the  sway  of  public  opinion  is  impaired  or  anni- 
hilated. But  while  this  privilege  of  the  chief  magistrate's 
concurrence  allows  public  opinion  to  acquire  a  greater  degree 
of  pow.r,  his  frequent  use  of  his  power  of  non-concurrence 
meets  with  an  obstacle  in  the  same  public  opinion.  Still,  this 
concurrence  or  non-concurrence  is  quite  different  from  the 
vast,  absolute  Roman  veto.  That  our  veto  is  no  original 
privilege  of  itself  is  clear,  among  other  things,  from  the  fact 
that  most  modern  constitutions  of  any  degree  of  liberality 
settle  the  form  in  which  the  chief  executive  shall  withhold  his 
approval  or  sanction ;  in  most  constitutions  it  is  expressed  in 
a  courteous  form,  such  as,  the  king  will  think  about  it,  or  will 
examine.  The  veto  question,  in  modern  political  law,  can 
never  be  properly  treated,  except  as  part  of  the  greater  ques- 
tion of  executive  concurrence  in  the  great  political  act  of 
making  laws.  This  concurrence  is  the  primary  question,  the 
veto  a  consequence  only.  The  concurrence,  however,  is,  as 
it  appears  to  me,  one  of  those  necessary  conciliatory  principles 
so  indispensable  in  politics.  But  it  must  appear,  likewise, 
plain  that  the  veto,  being  but  incident  to  the  concurrence, 
while  the  concurrence  is  the  last  finish  given  to  a  law,  not  the 
essential  production  and  generation  of  it,  which  is  the  prov- 
ince proper  of  the  legislature,  ought  to  be  used  with  the 
utmost  caution  and  only  when  it  appears  to  the  executive 
that  insurmountable  obstacles  are  in  the  way  of  his  sanction- 
ing the  proposed  measure.  The  veto  question  is  more  impor- 
tant in  governments  like  that  of  the  United  States,  where  a 
disagreement  between  the  executive  and  legislature  may  exist 
not  only  in  theory  but  practically,  since  there  is  no  practical 
means  of  enforcing  harmony  at  the  instant,  no  constitutional 
conciliatory  principle  until  new  elections  take  place.  At  least 


392 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


no  such  means  has  as  yet  worked  itself  out  in  practice.  Con- 
gress has  no  means  indirectly  to  coerce  the  executive  into 
compliance,  as  parliament  has  by  refusing  supplies,  which 
would  not  have  the  same  effect  in  the  United  States ;  nor  has 
the  executive  any  power  to  produce  compliance  if  it  should  be 
diametrically  opposed. 

In  constitutional  monarchies,  where  the  monarch  is  above 
and  outside  of  the  administration,  we  all  know  the  practical 
operation  of  the  conciliatory  principle,  which  has  worked 
itself  out  of  the  supplies  on  the  one  hand,  and  out  of  the  con- 
stitutional impossibility  of  regal  action  without  ministerial  co- 
operation on  the  other.  Hence  the  king  of  England  has  not 
declined  concurring  for  above  a  century,  except,  indeed,  by 
anticipating  the  necessity  of  non-concurrence  by  proroguing 
parliament.  The  president  of  the  United  States  may  veto, 
and  has  often  done  so.  It  becomes  therefore  the  more 
urgently  necessary  for  him  to  do  so  faithfully,  consci- 
entiously, and  cautiously,  in  the  constitutional  spirit  of  his 
country;  not  in  the  narrow  limit  of  a  party. 

VI.  In  most  countries  in  which  there  exist  constitutions, 
the  privilege  of  pardoning  and  reprieving  is  conferred  upon 
the  chief  executive,  with  few  or  no  limitations,  if  we  speak  of 
the  punishment  for  common  offences  only.  The  restrictions 
relate  in  almost  all  states  exclusively  to  impeachments  and 
p&litical  offences,  to  protect  which  the  executive  might  feel 
tempted  or  which  may  involve  the  executive  itself.  The 
question  of  pardoning  has  not  received  by  any  means  that 
degree  of  attention  which  it  deserves,  since  the  time  of  the 
essential  change  which  has  taken  place  in  the  spirit  of  penal . 
laws  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  more  decidedly  acknowledged 
sway  of  the  law  as  indissolubly  connected  with  substantial 
civil  liberty  on  the  other.  Montesquieu  says  that  pardoning  is 
the  most  beautiful  attribute  of  sovereignty  ;T  a  recent  writer 
on  constitutional  law2  calls  it  the  most  precious  right  of  the 


1  Esprit  des  Lois,  vi.  5. 

2  Aretin,  Staatsr.  d.  constitutioneller  Monarchic,  i.  205. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS, 


393 


monarch.  Whether  these  assertions  are  exaggerated  or  not 
it  is  not  necessary  to  examine  here.  Certain  it  is  that  when 
Montesquieu  wrote,  and  when  the  penal  law  bore  the  imprint 
of  a  spirit  of  revenge  and  indignation  at  rebellious  disobedi- 
ence against  the  will  of  the  power-holder,  mercy  in  pardoning 
justly  appeared  to  be  a  most  beautiful  attribute  ;  and  we  can 
understand  the  meaning  of  pardoning  hundreds  and  thou- 
sands at  a  time,  on  some  joyous  occasions,  though  there  was 
also  a  wrong  idea  always  connected  with  it.  In  our  times  it 
becomes  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  if  whole  numbers  of 
common  criminals — not  of  political  offenders — are  pardoned, 
and  the  community  is  thus  exposed  again  to  all  the  dangers 
to  life  and  property,  as  was  for  instance  lately  the  case  when 
a  son  was  born  to  the  king  of  Naples.  If  it  was  unnecessary 
to  keep  the  criminals  imprisoned,  it  was  shocking  to  retain 
them  at  all ;  if  it  was  right  and  necessary  to  retain  them,  it 
was  shocking  to  let  them  loose  upon  the  community.  To 
make  either  dependent  upon  the  birth  of  a  prince,  a  wholly 
extra-judicial  and  extra-legal  event,  is  contrary  to  the  spirit 
of  the  law  and  the  duty  of  the  executive.  The  king  might 
have  pardoned  all  whom  he  conceived  to  have  offended  him 
or  his  authority  more  individually;  but  he  evidently  abused 
his  prerogative  in  pardoning  common  criminals.  It  may  be 
very  consonant  to  a  father's  heart  bounding  with  joy  to  give 
joy  to  hundreds,  in  a  moment  of  happy  exultation,  but  it  is 
no  pleasure  to  the  honest  to  have  criminals  turned  upon  them 
by  the  hundred,  most  of  whom,  there  is  not  the  slightest 
doubt,  committed  new  crimes  before  three  days  had  passed. 

Yet  the  incalculable  mischief  caused  by  unwarranted  and 
injudicious  pardons  in  monarchies  hardly  deserves  mention 
if  we  compare  it  to  the  evil  caused  by  this  interruption  of  the 
proper  course  of  law  in  the  United  States,  already  so  mild  in 
many  parts,  and  yet  so  often  set  aside  upon  the  most  frivolous 
grounds,  indeed  very  frequently  upon  no  grounds  at  all,  ex- 
cept that  some  persons,  who  allow  their  zeal  to  be  stirred 
more  by  sympathy  with  the  guilty  than  with  the  honest 
obtain  a  number  of  signatures  to  a  petition.  "  Foreasmuch  as 


394 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


many  doe  offend  in  hope  of  pardon  that  pardons  be  very 
rarely  granted,"  has  been  said  already  by  Lord  Coke.1  In 
some  of  the  United  States  pardon  almost  amounts  to  cer- 
tainty; and,  were  we  not  warranted  in  drawing  the  conclusion 
from  statistics,  we  have  the  confession  of  the  criminals  them- 
selves, to  the  effect  that  the  impunity  held  out  by  constant 
pardons  has  influenced  them  greatly,  either  in  a  direct  way, 
or  indirectly  by  lessening  the  fear  of  the  law  in  general.  Yet 
this  is  not  the  greatest  of  the  evils  caused  by  injudicious  par- 
doning. Clergymen  who  injudiciously  collect  signatures  for 
pardons  little  think  of  the  incalculable  injury  they  do  to  many 
young  persons  by  aiding  the  propagation  of  crime,  by  return- 
ing unpunished  and  hardened  criminals  upon  the  community, 
and  to  society  by  loosening  the  necessary  framework  of  the 
law.  This,  however,  is  not  the  place  fully  to  expose  all  these 
many  evils.  It  belongs  to  criminal  statistics,  and  to  the  whole 
science  of  punishment,  and  I  must  refer  the  reader  for  further 
discussion  of  the  subject  to  works  relating  to  those  branches 
especially.2  But  one  remark  I  wish  to  make  for  charitably 
disposed  persons,  who  see  in 'the  punishment  of  a  sentenced 
criminal  some  evil  or  other  befalling  an  individual  only,  and 
forget  his  previous  crime,  the  welfare  of  society,  and  the 
will  of  God  that  we  should  have  laws,  and  that  therefore  we 
should  obey  and  not  interfere  with  them.  My  remark  to 
such  persons  is  this,  that  if  they  knew  the  affiliation  and 
what  might  be  called  the  whole  economy  of  crime,  they 
would  know  among  other  things  that  an  immense  number  of 
offences  remain  untried,  and  an  immense  number  of  tried 
offences  unpunished,  and  that  the  common  offender  stands 
already,  in  all  countries  in  which  the  summary  process  is 


1  3d  Institute,  243. 

a  Beaumont  and  Tocqueville,  The  Penitentiary  System  in  the  United  States, 
translated  and  provided  with  Notes  by  myself,  Philadelphia,  1833,  in  the  Intro- 
duction to  which,  p.  xxix.,  I  have  given  my  views  on  pardoning;  and  my  Letter 
on  Subjects  of  Penal  Law,  published  by  the  Philadelphia  Prison  Society,  1838. 
The  repeated  Reports  of  the  Agents  of  Penitentiaries,  and  many  persons  in  high 
employ  in  prison-matters  in  Europe,  all  concur  that  injudicious  pardoning  is  a  very 
great  dereliction  of  duty  in  him  who  has  the  power.  [Cf.  Civil  Liberty,  App.  II.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  395 

justly  abandoned,  a  great  chance  of  escape,  without  holding 
out  to  him  this  additional  hope  of  ultimate  impunity,  after 
tiresome  proof  and  conviction. 

VII.  Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  that  the  pardoning  power 
exist  somewhere,  even  where  the  laws  are  conformable  to  the 
spirit  of  the  age,  and  imprisonment  is  not  of  a  kind  to  expose 
the  prisoner  to  contamination  and  greater  corruption.  For  it 
is  impossible  for  any  legislator  to  frame  his  laws  in  such  a 
manner  that  their  application  to  some  complex  cases  should 
not  operate  against  their  own  spirit  or  object.  Other  consid- 
erations, such  as  imperative  demands  of  public  welfare,  may 
exist,  which  make  the  suspension  of  the  rigorous  course  of 
the  law  advisable  or  necessary;  or  actual  mistakes  may  hap- 
pen, so  that  the  execution  of  the  sentence  would  be  no  longer 
the  execution  of  the  law,  but  unlawful  barbarity.  A  French- 
woman, Elizabeth  Colliaux,  was  sentenced,  in  consequence  of 
an  error  which  the  jury  themselves  had  noticed,  to  five  years' 
imprisonment.  The  jury,  who  expected  her  acquittal,  were 
surprised  at  her  sentence,  and  prayed  at  once  for  pardon. 
Strange  to  say,  she  was  not  pardoned  on  the  day  of  St.  Charles, 
when  many  real  criminals  were;  she  was  put  in  the  pillory 
and  branded.1 

On  the  other  hand,  a  pardon  or  reprieve,  being  an  inter- 
ruption of  the  law,  is  of  itself  dangerous  in  all  states  in  which 
the  supremacy  of  the  law  is  justly  considered  the  .main  shield 
of  civil  liberty.  This  difficulty  is  much  increased  in  republics, 
because  in  them  the  supremacy  of  the  law  is  of  the  very  last 
importance,  and  at  the  same  time  the  chief  magistrate  is  so 
easily  accessible  that  resistance  against  solicitations  for  pardon 
becomes  the  more  difficult.  By  what  principles  ought  those 
magistrates,  then,  to  whom  this  prerogative  is  confided,  or  the 
ministers  of  the  crown  who  propose  pardons,  to  be  guided  ?  I 
believe  by  the  following: 


*  All  France  was  deeply  affected  at  this  heart-rending  event.      Gazette  des 
Tribunaux,  No.  1347  of  1829. 


396  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

Pardoning  power  has  been  granted  by  the  state  to  an  indi- 
vidual only  for  the  better  obtaining  of  the  true  ends  of  the 
law,  or  the  better  fulfilment  of  its  true  spirit  and  not  of  its 
mere  form.  The  contrary  would  imply  an  absurdity.  It  would 
be  absurd,  indeed,  first  to  make  laws  with  great  expense  and 
trouble,  then  to  make  offenders  amenable  to  these  laws  with 
still  greater  expense,  and  finally  to  invest  an  officer  with  a 
privilege  to  set  at  naught  all  these  ends,  unless  it  were  meant 
that  this  privilege  should  aid  in  obtaining  the  general  end  of 
all  law,  that  is,  right  and  justice.  There  ought  always  to 
exist  peculiar  and  strong  reasons,  not  why  the  law  ought  to 
be  adhered  to,  but  why  its  regular  course  ought  to  be  inter- 
rupted. A  case  actually  occurred  a  few  years  ago,  when  the 
governor  of  one  of  the  largest  western  states  of  the  Union 
respited  a  criminal  sentenced  for  murder  in  open  daylight, 
"  in  order  that  the  sentiments  and  wishes  of  the  people  of  [a 
certain]  county  might  be  known,"  declaring  "that  if  at  the 
expiration  of  the  time  he  could  be  satisfied  that  it  is  the  wish  of 
the  citizens  of  [said]  county  generally  that  this  sentence  should 
be  commuted  to  that  of  imprisonment  for  life,  their  wishes 
could  then  be  complied  with."  Thus  the  governor  introduced 
on  his  own  responsibility  the  entirely  new  system  of  making 
the  execution  of  the  sentence,  after  having  been  delivered  in  due 
course  of  law,  dependent  upon  the  "  wishes"  of  the  majority 
of  that  county  to  which  the  criminal  happened  to  belong. 
What  a  view  of  general  law  and  general  justice ! 

If,  therefore,  a  case  is  brought  before  the  chief  magistrate 
who  has  the  power  of  pardoning,  he  ought  to  inquire  whether 
there  are  any  strong  palliating  circumstances  of  which  the 
law  could  not  take  notice,  or  circumstances  which  render  the 
sentence,  although  in  strict  conformity  with  the  law,  severer 
than  the  intention  of  the  law-makers  themselves  can  fairly  be 
supposed  to  have  been.  If  such  be  the  case,  a  partial  or  entire 
pardon  is  proper. 

If  the  law  is  manifestly  and  offensively  against  the  more 
humane  spirit  of  the  age,  especially  if  old  laws  demand  cruel 
punishments  and  tortures,  a  pardon  is  right ;  for  it  is  fair  and 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

just  to  suppose  that  this  is  one  of  the  cases  for  which  the 
privilege  was  granted,  namely,  to  temper  the  law  by  equity 
and  mercy.  The  code  of  Prussia  decrees  for  some  crimes  the 
punishment  of  breaking  on  the  wheel;  the  judges  are  bound 
to  award  it ;  but  the  king  invariably  issues  an  order  to  strangle 
the  criminal  before  his  body  be  broken  on  the  wheel,  or  com- 
mutes the  punishment  into  simple  beheading. 

The  more  recently,  therefore,  the  laws  have  been  revised, 
and  the  more  the  process  of  revision  has  been  such  that  we 
may  suppose  it  to  have  been  fairly  influenced  by  the  spirit  of 
society,  the  more  rarely  pardon  ought  to  be  exercised. 

It  is  dangerous,  however,  in  the  highest  degree,  if  pardons 
are  granted  from  a  merely  private  compassion  for  the  offender, 
or  from  any  other  motive  unconnected  with  the  welfare  of  the 
state  or  the  peculiar  hardship  of  the  single  case.  The  enor- 
mous abuse  of  pardoning  in  the  United  States  has  contributed 
to  undermine  political  morality,  and  has  seriously  interfered 
with  the  greatest  safeguard  of  right  and  liberty,  the  govern- 
ment of  law.  If  a  case  presents  circumstances  which  can 
leave  no  feeling  heart  without  regret,  which  yet  are  the  neces- 
sary consequences  of  the  law,  known  perfectly  well  by  the  law- 
makers at  the  time  of  making  the  law, — for  instance,  the  afflic- 
tion of  a  respectable  family  by  the  committal  of  a  degenerate 
son  to  prison,  or  the  want  and  poverty  of  a  mother  with  her 
children  in  consequence  of  her  husband's  having  been  sen- 
tenced for  a  crime, — the  pardon  must  necessarily  be  refused  ; 
for  the  magistrate  is  not  charged  to  consider  these  circum- 
stances.1 


1  I  cannot  forbear  transcribing  here  a  passage  from  Beccaria's  Essay  on  Crimes 
and  Punishments,  Engl.  trans!.,  Edinburgh,  1807,  chap.  xlvi.  Beccaria  will  be 
allowed  to  be  the  best  authority  for  a  lenient  spirit: 

"As  punishments  become  more  mild,  clemency  and  pardon  are  less  necessary. 
Happy  the  nation  in  which  they  will  be  considered  as  dangerous !  Clemency, 
which  has  often  been  deemed  a  sufficient  substitute  for  every  other  virtue  in  sov- 
ereigns, should  be  excluded  in  a  perfect  legislation,  where  punishments  are  mild 
and  the  proceedings  in  criminal  cases  regular  and  expeditious.  This  truth  will 
seem  cruel  to  those  who  live  in  countries  where,  from  the  absurdity  of  the  laws 
and  the  severity  of  punishments,  pardons  and  the  clemency  of  the  prince  are 


398  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

Every  pardon  granted  upon  insufficient  grounds  becomes  a 
serious  offence  against  society,  and  he  that  grants  it  is,  in  jus- 
tice, answerable  for  the  offences  which  the  offender  may  com- 
mit, and  for  the  general  injury  done  to  political  morality  by 
undue  interference  with  the  law.  The  pardoning  magistrate 
ought  never  to  forget  that  society  and  the  criminal  form  two 
parties,  the  one  invisible  as  a  whole  and  unrepresented,  the 
other  under  sufferance  before  him  and  hence  engaging  his 
feelings  very  differently  ;  and  that,  moreover,  while  it  is  but 
natural  that  our  feelings  should  turn  somewhat  in  favor  of  the 
prisoner  the  moment  that  sentence  is  actually  pronounced, 
because  he  appears  as  the  vanquished  party,  these  feelings 
must  not  sway  him  in  whose  hands  society  has  in  part 
intrusted  the  maintenance  not  the  subversion  of  law,  the 
protection  not  the  undermining  of  society.  Still  more  objec- 
tionable is  it  if  considerations  such  as  the  female  sex  of  the 
offender  are  urged  in  favor  of  a  pardon.  Is  then  woman  not 
a  moral  and  a  responsible  being,  and  shall  we  again  disgrace 
her  by  holding  her  unaccountable  after  she  has  been  raised 
by  positive  laws  to  moral  accountability?  The  Chinese  wife 
is  not  morally  emancipated  to  this  day.  They  have  a  maxim 
to  this  day  that  a  "  married  woman  can  commit  no  crime  ;  the 
responsibility  rests  with  the  husband."  How  degrading  for 
the  woman  !  I  have  cited  on  another  occasion  the  Swedish 
law  of  1335  by  which  the  woman  of  that  country  was  made 
amenable  to  the  laws  in  her  own  individuality.1  Lately,  some 
respectable  British  papers  expressed  the  hope  that  an  atro- 


necessavy.  It  is,  indeed,  one  of  the  noblest  prerogatives  of  the  throne,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  a  tacit  disapprobation  of  the  laws.  Clemency  is  a  virtue  which 
belongs  to  the  legislator  and  not  to  the  executor  of  the  laws;  a  virtue  which 
ought  to  shine  in  the  code,  and  not  in  private  judgment.  To  show  mankind 
that  crimes  are  sometimes  pardoned,  and  that  punishment  is  not  the  necessary 
consequence,  is  to  nourish  the  flattering  hope  of  impunity,  and  is  the  cause  of 
their  considering  every  punishment  inflicted  as  an  act  of  injustice  and  oppression. 
The  prince,  in  pardoning,  gives  up  the  public  security  in  favor  of  an  individual, 
and,  by  ill-judged  benevolence,  proclaims  a  public  act  of  impunity.  Let,  then, 
the  legislator  be  tender,  indulgent,  and  humane. 

1  My  letter  to  the  Philadelphia  Prison  Society,  p.  39. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

cious  murderess  would  be  pardoned,  because  she  was  a  woman 
and  the  monarch  was  of  the  same  sex !  Nor  do  those  who 
so  readily  claim  pardons  for  women  because  they  are  women 
seem  to  be  aware  that  a  woman  once  a  criminal  generally 
belongs  to  the  very  worst  and  most  dangerous  class  of  of- 
fenders. "  What  use  is  there  in  dragging  a  weak  woman  to 
prison  ?"  is  current  cant  assuming  the  garb  of  generosity, 
while  it  is  in  fact  the  effect  of  an  unfortunate  laxity  in  all 
views  of  public  morals,  of  right,  and  the  most  sacred  prin- 
ciples of  society  and  mankind. 

If  doubts  are  proved  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  verdict  or 
of  the  sentence,  pardon  ought  to  be  granted. 

If  for  whatever  reason  the  punishment  becomes  severer 
than  the  sentence  intended  it  to  be,  for  instance  by  the 
prisoner's  becoming  consumptive  in  a  prison  in  which  proper 
medical  aid  or  care  cannot  be  obtained  by  him,  pardon  may 
be  granted  under  certain  circumstances,  although  it  is  not 
necessary  that  it  should  be. 

If  the  offence  has  been  committed  in  the  opinion  that  it  was 
a  right  or  perhaps  a  praiseworthy  act  and  no  danger  accrues 
from  pardoning,  pardon  ought  certainly  to  be  granted  on  all 
fair  grounds,  for  instance  in  cases  of  political  offences. 

If  the  law  is  cruel  or  obviously  against  the  spirit  of  the 
whole  society,  there  is  no  harm  if  the  magistrate  forms  a  rule 
for  himself  to  grant  conditional  or  entire  pardons  in  all  such 
cases,  for  instance  if  no  children  are  ever  executed  in  Eng- 
land although  they  are  sentenced  to  die.  But  it  becomes 
highly  dangerous  if  by  this  privilege  a  chief  magistrate  sets 
himself  up  against  a  law  which  he  individually  considers  in- 
expedient ;  for  instance  if  he  should  be  opposed  to  capital 
punishment  and  on  that  ground  were  to  pardon  all  convicts 
sentenced  to  die.  He  would  legislate  in  a  very  important 
sphere  alone  and  uncontrolled  by  society,  for  he  would  evi- 
dently change  the  law,  which  he  was  acquainted  with  before 
entering  office,  and  to  maintain  which  he  took  a  sacred  oath. 

The  reported  reformation  of  the  convict  must  in  no  case 
form  the  sole  ground  for  pardoning.  This  is  acknowledged, 


400  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

I  believe,  by  almost  all  penologists  of  note  and  practical 
knowledge ;  and  where  it  has  been  tried  to  hold  out  an 
abridgment  of  the  punishment  as  a  reward  for  good  be- 
havior, the  consequences  have  been  found  to  be  bad,  as  for 
instance  in  France,  where  the  officer  who  drew  up  the  law 
holding  out  that  reward  petitioned,  after  having  observed  its 
operation,  for  its  abolition.1  I  speak  here  always  of  revised 
laws,  and  proper  systems  of  punishments,  for  nothing  can  be 
given  as  a  rule  for  bad  laws  and  worse  punishments.  The 
hope  of  pardon  for  good  behavior,  which  of  course  can  never 
be  absolutely  known,  leads  to  hypocrisy,  and  prevents  the 
very  reformation  sought  for,  because  it  does  not  allow  the 
prisoner  to  enter  into  that  state  of  calm  resignation  which, 
according  to  all  experience  in  criminal  psychology,  is  an  in- 
dispensable requisite  for  reformation.  If  the  punishment  is 
mild,  and  the  penitentiary  system  sound,  the  truly  reformed 
convict  himself  will  hardly  desire  a  pardon. 

The  pardoning  magistrate  ought  to  be  influenced,  in  con- 
junction with  other  considerations,  by  the  nature  of  the  guar- 
antees the  individual  to  be  pardoned  can  offer,  such  as  whether 
he  knows  a  trade,  has  received  some  education,  has  honest 
relations  who  acknowledge  him  or  not,  and  can  give  other 
pledges  of  a  probably  steady  life. 


1  Mr.  cle  la  Ville  de  Mirmont,  Inspector-General  of  the  Central  Prisons,  says 
in  his  work,  Observations  sur  les  Maisons  Centrales  de  Detention  a  1'Occasion  de 
1'Ouvrage  de  Beaumont  et  Tocqueville,  Paris,  1833,  p.  55,  et  seq.,  that  he  was 
the  one  who  obtained  the  law  in  1818,  and  that  he  often  repented  of  it.  The 
Bavarian  code  offers  pardon  after  three-fourths  of  the  time  of  imprisonment  have 
elapsed,  if  the  conduct  has  been  correct.  Of  course  the  apportionment  of  pun- 
ishments is  made  accordingly.  I  do  not  know  how  the  law  operates. 


CHAPTER    II. 

Juclge,  Juror,  Advocate,  and  Witness. — Official,  external,  and  moral  Independ- 
ence of  the  Judge. — Sanctissimus  Judex  of  the  Romans. — The  Judge,  where 
there  is  doubt,  must  interpret  in  Mercy,  in  Penal  Cases ;  in  Favor  of  civil  Lib- 
erty, in  all.— The  Institution  of  the  Jury. — The  sacred  Office  of  the  Juryman. — 
What  is  he  to  do  when  the  Law  is  contrary  to  the  universal  Conscience? — The 
Institution  of' the  Advocate. — Moral  Obligation  of  the  Advocate. — Political 
Relations  of  Lawyers  in  Free  Countries. — Duties  of  the  Witness. 

VIII.  FROM  all  that  has  been  said  of  justice  as  the  main 
and  broad  foundation  of  the  state,  of  the  superior  sway  of  law 
as  an  indispensable  requisite  of  civil  liberty  and  the  necessary 
independence  of  the  judiciary,  it  must  appear  that  there  is  no 
member  of  the  state  or  officer  of  government  superior  in  im- 
portance to  the  judge,  and  indeed  very  few  of  equal  impor- 
tance with  him.  All  mankind,  if  at  all  advanced  in  political 
civilization,  have  agreed  that  an  unjust  judge  defiles  the  very 
altar  for  the  service  of  which  he  was  ordained  a  priest.  The 
religious  codes  of  the  most  remote  antiquity,  the  law-books 
of  the  absolute  governments  of  the  East,  fettered  by  heredi- 
tary castes,  pronounce  this  universal  feeling  as  distinctly  as  the 
religions,  laws,  or  poetry  of  the  modern  or  freest  nations — the 
Vedas  as  well  as  Shakspeare.  A  truckling  judge  fawning  on 
power,  whoever  may  possess  it,  whether  monarch  or  people, 
is  one  of  the  most  offensive  and  humiliating  sights,  and  a  de- 
moralizing example  to  a  nation.  If  it  be  shameful  or  criminal 
for  a  citizen,  to  whom  no  peculiar  charge  has  been  confided,  to 
betray  his  country,  it  is  doubly  so  in  a  judge  to  betray  justice 
.and  liberty  by  yielding  to  power,  and  swerving  from  what  is 
just,  true,  and  right,  because  to  him  in  particular  has  their  cus- 
tody been  confided,  and  in  forsaking  justice  and  liberty  he 
betrays  his  country.  It  is  painful  to  peruse  the  bad  periods  of 
monarchies  or  republics,  when  judges  are  found  ready  to  bend 
the  law  according  to  the  desire  of  the  monarch  or  ruling  party, 
VOL.  II.  26  401 


402 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


and  it  is  comforting  indeed  when  we  find,  on  the  other  hand, 
men  who  comprehended  the  lofty  character  of  the  judge,  and 
had  sufficient  firmness  to  stand  as  the  independent  interpreters 
or  pronouncers  of  the  law,  for  or  against  whomsoever  this 
might  be.  The  names  of  judges  great  in  their  views,  calm  in 
their  decisions,  and. pure  in  all  their  life,  who  are  known  by 
the  whole  people  to  have  distinguished  themselves  by  un- 
swerving honesty  and  stout  hearts,  judges  whose  grasp,  pene- 
tration, and  blandness  of  mind  were  equally  great,  form  a 
moral  element  in  the  history  of  a  nation ;  they  constitute  a 
most  valuable  part  of  the  inherited  and  traditional  stock  of 
national  virtue,  and  give  a  moral  tone  and  stability  to  the 
community,  for  which  nothing  else  of  equally  great  effect  can 
be  substituted.  Those  great  judges  whom  England  counts 
in  her  history  have  done  more  of  good  than  the  infamous 
ones  who  have  disgraced  the  British  bench  have  been  able  to 
do  of  evil.  The  greater  the  liberty  the  greater  likewise,  as  is 
natural,  the  necessity  of  unbiassed,  clear,  learned,  and  strong- 
minded  judges — that  is,  oracles  of  the  law.  This  truth  of 
general  import  has  fully  appeared  from  all  the  preceding  parts 
of  this  work  ;  but  it  is  necessary  to  mention  here  in  particular 
that  the  moral  independence  of  the  judge  is  of  most  particular 
importance  in  republics  founded  upon  an  extensive  popular 
principle :  this  is  owing  to  the  fact  which  has  been  touched 
several  times,  that  resistance  against  the  crown  has  something 
heroical  in  it  and  will  seldom  fail  to  awaken  the  sympathy  of 
the  multitude,  while  resistance  to  popular  clamor,  passion,  or 
interest  appears  in  the  eye  of  the  excited  many  as  sin  and 
heresy.  The  American  history  offers  instances  of  judges  who 
either  have  been  overawed  by  the  clamor  of  the  people,  or, 
which  is  equally  to  be  shunned,  have  participated  in  the 
general  excitement. 

The  idea  which  the  Romans  entertained  of  the  judge,  the 
Sanctissimus  Judex  (Cic.  pro  Plane.,  xiii.  32),  and  indeed  the 
very  origin  of  the  word  Judex,1  are  characteristic,  and  distin- 


1  Judex  from  jus-dicere,  as  vindex  from  vim-dicere.     The  judex,  therefore,  was 
not  in  the  eye  of  the  Roman  the  avenger,  as  he  is  called  in  several  languages.   So 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  4O3 

guish  them  strikingly,  and  in  this  particular  favorably,  from  the 
Greeks.  The  latter  likewise  acknowledged  the  law,  not  only 
as  infinitely  superior  to  the  individual  charged  to  execute  it, 
but  also  as  that  which  alone  should  have  true  supremacy. 
Yet  this  was  the  case,  with  respect  to  law  in  general  only.  The 
Greeks  never  sufficiently  separated  judicial  law  from  political 
and  administrative;  the  judge,  therefore,  with  them  never 
appeared  in  so  sacred  a  light  as  with  the  practical  and  honest 
Romans.1  It  might,  indeed,  be  observed  here  as  a  general 
remark  that  the  Sacrosancta  Auctoritas  inherent  in  the  highest 
offices  is  quite  peculiar  to  Rome,  and  indicates  one  of  the 
most  essential  features  by  which  that  republic  so  remarkably 
differed  from  the  Grecian  states. 

If  the  judge,  then,  ought  to  be  independent  in  every  way, 
he  ought  to  be,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  first  part  of  this  work, 
independent  of  the  executive  and  power-holder,  unswayed  by 
prince  or  people;2  he  ought  to  be  made  independent  in  his 
situation  ;  his  salary  ought  to  be  sufficient  both  to  elevate  him 
above  want  and  its  influences  and  to  command  the  highest 
talent ;  for  in  every  well-regulated  commonwealth  a  judgeship 
should  always  be  the  last  and  highest  goal  the  lawyer  looks  for: 
his  salary,  again,  ought  to  be  fixed,  not  dependent  upon  fees,3 
and  so  not  dependent,  in  appearance  at  least,  upon  those  whom 


are  Justice  and  Revenge  or  Retribution  in  many  idioms  one  and  the  same  word; 
but  Judex  meant  the  pronouncer,  declarer  of  right.  [But  jus  denoted  originally 
id  quod  populus  juhet.  The  moral  sense  came  into  it.] 

1  [The  Romans  lost  this  feeling  of  the  sacredness  of  the  judge  at  length.  For 
instance,  the  question  between  senate  and  equites,  as  to  the  order  from  which  the 
judices  should  be  drawn,  had  for  its  motive  in  part  to  screen  persons  under 
accusation  for  peculation,  maladministration,  etc.] 

8  This  applies  in  a  great  measure  to  all  law-officers  whose  ultimate  end  is  the 
administration  of  justice.  Erskine  calls  Lord  Coke — even  Coke — "  the  infamous 
prosecutor  of  Raleigh."  (Defence  of  Thomas  Hardy,  for  High  Treason.)  The 
dereliction  of  duty  is  equally  great  if  the  sovereign  is  not  the  monarch  but  the 
people,  though  it  may  not  appear  so  at  the  time. 

3  There  is  a  strange  anomaly  in  the  British  high  court  of  admiralty.  The  judge 
has  no  salary,  and  consequently  very  little  indeed  in  peace,  but  in  times-of  war  his 
salary  amounts  to  about  eight  thousand  pounds.  Nothing  is  more  directly  against 
all  true  principles  of  government  than  to  give  part  of  confiscations  to  the  judges 


404  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

he  judges,  nor  diminished  whilst  he  holds  his  seat,  lest  he 
become  or  be  suspected  of  being  dependent  upon  his  em- 
ployers, the  legislature  or  executive.  His  independence  im- 
plies, as  we  have  seen  previously,  his  immovability  from  office, 
except  by  impeachment.  Finally,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the 
judge  be  placed  in  a  state  of  independence:  he  must  place 
himself  so  as  much  as  in  him  lies.  Lord  Brougham  lately 
pronounced  himself  against  judges  having  any  seat  as  mem- 
bers of  elective  legislatures,  so  as  not  to  be  influenced  by  their 
constituencies.1  It  is  of  course  impossible  to  draw  with  any  dis- 
tinction the  line  beyond  which  a  judge  ought  not  to  go  in  his 
participation  in  public  political  meetings ;  but  certain  it  is  that 
he  injures  the  sacredness  of  his  office  in  the  same  degree  in 
which  he  becomes  a  partisan,  and  that  he  ought  ever  to  be 
mindful  that  his  moral  power  in  pronouncing  judgment  ac- 
cording to  the  law  already  made  will  be  impaired,  if  he  mixes 
in  the  excitement  which  may  be  connected  with  the  making 
of  it.  His  moral  weight,  of  the  greatest  importance  in  every 
free  country,  is  derived  greatly  from  the  fact  that  he  can  say, 
"  Not  I,  directly  or  indirectly  in  any  way  whatever,  but  the 
law,  which  is  given  to  me  and  is  my  master,  says  thus." 

As  it  is  a  rule  that  where  a  law  leaves  any  doubt  it  shall  be 
interpreted  in  mercy  for  the  prisoner,  so  ought  the  judges  in 
a  wider  sphere  to  consider  themselves  as  the  perpetual  ser- 
vants of  civil  liberty  and  of  strict  government  by  law,  and 
never  to  join  either  the  -executive  or  any  party,  political  or 
religious,  in  persecutions,  in  injurious  interpretations  or  dis- 
tortions of  law,  or  in  any  even  the  slightest  oppression. 
Where  there  as  doubt  at  all  on  points  of  public  or  constitu- 
tional law,  the  judge  ought  always  to  interpret  in  favor  of 
civil  liberty ;  and,  in  fine,  he  ought  not  in  penal  cases  to  con- 
sider the  mere  disobedience  to  the  law  in  itself  an  additional 
offence  besides  the  crime  or  offjnce  committed — a  view  which 


as  reward  for  their  alacrity  in  prosecuting,  as  we  give  a  small  piece  of  the  hunted 
game  to  the  hounds  who  pursue  it,  to  incite  their  future  zeal. 
1  In  the  Lords,  February  12,  1839. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  405 

formerly  led  but  too  frequently  to  harsh  punishments,  and 
afforded  a  basis  for  the  inadmissible  penal  theory  which  de- 
rives the  punitory  power  of  the  state  from  public  vengeance. 

IX.  By  the  institution  of  the  jury  two  great  ends,  the  one 
of  liberty,  the  other  of  the  administration  of  justice,  have  been 
united — namely,  direct  participation  of  the  people  in  the  dis- 
pensing of  justice  and  the  preventing  of  it  from  falling  entirely 
into  the  hands  of  the  executive  or  of  a  separate  and  closed 
caste.  From  whatever  point  of  view  we  may  examine  this 
peculiar  institution  as  it  has  developed  itself  in  the  Anglican 
race — and  it  may  be  viewed  in  a  great  many,  all  equally  im- 
portant— it  will  always  appear  that  the  citizen  cannot  act  in 
any  more  solemn  capacity  than  that  of  a  juror :  in  my  opinion, 
in  no  capacity  so  solemn  and  important.  Society  requires  the 
state;  the  state  acts  through  laws;  the  laws  are  the  great 
organs  of  human  society,  of  combined  reason  ;  and  now,  when 
the  very  moment  ultimately  arrives  for  which  the  law  was 
made,  when  it  is  finally  to  be  applied  as  a  general  rule  to  a 
practical  and  concrete  case,  when,  in  short,  the  abstract  prin- 
ciple is  to  be  realized  in  practical  life,  for  weal  or  woe,  for  the 
protection  of  some  or  the  punishment  of  others,  all  this  is  in 
a  great  measure  left  to  the  juror,  to  the  citizen  taken  fresh 
from  the  people.  The  jurors,  therefore,  are  justly  called  by 
the  British  law  the  country.1  There  is  a  deep  meaning  in 
this  expression,  as  it  has  grown  in  the  course  of  centuries ; 
for  the  jury  truly  and  practically  represent  the  country  to  the 
person  that  is  to  be  tried.  The  law  is  the  expression  of  pub- 
lic will,  and  the  jury  represent  the  jural  society,  in  judging 
whether  in  the  given  case  the  facts  warrant  the*  application  of 
the  law.  The  jury  represent  the  country,  not  the  government; 
they  judge  of  facts  according  to  rules  and  laws  indeed,  but  also 
with  the  feelings  of  living  men,  and  not  merely  as  if  they  repre- 


1  For  instance,  when  the  clerk,  reading  the  indictment,  concludes  thus :  "  Upon 
this  indictment,  gentlemen,  the  prisoner  has  been  arraigned;  upon  his  arraign- 
ment he  pleaded  not  guilty ;  and  for  trial  hath  put  himself  upon  God  and  his 
country  ;  which  country  you  are,"  etc. 


406  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

sented  the  abstract  law  as  it  is  written  down.  To  represent 
this  a  learned  judge  would  be  sufficient.  The  jury  represents, 
or  rather  is,  whenever  faithful,  the  living,  operating  law.  In- 
deed, it  may  justly  be  said  that  though  for  a  brief  time,  yet, 
for  this  brief  time,  a  jury  represents  more  fully  and  entirely 
human  society  as  formed  into  a  state,  with  its-great  objects, 
than  any  other  person  or  body  of  men,  even  the  monarch's 
person  not  excepted.  Not  that  I  mean  to  intimate  the  idea 
as  if  on  this  account  the  jury  were  released  either  from  strict 
obedience  to  law  or  proper  advice.  Even  though  they  were 
the  very  sovereign,  we  have  seen  on  a  previous  occasion  that 
sovereignty  and  absolute  power  are  very  different.  On  the 
contrary,  the  jury  according  to  the  essence  of  their  character 
are  strictly  bound  by  the  law,  yet  by  the  law  as  their  country 
requires  it  or  must  be  supposed  to  require  it,  applied  to  the 
particular  and,  probably,  complex  case  before  them. 

A  juryman,  therefore,  ought  to  serve  with  the  deepest  im- 
pression of  the  grave  responsibility  which  his  oath  has  im- 
posed upon  him :  he  sits  there  for  his  country,  he  acts  for  the 
country;  the  laws  must  be  applied  through  him,  they  must 
strike  or  protect  through  him.  The  foundation  of  the  state 
is  justice;  the  country  asks  it  at  his  hands  for  the  prisoner. 
The  just  object  of  the  state  is  protection;  the  country  demands 
it  against  crime  at  his  hands.  The  juryman  therefore  must  not 
trifle  with  his  duty,  either  by  discharging  it  lightly  or  indo- 
lently j1  he  does  not  sit  there  to  dispense  with  the  laws,  or  set 
them  at  naught  by  ill-advised  and  weak  compassion  for  guilt, 
but  to  apply  the  law  ;  and  he  is  bound  by  sacred  ties  to 
his  country  and  mankind  to  receive  the  law  at  the  hands 


1  I  have  seen  a  juryman  asleep  during  a  trial  for  murder.  It  is  true  it  was  hot, 
and  in  the  afternoon.  Feuerhach,  in  Considerations  on  Public  and  Oral  Admin- 
istration of  Justice,  Giessen,  1825,  vol.  ii.  p.  221,  says  that  he  has  seen  the  judges 
in  Paris  repeatedly  sleep  on  the  bench  ;  but  it  ought  to  be  observed  that  there  are 
several  judges,  and  that  Feuerbach  does  not  speak  of  the  presiding  judge  or 
president ;  as,  indeed,  in  the  above  case  it  was  not  the  foreman  who  slept.  The 
author  adds  in  a  note  an  extract  from  a  French  Dictionary,  published  in  1778, 
according  to  which  sleeping  and  talking  about  the  news  of  the  day  was.  then  not 
uncommon  for  judges  when  in  audience. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


407 


of  the  judge,  wherever  necessary.  No  consideration,  pri- 
vate favor  or  disfavor,  no  political  bias,  must  influence  his 
judgment.  All  this  indeed  amounts  to  embracery  on  an  en- 
larged scale:  although  it  cannot  be  made  indictable,  yet  it 
has  all  the  guilt  of  embracery,  which  is  the  offence  of  im- 
properly influencing  the  jury.  The  juror,  as  he  is  always 
instructed  to  do,  must  judge  by  the  evidence  which  is  brought 
before  him,  and  nowise  by  the  capricious  impression  which 
he  may  have  received  elsewhere.  Respecting  this  point,  he 
must  remember  that  the  words  of  the  verdict  "  not  guilty"  are 
not  of  absolute  import,  but  have  a  legal  meaning;  that  is,  the 
jury,  in  delivering  the  verdict,  do  not  mean  to  say,  We  abso- 
lutely declare  the  prisoner  at  the  bar  not  guilty,  nor  even  that 
they  are  morally  convinced  of  his  innocence.  All  that  a  ver- 
dict of  not  guilty  can  mean- is  this,  that  according  to  the  dis- 
tinct rules  of  law  and  the  evidence  as  now  laid  before  us  in  the 
course  of  the  trial,  the  prisoner  cannot  in  the  sense  of  the  law, 
according  to  such  application  of  it  as  society  demands,  be 
called  guilty ;  or,  in  other  words,  according  to  those  rules 
which  society  wills  us  strictly  to  obey  in  judging  of  the 
prisoner,  he  has  not  been  proved  guilty. 

X.  Here  I  have  arrived  at  a  question  of  a  peculiarly  serious 
and  delicate  character,  which  it  is  nevertheless  necessary  can- 
didly to  discuss  in  a  work  that  occupies  itself  professedly  with 
ethics  in  connection  with  the  state,  or  the  subject  of  right. 
The  question  is,  Can  a  jury,  under  any  circumstances,  bring  a 
verdict  of  Not  Guilty,  if,  according  to  evidence  as  well  as 
the  letter  of  the  law,  their  verdict  ought  to  be  Guilty,  without 
perjuring  themselves?  Many  distinguished  jurists  have  un- 
qualifiedly answered  that,  whatever  the  law  may  be,  the  jury 
are  bound  to  go  by  its  letter :  it  is  no  province  of  theirs  to 
judge  of  the  law  and  its  mild  or  severe  effects.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly true  in  all  cases  except  those  of  extremity,  and 
these  are  the  very  ones  which  constitute  the  difficulty.  So  it 
is  not  for  the  soldier  to  judge  whether  what  his  officer  bids 
him  to  do  is  right;  yet  in  cases  of  extremity  he  will  and  must 


408  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

do  so.  Mankind  will  not  and  cannot  be  reasoned  out  of  their 
original  and  natural  sentiments;  and  so,  as  obedience  to  the 
laws  is  a  general  duty,  while  resistance  adopted  as  a  general 
principle  would  necessarily  dissolve  human  society,  we  dis- 
obey and  resist  in  the  extreme  case  when  a  government 
openly,  directly,  and  repeatedly  acts  against  the  very  objects 
for  which  it  was  established.  So  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
to  force  mankind  into  an  obedience  to  laws  which  directly  and 
palpably  militate  with  the  conscience  of  every  one,  whatever 
learned  men  may  have  said  to  the  contrary.  If  an  ancient  law 
punishes  the  pilfering  of  a  trifle  with  death,  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  to  force  a  jury  who,  with  the  whole  age  in  which 
they  live,  consider  the  law  murderous,  into  what  they  would 
feel  to  be  directly  opposite  to  the  ends  of  all  law,  that  is  jus- 
tice and  protection.  If  the  law-maker  neglects  to  adapt  the 
law  to  the  altered  circumstances  and  the  spirit  of  the  whole 
age,  the  law  may  indeed  remain  undisturbedly  upon  the  books, 
but  the  inevitable  difficulty  of  applying  that  law  to  real  cases 
is  not  thereby  avoided.  The  jury  will  not  bring  a  victim  to 
so  barbarous  a  law,  nor  load  their  consciences  with  having 
contributed  in  destroying  him.  Some  of  the  most  eminent 
judges  have  evidently  entertained  the  same  opinion.  Lord 
Mansfield,  as  I  have  mentioned  already,  instructed  a  jury  to 
find  a  verdict  for  theft  of  less  than  twenty  shillings,  when  the 
amount  of  stolen  goods  had  been  proved  to  be  worth  far 
more  ;  because  the  case  was  of  a  very  peculiar  character  and 
the  prisoner  would  otherwise  have  been  hanged.  Now,  on 
what  ground  could  the  judge  instruct  thus  or  the  jury  bring 
a  verdict  against  the  truth  before  them  ?  Were  they  then  not 
perjured?  They  could,  it  seems  to  me,  bring  this  verdict, 
which  was  clearly  at  variance  with  the  real  state  of  things 
before  their  eyes,  on  the  ground  that  the  words  of  the  verdict 
have  a  meaning  relatively  to  the  law,  the  case,  etc.  If  a  jury 
formerly,  although  the  crime  was  proved,  brought  a  verdict 
of  not  guilty  for  a  prisoner,  say  twelve  years  old,  charged  with 
shoplifting,  for  which  the  law  said  that  he  should  be  hanged, 
the  words  of  the  verdict  mean,  I  take  it,  Not  Guilty  in  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

sense  in  which  the  country  wills  the  law  to  be  understood  ("in 
mitiori  sensu,"  as  it  were) — the  law  which  has  a  sense  and 
meaning  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  for  the  benefit  and  not  the  ruin 
of  society,  and  the  letter  of  the  law,  which  in  this  case,  when 
a  boy  of  tender  years  would  be  hanged  for  an  offence  arising 
out  of  juvenile  thoughtlessness,  palpably  militates  against  the 
very  objects  of  the  state.  I  am  well  aware  that  nothing  is 
more  dangerous  than  to  look  habitually  towards  the  effect  of 
the  law,  for  a  jury  who  ought  in  common  cases  to  decide 
only  on  what  is  submitted  to  them.  But  I  speak  of  extraor- 
dinary cases,  which  do  occur  in  some  instances,  and,  despite 
their  danger,  must  be  decided  one  way  or  the  other.  Nor  do 
we  gain  anything  by  deciding  them  theoretically,  against  the 
universal  conscience  of  mankind.  For  the  practice  will  prove 
too  powerful  for  the  theory.  Where  the  laws,  however,  are 
mild,  perhaps  already  too  mild,  where  many  pardons  are  in- 
judiciously granted,  a  jury  ought  to  consider  nothing  but  the 
peculiar  questions  before  them,  and  consider  neither  condi- 
tion, sex,1  nor  any  such  circumstance  in  making  up  their  ver- 
dict.2 The  jury  ought  never  to  forget  that  the  cases  spoken 
of  above  remain  exceptions.3 


1  It  is  lowering  the  character  of  the  woman,  if  juries  are  influenced  by  the  fact 
that  the  arraigned  prisoner  is  a  female,  or  by  her  beauty;  though  this  has  fre- 
quently happened. 

"The  utmost  attention  and  care  are  necessary  in  juries;  sad  mistakes  have 
taken  place,  and  are  on  the  records  of  legal  history.  I  would  refer  the  reader 
to  Blackstone,  iii.  pp.  378-385  ;  Kent's  Commentaries  in  the  proper  places.  The 
Guides  for  Jurymen,  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  relate  more  to  the  business 
than  to  the  ethical  relations  of  the  juryman. 

3  [The  author  here  substantially  invests  the  jury  with  a  pardoning  power.  This 
ground  is  a  dangerous  one:  his  extreme  cases  must  multiply,  if  all  persons  ad- 
mitted that  the  jury  had  anything  to  do  besides  saying  that  the  facts  were  proved. 
One  man  would  never  find  guilty  in  cases  where  the  punishment  was  capital ; 
another,  where  it  seemed  to  him  of  great  general  evil  to  society.  All  biasses 
which  prevent  a  juryman  from  looking  at  the  question  of  fact,  of  guilty  or  not 
guilty,  are  wrong.  All  meanings  given  to  guilty  or  not  guilty,  relatively  to  the 
benefit  of  society,  are  false  meanings.  The  jury  could  recommend  for  mercy, 
they  could  even  protest  against  the  law ;  but  they  must  not  take  their  oath  in  a 
non-natural  sense.] 


4io 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


XI.  Wherever  nations  have  arrived  at  any  high  degree  of 
political  civilization,  so  as  to  value  the  protection  of  individual 
rights,  we  find  the  institution  of  the  advocate,  which,  such  as 
we   know   it,  we   may   consider   as    peculiarly  belonging  to 
Western  or  European  life.     We  find,  indeed,  attorneys  and 
"the  borrowing  of  another's  mouth"  in  Sumatra,1  among  some 
of  the  Hindoo  nations,  and  in  Morocco;2  but  neither  Turkey, 
Siam,  Persia,  nor  China  has  advocates  proper,  whose  order 
the  venerable  D'Aguesseau  calls  "  as  ancient  as  the  office  of 
the  judge,  as  noble  as  virtue,  and  as  necessary  as  justice."3 
This  is  certainly  a  little  French,  and,  whatever  we  may  think 
of  the  second  position  in  particular,  it  is  nevertheless  true 
that  the  institution  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  true  empire 
of  the  law.     Despotism  sees  very  little  or  no  difference  be- 
tween civil  and  penal  actions;  all  actions  become  penal,  they 
are  trials,  and  all  trials  are  conducted  upon  the  principle  of 
inquisition  on  the  part  of  the  judge;4  and  the  trials  are  by  no 
means  conducted  on  the  principle  of  the  greatest  possible  pro- 
tection under  the  law  so  far  as  the  ends  of  the  law  and  justice 
admit. 

XII.  That  it  is  dishonorable  for  a  lawyer  to  foment  dis- 
putes— as  there  are  those  who  do  in  all  countries — is  too  clear 
to  need  any  consideration.     It  amounts  to  actual  robbing  of 
the  clients.     Physicians  might  as  well  first  promote  sickness 
in  order  to  have  afterwards  the  benefit  of  curing.     Nor  does 


1  "  Pinjam  mulut;"   Marsden,  History  and  Description  of  Sumatra. 

2  Host,  Information  of  Morocco. 

3  D'Aguesseau,  Discours  sur  l'Ind<Spendance  de  1'Avocat.     CEuvres,  torn.  ii. 
p.  4,  Yverdun  edit. 

*  In  despotic  empires  exists  what  Montesquieu  calls  "la  magistrature  unique," 
that  is,  there  is  but  one  judge,  and  not  a  number  of  judges.  Feuerbach,  in  his 
Considerations  on  Public  and  Oral  Administration  of  Justice  (in  German),  vol. 
i.  p.  354  et  seq.,  has  many  pertinent  remarks  on  the  subject.  He  there  exhibits 
also  the  great  error  of  Montesquieu,  who  asserts  that  "in  despotic  governments 
there  is  no  law;  the  judge  is  his  own  rule"  (Esprit  des  Lois,  vi.,  ch.  i.  3),  when 
in  fact  the  body  of  Turkish,  Chinese,  and  Hindoo  established  and  collected  laws 
equal  or  exceed  in  bulk  those  of  Rome  or  England. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  4II 

it  require  our  attention  to  consider  how  much  more  honor- 
able it  is  if  he  who  knows  the  law  uses  his  knowledge  in 
giving  advice  to  prevent  rather  than  profit  by  litigation.  In 
this  respect,  honorable  lawyers  of  extensive  practice  are  real 
blessings  to  a  community.  Let  us  proceed  at  once  to  the 
consideration  of  some  of  the  prominent  duties  of  the  advocate 
during  trial,  as  they  interest  political  society  at  large,  leaving 
all  the  other  duties  to  the  consideration  of  those  who  may 
make  hereafter  legal  ethics  the  peculiar  subject  of  their 
studies.  It  certainly  deserves  the  fullest  attention ;  and  many 
points  would  then  be  examined  by  reflecting  men  which  at 
present  have  in  some  countries  hardly  attracted  any  notice, 
while  in  others  they  are  considered  with  great  rigidness. 

The  advocate,  wherever  the  institution  exists,  enjoys  various 
privileges.  In  some  countries  he  is  actually  considered  an 
officer.  For  what  purpose  are  those  privileges  granted  him? 

The  state,  on  the  one  hand,  must  needs  act  upon  the 
principle  that  the  law  is  known  to  every  one,  or  may  be 
known  to  every  one,  if  he  chooses  to  know  it;  while  on  the 
other  hand  it  knows  full  well  that  in  every  civilized  society  it 
is  impossible  that  the  law  in  its  whole  extent  can  be  actually 
known  to  every  citizen.  The  advocates,  therefore,  as  a  class, 
are  favored  by  society,  that  they  may  freely  give  advice 
before  a  lawsuit  has  commenced,  and  may  freely  speak  for 
the  client,  with  all  their  knowledge  of  the  law,  during  the 
trial.  Secondly,  the  state,  desiring  to  extend  to  every  one 
full  protection  and  civil  liberty,  is  as  much  interested  in  see- 
ing the  full  protection  of  the  law  realized  in  each  case,  that 
is,  that  no  more  be  demanded  than  what  the  law  does  de- 
mand, and  that  all  the  advantage  granted  by  the  law  be 
actually  enjoyed,  as  it  is  in  seeing  every  wrong  suppressed 
and  right  secured  or  re-established  wherever  it  has  been 
interrupted. 

To  obtain  these  various  equally  important  objects,  the  insti- 
tution of  the  advocate  is  established  ;  and  from  these  premises 
we  shall  be  able  to  derive  some  very  important  ethical  con- 
clusions. 


412 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


The  advocate  exists  for  the  better  obtaining  of  justice  and 
protection.  It  would  be  absurd  to  imagine  that  human  society 
first  makes  laws  with  great  pains  and  expense,  and  then  suffers 
or  charters  a  whole  class  of  skilful  men  to  defeat  them.  All 
the  conclusions,  therefore,  which  people  have  drawn  from  the 
analogy  between  warfare  and  a  lawsuit  are  utterly  inadmissi- 
ble. It  has  been  even  asserted  that  the  counsel  are  permitted 
to  state  what  is  not  true,  just  as  the  soldier  is  permitted  to 
deceive  the  enemy.  Nothing  can  be  more  erroneous.  That 
which  characterizes  war  is  the  fact  that  the  belligerents  appeal 
from  reasoning  to  the  use  offeree;  the  lawsuit,  however,  and 
the  whole  administration  of  justice,  are  founded  upon  the 
very  ideas  of  truth,  justice,  and  reasoning,  according  to  sound 
rules  of  judgment  and  proof.  The  lawsuit  is  part  and  parcel 
of  the  intercourse  of  the  citizen  in  peace  and  within  the  sphere 
of  law  :  it  is,  in  short,  the  very  opposite  to  war  in  every  re- 
spect. So  it  has  been  said  that  the  lawyer  has  nothing  what- 
soever to  do  with  the  morality  of  the  case  which  he  defends, 
and  that  he  lets  out  his  talent  and  knowledge  to  his  client, 
who,  if  he  himself  possessed  it,  would  use  it  in  every  way  for 
his  advantage.  This  again  is  erroneous ;  for,  first,  no  man 
can  divest  himself  of  his  moral  individuality,  as  we  have  seen 
before :  else  the  hired  assassin  would  be  right,  who  says,  My 
employer  hires  me;  he  has  not  sufficient  physical  strength  or 
courage ;  these  I  lend  him  for  money ;  but  I  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  morality  of  the  murder.  Secondly,  even  if  it  were 
so,  it  would  be  wrong  in  the  client  to  state  falsehoods ;  and, 
finally,  if  it  were  actually  so,  the  state  could  do  nothing  better 
than  speedily  to  abolish  so  dangerous  a  class  of  men.  If  it 
means  that  the  lawyer  should  defend  every  case  if  called  upon, 
that  he  ought  to  do  everything  consistent  with  law  and  mo- 
rality which  may  be  advantageous  to  his  client,  this  is  correct, 
as  we  shall  see  presently  more  fully. 

Lastly,  it  has  been  said  that  the  lawyer  has  no  more  to  do 
with  the  morality  of  the  case  offered  to  him  than  the  physician 
who  may  be  called  upon  to  save  a  man  whom  he  knows  to 
be  an  injury  or  dishonor  to  his  country.  Thus,  though  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


413 


lawyer  fully  knows  that  the  case  which  he  defends  is  founded 
upon  fraud,  and  that  if  he  succeeds  he  will  rob  others  of  their 
property,  say  an  orphan  in  defending  the  case  of  a  fraudulent 
guardian,  he  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  causes  and  possible 
effects  of  the  case,  but  merely  to  handle  it  according  to  the 
best  knowledge  of  the  law  and  the  skill  which  he  possesses,  as 
the  physician,  called  upon  to  attend  the  patient  who  when  in 
health  ill-treats  his  wife  and  children,  has  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  any  other  consideration  than  how,  with  his  experi- 
ence, he  can  soonest  cure  his  patient.  But  the  sole  object  of 
the  whole  healing  art  is  the  re-establishment  of  physical  health, 
or,  where  this  cannot  be  done,  the  greatest  possible  diminution 
of  physical  suffering.  The  object  of  all  administration  of  jus- 
tice is  Right;  and  the  vocation  of  the  advocate  has  a  sensible 
meaning  only  as  forming  part  of  this  administration  of  justice. 
He  is  allowed  to  speak  for  another  on  so  solemn  an  occasion 
as  that  of  a  trial,  for  the  very  purpose  that  truth  may  be  better 
known  and  justice  better  done,  but  not  to  veil  the  one  or  to 
defeat  the  other,  knowingly  and  purposely.  It  would  be,  as 
was  said  before,  absurd. 

It  is  believed  that  the  ends  of  justice  are  best  promoted, 
among  other  things,  if  every  person  charged  with  an  offence 
have  counsel,  versed  in  the  law,  both  to  protect  him  against 
unlawful  oppression  and  to  obtain  all  the  advantages  for  him 
which  the  law  may  offer ;  but  the  state  cannot  sanction  im- 
morality or  the  infringement  of  the  rights  of  others.  That 
my  remarks  do  not  apply  to  suspicions  and  rumors  must  be 
clear;  I  speak  here  of  wrong  only  that  is  positively  known  by 
the  advocate. 

XIII.  The  rules  of  action  for  the  counsel  are  twofold,  as 
appears  to  me — the  common  ethical  rules,  and  those  which 
are  peculiar  to  his  profession. 

As  to  the  first,  the  advocate  does  not  cease  to  be  a  human 
being  with  all  his  ethical  and  religious  obligations,  a  citizen 
with  all  his  political  obligations  to  his  country  and  her  laws, 
and  a  gentleman  with  all  the  obligations  of  honor  and  civil 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

intercourse.  He  is  no  morally  privileged  person,  as  no  man 
can  be.  The  more  justice  and  due  protection  of  the  citizen 
require  that  he  should  have  great  freedom  of  speech  and  ac- 
tion in  court,  the  more  he  is  bound  to  regulate  his  conduct 
towards  a  witness  by  genuine  courtesy,  and  towards  the  court 
by  due  deference  to  the  cause  of  justice  partly  represented  by 
the  bench.  Yet  a  true  advocate  will  never  forget  that  in  de- 
fending a  citizen  he  is  as  much  the  representative  of  the  law 
of  the  land,  which  wills  protection  to  every  one,  as  is  the 
judge,  and,  with  all  proper  respect  for  the  bench,  he  will,  if 
the  case  calls  for  it,  stand  for  his  client's  rights  as  Erskine  did 
in  the  trial  of  the  dean  of  St.  Asaph.1 

As  to  the  second  class  of  rules,  he  must  abide  by  the  rules 
agreed  upon  among  the  members  of  the  bar  as  best  calculated 
to  promote  professional  intercourse  and  the  advantages  of  the 
profession,  so  far  as  they  agree  with  the  advantages  of  the 
community. 

As  it  is  the  object  of  the  institution  of  the  advocate  that 
every  person  should  have  all  the  advantage  which  the  law 
affords,  and  that  final  sentence  be  given  only  after  all  that 
may  be  urged  on  both  sides  is  said  and  sifted,  there  is  no  case 
in  which  a  person  charged  with  an  offence  should  not  be  de- 
fended. Many  codes  enact  this  principle  as  law.  There  are 
not  a  few  persons  who  revolt  at  this  idea,  conceiving  of  a  case 
in  which  the  guilt  of  the  offender  is  known  to  every  one. 
Defending,  however,  does  not  necessarily  mean  representing 
the  prisoner  as  innocent,  but  merely,  first,  seeing  that  the  guilt 
be  actually  proved, — for  every  man,  as  is  well  known,  must 
be  held  innocent  until  proved  guilty, — and,  secondly,  that  no 
more  than  what  is  strictly  warranted  by  the  law  should  be 
awarded.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  that  counsel  give 
up  a  case  as  absolutely  hopeless;  but  still  they  must  continue 


1  In  the  trial  of  Shipley,  the  dean  of  St.  Asaph,  for  libel,  Justice  Buller  said, 
"  Sit  down,  sir  ;  remember  your  duty,  or  I  shall  be  obliged  to  proceed  in  another 
manner."  Mr.  Erskine  answered,  "  Your  lordship  may  proceed  in  what  man- 
ner you  think  fit :  I  know  my  duty  as  well  as  your  lordship  knows  yours.  I  shall 
not  alter  my  conduct." 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


415 


to  protect  the  client  against  a  privation  of  any  advantage 
which  the  law  warrants,  for  instance  that  the  sentence  be  not 
too  severe. 

I  do  not  know  that  anything  redounds  more  to  the  honor 
of  the  Americans  than  the  readiness  with  which  in  1770  the 
British  soldiers  who  had  fired  upon  the  people  in  Boston 
found  counsel  even  during  that  great  excitement  which  pre- 
ceded the  Revolution,  and  that  counsel,  too,  men  who,  as 
American  citizens,  were  enthusiastic  for  the  popular  cause. 
There  is  a  remarkable  letter  in  the  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  jun., 
of  Massachusetts  (written  by  his  son,  Josiah  Quincy,  Boston, 
1825).  He  had  been  engaged  for  one  of  those  soldiers,  and 
his  father  inquired  with  great  anxiety  whether  it  was  true  that 
his  son  had  become  "an  advocate  for  those  criminals  who  are 
charged  with  the  murder  of  their  fellow-citizens.  Good  God!" 
he  continues,  "  is  it  possible?  I  will  not  believe  it."  The  son 
answered,  in  a  noble  letter,  that  they  had  not  yet  been  found 
guilty,  but  were  only  charged  with  the  guilt.1 

Cicero  says  that  the  judge  must  always  follow  out  the  truth, 
but  that  the  advocate  may  defend  what  is  but  the  semblance 
of  truth,  though  it  be  short  of  truth.  I  think  the  truth  on 
this  point  is  that  the  advocate  has«no  more  right  to  abandon 
truth  than  any  one  else  in  the  whole  world,  but  he  is  bound 
to  represent  his  case  in  the  best  possible  light  consistent  with 
the  truth  ;  so  that  if  there  be  any  substantially  good  point  it 
may  be  found  out.  Cicero  is  not  altogether  very  distinct  or 
precise  in  this  passage  :  thus,  he  says,  "we  need  not,  on  the 
other  hand,  make  any  scruple  of  speaking  sometimes  in  be- 


1  The  work  is  written  by  the  son  of  its  subject,  Josiah  Quincy,  President  of 
Harvard  University,  Boston,  1825.  The  letter  of  the  father  is  of  March  22,  1770, 
that  of  the  son,  of  March  26  of  the  same  year.  It  is  historically  important  and 
highly  honorable  to  the  people  then  on  the  eve  of  a  revolution,  that  the  most 
prominent  men  in  the  community  where  blood  had  been  spilt,  such  as  Adams, 
Hancock,  Warren,  Cooper,  Henshaw,  Gushing,  Moleneux,  Pemberton,  Philipps, 
strongly  advised  and  urged  Quincy  to  undertake  the  defence  of  the  indicted  sol- 
diers.  It  is  the  evident  manifestation  of  the  Anglican  veneration  for  the  law, 
even  in  the  midst  of  much  excitement,  and  in  the  face  of  much  popular  odium 
which  miyht  have  visited  a  zealous  advocate  with  bitter  hostility. 


41 6  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

half  of  the  guilty,  provided  he  be  not  wholly  villanous  and 
abominable."  But  what  is  wholly  villanous  and  abominable  ? 
Every  one  ought  to  be  defended,  that  is,  be  it  repeated,  he 
ought  to  be  so  protected  that  he  may  receive  all  the  advan- 
tage which  the  law  justly  and  wisely  affords  and  which  his 
peculiar  case  allows.  Escape  of  the  client  is  not  the  ultimate 
object,  but  justice  alone. 

An  advocate  has  not  the  right  of  injuring  knowingly  and 
willingly  another  person,  either  in  reputation  or  property,  in 
order  to  save  or  serve  his  client.  It  is  evident  that  he  cannot 
have  the  right  knowingly  to  rob  another  for  his  client,  or 
make  aspersions  upon  the  honor  and  reputation  of  an  inno- 
cent man.  He  would  certainly  load  his  conscience  with  heavy 
guilt  were  he  to  exert  his  skill  in  defending,  for  instance,  what 
he  actually  knew  to  be  a  forged  will, — and  such  a  case  may 
be  imagined ;  or  were  he  to  defend  a  criminal  for  a  fee  con- 
sisting, to  his  knowledge,  of  the  very  goods  for  stealing  which 
the  prisoner  is  indicted.  This  may  not  only  be  imagined,  but 
has  taken  place.  Nor  is  this  surprising,  for  where  the  profes- 
sion of  the  law  is  extensive — and  it  will  always  be  extensive 
where  civil  liberty  is  enjoyed  in  a  high  degree — it  is  but 
natural  that  many  of  the  best  and  some  of  the  meanest 
citizens  should  belong  to  it.  Every  person  charged  with  an 
offence  ought  to  be  defended,  that  is,  duly  protected ;  but  this 
differs  widely  from  aiding  a  client  in  committing  a  crime  by 
gaining  a  fraudulent  lawsuit,  for  instance  by  making  use  for 
his  defence  of  documents  most  strongly  suspected  by  the 
advocate  to  be  forged.  There  may  be  many  cases  of  this  sort 
imagined  in  which  no  honorable  lawyer  would  be  willing  to 
engage. 

The  advocate  ought  on  no  occasion  to  m'--stat"  th  law,  or 
endeavor  to  mislead  the  judge,  or  to  misstate  a  fact  in  order 
to  deceive  the  jury.  This  of  course  does  not  exclude  the  en- 
deavor to  make  the  best  of  the  law  for  his  client,  or  to  present 
the  more  favorable  points  of  the  law  or  facts  with  peculiar 
force.  Morality  and  prudence  coincide  here,  as  they  so  often 
do ;  for  an  advocate  will  but  little  advance  his  reputation  as  a 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

lawyer,  and  consequently  as  little  his  worldly  interest,  by 
habitual  disingenuous  handling  of  the  law  or  the  fact.1  It 
lends  considerable  power  to  a  lawyer  if  judge  and  jury  listen 
to  him  with  the  belief  in  his  honesty. 

There  is  a  consideration  which  I  submit  to  the  peculiar  re- 
flection of  those  who  intend  to  become  members  of  the  pro- 
fession, because  it  is  of  grave  importance  to  society,  and  yet 
perhaps  but  little  known  to  lawyers  themselves.  From  fre- 
quent and  free  conversations  with  convicts  in  the  peniten- 
tiaries I  know  it  to  be  a  fact  that  many  criminals  have  been 
led  on  in  the  path  of  crime  by  the  circumstance  that  when 
young  and  indicted  for  the  first  offence,  perhaps  for  a  petty 
theft,  and  when  they  were  deeply  impressed  with  the  conse- 
quences to  which  their  guilty  thoughtlessness  had  brought 
them,  they  became  reassured  when  hearing  their  counsel 
boldly  utter  things  in  their  defence  which  the  young  offenders 
knew  that  their  counsel  well  knew  not  to  be  true.  If,  in  par- 
ticular, a  verdict  of  not  guilty  was  the  effect,  the  young  crimi- 
nal came  out  of  the  trial  with  his  previous  rashness  confirmed 
into  conscious  and  settled  purpose. 

It  is  a  serious  evil  which  is  necessarily  connected  with  all 
public  trials  and  defences  in  the  presence  of  the  criminal,  both 
that  he  learns  many  ways  and  means  intended  by  the  law  as 


1  "  An  honorable  barrister  will  never  misstate  either  law  or  facts  within  his 
own  knowledge ;  but  he  is  justified  in  urging  any  argument,  whatever  may  be  his 
own  opinion  of  the  solidity  or  justness  of  it,  which  he  may  think  will  promote  the 
interests  of  his  client,  for  reasoning  in  courts  of  justice  and  in  the  ordinary  affairs 
of  life  seldom  admits  of  geometrical  demonstration  :  but  it  happens  not  unfre- 
quently  that  the  same  argument  which  appears  sophistry  to  one  is  sound  logic  in 
the  mind  of  another,  and  every  day's  experience  proves  that  the  opinions  of  a 
judge  and  an  advocate  are  often  diametrically  opposite.  Many  circumstances 
may  occur  which  will  justify  or  compel  an  individual  member  of  the  profession 
to  refuse  the  defence  of  a  particular  client,  but  a  cause  can  hardly  be  conceived 
which  ought  to  be  rejected  by  all  the  bar,  for  such  a  conduct  in  the  profession 
would  excite  so  strong  a  prejudice  against  the  party  as  to  render  him  in  a  great 
degree  condemned  before  his  trial."  (Christian's  note  to  4th  Blackstone,  356.) 
But  there  are  cases,  as  mentioned  before,  in  which  the  aid  of  the  advocate  is  re- 
quired, in  order  that  with  his  knowledge  fraud  way  be  committed;  which  of 
course  must  be  declined  by  all  honest  men. 
VOL.  II.  27 


4i8  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

the  protection  of  innocence,  but,  of  course,  used  also  by  the 
guilty  as  a  screen  for  nefarious  doings,  and  that  he  becomes 
more  hardened  by  hearing  the  counsel  speak  so  confidently 
and  openly  in  his  favor.  The  necessary  assurance  of  the  ad- 
vocate becomes  shamelessness  in  the  offender.  He  accustoms 
himself  to  consider  the  whole  trial  a  game  of  skill  and  clever- 
ness, and  no  more.  This  evil,  great  as  it  is,  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  separated  from  public  and  oral  trial,  the  many  and 
substantial  advantages  of  which,  and,  indeed,  the  necessity  of 
which  for  civil  liberty,  make  us  endure  it.  Still,  we  ought  to 
remember  that  the  evil  exists,  and  that  it  is  a  great  one.  The 
advocate,  for  this  very  reason,  ought  not  to  increase  the  evil  by 
adding  his  authority,  in  the  mind  of  the  criminal,  to  his  own 
disregard  of  right  and  wrong. 

From  all  that  I  have  been  able  to  learn  from  convicts  as 
well  as  the  most  intelligent  superintendents  in  the  peniten- 
tiaries, I  cannot  but  consider  the  circumstance  just  spoken  of 
as  an  active  cause  in  the  diffusion  and  propagation  of  crime, 
and  deserving,  therefore,  I  feel  sure,  the  fullest  attention  of 
every  honorable  advocate. 

Few  things  are  more  important  for  the  upright  advocate 
than  to  scrutinize  with  the  utmost  delicacy  of  honor  and 
tenderness  of  conscience  all  opportunities  of  increasing  his 
wealth  which  may  accrue  out  of  his  legal  transactions,  except 
those  of  receiving  fees  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term ;  nor 
must  he  ever  be  unmindful  of  the  object  for  which  he  is  em- 
ployed by  his  client,  that  is,  the  client's  advantage,  which  in- 
cludes the  quickest  possible  termination  of  the  particular  case, 
or,  in  other  words,  that  he  is  in  the  service  of  the  client  and 
that  his  client  is  not  his  prey.  • 

If  the  advocate  is  a  prosecutor  for  the  public,  or,  as  it  is 
called  in  monarchies,  for  the  king,  it  is  very  necessary  for  him 
never  to  forget  that,  although  it  is  the  advocate's  bounden 
duty  to  represent  a  case  in  the  best  possible  light  when  he  is 
counsel  for  the  private  party,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  it  is 
his  duty,  when  he  prosecutes  for  the  public,  to  represent  the 
case  in  the  worst  possible  light,  or  to  aim  always  at  the  high- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

est  damage  or  penalty  which  the  case  may  allow.  This  would 
amount  to  reasoning  backwards,  and  is  therefore  wrong.  The 
defending  counsel  must  represent  the  case  in  the  best  possible 
light,  for  the  very  reason  that  he  defends  a  being  prosecuted 
by  public  power;  he  defends  the  individual  against  the  society. 
But  to  draw  from  this  fact  the  conclusion  that  because  the 
case  of  the  accused  person  is  presented  by  his  counsel  in  the 
best  possible  way,  the  first  and  originating  party,  that  is,  the 
state,  ought  therefore  to  present  it  in  the  worst  possible  light, 
would  be  turning  the  effect  of  the  original  danger,  that  power 
may  be  too  strong  for  the  individual,  into  a  new  cause  of  its 
own  increase.  And,  be  it  observed,  this  remark  holds  equally 
good  where  the  criminally  indicted  prisoner  has  no  counsel 
allowed  to  him :  the  prosecuting  officer  in  such  a  case  is  in 
conscience  bound  to  consider  himself  the  protector  of  the  pris- 
oner,1 the  impartial  substitute  for  the  counsel  who  ought  to  be 

1  Christian,  in  his  note  to  4th  Blackstone,  356,  says,  "  Hence,  in  all  criminal 
.  prosecutions,  especially  where  the  prisoner  can  have  no  counsel  to  plead  for  him 
[the  writer  therefore  includes  all  cases,  and  says  indeed  as  fully  as  I  have  said 
in  the  text,  that  a  prosecuting  officer  is  not  allowed  to  make  the  case  as  black  as 
his  ingenuity  will  permit],  a  barrister  is  as  much  bound  to  disclose  all  those  cir- 
cumstances to  the  jury,  and  to  reason  upon  them  as  fully,  which  are  favorable  to 
the  prisoner,  as  those  which  are  likely  to  support  the  prosecution."  It  is  right 
to  give  this  as  a  rule,  but  it  is  likewise  right  to  consider  man's  nature,  and  that 
few  are  willing  and  still  fewer  capable  of  thus  willing  a  thing  (the  accusation 
anrl  representation  of  guilt  of  a  man)  and  at  the  same  time  of  throwing  all  possi- 
ble obstacles  (the  reasons  for  the  prisoner)  in  the  way.  Indeed,  the  theoretical 
junction  of  the  British  prosecutor  and  defensor  in  penal  cases  is  contradictory  in 
itself,  and,  speaking  in  reference  to  legal  philosophy,  as  absurd  as  the  threefold 
person  "  as  which  we  are  told  we  must  consider  the  judge  in  the  inquisitorial 
process  (the  one  in  practice  in  most  countries  in  which  the  civil  law  has  been 
adopted),  namely  "as  representative  of  the  offended  state,  inasmuch  as  he  is 
bound,  in  its  place,  to  see  right  done  according  to  the  penal  law;  as  representa- 
tive of  the  accused,  inasmuch  as  he  is  bound  at  the  same  time  to  find  out  and 
represent  everything  on  which  the  innocence  or  a  less  degree  of  criminality  can 
be  founded ;  and,  finally,  as  judge,  inasmuch  as  he  must  judge  of  and  decide 
upon  the  given  facts."  (Feuerbach's  Manual  of  the  Common  German  Penal  Law, 
10th  edit.,  \  623.)  I  know  of  no  higher  authority  than  Feuerbach  ;  I  know  of  no 
passage  ever  written  by  the  adversaries  of  the  inquisitorial  process  which  sets  forth 
half  so  well  its  general  badness  and  its  utter  incompatibility  with  civil  liberty  as  the 
quoted  one.  One  mortal  man  shall  be  at  once  accuser,  defender,  and  judge! 


420  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

assigned  to  him.  Nor  ought  a  citizen  ever  to  be  placed  in  a 
state  of  accusation  on  insufficient  grounds,  for  the  reason  that 
the  state  has  provided  for  him  ample  means  of  defence  and 
barriers  of  security.  An  individual  is  to  be  defended  because 
accused,  but  not  to  be  accused  because  he  will  be  defended.1 

Although  we  do  not  suffer  the  evils  of  an  inquisition,  whose 
mere  accusation  is  blasting  although  acquittal  follows,-  still 
the  prosecuting  officer  should  never  forget  that  he  cannot  cal- 
culate or  know  how  much  suspicion  may  deface  a  man's  char- 
acter even  after  a  fair  acquittal.  Since  the  only  true  object 
of  society  in  prosecuting  is  justice,  he  has  no  manner  of  busi- 
ness to  involve  the  accused  in  greater  difficulty,  or  to  throw  a 
heavier  cloak  of  suspicion  over  him,  than  the  simple  facts  of 
the  case  warrant  and  the  objects  of  political  society  demand. 
A  penal  case  is  not  a  case  between  two  equal  parties,  nor  a 
trial  of  skill  and  ingenuity  between  two  advocates,  nor  a  mat- 
ter of  legal  reputation  for  the  respective  lawyers,  but  it  is  a 
very  grave  case  between  the  state  and  an  individual  charged 
with — that  is,  until  proved,  strongly  suspected  of — an  offence ; 
it  is  the  case  of  Justice  one  and  indivisible  alone,  not  a  tour- 
nament of  legal  dialectics.2 


In  cases  where  affection  is  not  the  foundation,  as  in  the  family,  but  where 
right  forms  the  sole  basis  !  There  are  some  advantages  connected  with  the  in- 
quisitorial process,  indeed,  which  the  process  of  accusation  lacks ;  but  what  are 
these  advantages,  compared  to  this  startling  jumble  of  the  most  opposite  char- 
acters ?  Where  is  there  the  slightest  guarantee  for  times  of  usurpation  ?  To  pre- 
vent misconceptions,  however,  I  ought  to  mention  that,  though  the  judge  is  also 
defender,  a  separate  defender  is  assigned  to  the  indicted  person,  and,  what  is  re- 
markable, in  most  countries  a  person  cannot  be  sentenced  for  any  high  offence 
without-  having  been  defended,  even  though  the  defender  should  plead  guilty. 
Yet  the  defences  by  such  a  defender  sound  to  us,  accustomed  as  we  are  to  the 
freest  and  often  boldest  scope  of  counsel,  very  tame  indeed,  and  the  court 
frequently  rebukes  where  we  should  not  see  any  boldness  in  his  words  or 
arguments. 

1  [Dr.  Lieber,  in  a  manuscript  note,  here  discusses  malicious  prosecution  and 
prosecution  on  insufficient  grounds.  The  substance  of  his  remarks  is  inserted  in 
his  Civil  Liberty,  chap.  vii.  p.  77.] 

3  I  must  refer  the  reader  for  some  more  remarks  on  the  ethical  relations  of  a 
barrister,  especially  with  respect  to  his  obligations  connected  with  interpretation, 
and  the  important  question  whether  he  may  feel  himself  at  liberty,  as  a  strictly 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  42I 

XIV.  Where  there  is  enduring  civil  liberty,  the  supremacy 
of  the  law  must  be  acknowledged ;  where  the  supremacy  of 
the  law  is  acknowledged,  the  lawyers  must  necessarily  pos- 
sess much  influence.  It  is  so  at  present  with  all  free  nations, 
who  are  not  merely  enjoying  a  transient  period  of  liberty,  but 
have  founded  it  on  lasting  institutions ;  and  it  was  so  in  an- 
cient times,  in  which  the  freest  republics  have  probably  never 
suffered  so  much  from  professional  lawyers  as  from  dema- 
gogues who  were  not  members  of  their  profession.1  Their 
constant  occupation  with  the  laws  of  the  land  and  ques- 
tions of  right,  and  their  habit  of  consecutive  reasoning,  as 
well  as  the  necessity  in  which  they  constantly  find  them- 
selves of  viewing  a  subject  in  its  different  lights,  make  them 
more  fit  to  grapple  with  many  questions  which  involve  the 
rights  and  interests  of  many  and  opposite  parties,  than  other 
people,  as  well  as  more  liberal,  upon  the  whole,  towards  those 
who  dissent  from  their  opinion,  and  bolder  in  asserting  rights 
where  there  is  danger  in  doing  so,  because  they  are  better 
able  to  find  out  the  firm  ground  of  positive  law  and  of  well- 
acknowledged  precedent.  These  advantages,  however,  have 
also  their  counterbalancing  evils.  The  professional  lawyer, 
accustomed  to  seek  the  best  arguments  for  any  side  on  which 
he  may  be  engaged,  not  unfrequently  loses  the  original  im- 
pulse of  the  first  principle  from  which  matters  of  state  derive 
their  value  or  want  of  value.  The  professional  lawyer  carries 
at  times  the  habit  of  special  pleading  into  the  halls,  where 
subjects  are  to  be  treated  of  on  the  broad  principles  of  general 
good;  and  this  may  be  the  cause  that  we  find  few  of  the  great- 
est British  statesmen  and  great  parliamentary  leaders  to- have 

moral  man,  to  make  use  of  "artful  interpretation,"  to  my  Legal  and  Political 
Hermeneutics.  Mr.  Justice  Story  speaks  of  the  general  duties  and  elevated 
position  of  the  advocate  in  his  inaugural  address  as  D.ane  professor  in  the  law 
school  of  the  University  at  Cambridge,  Massachusetts  (Miscellaneous  Writings, 
p.  452).  He  likewise  touches  upon  the  subject  in  his  Law  of  Agency,  Boston, 
1839,  page  25.  [Comp.  Dr.  Lieber's  Civil  Liberty,  chap.  xx.  p.  239,  et  seq.] 

1  [In  free  Greece  there  were  rhetoricians  and  teachers  of  rhetoric,  but  no  law- 
yers. In  Rome  the  profession  was  but  in  its  infancy  when  the  republic  fell. 
That  lawyers  thrive  in  a  country  is  no  proof  of  free  institutions.] 


422  POLITICAL   ETHICS. 

been  professional  lawyers,  or,  if  they  had  entered  the  bar,  like 
Pitt,  they  can  hardly  be  called  virtual  lawyers.  Impulses 
towards  great  reforms  in  legislation  have  rarely,  I  believe, 
proceeded  from  the  profession.1 

The  lawyer,  always  looking  up  to  the  law  as  his  great  au- 
thority, which,  as  was  mentioned,  makes  him  frequently  the 
bolder  in  asserting  right,  becomes  generally  rather  the  repre- 
sentative of  that  which  exists  than  the  advocate  of  that  which 
ought  to  be;  still  farther,  he  is  not  unfrequently  blinded  by 
existing  laws  and  institutions,  and  resists  improvements  which 
must  be  judged  of  upon  strict  principle  and  consist  in  a  change 
of  what  exists.  For  this  reason  it  is  always  desirable  that  the 
lawyers  take  an  active  part  in  the  legislation  of  a  country;  for 
it  is  most  necessary  that  the  existing  state  of  things  be  fairly 
represented,  and  that  the  legislators  of  a  state  do  not  precipi- 
tate the  state  into  heedless  speculation  or  untried  experiments, 
appearing  brilliant  to  the  unexperienced ;  but  their  number 


1  *  There  is  a  very  excellent  passage  on  this  subject  in  the  reflections  of  Sir 
Samuel  Romilly  on  himself  and  the  good  he  might  do  should  he  be  appointed 
lord  chancellor,  page  384  et  seq.  of  vol.  iii.  of  his  Memoirs,  ad  edit.,  Lond.,  1840. 
He  says,  "  It  is  not  from  such  [men  as  have  for  a  long  period  been  appointed 
to  the  chancellorship]  that  we  should  expect  comprehensive  reforms  or  important 
alterations  in  the  law.  His  education,  his  inveterate  habits,  the  society  he  has 
lived  in,  the  policy  by  which  he  has  always  regulated  his  conduct,  have  all  tended 
to  inspire  him  with  a  blind  reverence  for  every  part  of  that  system  of  law  which 
he  has  found  established.  When  we  reflect  on  this,  when  we  trace  the  former 
lives  of  all  the  chancellors  of  modern  times, — when  we  see  them,  from  the  mo- 
ment when  they  quitted  college,  giving  up  their  whole  time  to  the  study  of  one 
positive  science  and  cultivating  no  faculty  of  the  mind  but  memory,  the  talent  of 
discovering  and  pursuing  nice  and  subtle  distinctions  and  forced  analogies,  and 
the  art  of  amplifying  and  disguising  truth, — when  we  see  them  stunned,  as  it 
were,  during  the  best  years  of  their  lives,  by  the  continual  hurry  of  business,  read- 
ing nothing  but  what  relates  to  the  particular  cases  before  them,  shutting  out  all 
liberal  knowledge  from  {heir  minds,  and  contracting  their  views  to  the  little 
objects  with  which  they  are  continually  occupied,"  etc. 

The  passage  must  be  read  much  farther. 

With  reference  to  America,  however,  we  must  observe  that  the  lawyers  as  a 
class  form  the  most  liberal  part  of  the  people,  and  withal  the  only  large  class 
who  attain  anything  like  a  gradual  political  education  and  represent  more  than 
mere  momentary  excitements  and  measures. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

must  not  overbalance  the  other  portion  of  the  legislators,  who 
view  the  existing  law  without  that  charm  with  which  it  is  in- 
vested to  the  eye  of  the  lawyer,  and  without  that  fond  per- 
tinacity which  arises  from  the  pains  the  lawyer  has  taken  to 
learn  the  law  with  all  the  intricate  difficulties  attending  it 
The  greatest  part  of  the  most  important,  radical,  and  salutary 
reforms  have  not  originated  with  lawyers,  as  was  mentioned 
already :  still,  we  must  not  forget  that  Pym  was  probably  as 
great  a  man  as  Hampden,  and  quite  as  indispensable  to  his 
great  party. 

When  power  struggles  with  liberty,  and  yet  is  forced  to  de- 
rive an  appearance  of  support  from  law,  as  is  the  case  when  the 
crown  or  a  despotically  disposed  party  endeavors  to  arrogate 
undue  power  over  a  people  still  cherishing  their  rights  and 
the  endeared  tradition  of  liberty,  it  is  natural  that  the  party 
of  power  should  always  find  many  valuable  aids  among  law- 
yers, because  there  are  men  in  all  professions  who  desire  their 
advancement  at  any  price,  and  it  is  the  willing  lawyer  who,  in 
the  cases  alluded  to,  is  of  the  greatest  value  on  account  of  his 
peculiar  species  of  knowledge.  .When  the  state  of  things  is 
such  that  clergymen  can  better  or  equally  well  give  their  aid 
to  existing  power,  there  are  never  members  of  that  profession 
wanting  that  are  ready  to  degrade  their  skill,  knowledge,  and 
influence  in  a  like  manner.  Indeed,  the  clergy  have  more 
frequently  and  more  extensively  sided  with  power  and  au- 
thority, in  states  where  government  can  offer  any  preferment, 
than  the  lawyers.  .  Though  the  British  prerogative-lawyers 
have  prostituted  their  knowledge  to  the  essential  injury  of  the 
people,  we  must  also  remember  that  liberty  owes  to  the  aid 
afforded  by  the  profession  of  the  advocate  some  of  the  great- 
est achievements  in  the  cause  of  national  progress.  Laud  and 
Strafford  hated  the  lawyers  most  cordially :  their  instinct  taught 
them  rightly.  How  much  has  not  Erskine  done  for  the  asser- 
tion and  clearer  representation  of  many  valuable  constitutional 
points  !  Does  not  our  whole  race  bwe  much,  in  the  cause  of 
freedom,  to  such  judges  as  Lords  Somefs  and  Camden? 

If  a  lawyer  then  becomes  a  member  of  legislating  assem- 


424 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


blies,  he  must  carefully  strive  to  elevate  his  mind  above  the 
level  of  special  pleading,  so  as  not  to  be  the  mere  advocate  of 
his  party  or  of  power,  and  to  view  subjects  on  the  ground  of 
broad  national  interest.  That  in  smaller  matters  he  must  not 
carry  the  dust  of  the  courts  adhering  to  his  vestments,  with 
all  the  petty  manoeuvring  to  which  a  circumscribed  practice 
frequently  leads,  into  the  halls  of  the  legislature,  need  not  be 
mentioned. 

XV.  The  importance  of  the  pure  administration  of  justice  for 
the  state  in  general,  as  well  as  for  individuals,  lends  of  course 
proportionate  importance  and  solemnity  to  every  part  and 
element  of  this  administration,  whether  it  consist  in  applying 
the  law  and  giving  every  one  his  due  after  the  truth  is  known, 
or  in  aiding  to  find  out  this  truth.  Among  the  elements  of 
the  administration  of  justice  belonging  to  the  latter  class  the 
witness  is  the  most  important.  A  witness  upon  the  stand, 
whoever  may  have  called  him  there,  whether  the  government 
or  a  private  party,  ought  ever  to  consider  himself  as  being  for 
the  time  in  the  service  of  Justice  herself,  and  unbiassed  truth 
becomes  his  binding,  solemn,  and  sole  obligation.  The  oath 
or  affirmation  to  tell  "  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,"  puts  a  very  serious,  solemn,  and  great  obliga- 
tion upon  the  witness  ;  for  it  is  necessary  that  as  witnesses  we 
abstain  first  from  every  falsehood,  even  the  smallest;  secondly, 
from  everything  which  in  one  sense  may  be  true,  but  in  the 
sense  in  which  it  will  be  probably  taken  by  the  adverse  party 
or  the  court  is  not  true;  thirdly,  from  all  omissions  which 
materially  interfere  with  the  whole  truth ;  and  fourthly  also 
that  we  solemnly  bind  ourselves  to  state  nothing  in  rashness, 
nothing  which  we  believe  to  be  true  but  which  nevertheless 
is  only  a  framework  of  facts  filled  up  with  the  productions  of 
a  lively  imagination,  so  often  repeated  in  our  mind  that  they 
appear  to  us  perfect  truth — an  evil  to  which  women  in  par- 
ticular are  subject.  Nor  must  we  allow  our  feelings  to  be 
wrought  up  so  that  something  may  appear  to  us  true  at  the 
moment  we  are  testifying,  which  nevertheless  is  not  true  or 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

not  precisely  as  we  state  it  The  holy  cause  of  justice  de- 
pends in  a  degree  upon  every  word  that  drops  from  the  lips 
of  a  witness  ;  and  the  oath  he  takes,  which  to  his  fellow-men 
becomes  the  most  solemn  of  all  pledges  of  truth,  ought  to  be 
within  him  a  fervent  prayer  that  his  memory  may  be  correct 
and  his  mind  calm  and  clear,  so  that  he  himself  mistake  not 
semblance  for  truth  and  that  he  be  in  a  frame  of  mind  to 
choose  the  proper  words  precisely  to  express  what  he  wishes 
to  express.  A  witness  must  take  care,  therefore,  not  to  suffer 
his  temper  to  be  ruffled,  even  though  the  questioning  advo- 
cate should  forget  his  duty  by  impertinence  and  arrogance. 
In  all  such  cases  it  is  by  far  the  best  for  the  witness  to  appeal 
at  once  to  the  court  for  protection,  and  not  to  enter  by  pert  rep- 
artees into  a  contest  with  an  insolent  lawyer.  A  witness  ought 
to  prepare  himself  for  the  discharge  of  his  duty,  especially 
when  he  has  to  testify  to  facts  either  long  gone  by,  or  ob- 
served by  him  when  he  himself  was  excited,  or  which  happened 
surrounded  by  tumultuous  agitation.  Few  who  have  not  made 
some  careful  experiments  upon  themselves  have  any  idea  how 
far  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  deceived  by  our  constantly  work- 
ing and  combining,  picturing  and  deceiving  imagination,  and 
in  what  degree  we  may  succeed  in  undeceiving  ourselves  and 
unravelling  the  mazes  of  our  own  fancy.  Persons  of  a  lively 
imagination  are  especially  bound  to  review  facts  well  and  to 
endeavor  to  sift  and  prune  what  the  imagination  may  busily 
have  added,  before  they  asseverate  anything  as  witnesses  for 
or  against  any  man.  The  law  makes  a  considerable  difference 
between  questions  which  may  or  may  not  be  put  to  a  witness 
under  different  circumstances ;  but  whatever  the  law  does 
allow  to  be  asked — over  which  the  court  watches- — must  be 
answered  in  the  spirit  of  absolute  veracity.  There  is  in  the 
oath  or  affirmation  of  witnesses  no  different  kind  or  degree  of 
obligation  to  state  the  truth ;  all  witnesses,  whether  for  or 
against  the  prisoner  (virtually  they  are  all  for  Justice),  sol- 
emnly pledge  themselves  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth, 
and  nothing  but  the  truth. 


CHAPTER    III. 

War. — Definitions. — Present  Exaggerations  aqainst  War. — Christian  Religi  D 
does  not  prohibit  just  War ;  neither  the  Bible,  nor  the  early  Writers  of  the 
Church. — Objections  against  War  on  the  Score  of  Morality ;  of  Reason ;  of 
Political  Economy. — Just  and  Patriotic  Wars  have  morally  raised  Nations. — 
Eternal  Peace. — Arbitration  by  a  Congress  of  Nations. — Just  Wars. — National 
Debasing  Effect  of  suffering  national  Insult  and  Injustice  without  Resistance. 
— The  Age  of  Louis  XIV. — Wars  do  not  absolve  from  Obligations  to  the 
Enemy. — Who  is  the  Enemy? — Are  Citizens  of  the  hostile  State  Enemies? — 
What  means  of  injuring  the  Enemy  are  admissible? — Treaties  containing  Pro- 
visions for  the  Case  of  War  between  the  Contracting  Powers. — Shall  Confidence 
be  abused  in  War? — Does  War  allow  Deception? — Capitulations  are  sacred. 
— Destruction  in  War. — Carrying  off  Works  of  Art,  Archives,  etc. — Duties 
of  the  individual  Soldier. 

XVI.  IN  this  last  chapter  it  is  proposed  to  give  a  few  re- 
marks on  War,  as  connected  with  our  subject.  I  am  well 
aware  that  the  whole  subject  of  war  belongs  properly  to  the 
so-called  law  of  nations  and  international  ethics ;  yet  so  much 
has  been  advanced  of  late  regarding  war  as  affecting  the 
morality  of  the  individual,  and  so  many  cases  which  are  to  be 
decided  on  ethical  grounds  by  the  individual  necessarily  occur 
in  every  war,  that  I  feel  obliged  to  add  this  chapter  to  the 
present  work,  although  international  ethics  in  general  have 
been  excluded  from  it.  I  shall  confine  myself,  however,  to 
some  remarks  touching  in  general  the  admissibility  of  war 
among  rational  and  moral  beings,  and  some  respecting  the 
conduct  of  the  individual  who  takes  part  in  a  war,  excluding 
from  our  inquiry  the  whole  important  field  of  the  law  of  war 
proper. 

War  is  a  state  of  enmity  between  two  parties,  in  which  each 
is  known  by  the  other  to  be  ready  to  obtain  its  ends  by  other 
means  besides  intellectual  ones,  especially  by  force  and  strat- 
agem. We  generally  use  the  word  War  as  applied  to  con- 
siderable masses,  and  of  a  protracted  contest ;  hence  partly  the 
426 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  427 

term  "  state  of  enmity"  has  been  used ;  for  the  word  protracted 
is  not  sufficiently  definite.  Otherwise  the  following  might 
be  the  simplest  and  most  comprehensive  definition :  War  is 
protracted  and  active  enmity. 

That  it  has  been  found  difficult  to  give  an  exact  definition 
of  war  is  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  term  is  used  for  almost  all 
shades  of  contest  and  continued  enmity,  more  or  less  meta- 
phorically. Most  definitions  which  have  been  given  of  war 
would  apply  equally  well  to  mere  battles,  or  they  exclude  the 
various  means  besides  force  which  we  make  use  of  in  war  in 
order  to  obtain  our  object,  for  instance,  cunning,  intimidation, 
the  devastation  of  one's  own  country  to  deprive  the  enemy  of 
sustenance,  etc.1 


1  Cicero,  in  saying  in  his  Offices  that  "  there  are  two  kinds  of  contests  between 
men,  the  one  by  argument  and  the  other  by  force,"  though  undoubtedly  meaning 
by  the  latter  war,  cannot  have  meant  to  give  a  strict  definition,  for  this  would  apply 
to  single  battles  likewise.  But  a  war  generally  comprehends  battles,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  there  have  been  wars  without  battles.  Grotius  saw  this 
deficiency  distinctly.  Albericus  Gentilis,  in  his  work  De  Jure  Belli,  Oxon., 
1588,  says,  "  War  is  a  just  contention  of  the  public  force."  Surely,  in  that  case, 
Ferdinand  of  Aragon  and  Louis  XII.  could  never  have  been  at  war,  despite  all 
the  blood  with  which  their  captains  drenched  the  fields  of  Italy.  Or,  if  Aragon 
pretended  to  be  right  in  spoliating  her  poor  kinsman,  how  should  we  call  wars 
professedly  undertaken  for  robbing?  [Albericus  means  just  in  idea,  as  a  judge 
may  give  an  unjust  decision  in  a  court  of  justice.]  Hugo  Grotius  says,  "  War  is 
the  state  of  contending  parties,  considered  as  such"  (helium  status  per  vim  cer- 
tantium,  qua  tiles  sunt).  (De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis,  cap.  i.  2.)  Puffendorf  calls 
war  the  state  in  which  those  are  who  in  turn  harm  one  another  and  repel  the 
harm  by  force,  or  who  strive  to  obtain  their  due  by  force.  (Law  of  Nature  and 
Nations,  i.  ch.  i,  8.)  Bynkershoek,  in  his  excellent  treatise  on  the  Law  of  War, 
says,  "  War  is  a  contest  carried  on  between  independent  persons,  by  force  or 
fraud,  for  the  sake  of  asserting  their  rights."  This  would  exclude  civil  wars, 
and  apply  to  the  single  battle  as  well  as  the  whole  war.  Vattel  says,  "  War  is 
that  state  in  which  we  prosecute  our  right  by  force."  (Book  3,  ch.  i.)  There 
have  been  wars  in  which  actually  the  possession  of  no  rights  was  pretended. 
I  have  mentioned  one  in  Book  I.  \  xxxix. — But  was  this  no  war?  See  also 
Wheaton's  Elements  of  International  Law,  8th  edition,  1866,  §  295,  et  seq. — 
General  Clausewitz,  in  his  work  On  War  (Vom  Kriege),  Berlin,  2  vols.,  1835, 
says,  "  War  is  the  act  of  compelling  an  opponent  to  submit  to  one's  will.  Thus, 
force  is  the  medium,  and  submission  the  object,  and  the  latter  can  only  be  ob- 
tained by  the  development  of  the  former.  In  order  to  effect  this,  the  enemy 


428  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

XVII.  War  may  be  considered  in  various  points  of  view,  for 
ins'ance,  that  of  religion,  of  pure  morality  and  right,  of  utility, 
and  with  regard  to  its  effects.  On  all  these  and  other  grounds 
war  has,  at  times,  been  represented  as  entirely  inadmissible 
among  rational  beings,  and,  as  is  usually  the  case  in  discus- 
sions of  this  sort,  men  have  gone  all  sorts  of  lengths,  some 
from  sincere  zeal,  others  from  vanity,  and  still  others  from 
sinister  views.  While  some  political  economists  and  pulpit 
orators  have  maintained,  in  contradiction  to  facts  and  history, 
that  nations  in  no  case  gain  by  wars  anything  to  be  compared 
to  the  loss  sustained  thereby,  or  that  war  may  be  the  interest 
of  one  man  but  can  never  be  that  of  the  people,  others  have 
gone  still  farther  in  their  exaggeration,  and  denied  that  great- 
ness of  intellect  is  shown  and  proved  by  great  generalship  ;  as 
if  we  could  without  paradox  possibly  deny  energy  and  inde- 
pendence of  thought,  elevation  and  firmness  of  character,  in- 
tensity of  action,  vastness  of  combination,  inventive  fertility, 
penetration  into  the  simple  elements  of  what  is  complicated, 
confused,  and  hidden,  and  that  peculiar  attribute  of  greatness 
of  intellect  by  which  it  communicates  the  spark  of  moral  elec- 
tricity to  others  and  obtains  mental  dominion  over  them,  the 
command  of  souls,  to  men  like  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gonsalvo  of 
Cordova,  William  I.  of  Orange,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  De  Ruy- 


must  be  rendered  powerless.  .This  is  the  grand  aim  of  all  hostilities."  This 
definition  does  not  include  the  defence  of  small  states  against  attacks  of  large 
ones,  whom  they  cannot  intend,  because  they  cannot  hope,  to  render  powerless. 
Have  not  small  communities,  when  attacked,  gone  into  war,  resolved  to  sacrifice 
themselves,  and  knowing  that  this  would  be  the  end  ?  Yet  this  was,  never- 
theless, war. 

The  word  War  is  radically  the  same  with  the  German  Wehr,  meaning  arms 
and  protection,  defence;  Wehren,  the  verb,  means  defending  and  interfering 
with  something,  and  is,  radically,  the  same  word  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  Weran, 
Swedish  Varja,  Icelandic  Veria;  which  we  have  still  in  Beware,  which  means 
to  take  care,  guard  one's  self;  as  the  German  Bewahren  means  to  preserve  and 
keep  properly.  The  French  Guerre,  Spanish  Guerra,  and  the  corresponding 
terms  in  the  other  Romanic  languages  are  all  derived  from  the  Teutonic  War  or 
Wehr,  the  w  changing  into  gu,  as  it  does  frequently,  for  instance  in  the  names 
of  Witt,  Vitus,  into  Guido,  Guy.  [War,  Anglo-Saxon  Werra,  is  more  naturally 
connected  by  philologists  with  Werran  =  Wirren,  German,  to  confound,  disturb.] 


429 

ter,  Frederic,  Napoleon,  Nelson,  or  Wellington.1  If  some  of 
these  men  have  committed  acts  which  we  disapprove,  or  are 
supposed  to  have  used  the  greatness  of  their  intellect  alto- 
gether for  evil  ends,  it  does  not  invalidate  the  position  that 
the  fact  of  their  having  been  truly  great  generals  shows  also 
the  greatness  of  their  intellect,  any  more  than  the  fact  of 
Bacon's  soiling  his  pages  with  umvorthy  flattery  of  a  puerile 
monarch  proves  him  not  to  have  been  a  great  philosopher,  or 
of  Lord  Coke's  having  disgraced  himself  by  some  of  the  most 
servile  arguments  in  favor  of  the  crown  and  to  the  ruin  of  the 
persecuted  disproves  his  having  been  a  capacious  and  pene- 
trating lawyer.  Views  like  these  have  generally  been  main- 
tained by  persons  who  have  an  inadequate  idea  of  what  war 
actually  is,  what  a  general  has  to  do,  and  into  what  parts  war 
resolves  itself.  They  see  troops  moving  by  command  on  the 
drilling  ground,  and  think  armies  are  commanded  in  a  like 
manner  and  as  easily,  and  that  moral  vigor  is  altogether  out 
of  the  question.  Others  have  pushed  the  argument  so  far  as 
boldly  to  assert  that  soldiers  never  fight  from  patriotism,  and 
that,  if  they  did,  it  would  not  be  worth  much,  patriotism  being 
altogether  worth  little  to  a  Christian !  Verily,  it  is  seen  that 

1  *  ["  A  nation's  external  life,  then,  is  displayed  in  its  wars,  and  here  history 
has  been  sufficiently  busy  :  the  wars  of  the  human  race  have  been  recorded  when 
the  memory  of  everything  else  has  perished.  Nor  is  this  to  be  wondered  at ;  for  the 
external  life  of  nations,  as  of  individuals,  is  at  once  the  most  easily  known  and  the 
most  generally  interesting.  Action,  in  the  common  sense  of  the  word,  is  intelligible 
to  every  one;  its  effects  are  visible  and  sensible  ;  in  itself,  from  its  necessary  con- 
nection with  outward  nature,  it  is  often  highly  picturesque,  while  the  qualities 
displayed  in  it  are  some  of  those  which  by  an  irresistible  instinct  we  are  most 
led  to  admire.  Ability  is  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  courage,  endurance, 
and  perseverance,  the  complete  conquest  over  some  of  the  most  universal  weak- 
nesses of  our  nature,  the  victory  over  some  of  its  most  powerful  temptations  :  these 
are  qualities  displayed  in  action,  and  particularly  in  war.  And  it  is  our  deep 
sympathy  with  these  qualities,  much  more  than  any  fondness  for  scenes  of  horror 
and  blood,  which  has  made  descriptions  of  battles,  whether  in  poetry  or  history, 
so  generally  attractive.  He  who  can  read  these  without  interest  differs,  I  am  in- 
clined to  think,  from  the  mass  of  mankind  rather  for  the  worse  than  for  the  better : 
he  rather  wants  some  noble  qualities  which  other  men  have,  than  possesses  some 
which  other  men  want." — Inaugural  Lecture,  Lectures  of  Modern  History,  by 
T.  Arnold,  D.D.] 


430 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


these  writers  can  never  have  taken  up  arms  in  defence  of  their 
country,  or  have  been  ready  to  shed  their  blood  for  it  without 
earthly  reward.  How  much  are  those  to  be  pitied  whose 
hearts  remain  cold  at  some  of  the  choicest  pages  of  history 
that  testify  to  every  glowing  bosom  the  nobleness  of  human 
nature!  A  devoted,  humble  citizen  bleeding  and  dying  for 
his  beloved  country,  her  laws  and  liberty,  the  freedom  of  his 
children,  their  religion,  their  language,  for  their  very  intel- 
lectual existence,  is  nothing  to  them.1 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  men  at  our  time  should  urge 
the  inadmissibility  of  war,  or  assert  the  extravagant  extremes 
just  mentioned,  more  loudly  than  perhaps  at  any  previous 
period.  Europe  had  seen  most  melancholy  and  unrighteous 
wars  during  the  seventeenth  century.  Most  governments 
strove  for  concentration,  and  military  service  was  the  best 
rewarded  and  most  honored  of  professions.  While  thus  good 
and  pious  as  well  as  judicious  men  naturally  began  to  raise  their 
voices  against  war,  it  was  likewise  an  inducement  for  the  bold 
and  witty  to  speak  against  great  generals  as  if  no  better  than 
common  robbers  either  in  capacity  or  morality,  and  a  Shaftes- 


1  Mr.  J.  Dymond,  in  his  Inquiry  into  the  Accordancy  of  War  with  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Christianity,  etc.,  3d  edition,  Philadelphia,  1834 — a  work  which  would 
seem  to  embody  all  the  objections  that  have  been  raised  on  the  ground  of  the 
Christian  religion  against  war,  and  on  this  account  is  to  be  consulted  by  the  stu- 
dent— declares  that  soldiers  do  not  die  for  their  country,  and  seeks  to  prove 
it  by  asserting  that  no  one  of  them  would  be  willing  quietly  to  be  executed  for 
his  country  in  a  distant  land :  hence,  he  thinks,  it  is  clear  that  glory  alone 
prompts  him  to  fight  for  his  country.  As  to  the  first  point,  it  must  be  observed 
that  no  doubt  there  are  some  who  would  willingly  lay  down  their  lives  for  their 
country.  If  his  own  heart  does  not  tell  him  that  there  are  some  such,  let  him 
look  at  history,  which  will  give  him  instances  of  men  who  willingly  died  for 
their  country  but  could  not  have  expected  their  names  ever  to  be  known. 
Why  not  deny  the  same  respecting  religion  ?  Regarding  the  second,  I  do  not 
know  how  glory  can  be  the  all-powerful  agent  in  a  national  war  such  as  the 
Dutch  war  of  independence  was  against  the  Spaniards.  Soldiers  know  that  their 
names  will  not  be  gazetted.  I  do  not  see  what  glory  there  was  to  be  earned  by  the 
poor  people  of  Leyden,  who  still  held  out  against  the  Spaniards,  when  reduced  to 
famished  skeletons,  despite  ravenous  hunger,  fever,  and  total  exhaustion,  unless 
we  call  glory  that  which  a  man  feels  within  him  when  he  sacrifices  himself  to 
his  duty,  to  the  liberty  of  his  country,  to  the  cause  of  mankind  and  his  religion. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  43I 

bury,  strange  to  say,  came  to  agree  with  bishop  Watson.  At 
a  still  later  period,  political  economy,  viewing  national  trans- 
actions chiefly  in  the  light  of  their  immediate  and  pecuniary 
results,  was  more  and  more  studied,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
wars  on  a  gigantic  scale  were  carried  on  by  Napoleon,  and 
many  states  since  then  have  enjoyed  the  sweets  and  rapid 
improvements  of  peace.  Thus  people  were  easily  carried  to 
another  extreme,  and  while  in  former  times  military  glory 
was  almost  the  only,  certainly  the  highest,  title  to  political 
distinction,  now  persons  are  induced  to  decry  military  talent 
as  having  a  merely  brutal  character,  and  glory,  even  though  it 
be  earned  in  a  noble  cause,  as  ludicrous ;  nay,  even  patriotism 
as  beneath  either  high  religious  feeling,  or  pure  utilitarian 
perception  unalloyed  by  any  dross  of  feeling. 

XVIII.  A  just  war  implies  that  we  have  a  just  cause,  and 
that  it  is  necessary ;  for  war  implies  suffering  on  the  part  of 
some,  and  it  is  a  principle  of  all  human  actions  that,  in. order 
to  be  justified  in  inflicting  suffering  of  any  kind,  we  must  not 
only  be  justified,  but  that  there  is  a  necessity  for  the  inflic- 
tion. I  shall  speak  more  of  just  wars  further  below. 

If  a  war  is  just,  the  Christian  religion  does  not  prohibit  it. 
If  it  did,  one  of  two  things  must  be  true,  either  war  must  be 
directly  prohibited,  or  the  prohibition  must  be  fairly  im- 
plied in  other  direct  commandments.  This  would  be  neces- 
sary for  the  Protestant;  for  the  Catholic  there  might  be  a- third 
supposition,  namely,  that  the  church  from  earliest  times  should 
have  traditionally  prohibited  all  war.  Neither  of  these  posi- 
tions, however,  can  be  maintained ;  while  there  are  strong 
biblical  reasons  which  support  the  advocates  of  just  war.  The 
Bible  nowhere  directly  prohibits  war.  Indeed,  it  may  be 
answered,  So  there  are  many  vices  and  offences  not  specifically 
prohibited,  for  instance  suicide.  But  war  is  positively  en- 
joined in  the  Old  Testament,  and  not  only  war  but  even  con- 
quest; while  in  the  New  Testament  it  is  not  prohibited, 
although  war  was  raging  in  the  world,  and  the  subject  was 
brought  almost  directly  before  Christ  and  the  apostles :  still 


432  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

they  said  not  a  word  of  it.  Compare,  for  instance,  Luke  vii. 
8  and  iii.  I4.1  To  this  we  may  add  Paul's  words,  "  For  he 
[the  ruler,  magistrate]  beareth  not  the  sword  in  vain."  (Ro- 
mans xiii.  4.)  What  is  the  sword  ?  An  edged  weapon  to 
compel  if  need  be  by  force,  even  at  the  risk  of  the  opponent's 
life.  If  Paul  acknowledges  this  power  to  compel  or  overawe 
as  lodged  in  some  one  at  home,  if  he  acknowledges  in  the 
ruler  not  only  the  right  to  wear  the  sword  but  to  use  it,  for 
"  he  does  not  bear  it  in  vain,"  if  he  acknowledges  the  right 
of  having  armed  servants,  for  this  is  evidently  meant  by  the 
sword,  since  the  ruler  alone  cannot  use  the  sword,  and  of  using 
these  armed  servants  not  only  to  compel  subjects  and  citizens 
but  actually  to  avenge,  it  is  very  plain  that  the  ruler  must  have 
a  still  greater  right  to  protect  his  subjects  against  unjust  ag- 
gression and  oppression ;  for,  be  it  said  at  this  early  stage  of 
our  inquiry,  the  question  as  to  the  original  and  moral  legality 
of  war  is  no  other  than  the  general  one  of  resistance — that  is, 
ought  force  to  be  resisted  by  force  ? 

Lastly,  the  fathers  of  the  church  amply  acknowledge  the 
right  of  war,  and  not  only  this,  but  it  is  acknowledged  that 
war  once  declared  and  justly  declared,  the  Christian  may  carry 
it  on  by  open  force  or  by  fraud,  that  is,  stratagem.  See  St. 
Augustine,  Quest.  10,  in  Josuam.2 

Against  this  it  is  said  that  our  religion  is  eminently  peace- 
ful in  its  character,  commands  that  we  should  love  one  an- 
other, prohibits  revenge  and  hatred,  commands  to  overcome 
evil  with  good,  that  we  should  be  meek,  etc.3  Some  point  at 
passages  such  as,  "  I  say  unto  you,  that  ye  resist  not  evil,  but 
whosoever  shall  smite  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him 
the  other  also"  (Matthew  v.  39),  and,  "  Put  up  again  thy  sword 


1  Both  passages  mentioned  by  Paley,  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy,  vi.  ch.  xii. 

2  [The  words  are,  "  cum  justum  helium  susceperit,  utrum  aperta  pugna  utrum 
insidiis  vincet,  nihil  ad  justiliam  interest."     Qusest.  in  Heptateuch,  on  Joshua, 
cap.  viii.  (iii.  I,  906,  Paris  reprint  of  Benedict,  ed.  1836).     All  sorts  of  fraud  are 
not  here  allowed.] 

3  See  the  cited  work  of  Dymond,  and  the  last  chapter  of  Wayland's  Elements 
of  Moral  Science,  New  York,  1835. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

into  his  place,  for  all  they  that  take  the  sword  shall  perish 
with  the  sword"  (Matthew  xxvi.  52),  or  the  commandment, 
"  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  as  containing  more  direct  or  typical 
commands  for  the  Christian  never  to  use  the  sword. 

Upon  this  it  is  to  be  answered,  that  although  Christ  came 
among  other  things  to  preach  and  diffuse  love,  forbearance, 
charity,  and  even  love  of  our  enemy,  he  by  no  means  intended 
to  abolish  thereby  all  relations  of  right,  all  law,  all  defence  of 
right,  for  this  would  necessarily  lead — and  actually  has  misled 
crazy  religionists  more  than  once — to  the  abolition  of  all 
magistracy  and  of  the  institution  of  the  state  itself.  How 
often  in  history  has  not  this  advent  of  dissolution  been 
preached  by  fanatics,  such  as  the  Anabaptists,  who  ended,  as 
nearly  all  these  fanatics  do,  by  using  every  species  of  cruelty 
and  ferocity  in  order  to  compel  others  into  their  belief  of 
non-resistance !  Christ  came  to  infuse  the  spirit  of  kindness, 
not  to  abrogate  the  principles  of  God's  creation.  A  stone  is 
attracted  by  the  centre  of  the  earth  now,  as  before  Christ ;  a 
conclusion  drawn  according  to  the  logical  laws  of  reasoning 
is  now  as  binding  as  before  Christ ;  and  the  eternal  principles 
of  justice  are  now  as  strong,  as  imperative,  and  as  sacred 
as  before  Christ.  Let  the  law  do  justice  and  full  justice 
alone,  and  leave  love  to  the  individual ;  for,  sacred  as  it  is, 
it  becomes  so  only  if  added  to  justice,  but  not  if  put  in  the 
place  of  justice.  Every  one  ought  to  be  reminded  again  and 
again  that  mutual  love  is  a  great  virtue,  but  before  all  we 
must  be  just,  which  is  not  so  easy. 

Christ  as  well  as  the  apostles  acknowledged  positively  law, 
the  state,  and  the  magistracy.  A  citizen  who  fights  because 
called  upon  by  his  government,  a  man  who  fights  in  a  just 
cause,  does  not  on  that  account  hate  his  military  enemy ;  he 
does  not  shoot  at  him  from  hatred  or  revenge.1  He  would  do 


1  It  is  well  known  that  enemies,  as  soon  as  overcome,  that  is,  as  soon  as  made 
harmless,  treat  each  other  without  any  feeling  of  personal  malignity,  and  even 
with  chivalrous  acknowledgment  of  their  gallantry.  Whatever  cases  may  occur 
to  the  contrary,  they  are,  among  civilized  nations,  considered  with  universal  dis- 
approval, and  form  exceptions.  A  very  striking  instance  that  war  does  not  beget 
VOL.  II.  28 


434 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


this  if  he  were  to  fight  for  the  sake  of  fighting,  but  the  object 
of  just  fighting  is  peace,  the  obtaining  of  right  and  its  protec- 
tion, and  he  fights  against  the  enemy  only  because  he  cannot 
obtain  these  ends  without  removing  the  wanton  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  obtaining  it — that  is,  the  enemy.  This  appears 
from  the  fact  that  all  personal  cruelty  is  prohibited,  and  that 
after  a  battle  the  wounded  enemy  is  taken  care  of  equally  with 
the  wounded  friend. 

As  to  the  supposed  injunctions  never  to  fight,  we  must 
understand  these  passages  as  all  the  others,  and  as  anything 
expressed  in  human  language,  that  is,  in  conjunction  with 
other  passages,  in  the  spirit  of  the  whole  document  or  text, 
and  without  losing  sight  of  the  first  key  of  all  interpretation, 
that  is,  of  common  sense  and  good  faith ;  we  must  take  what 
is  tropical  as  tropical,  what  is  hyperbolical  as  hyperbolical. 
It  stands,  Thou  shalt  not  kill.  Does  not  this  m_an,  Thou  shalt 
not  unjustly  kill?  For  killing  means  violently  depriving  of 
life.  If  we  apply  the  commandment  to  every  violent  extinc- 
tion of  human  life — and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  can  be 
done,  since  the  commandment  is  in  the  Old  Testament,  in 
which  war  was  absolutely  commanded  by  the  same  author- 
ity from  which  this  commandment  proceeded — we  may  as 
well  extend  it  to  all  animal  life,  as  indeed  some  sects  have 
done.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  why  we  should  stop  here. 
Plants  have  undoubtedly  life  too,  and  the  commandment 
might  be  supposed  to  extend  to  vegetable  as  well  as  animal 
life.  Here,  every  one  would  exclaim,  This  is  against  all 
sense !  This  is  precisely  the  answer  which  is  the  correct  one 
to  be  given  to  those  who  take  the  precept  literally. 

The  other  passage  must  be  likewise  understood  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  whole  Bible;  and  \\e  have  seen  already  that 


personal  hatred  occurred  in  the  year  1838,  when  Marshal  Soult,  who  had  com- 
manded the  French  in  the  Peninsular  war  against  the  British  under  Welling- 
ton, visited  England.  The  marshal  was  received  by  the  duke,  as  well  as  by  the 
whole  British  people,  wherever  he  went,  with  the  greatest  respect,  and  a  warmth 
of  feeling  which  was  acknowledged  by  Soult  himself  as  well  as  by  the  French 
nation  was  highly  conducive  towards  increasing  the  good  feeling  now  subsisting 
between  those  two  great  nations. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  435 

Paul  speaks  of  the  necessity  of  the  sword  to  the  magistrate, 
and  that  Christ  does  not  seize  upon  those  opportunities 
which  we  may  fairly  suppose  he  would  have  improved  had 
he  intended  to  prohibit  war  altogether.  The  expression  that 
when  smitten  on  one  cheek  we  ought  to  turn  the  other 
is  as  evidently  hyperbolical,  in  order  to  teach  in  a  strongly 
impressive  figure  of  speech  the  general  principle  of  love  and 
forgiveness,  as  are  the  similar  passages  which  command  us  to 
give  our  cloak  when  robbed  of  our  coat,  or  when  compelled 
to  go  a  mile  to  go  twain.  Christ  taught  principles,  not  abso- 
lute mathematical  formulas,  but  addressed  them  to  rational 
beings,  who  therefore  must  apply  them  with  reason.  If  the 
various  passages  of  the  Bible  were  to  be  taken  literally,  no 
book  would  contain  greater  contradictions  or  render  it  more 
impossible  for  any  one  to  obey  all  commands  at  the  same 
time.  In  addition  it  ought  to  be  observed  that  I  should 
actually  commit  a  moral  wrong  in  literally  following  these 
precepts  and  in  not  resisting  without  hatred  wicked  attacks, 
for  I  should  thus  induce  the  evil-doer  to  commit  still  more 
wrong  or  crime.  Literally  when  asked  for  a  coat  to  give  a 
cloak  besides,  to  offer  the  one  cheek  if  the  other  has  been 
smitten,  to  walk  two  miles  if  bidden  to  march  one,  would 
amount  to  an  invitation  to  the  robber,  the  insolent,  and  the 
oppressor  to  proceed  in  their  path  of  crime.  Respecting  the 
typical  sense  of  Christ's  command  to  his  disciple  to  put  up 
the  sword,  we  must  observe  that  no  typical  sense  can  be 
supposed  to  exist  where  we  have  not  otherwise  the  means  to 
find  out  that  it  is  typical ;  else  how  could  we  know  that  it  is 
typical  ?  In  this  case,  we  ought  to  know  from  other  parts 
of  the  Bible  that  war  is  absolutely  prohibited  before  we  can 
maintain  that  this  passage  is  typical.  It  would  be  surprising 
indeed  if  a  command  should  be  given  in  typical  form  and 
leave  men  therefore  in  doubt ! 

XIX.  On  the  score  of  ethics  alone  the  objections  against 
war  may  be  comprehended  under  the  following  divisions: 
Men — that  is,  rational  beings— ought  to  contend  with  one  an- 


436  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

other  by  argument,  that  is,  by  the  strength  of  reason,  and  not 
by  force,  by  which  they  sink  to  the  level  of  animals.  We  do 
not  prove  our  right  even  if  we  obtain  victory,  which  is,  never- 
theless, doubtful.  In  wa$  those  suffer  who  probably  had 
little  or  no  hand  in  bringing  it  about.  War  is  immoral,  be- 
cause it  is  a  cessation  of  morality,  and  in  addition  it  breeds 
immorality.  The  effects  of  the  most  successful  wars  are  al- 
ways disproportionate  to  the  evils  which  they  entail.  Finally, 
war  being  necessarily  caused  by  an  act  of  injustice,  of  im- 
morality on  one  side  if  not  on  both,  it  is  at  least  evident  that 
it  must  cease  with  a  state  of  diffused  morality,  and  might  be 
stopped,  on  a  very  large  scale  at  any  rate,  if  a  large  number 
of  independent  states  would  adopt  among  themselves  the  same 
rule  which  the  various  civilized  societies  adopt  within  them- 
selves, namely,  to  prohibit  the  obtaining  of  right  by  force,  and 
to  allow  it  to  be  obtained  by  argument,  by  reasoning,  on  the 
powerful  ground  of  justice  alone. 

XX.  As  to  the  first  objection,  that  men  are  rational  beings 
and  ought  to  decide  all  differences  by  reason,  we  have  to  ob- 
serve that  although  they  ought  to  do  it  there  are  many  who 
will  not  do  it,  and  that  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  good 
always  to  prevent  those  who  will  not  from  doing  so.  Through- 
out human  life  we  resort  to  force  if  we  cannot  obtain  our 
right  otherwise.  Resorting  to  physical  force  is  not  on  that 
account  brutish.  Raising  a  wall  around  our  garden,  fasten- 
ing our  doors  by  locks  and  bolts,  is  resorting  to  physical 
means,  because  we  know  the  thief  would  not  allow  himself 
to  be  argued  away,  or  we  have  no  time  or  obligation  to  watch 
the  door  until  he  come  that  we  may  argue  with  him.  We 
chastise  a  child,  that  is  resort  to  force,  when  it  is  so  young 
that  we  cannot  yet  reason  with  it  and  an  evil  disposition 
shows  itself  so  prominently  as  to  need  to  be  controlled.  We 
prevent  people  from  using  a  path  by  blocking  it  up,  that  is 
we  resort  to  physical  force,  because  a  mere  tablet,  with  a  re- 
quest to  passengers  not  to  use  it,  would  be  without  effect. 
Going  to  law,  is  in  all  cases  in  which  there  is  a  malign  intent 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

on  one  side,  resorting  to  force,  only  with  this  difference,  that 
we  wisely  give  up,  or  are  forced  to  give  up,  private  force,  and 
resort  to  public.  For  we  all  know  full  well  that  our  unjust 
adversary  would  not  do  the  bidding  of  the  court  and  abide 
by  its  decision  were  it  not  supported  by  public  force.  We  do 
not  go  to  the  court  to  convince  our  adversary,  but  to  convince 
the  judge.  A  lawsuit  against  a  wicked  person  amounts  to 
this  :  A  has  wronged  B ;  B  goes  to  the  executive  and  demands 
assistance  against  A.  The  executive  says,  "  I  will  lend  as- 
sistance, but  I  must  first  be  convinced  that  you  are  not  mis- 
taken, or  that  A  did  not  mean,  perhaps,  to  wrong  you.  Go 
to  C,  who  has  been  appointed  to  see,  in  such  cases,  who  is 
right.  He  is  a  judge  ;  and  if  he  says  that  you  are  right,  come 
back,  and  I  will  lend  you  force  to  obtain  right  from  A."  Let 
us  go  farther.  My  child  is  attacked  by  a  murderer :  have  I 
not  the  right  in  this  case  to  protect  him,  which  protection 
may  make  absolutely  necessary  not  only  the  parrying  off  of 
the  assassin's  blows  but  also  the  rendering  him  innocuous  ?  I 
have  the  right  to  kill  an  animal  which  attacks  me  and  en- 
dangers my  life.  If  a  murderer  attacks  me  he  thereby  lowers 
himself  for  that  moment  to  an  animal,  and  he  puts  it  out  of  my 
power  to  use  any  other  means  than  those  I  would  use  against 
the  animal,  so  long  as  I  must  avert  the  danger  to  which,  like 
an  animal,  he  exposes  me ;  and  whatever  danger  or  suffering 
accrues  from  it  is  his  own  doing,  not  mine.  I  am  bound  to 
protect  my  life,  for  my  Creator  has  given  it  to  me  for  various 
solemn  purposes.  Were  I  not  to  protect  it,  brute  force  would 
rule,  and  the  most  sacred  ends  -of  humanity  would  be  set 
at  naught.  Man  is  a  reasonable  being  indeed,  but  he  is  not 
ordered  to  act  by  reason  alone.  But  against  killing  a  human 
being  this  objection  has  been  made:  You  settle  the  doom  of 
the  killed.  The  answer  is,  that  if  a  human  being  is  killed 
according  to  the  principles  of  justice  and  perfect  right  and  the 
necessity  of  the  case  brought  on  by  the  assailant,  we  must 
needs  suppose  that  this  was  intended  to  be  his  final  hour, 
whatever  consequences  may  be  attached  to  it,  because  the 
principles  of  justice  and  right  come  from  the  Creator  and  are 


438  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

essentials  in  his  vast  system.  If  then  they  were  to  militate 
with  others  of  his  intention's,  there  would  be  contradiction  in 
his  government  of  the  world,  which  it  is  absurd  to  suppose. 
In  brief,  the  ancient  "vim  vi  repellere  licet"  is  not  only  justi- 
fiable, but  is  one  of  the  principles  of  God's  whole  creation, 
and  the  abolition  of  it  would  create  universal  moral  and 
physical  disorder. 

We  do  not  prove  our  right  by  victory.  This  is  very  true, 
as  it  is  likewise  true  that  our  injustice  is  not  proved  by  defeat; 
but  no  one  maintains  that  wars  are  undertaken  to  prove  any- 
thing ;  they  are  not,  like  the  ancient  ordeals,  a  supposed  trial 
of  justice.  We  undertake  wars  in  order  to  obtain  right,  and 
if  victory  is  doubtful  and  we  still  undertake  it,  we  do  so  be- 
cause we  believe  the  loss  by  submission  would  be  so  great 
that  we  must  at  least  try  to  protect  ourselves  and  hope  that 
God  will  grant  victory  to  the  just  cause  :  with  such  a  hope 
the  Swiss  fought  for  their  liberty  against  Austria,  and  the 
Americans  resorted  to  arms  because  without  it  they  were  to 
be  subjected  by  British  arms,  or  made  to  submit  to  legislation 
which  they  thought  disgraceful. 

In  war  those  suffer  generally  most  who  were  least  the  cause 
of  wrong.  This  is  undoubtedly  true ;  but  first  it  is  not  in  the 
power  or  the  choice  of  those  whom  we  suppose  unjustly  as- 
sailed to  avert  the  evil, — they  only  protect  themselves ;  and 
secondly  the  evil,  though  great,  as  has  been  admitted,  is  not 
so  great  as  is  often  supposed.  For  it  is  the  plan  of  the  Cre- 
ator that  government  and  people  should  be  closely  united 
in  weal  and  woe :  no  state  of  political  civilization,  no  high 
standard  of  national  liberty  and  general  morality,  is  possible 
where  this  is  not  the  case.  History  offers  no  more  deplorable 
objects  for  the  historian's  contemplation  than  those  nations 
which,  owing  to  whatever  cause,  take  no  part  in  their  govern- 
ment, are  unconnected  by  feeling  with  it,  and  change  alle- 
giance as  rapidly  as  the  fate  of  battle  may  change,  like  the 
people  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
If,  however,  this  union  of  government  and  people  is  desirable, 
the  evil  above  alluded  to  cannot  be  averted.  But,  however 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  439 

this  may  be,  it  is  not  for  those  who  are  threatened  with  war 
to  submit  because  innocent  persons  under  the  assailing  gov- 
ernment may  suffer.  The  same  principle  applied  to  municipal 
matters  would  infallibly  bring  confusion  and  ruin  upon  so- 
ciety ;  for  there  is  hardly  a  single  sentence  inflicted  upon  a 
criminal  which  does  not  affect  in  the  infinite  catenation  of 
human  connections,  morally  or  physically,  some  innocent 
person — children  who  depend  upon  the  father,  a  mother  who 
mourns  the  disgrace  of  her  son,  or  an  innocent  wife  or  a 
friend. 

XXI.  We  come  now  to  consider  the  last  positions  :  War  is 
immoral  and  begets  immorality;  it  never  furnishes  advantages 
which  can  compensate  for  the  evils  it  entails ;  and,  as  rational 
beings,  nations  ought  to  settle,  and  might  easily  settle,  their 
differences  in  the  same  way  as  those  of  individuals  are 
settled. 

An  unjust  war  is  not  only  immoral,  but  it  is  one  of  the 
greatest  crimes — murder  on  a  large  scale;  wars  undertaken  for 
plunder,  or  for  the  unrighteous  end  of  compelling  men  in  their 
•belief,  beget  immorality  and  crime,  annihilate  the  fixed  stand- 
ard of  morality  and  pure  justice,  and  are  on  this  account  alone, 
were  there  no  other  reasons,  destructive  to  civil  liberty,  the 
government  of  law  and  right.  So  is  unjust  litigation  immoral 
in  its  effects  as  well  as  in  its  cause.  Yet,  for  all  this,  there 
would  be  much  greater  immorality  and  unrighteousness  were 
there  no  courts  of  justice,  and  were  people  to  suffer  the  wicked 
to  commit  their  wrong  without  any  litigation.  So-called  re- 
ligious wars,  or  wars  of  plunder,  are  ruinous  in  the  very  high- 
est degree  both  to  society  at  large  and  to  the  individuals  who 
engage  in  them.  But  just  wars  are  not  demoralizing.  As 
protracted  peace  is  not  unalloyed  with  evil  (for  instance,  in 
frequently  begetting  sordid  selfishness  and  degrading  sub- 
missiveness,  increasing  with  each  generation,  as  we  see  to  be 
the  case  in  China),  so  is  a  just  war  not  without  its  great  ad- 
vantages. Public  spirit,  founded  upon  the  very  principle  of 
unselfishness,  is  roused  by  few  national  events  so  much  and 


440 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


raised  to  such  a  pitch  as  by  a  just  war.  The  tone  of  morality 
of  those  who  engage  in  a  patriotic  war  is  eminently  raised ;  no 
one  who  is  acquainted  with  all  the  details  can  deny  that  the 
whole  moral  tone  of  the  German  nation  was  greatly  raised  by 
their  struggle  for  national  independence  against  the  French 
in  1812—14 — a  moral  elevation  which  showed  itself  in  all 
spheres  and  all  branches ;  and  it  was  universally  observed  at 
the  time  that  the  soldiers  had  returned  from  those  wars  with 
high  and  elevated  tone  of  moral  feeling.  The  Americans  cer- 
tainly came  out  of  their  revolutionary  struggle  none  the  worse 
in  their  morals ;  and  is  not  the  nation  to  this  day  intellectually 
and  morally  feeding,  as  it  might  be  called,  upon  their  struggle 
for  liberty?  Whence  do  the  Americans  habitually  take  their 
best  and  purest  examples  of  all  that  is  connected  with  patriot- 
ism, public  spirit,  devotion  to  common  good,  purity  of  motive 
and  action,  if  not  from  the  daring  band  of  their  patriots  of  the 
Revolution  ?  If  war  frequently,  nay  generally,  makes  party 
spirit  run  high  in  a  free  country,  and  very  often  leads  to  ca- 
lamitous consequences,  we  must  not  forget  that,  notwithstand- 
ing all  warmth  and  undue,  nay  dangerous,  zeal,  parties  during 
wars  are  generally  much  purer  than  those  which,  growing1 
up  in  protracted  peace,  are  founded,  like  court  factions  of 
corrupt  monarchies,  on  the  worst  principles  of  selfishness, 
intrigue,  and  avidity  for  plunder.  The  British  parties  of 
Pitt  and  Fox  are  certainly  not  the  worst  in  English  history. 
High  as  the  American  parties  ran  during  the  last  war,  who 
would  say  that  they  were  not  purer  than  those  of  some  later 
periods  in  the  American  history  ?  Many  nations  have  been 
morally  rescued  by  wars,  which  imparted  new  vigor  to  them. 
In  no  situation  whatever  are  so  frequently  pure,  close,  and 
lasting  friendships  concluded,  after  the  first  period  of  unsus- 
picious youth  has  passed,  as  in  a  just  war.  Is  this  not  an  act 
eminently  moral  in  its  character  ?  To  no  period  whatever  do 
men  look  back  in  their  old  age  with  such  animating  delight 
as  to  that  in  which  they  fought  for  a  good  cause.  Poets  can- 
not delight  or  animate  a  nation  except  by  that  which  is  founded 
or  finds  a  responding  chord  in  the  better  part  of  the  human 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  44! 

soul,  as  has  been  already  observed  by  Mackintosh ;  but  what 
has  been  the  most  unceasing  theme  of  all  the  inspired  bards 
of  all  nations  and  all  periods — times  of  general  depravity  only 
excepted,  when  tartness  of  spicy  wit  must  succeed  to  generous 
feeling  which  no  longer  exists,  or  satire  against  vice  must 
stand  in  the  place  of  admiration  of  virtue  and  greatness — if 
not  death  for  our  country  ?     Has  this  been  so  by  agreement, 
or  were  the  poets  paid  for  it,  or  is  it  not  the  general,  spon- 
taneous burst  of  men's  noblest  emotions  ?     Wherever  we  find 
in  a  nation  or  period  a  general  incapacity  of  feeling  the  heart- 
stirring  beauty  of  this  theme,  we  may  set  them  down  as  lost 
to  every  thing  that  goes  beyond  self-interest  and  consequently 
appertains  to  the  best  traits  of  human  society.     Soldiers  are 
proverbially  known  for  frankness  and  generosity.     Who  that 
has  any  practical  knowledge  would  be  so  bold  as  to  assert 
that  the  soldiers  engaged  in  a  national  war  are  as  a  class  im- 
moral ?     Who,  indeed,  would  maintain  that  the  officers  even 
of  a  standing  army  are  less  moral  than  any  other  class  on  a 
similar  level  of  education  ?   Who  would  maintain  that  officers 
are    less    moral,   for   instance,  than    lawyers?     Facts    speak 
against  it.     Actions  in  court  against  officers  are  in  fact  pecu- 
liarly rare.     But  though  the  severest  charges  against  war  and 
soldiers  on  the  score  of  diffusing  immorality  were  true,  it  is 
equally  true  that  the  immoral  consequences  of  submission  to 
foreign  conquerors,  and  of  habitual  submission  to  injustice, 
plunder,  and  insult,  are  still  greater,  and  penetrate  deeper,  for 
they  tend  to  extinguish  that  lively  feeling  of  justice  without 
which  no  free  state  can  flourish. 

XXII.  That  wars  never  compensate  for  the  evils  which  they 
entail  is  as  sweeping  a  remark  as  if  a  person  were  to  assert  that 
men  would  be  all  the  healthier  for  having  no  such  profession  as 
that  of  medicine.  Even  if  it  were  true  in  a  physical  point  of 
view,  the  remark  would  yet  be  far  too  sweeping.  But  it  is  not 
true  even  thus  considered.  Nations  are  sometimes  so  situated 
that,  for  instance,  the  possession  of  the  estuary  of  their  largest 
river  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  their  whole  industry, 


442  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

while  those  who  inhabit  the  country  around  the  mouth  of 
that  river  may  likewise  be  greatly  benefited  by  being  united 
with  the  interior,  and  a  war  which  unites  both  may  become 
a  great  and  lasting  advantage  to  both.  The  continual  efforts 
requisite  for  a  nation  to  protect  themselves  against  the  ever- 
repeated  attacks  of  a  predatory  foe  may  be  infinitely  greater 
than  the  evils  entailed  by  a  single  and  energetic  war  which 
forever  secures  peace  from  that  side.  Nor  will  it  be  denied,  I 
suppose,  that  Niebuhr  is  'right  when  he  observes  that  the  ad 
vantage  on  the  score  of  power  and  national  vigor  to  Rome  of 
having  conquered  Sicily  were  undeniable.  But,  even  if  it  were 
not  so,  are  there  no  other  advantages  to  be  secured  ?  No 
human  mind  is  vast  enough  to  comprehend  in  one  glance, 
nor  is  any  human  life  long  enough  to  follow  out  consecutively, 
all  the  immeasurable  blessings  which  have  resulted  to  man- 
kind from  the  ever-memorable  victories  of  little  Greece  over 
the  rolling  masses  of  servile  Asia,  when  they  were  nigh 
sweeping  over  Europe  like  the  high  tides  of  a  swollen  sea, 
carrying  ruin  over  all  the  germs  of  civilization,  liberty,  and 
taste,  and  nearly  all  that  is  good  and  noble.  Think  what  we 
should  have  been  had  Europe  become  an  Asiatic  province, 
and  the  Eastern  principles  of  power  and  stagnation  so  deeply 
infused  into  her  population  that  no  process  ever  after  could 
have  thrown  it  out  again.  Has  no  advantage  resulted  from  the 
refusal  of  the  Hebrews  in  the  times  of  the  Maccabees'  to 
be  ground  in  the  dust,  and  ultimately  annihilated,  by  stifling 
servitude,  and  from  the  wars  which  followed  their  resolution? 
The  war  of  independence  in  the  Netherlands  has-  had  a  pene- 
trating and  decided  effect  upon  modern  history,  and,  in  the  eye 
of  all  who  value  the  most  substantial  parts  and  elementary 
ideas  of  modern  civil  liberty,  a  highly  advantageous  one,  both 
directly  and  through  Great  Britain.  Wars  have  frequent'y 
been,  in  the  hands  of  Providence,  the  means  of  disseminating 
civilization  if  carried  on  by  civilized  people,  as  in  the  case  of 
Alexander,  whose  wars  had  a  most  decided  effect  upon  the 
intercourse  of  men  and  extension  of  civilization;  or  of  rousing 
and  reuniting  people  who  had  fallen  into  lethargy,  if  attacked 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

by  less  civilized  and  numerous  hordes.  Frequently  we  find 
in  history  that  the  ruler  and  victorious  tribe  is  made  to  revive 
civilization,  as  it  were  already  on  the  wane,  in  a  refined  nation. 
Paradoxical  as  it  may  seem  at  first  glance,  it  is  nevertheless 
amply  proved  by  history  that  the  closest  contact  and  con- 
sequent exchange  of  thought  and  produce  and  enlargement 
of  knowledge  between  two  nations  otherwise  severed  is  fre- 
quently produced  by  a  war.  War  is  indeed  a  state  of  suffer- 
ing, but  it  is  often  one  of  those  periods  of  struggle  without 
which  no  great  and  essential  good  ever  falls  to  the  share  of 
man.  Suffering,  merely  as  suffering,  is  not  an  evil.  Religion, 
philosophy,  every  day's  experience,  prove  it.  No  maternal 
rejoicing  brightens  up  a  mother's  eye  without  the  anxiety  of 
labor. 

Of  what  good,  however,  it  has  been  asked,  is  war  to  those 
who  fail  in  a  war  by  which  we  may  suppose  one  nation  ulti- 
mately to  be  benefited  ?  Both  the  merest  utilitarian  and  many 
religious  people  have  fallen  into  the  error  of  never  considering 
man  except  in  his  isolated  capacity,  the  one  with  respect  to 
material  advantages,  the  other  with  regard  to  mental.  Men, 
however,  are  social  beings,  not  only  as  they  are  destined  to 
help  out  one  another  better  to  obtain  their  isolated  benefits, 
but  because  societies,  nations,  have  their  destinies  as  such, 
and  men  are  destined  to  live  for  one  another,  one  man  for  his 
brother,  and  one  generation  for  another.  All  that  is  noblest 
in  man  is  connected  with  his  sociality,  his  denial  of  self,  and 
his  living  and  striving  in  close  union  with  others.  If  it  were 
not  so,  nothing  could  be  more  absurd,  and  indeed  a  more 
direct  self-contradiction,  than  the  idea  of  sacrificing  one's  self 
for  another,  for  one's  children,  one's  country,  for  truth,  which 
of  course  can  mean  only  truth  in  so  far  as  it  shall  become 
known  by  and  therefore  part  of  others ;  yet  "  greater  love 
hath  no  man  than  this,  that  a  man  lay  down  his  life  for  his 
friend." 

XXIII.  One  word  respecting  the  proposed  plan  of  settling 
national  disputes  by  a  congress  of  nations,  according  to  an 


444 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


international  code,  on  the  plan  of  a  petition  lately  laid  before 
the  congress  of  the  United  States.1 

The  idea  of  a  perpetual  peace  has  been  repeatedly  conceived 
by  modern  writers,  as  by  St.  Pierre,  Bentham,  and  Kant,  and 
has  been  a  favorite  one  with  associations  for  the  promotion  of 
peace.2  The  way  of  settling  amicably  what  at  other  times  would 
have  led  to  bloodshed  has  of  late  become  more  frequent,  and 
is  undoubtedly  upon  the  whole  an  evidence  either  of  a  more 
generally  diffused  love  of  peace,  or  of  the  fact  that  govern- 
ments have,  in  the  course  of  civilization,  more  or  less  changed 
their  character  from  cabinet  governments  to  national  govern- 
ments. Nations  also  have  not  in  the  present  state  of  things 
as  frequent  desires  for  war  as  formerly,  or  as  individuals  may 
be  supposed  to  have ;  though  we  should  be  unjust  if  we  were 
to  ascribe  the  many  former  wars  always  to  the  warlike  spirit 
of  princes.  It  was  the  spirit  of  the  times,  and  in  not  a  few 
cases  were  the  princes  urged  by  the  people  to  a  war  in  which 
they  reluctantly  engaged. 

Yet  we  err  if  we  suppose  that  the  settlement  of  international 
questions  by  congresses  of  ambassadors  has  not  had  in  some 
cases  most  grievous  consequences  for  some  nations.  It  is 
impossible  to  bring  nations  into  such  close  contact  as  those 
congresses  allow,  and  yet  to  separate  the  international  ques- 


1  I  would  refer  the  reader  to  a  very  able  report  made  by  Mr.  Legare,  from  the 
committee  on  foreign  affairs  of  the  house  of  representatives,  June  13,  1838,  on  a 
memorial  of  the  New  York  Peace  Society,  praying  to  refer  the  subject  in  dispute 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  to  a  third  power  for  arbitration,  and  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  should  send  a  proposal  to  those  of  other 
nations  "  that  they  would  unite  with  it  in  the  establishment  of  a  great  international 
board  of  arbitration,  or  a  congress  of  nations,  to  which  to  refer  international  dis- 
putes ;  and  also  for  the  purpose  of  digesting  and  preparing  a  regular  code  of 
international  I  aw,  obligatory  on  such  nations  as  may  afterwards  adopt  it." 

[Of  the  two,  a  congress  of  nations  and  compromissory  arbitration  by  arbiters 
whom  the  parties  choose,  the  latter,  of  which  many  instances  are  to  be  met  with 
in  modern  diplomacy,  has  in  the  present  state  of  the  world  the  advantage.] 

a  On  Perpetual  Peace,  a  Philosophical  Sketch,  written  in  1795,  in  vol.  vii.  of 
Kant's  Complete  Works,  Leipsic,  1838. — This  paper,  much  as  there  is  con- 
tained in  it  for  reflection,  belongs  certainly  to  the  we'aker  productions  of  that 
philosopher. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  445 

tions  strictly  from  questions  which,  though  domestic,  are  of 
general  interest.  Domestic  interference  is  an  almost  neces- 
sary consequence.  Wherever  people  meet,  the  most  power- 
ful must  sway,  in  politics  as  in  every  other  sphere;  and 
wherever  parts  of  nations  or  entire  nations  meet  nominally  on 
terms  of  parity,  it  is  unavoidable  that  the  most  powerful  must 
sway  the  less  powerful.  Independent  national  development, 
therefore,  one  of  the  most  necessary  requisites  of  a  general, 
diverse,  and  manifold  civilization,  in  law,  language,  custom, 
and  literature,  would  be  as  seriously  interfered  with  by  such 
a  proposed  congress  of  nations  as  it  was  for  a  long  time  in  the 
middle  ages  by  the  papal  power.  All  legislation  at  a  distance 
becomes  inconvenient,  not  unfrequently  ruinous,  because  un- 
adapted  to  the  specific  case.  A  congress  on  the  banks  of  the 
Po,  or  on  the  Bosphorus,  for  Asia,  Europe,  and  America, 
would  make  galling  decisions  for  people  near  the  Rocky 
Mountains.  All  the  inconveniences  and  hardships  of  so- 
called  universal  monarchies  would  be  felt.  Nor  can  many 
international  questions  possibly  be  settled  like  mathematical 
questions.  The  difference  of  nations,  which  nevertheless  is 
necessary,  must  needs  lead  to  very  different  wants  and  views. 
Something  similar  takes  place  in  many  law  cases.  Right  and 
wrong  are  frequently  not  so  strictly  divided  in  complex  cases 
that  we  can  demonstrate  it  with  absolute  mathematical  cer- 
tainty. Still  I  may  be  answered,  They  are  settled  by  the 
courts.  They  are  settled,  indeed;  but  how?  Are  both  par- 
ties satisfied?  They  abide  by  the  decision  for  two  reasons: 
because  public  opinion  compels  them  to  do  so,  and  because 
if  they  would  not,  there  is  the  executive,  the  compelling 
power,  without  which  no  state  could  exist.  The  one  of  these 
agents  would  be  very  weak,  the  other  would  not  exist  at  all, 
in  those  decisions  of  a  supposed  congress.  Moreover,  inter- 
national law  is  one  of  the  proudest  victories  of  civilization, 
despite  whatever  incongruities  there  may  still  exist  in  it  as  it 
appears  in  the  best  authorities.  Yet  why  is  it  so  ?  Where 
does  its  force  lie  ?  Because  it  has  gradually  developed  itself 
out  of  the  intercourse  in  peace  and  war  of  civilized  nations, 


446  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

and  a  united  feeling  of  justice  or  fairness,  mutual  advantage 
and  honor;  but  a  mere  legislation  even  of  the  wisest  men  of 
all  nations,  should  we  suppose  them  ever  to  agree,  would 
fall  to  the  ground  like  any  other  legislation,  if  not  founded 
upon  existing  circumstances  and  customs.  Finally,  we  Amer- 
icans should  be  the  very  last  to  propose  such  a  congress, 
because  we  might  be  sure  that  our  republican  ministers  would 
play  a  very  subordinate  part  in  a  congress  of  ambassadors 
consisting  almost  entirely  of  monarchical  deputies,  whose 
principles  and  views,  therefore,  would  always  be  prevalent. 

-XXIV.  A  war,  to  be  justifiable,  must  be  undertaken  on  just 
grounds — that  is,  to  repel  or  avert  wrongful  force,  or  to  estab- 
lish a  right ;  must  be  the  last  resort — that  is,  after  all  other 
means  of  reparation  are  unavailable  or  have  miscarried  ;  it 
must  be  necessary — that  is,  the  evil  to  be  averted  or  redressed 
should  be  a  great  one;  and  it  must  be  wise — that  is,  there 
must  be  reasonable  prospect  of  obtaining  reparation,  or  the 
averting  of  the  evil,  and  the  acquiescence  in  the  evil  must  be 
greater  than  the  evils  of  the  contest.1 


1  The  following  passage  on  war  comes  from  so  excellent  a  writer,  and  contains 
such  just  views,  that  I  feel  authorized  in  transcribing  it : 

"  The  war  of  a  people  against  a  tyrannical  government  may  be  tried  by  the 
same  tests  which  ascertain  the  morality  of  a  war  between  independent  nations. 
The  employment  of  force  in  the  intercourse  of  reasonable  beings  is  never  lawful 
but  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  or  averting  wrongful  force.  Human  life  cannot 
lawfully  be  destroyed,  or  assailed,  or  endangered,  for  any  other  object  than  that 
of  just  defence.  Such  is  the  nature  and  such  the  boundary  of  legitimate  self- 
defence  in  the  case  of  individuals.  Hence  the  right  of  the  lawgiver  to  protect 
unoffending  citizens  by  the  adequate  punishment  of  crimes ;  hence,  also,  the 
right  of  an  independent  state  to  take  all  measures  necessary  to  her  safety,  if  it  be 
attacked  or  threatened  from  without ;  provided  always  that  reparation  cannot 
otherwise  be  obtained,  that  there  is  a  reasonable  prospect  of  obtaining  it  by  arms, 
and  that  the  evils  of  the  contest  are  not  probably  greater  than  the  mischiefs  of 
acquiescence  in  the  wrong;  including,  on  both  sides  of  the  deliberation,  the  or- 
dinary consequences  of  the  example,  as  well  as  the  immediate  effects  of  the  act. 
If  reparation  can  otherwise  be  obtained,  a  nation  has  no  necessary,  and  therefore 
no  just,  cause  of  war;  if  there  be  no  probability  of  obtaining  it  by  arms,  a  gov 
ernment  cannot,  with  justice  to  their  own  nation,  embark  it  in  war;  and  if  tin 
evils  of  resistance  should  appear,  on  the  whole,  greater  than  those  of  submission 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  447 

Just  wars  may  be : 

Wars  of  insurrection,  to  gain  or  regain  liberty,  as  in  the 
late  case  of  the  Greeks;  for  man  is  not  bound  to  suffer 
oppression.  His  moral  character  is  deeply  involved  in  it. 

Wars  of  independence ;  for  instance,  if  a  colony  has  grown 
into  sufficient  strength  to  provide  for  its  own  safety  by  inde- 
pendent legislation  [and  is  treated  oppressively  by  the  mother 
country]. 

Wars  to  quell  armed  factions,  like  those  of  Henry  IV.  in 
France. 

Wars  to  unite  distracted  states  of  the  same  nation,  or  in  a 
country  destined  by  nature  to  form  one  political  society,  as 
the  wars  of  the  Swedish  monarchs  who  united  the  conflicting 
states  and  parts  of  Sweden. 

Wars  of  defence ;  for  instance,  against  invasion  or  conquest. 
A  war  may  be  essentially  defensive,  and  yet  we  may  begin  it, 
for  instance,  if  we  must  prevent  an  invasion  which  is  under 
preparation.  Wars  undertaken  to  assist  an  ally  according  to 
a  previous  treaty  of  common  defence  are  wars  of  defence. 

Wars  of  chastisement.  A  nation  which  habitually  would 
suffer  insult,  depredation,  and  plunder  would  soon  sink  into 
meanness  and  lose  its  own  respect.  What  in  the  first  gener- 
ation might  have  been  mistaken  generosity — I  say  mistaken, 
for  it  is  the  business  of  the  state  to  protect  its  subjects — 
would  be  meanness  in  the  next.  It  is  one  of  the  prominent 


wise  rulers  will  consider  an  abstinence  from  a  pernicious  exercise  of  right  as  a 
sacred  duty  to  their  own  subjects,  and  a  debt  which  every  people  owes  to  the 
great  commonwealth  of  mankind,  of  which  they  and  their  enemies  are  alike 
members.  A  war  is  just  against  the  wrong-doer  when  reparation  for  wrong  can- 
not otherwise  be  obtained  ;  but  it  is  then  only  conformable  to  all  the  principles 
of  morality  when  it  is  not  likely  to  expose  the  nation  by  whom  it  is  levied  to 
greater  evils  than  it  professes  to  avert,  and  when  it  does  not  inflict  on  the  nation 
which  has  done  the  wrong  sufferings  altogether  disproportionate  to  the  extent  of 
the  injury.  When  the  rulers  of  a  nation  are  required  to  determine  a  question 
of  peace  or  war,  the  bare  justice  of  their  case  against  the  wrong-doer  never  can 
be  the  sole,  and  is  not  always  the  chief,  matter  on  which  they  are  morally  bound  to 
exercise  a  conscientious  deliberation.  Prudence  in  conducting  the  affairs  of  their 
subjects  is,  in  them,  a  part  of  justice."  Mackintosh,  History  of  the  Revolution 
in  1688,  chap.  ix. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

features  in  the  Roman  history,  which  showed  that  they  had 
an  elevated  view  of  the  state,  that  at  an  early  period  they 
considered  the  state  pledged  to  protect  the  individual  against 
foreign  injury.  They  early  saw  the  essence  of  the  state.  The 
Roman  ambassador,  when  sent  to  remonstrate  with  the  Epi- 
rote  queen  for  the  piracies  committed  by  her  and  her  sub- 
jects against  Romans,  sai'd,  "  We  Romans  have  the  admirable 
custom  of  avenging  with  the  whole  force  of  the  state  offences 
done  to  private  individuals,  and  aiding  those  who  have  under- 
gone injustice.  By  the  aid  of  the  gods,  therefore,  we  shall 
speedily  and  vigorously  endeavor  to  constrain  you  to  amelior- 
ate the  royal  regulation  of  Illyria." 

The  German  empire  and  the  republic  of  the  Netherlands, 
but  a  short  time  previously  so  great  and  powerful,  and  indeed 
all  the  neighbors  of  France,  were  fast  sinking  into  degradation 
and  sustained  incalculable  moral  and  physical  evil  when  they 
allowed  Louis  XIV.  to  commit  his  endless  and  insulting 
iniquities  in  robbing  land  and  cities,  and  in  other  ways,  during 
times  of  peace,  from  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Nimeguen 
to  the  breaking  out  of  the  third  war  in  1688  ;  and  no  man  can 
calculate  what  would  have  become  of  all  Europe,  how  deep 
it  might  have  sunk  in  utter  degradation,  through  the  loss  of 
the  sense  of  justice  and  love  of  liberty,  had  not  salvation 
ultimately  come  from  England,  whence,  as  William  justly 
wrote  in  1681  to  Lord  Hyde  (Clarendon  Corresp.,  i.  56,  59), 
salvation  for  Europe  alone  was  possible.  We  are  apt  to  con- 
sider the  revolution  of  1688  only  in  its  mighty  effects  upon 
British  and,  through  it,  upon  European  and  American  civil 
liberty.  But  William  is  no  less  a  great  British  king  than  he 
is  a  great  European  hero,  for  having  stemmed  the  current 
which  was  fast  enslaving  and  politically  demoralizing  all  Eu- 
rope, and  was  the  more  dangerous  as  it  was  accompanied  by 
the  dazzling  yet  unsound  grandeur  of  an  unprincipled  mon- 
arch. The  year  1688  was  probably  no  less  portentous  for 
Europe  than  the  years  590  and  580  before  Christ  had  been, 
when  the  gallant  Greeks  stemmed  the  Asiatic  invasion.  A 
nation  which  at  the  proper  time  does  not  know  how  to  un- 


POLITICAL  ETHICS  440 

sheathe   the  sword  can    never  be  considered  as  resting  its 
liberty  or  morality  on  a  certain  and  firm  basis. 

Those  cases  of  war  where  the  possession  of  some  place  or 
province  becomes  absolutely  necessary  for  the  safety  or  exist- 
ence of  a  state  or  nation,  clearly  seeing  that  its  destiny  is  to 
exist  as  a  nation  and  to  manifest  itself  as  such,  to  which  I 
have  alluded  before,  must  be  considered  as  exceptions  pro- 
duced by  the  clashing  interests  of  various  parties.  Although 
these  cases  have  been  frequently  made  the  iniquitous  pretexts 
for  the  worst  wars,  truth,  nevertheless,  binds  us  to  acknowl- 
edge that  such  cases  of  extreme  necessity  do  actually  occur.1 

XXV.  War  does  not  rest  on  the  contest  of  argument  or 
reason ;  but  it  by  no  means  absolves  us  from  all  obligation 
towards  the  enemy,  for  various  reasons.  They  depend  in 
part  on  the  objSct  of  war,  in  part  on  the  fact  that  the  belliger- 
ents are  human  beings,  that  the  declaration  of  war  is,  among 
civilized  nations,  always  made  upon  the  tacit  acknowledgment 
of  certain  usages  and  obligations,  and  partly  on  the  fact  that 
wars  take  place  between  masses  who  fight  for  others  or  not 
for  themselves  only. 

I  repeat  that  I  do  not  intend  by  any  means  to  give  here  an 
outline  of  the  law  of  war,  but  shall  merely  touch  upon  some 
points  of  importance  in  public  ethics. 

War  does  not  absolve  us  from  ,all  obligations  to  the  enemy. 
The  Romans  acknowledged — no  matter  how  far  they  prac- 
tised upon  it — that  "  war  had  its  rights  as  well  as  peace,  and 
that  the  Romans  had  learned  to  conduct  war  justly  no  less 
than  gallantly."  These  are,  according  to  Livy  (v.  27),  the 
words  of  Camillus.  ("  Sunt  et  belli  sicut  pacis  jura,  justeque 
ea  non  minus  quam  fortiter  gerere  didicimus.")  Cicero,  de 
Leg.  ii.  14,  acknowledges  the  same  principle.  What  then  is 
permitted,  and  what  not? 

So  soon  as  war  is  declared,  or  the  respective  parties  are 


*  [Rather  dangerous  ground.     What  is  the  necessity  of  a  nation's  existence, 
compared  with  the  necessity  of  adherence  to  the  right?] 
VOL.  II.  29 


450  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

fairly  in  a  state  of  war,  it  is  understood  that  they  appeal  to 
force  and  stratagem.  I  may  deceive  the  enemy  whenever,  and 
must  injure  him  wherever,  I  can.1  Deceit  is  allowed,  but  not 
perjury;  and  as  to  the  injury  I  do  to  the  enemy,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  I  must  injure  him  as  an  enemy,  that  is,  so 
far  as  he  is  there  to  oppose  me  in  obtaining  the  ends  which  I 
consider  as  the  next  object  of  the  war — for  instance,  that  of 
obtaining  possession  of  the  capital  or  the  country,  or  that  of 
gaining  the  ultimate  object  of  the  war,  which  among  civilized 
nations  is  always  peace,  on  whatever  conditions  that  may  be. 
"  Truth  and  Peace"  was  Cromwell's  remarkable  watchword  in 
the  battle  of  Winceby,  or  Horncastle,  near  Lincoln.2 

From  these  positions  we  shall  derive  important  conse- 
quences, after  having  settled  who  the  enemy  is.  Properly 
speaking,  the  enemy  is  the  hostile  state,  next  represented  for 
the  belligerent  in  the  hostile  army,  but  also  represented  in 
all  its  citizens  from  whom  the  means  of  carrying  on  the  war 
are  drawn  or  who  furnish  them.  The  armed  enemy,  therefore, 
whether  he  actually  have  arms  in  hand  or  not  (Bynkershoek, 
Law  of  War,  ch.  i.),  provided  he  would  or  can  use  them,  must 
be  repelled  and  injured  by  arms  ;  the  unarmed  enemy,  in  sup- 
plying the  means  for  the  war  directly  or  indirectly. 

I  have  not  the  right  to  injure  my  enemy  without  reference 
to  the  general  object  of  the  war  or  to  that  of  the  battle.  We 
do  not  injure  in  war  in  order  to  injure,  but  to  obtain  the  object 
of  war.  All  unnecessary  infliction  of  suffering,  therefore,  re- 
mains cruelty  as  among  private  individuals.  All  suffering 
inflicted  upon  persons  who  do  not  impede  my  way,  for  instance 
upon  surgeons  or  other  inoffensive  persons,  if  it  can  possibly 
be  avoided,  is  criminal;  equally  so  is  all  turning  of  the  public 


1  "  The  law  of  nature,"  says  Heeren,  "  as  applied  to  war,  or  pure  military  law, 
recognizes  no  further  principle  than  '  I  injure  my  enemy  wherever  I  can.'  "    An 
Examination  of  the  Questions  respecting  the  Claims  of  the  Armed  Neutrality.    In 
his  Historical  Treatises,  translation,  Oxford,  1836.     I  remind  the  reader  of  the 
necessity  of  remembering  who  the  enemy  is. 

2  Which  took  place  October  n,  1643.    Forster's  Cromwell,  vol.  vi.  of  Eminent 
British  Statesmen,  London,  1838. 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

war  to  private  ends,  such  as  extorting  money  for  private  use, 
all  use  of  arms  or  of  the  power  which  I  enjoy  as  a  soldier  for 
private  purposes,  as  for  the  satisfaction  of  lust,  all  unnecessary 
destruction  of  private  property,1  all  avoidable  destruction  of 
works  of  art  or  science  in  particular,  and  all  unnecessary  de- 
struction of  any  kind.  No  pain  can  be  inflicted  nor  harm  be 
done  in  war  which  does  not  aid  the  operations  of  war  directly. 
As  soon  as  an  enemy  is  rendered  harmless  by  wounds  or 
captivity,  he  is  no  longer  my  enemy,  for  he  is  no  enemy  of 
mine  individually.  On  the  same  ground  I  have  no  right  to 
employ  assassins,  even  if  the  general  principle  of  honor  did 
not  make  us  abhor  it.  I  ought  not  only  to  abstain  from  in- 
juring the  harmless,  but  to  protect  them  against  the  unlawful 
attack  of  others,  simply  because  this  becomes  a  perfectly 
private  case. 

XXVI.  On  the  other  hand,  I  am  not  only  allowed — which 
is  altogether  an  unimportant  question  in  war — but  it  is  my 
duty  to  inflict  on  my  enemy,  as  such,  the  most  serious  injury 
I  can.Jn  order  to  obtain  my  end,  whether  this  be  protection 
or  whatever  else.  The  more  actively  this  rule  is  followed  out, 
the  better  for  humanity,  because  intense  wars  are  of  short 


1  The  question  of  privateering  crmnot  be  discussed  here.  I  will  only  say  thnt 
those  who  defend  it  do  it  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  when  war.  is  declared  my 
avowed  object  is  to  injure  my  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  in  order  to  compel 
him  to  peace  at  my  will.  So  far  as  this  object  is  in  view,  I  use  and  have  a  right 
to  use  all  means.  Capture  of  private  property  in  land  wars  is  not  generally  resorted 
to,  because  it  would  not  serve  the  purpose ;  but  no  general  would  be  pardoned 
for  not  taking  it  if  it  were  to  support  the  enemy  in  his  endeavors  to  injure  me, 
for  instance  if  it  consisted  of  grain.  Now,  there  is  very  frequently  no  other^vay 
of  injuring  the  enemy  so  that  he  feel  it  than  by  making  maritime  prizes.  Ten 
captured  vessels  may  dispose  the  enemy  more  to  peace  than  a  lost  battle.  The 
injustice  of  the  case,  it  is  maintained,  is  lessened,  so  far  as  the  war  is  with  the 
state;  and  all  are  bound  to  one  fate,  although  it  is  admitted  that  it  is  a  peculiarly 
hard  case  for  those  who  lose  the  prize,  yet  no  more  than,  for  instance,  in  the 
case  of  the  soldier  who  is  crippled.  This  too  is  an  individual  hardship. 

[Since  this  was  written,  most  of  the  nations  of  Christendom  have  agreed  to 
abolish  privateering,  and  to  allow  enemies'  goods  on  neutral  vessels  engaged  in 
innocent  trade  to  go  unharmed.  Every  merchant  can  now  put  his  goods  on  a 
safe  vessel,  so  that  nearly  entire  exemption  from  capture.is  already  reached.] 


452 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


duration.  If  destruction  of  the  enemy  is  my  object,  it  is  not 
only  my  right,  but  my  duty,  to  resort  to  the  most  destructive 
means.  Formerly,  when  there  were  so  many  wars,  in  which 
only  the  amount  of  suffering  interested  the  nations  concerned, 
and  which  the  belligerents  were  often  conscious  of  under- 
taking for  trifling  or  unjust  causes,  it  was  natural  that  many 
niceties  should  be  considered  as  laws  of  war.  Wars  were 
somewhat  like  duels,  or  tournaments,  and  the  laws  which 
regulated  them  were  carried  over  to  the  wars.  Certain  arms, 
advantages,  and  means  of  destruction  were  declared  to  be  un- 
lawful, or  not  considered  honorable.  The  "  Chevalier"  lost 
his  battle  against  King  George,  because  he  thought  it  unfair 
to  take  advantage  of  the  battle-ground !  When  nations  are 
aggressed  in  their  good  rights,  and  threatened  with  the  moral 
and  physical  calamities  of  conquest,  they  are  bound  to  resort 
to  all  means  of  destruction,  for  they  only  want  to  repel.  First, 
settle  whether  the  war  be  just;  if  so,  carry  it  out  vigorously : 
nothing  diminishes  the  number  of  wars  so  effectually.  It  was 
formerly  much  debated  whether  it  was  right  to  poison  wells, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  fair,  because  the  enemy  was  not 
prepared  for  it.  But  it  is  one  of  the  things  I  want  against  a 
wrongful  aggressor  in  war  that  he  be  not  prepared.  Should 
I  not  surprise  him  ?  Who  would  blame  the  Athenians  if,  in 
retiring  from  Attica  to  their  ships,  they  had  poisoned  the 
wells,  in  order  to  make  the  Persians  retire  the  sooner  ?  A 
just  war  is  not  made  for  the  pleasure  of  fighting.  The  only 
consideration  can  be  this :  Do  we  inflict  an  evil  upon  the 
individual  which  will  cruelly  afflict  him  after  he  has  ceased 
to  be  an  enemy,  and  which  we  can  avoid  ?  If  so,  let  us  avoid 
it  by  all  means.  As  for  the  destruction  alone,  in  whatever 
number  or  by  whatever  means,  it  is  lawful  and  advisable,  for 
the  reasons  already  given.1 


1  See  Bynkershoek,  Law  of  War,  translated  by  Peter  S.  Duponceau,  Philadel- 
phia, 1810,  chap.  i. — [In  1863,  Dr.  Lieber  prepared  a  code  of  laws  of  war  at 
the  request  of  the  United  States  government,  which  is  entitled  Instructions  for 
the  Government  of  Armies  of  the  United  States  in  the  Field.  He  there  says 
(article  70,  under  section  iii.),  "  The  use  of  poison  in  any  manner,  be  it  to  poison 


POLITICAL   ETHICS.  453 

Respecting  deception  we  must  observe  that  within  the 
sphere  of  war  it  is  perfectly  lawful,  but  not  beyond.  Hence 
capitulations  must  be  kept;  for  peace  is  the  end  of  war;  peace 
is  founded  upon  confidence,  but  the  breaking  of  capitulations 
would  destroy  it.  A  capitulation  or  any  agreement,  for  in- 
stance an  armistice,  or  a  permitted  convoy,  is  evidently 
above  the  declaration  of  war ;  an  exemption  from  it ;  founded 
upon  confidence,  otherwise  it  would  not  be  made.  For  the 
same  reason  we  are  bound  to  observe  those  provisions  of 
treaties  which  were  made  for  the  case  that  war  should  break 
out  at  some  future  period  between  the  contracting  powers. 
These  stipulations  must  be  faithfully  kept;  if  not,  it  was  ab- 
surd to  make  them,  and  the  confidence  necessary  for  the  basis 
of  a  future  peace  is  destroyed ;  but,  as  was  observed,  peace 
being  the  ultimate  object  of  just  war,  we  destroy  the  very 
object  of  the  war  in  which  we  are  engaged.  Indeed,  if  no 
degree  of  confidence  remained  between  the  belligerents,  every 
war  would  become  an  internecine  war;  and  such  is  the  case 
between  all  savage  tribes,  who  have  lost  all  confidence  in  one 
another.  The  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Prussia 
of  1785  (Treaties  of  the  United  States,  1871,  p.  706  and  onw.) 
stipulates,  among  other  things,  that  in  case  of  war  merchants 
of  either  nation  residing  in  the  country  of  the  other  shall 
have  nine  months'  time  to  wind  up  their  business,  and  be  au- 
thorized to  carry  off  all  their  property;  no  artisan,  etc.,  thus  re- 
siding is  to  be  molested;  no  letters  of  marque  are  to  be  given, 


wells  or  food  or  arms,  is  wholly  excluded  from  modern  warfare.  He  that  uses 
it  puts  himself  out  of  the  pale  of  the  law  and  usages  of  war."  He  had,  as  this 
shows,  learned  something  since  this  chapter  was  published,  in  which  he  seems  to 
follow  too  much  the  somewhat  savage  and  questionable  doctrines  of  Bynkershoek 
in  his  QujEst.  Jur.  Publ.,  book  first.  Great  lawyers  are  apt  to  be  harsher  than 
great  military  officers  who  are  not  imbruted  by  selfish  lust  of  acquisition  ;  for 
the  former  see  war  only  in  its  abstract  features,  the  latter  see  it  written  out  in 
letters  of  blood.  Dr.  Lieber  here  approves  of  poisoning,  but  two  pages  back 
justly  condemns  the  employment  of  assassins.  But  to  kill  a  general  in  an  under- 
hand way  is  surely  no  worse  than  to  poison  half  a  regiment.  Our  author's  ma- 
ture and  well-digested  opinions  in  the  code  of  war  do  him  the  highest  honor,  and 
modify  what  he  says  in  this  chapter  in  several  particulars.] 


454  .  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

and  private  property  is  to  be  safe  on  land  or  sea ;  prisoners  are 
not  to  be  sent  into  unhealthy  climates,  etc.  In  all  treaties  be- 
tween maritime  powers,  a  certain  time  is  stipulated,  in  case  of 
wars,  for  private  vessels  in  distant  regions,  during  which  they 
shall  not  be  molested  though  war  be  declared.  Such  con- 
ditions ought  to  be  most  punctiliously  and  most  cheerfully 
fulfilled,  for  they  are  the  moral  points  remaining  in  a  state  of 
force.  Yet  they  have  often  been  broken — for  instance,  when 
Charles  II.  seized  the  Dutch  vessels  in  the  Mediterranean,  in 
1672,  long  before  six  months  after  the  declaration  of  war 
had  elapsed,  although  by  the  Peace  of  Breda  this  time  had 
been  stipulated  to  give  the  citizens  of  the  two  states  time  to 
remove  their  property.  (State  Tracts  of  William  III.,  i.  35.) 
For  the  same  reason  that  capitulations  or  treaties  must  not 
be  broken,  perhaps,  or  because  the  injury  done  in  war  beyond 
the  necessity  of  war  is'  at  once  illegitimate,  barbarous,  and 
cruel,  works  of  art  generally  ought  not  to  be  carried  off  by  the 
victorious  party;  because  it  galls  the  conquered  nation  beyond 
the  time  of  war,  and,  as  peace  requires  mutual  good  will,  and 
war  of  itself  causes  irritation,  the  carrying  off  of  these  works 
would  awaken  feelings  opposed  to  continued  peace.  Yet  I  can- 
didly confess  that  I  cannot  see  the  jural  ground  on  which  the 
right  of  carrying  off  books  and  works  of  art,  provided  they 
belong  to  the  nation,  is  denied.  It  is  universally  admitted  that 
levying  a  contribution  for  the  sake  of  chastisement  for  a  wrong- 
ful war,  beyond  the  expenses  of  the  war,  is  lawful,  as  it  un- 
doubtedly is.  Why  then  should  it  be  wrong  to  carry  away 
works  of  art  for  the  sake  of  chastisement  ?  If  they  are  truly 
national,  connected  with  the  history  and  feelings  of  a  nation, 
and  were  carried  off  for  vain-glorious  exhibition,  it  would  be 
cruel.  Nothing  must  be  done  in  war  but  what  is  considered 
necessary.  The  destruction  of  works  of  art  is  vandalism,  and, 
as  their  removal  exposes  to  destruction,  this  is  an  additional 
ground  why  it  ought  but  very  rarely  to  be  resorted  to.  Still, 
this  is  merely  an  adventitious  reason,  not  one  founded  in  the 
subject  itself.  The  works  of  art  may  thus  be  injured;  but 
they  may  also  not.  They  may  be  saved  from  destruction  by 


POLITICAL  ETHICS.  455 

being  carried  off  by  the  victor.  What  should  we  possess 
of  the  wonders  of  ancient  art,  had  Rome's  conquering  sword 
not  collected  them  ?  There  would  be  no  Vatican. 

Wars  are  undertaken  under  the  silent  acknowledgment  of 
certain  usages,  which,  therefore,  must  be  kept;  both  on  the 
common  ground  of  honor,  and  because  they  are  necessary, 
either  for  mitigating  the  evils  of  war  and  bringing  it  within 
the  sphere  of  civilization,  or  for  obtaining  the  end  of  peace. 
Thus,  flags  of  truce  must  be  honored;  heralds  were  sacred 
in  most  ancient  times ;  indeed,  with  them  begins,  we  may  say, 
international  law.  Envoys  must  be  kept  sacred;  they  are, 
indeed,  the  remaining  representatives  of  reason,  in  the  state 
where  force  is  chiefly  appealed  to.1 

1  I  do  not  know  that  the  entire  denial  of  our  right  to  use  arms,  or,  in  other 
words,  of  the  legality  of  war,  was  ever  adopted  into  any  system,  except  by  Quakers, 
before  the  publication  of  Wayland's  Elements  of  Moral  Science,  New  York, 
1835.  It  may  be  proper,  therefore,  to  notice  his  objections  in  detail.  On  page 
443,  under  the  head  of  Redress  of  Grievances,  under  which  he  comprehends  the 
violation  of  treaties,  he  says, — 

1.  That  the  fact  that  a  nation  solely  relied  upon  the  justice  of  its  measures 
and  the  benevolence  of  its  conduct  would  do  more  than  anything  else  to  prevent 
the  occurrence  of  injury. 

This  might  be  true  in  some  cases,  in  others  not.  Besides,  there  are  two  points 
left  out  of  consideration.  National  measures  are  in  many  cases  not  so  absolutely 
just  or  unjust  that  they  cannot  appear  in  very  different  lights  to  different  persons. 
We  see  this  daily  with  respect  to  municipal  questions;  but  respecting  inter- 
national questions  there  is  the  additional  difficulty  of  nations  forming  separate 
communities,  large  enough  to  be,  in  a  degree,  their  own  world,  and  separated  by 
language,  history,  law,  views,  prejudices,  desires,  etc.  Secondly,  benevolence  is 
a  delicate  feeling,  depending  upon  the  individual  view  and  disposition  of  men. 
Where  many  have  to  decide,  as  is  the  case  in  national  questions,  it  is  not  often 
possible  that  problems  be  solved  by  delicacy  of  feeling,  which  depends  so  much 
on  individuality.  All  we  can  and  ought  to  desire  is  to  see  the  questions  solved 
upon  the  rules  of  strict  justice;  and  even  upon  this  it  is  not  always  easy  to  unite 
a  number  of  men.  We  must  not  forget  that  governments  have  their  power  in 
trust,  and  as  1  might  do  a  thousand  things  with  my  own  money  which  I  dare 
not  do  if  I  am  a  guardian,  so  government  cannot  act  in  many  cases  by  way  of 
benevolence,  but  must  go  by  the  principles  of  justice. 

2.  If  wrong  is  done,  the  proper  appeal  for  moral  beings  upon  moral  questions 
is  not  to  physical  force,  but  to  the  conscience  of  men. 

This  prohibits  us  from  going  to  war  before  we  have  tried  every  other  means. 
But  it  is  not  wrong  to  trust  to  physical  force  against  a  thief— for  instance,  as  was 


456  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

XXVII.  Connected  with  the  subject  of  war  is  that  of  armies. 
All  we  have  to  observe  with  regard  to  the  soldier,  to  his  con- 


said  above,  by  way  of  a  lock.  Those  who  deny  the  right  of  using  physical  force 
almost  always  commit  the  error  of  arguing  against  force  altogether.  Yet  no 
Quaker  hesitates  in  using  strictly  defensive  force — for  instance,  an  iron  chest. 
The  question  then  is  not,  as  stated  here  by  Wayland,  whether  we  are  permitted 
to  use  force  instead  of  applying  to  conscience,  but  whether  we  are  allowed  to  use 
compelling  force,  and,  above  all,  whether  we  are  allowed  to  kill  fellow-men  in 
our  endeavor  to  apply  compelling  force.  For,  I  repeat  it,  neither  destruction  nor 
killing  is  the  object  of  war.  The  object  of  war  is  either  my  defence  or  the  com- 
pulsion of  another,  and  in  effecting  this,  owing  to  my  being  impeded  in  my  way 
by  the  enemy,  arms  are  used.  If  the  question  is  thus  reduced,  it  remains  to  be 
answered  whether  we  are  prevented  from  killing  men  under  any  circumstances. 
The  Quakers  say  yes;  we  deny  it.  If  I  am  attacked  by  a  murderer,  I  hold  it  to 
be  my  solemn  duty  to  kill  him  in  order  to  save  myself,  because  God  does  not 
want  murder  to  triumph,  because  it  is  right  according  to  the  moral  order  of 
things  that  the  wicked  meet  with  their  desert,  because  my  life,  being  that  of  an 
innocent  man,  is  worth  more  than  the  murderer's,  and  for  a  number  of  other 
reasons,  unnecessary  to  state  here.  Puffendorf  says,  very  justly,  "  If,  then,  some 
one  treads  the  laws  of  peace  under  his  feet,  forming  projects  which  tend  to  my 
ruin,  he  could  not  without  the  last  degree  of  impudence  (impudentissime)  pre- 
tend that  after  this  I  should  still  consider  him  as  a.  sacred  person  who  ought 
not  to  be  touched;  in  other  words,  that  I  should  betray  myself  and  abandon  the 
care  of  my  own  preservation  in  order  to  give  way  to  the  malice  of  a  criminal 
that  he  may  act  with  impunity  and  with  full  liberty.  On  the  contrary,  since  he 
shows  himself  unsociable  towards  me,  and  since  he  has  placed  himself  in  a 
position  which  does  not  permit  me  safely  to  practise  towards  him  the  unties  of 
peace,  I  have  only  to  think  of  preventing  the  danger  which  menaces  me  ;  so 
that,  if  I  cannot  do  this  without  hurting  him,  he  has  to  accuse  himself  only,  since 
he  has  reduced  me  to  this  necessity."  (De  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent.,  lib.  ii.  ch.  v.  I.)  The 
same  applies  to  wars.  I  would  recommend  the  perusal  of  the  whole  second 
book  with  reference  to  this  subject. 

3.  Suppose  this  method  to  fail,  that  is,  the  appeal  to  the  consciences  of  men ; 
why,  then  let  us  suffer  the  injury. 

I  have  already  shown  the  reasons  why  I  believe  this  to  be  against  the  Bible, 
against  God's  law  "  written  in  our  hearts,"  against  reason,  and  subversive  of  all 
right  and  righteousness.  Why  not  apply  the  same  principle  much  sooner  to  the 
daily  and  municipal  intercourse  of  men  ?  Reason  with  a  defaulter  or  a  robber, 
and  if  he  will  not  listen,  why,  suffer  the  evil.  For  it  will  not  be  said  that  in  ap- 
pealing to  courts  we  appeal  to  reason  alone.  Courts  are  not  arbitrations.  They 
decide  upon  reason,  no  doubt,  but  their  decision  is  to  be  enforced  if  not  willingly 
obeyed.  All  the  arguments  of  the  first  part  of  p.  444  of  Wayland's  work  would 
apply  with  much  more  strength  to  municipal  courts. 

By  adopting  the  law  of  beijevolence,  as  Wayland  calls  the  adoption  of  the 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

duct  towards  his  own  country,  and  to  his  right  of  independent 
action,  is  this  : 

He  does  not  decide  upon  the  justness  of  war,  and  is  free  of 
all  obligation  respecting  this  point.1  Cases  of  the  utmost  ex^ 
U-emity,  such  as  revolutions,  when,  as  mentioned,  he  is  ordered 
to  fire  upon  his  fellow-citizens  for  resisting  unlawful  and  ruin- 
ous decrees  of  government,  form  exceptions,  and  cannot  be 
brought  under  any  general  rule.  He  must  decide  whether  it 
is  a  case  of  utmost  extremity  and  whether  the  most  sacred 
duties  do  conflict.  In  all  other  cases  obedience  for  him  is  a 

principle  never  to  use  force  between  men,  a  nation  would  render  the  event  of 
being  subjugated  highly  improbable.  He  adds,  "There  is  not  a  nation  in 
Europe  that  could  be  led  on  to  war  against  a  harmless,  just,  forgiving,  and 
defenceless  people." 

But  history  does  not  only  show  that  states  or  societies  have  been  attacked 
again  and  again  that  would  not  fight,  but  even  such  as  could  not  fight  have  been 
attacked  and  swallowed  up,  just  as  readily  as  the  ancient  New  Englanders  used 
force  with  the  Quakers,  despite  their  non-resistance  principle.  The  fact  is,  an 
undefended  state  known  to  have  the  rule  of  suffering  everything  would  become 
the  prey  of  all  the  others.  What  should  prevent  the  African  or  Asiatic  pirates 
from  plundering  such  a  nation — for  instance,  from  attacking  our  vessels  trading  to 
China,  should  we  adopt  the  "  law  of  benevolence"  ? 

If,  however,  says  Wayland,  such  a  case  of  subjugation  should  nevertheless 
occur,  we  ought  to  suffer. 

We  must  not  forget  that  an  individual  in  bondage  may  be  free,  but  a  nation 
cannot :  for  the  individual  may  have  a  rare  elevation  of  mind  and  be  born  free; 
were  he  born  in  a  jail,  he  could  not  but  be  base,  unless  he  were  particularly  in- 
structed. Every  nation  in  servitude  becomes  debased.  Strange,  indeed,  that  we 
are  expected  willingly  to  sacrifice  everything  divine — our  moral  elevation,  civil- 
ization, government  of  law  and  right,  and  God's  own  liberty  for  which  he  made 
men — simply  in  order  to  avoid  doing  one  single  thing,  that  is,  resisting;  as 
if  it  were  said  anywhere  that  this  was  absolutely  the  greatest  evil.  As  life  is  not 
the  greatest  good,  so  dying  is  not  the  greatest  evil. 

1  *  A  question  which  in  1846,  when  the  United  States  went  to  war  with 
Mexico,  became  of  great  practical  importance,  is,  whether  a  man  whose  govern- 
ment has  gone  to  war  has  a  right  to  volunteer,  if  he  considers  the  war  unjust, 
— whether  he  can  say,  In  my  individual  opinion  the  war  is  wrong,  but  it  is,  after 
all,  an  individual  opinion,  and  my  country  has  thought  differently,  and  I  am  not 
answerable  for  it.  But  who  is  the  country?  For  instance,  in  the  present  case 
the  president  plunged  us  into  the  war,  and  congress  was  obliged  to  follow.  Had 
it  not  been  for  this  ethical  consideration,  I  should  probably  have  solicited  a 
con.mission,  and,  I  dare  say,  should  have  got  one. 


458  POLITICAL  ETHICS. 

principal  point  of  honor.  The  very  meaning  of  an  army  is 
founded  upon  obedience.  He  therefore  destroys  his  own 
character  if  he  does  not  obey  and  does  not  do  this  as  a  duty. 
He  may  rest  assured  that  in  the  same  degree  as  he  aids  to 
infuse  any  other  spirit  than  that  of  patriotism,  obedience,  and 
gallantry  into  the  army,  he  injures  the  cause  of  liberty.  A 
disobedient  army  is  a  curse  to  its  country.  The  soldier,  there- 
fore, must  under  no  circumstances  allow  the  army  to  become 
deliberative,  or  a  politically  agitated  body.  Let  the  soldier, 
if  he  have  a  right,  go  to  the  poll,  but  the  necessity  of  sub- 
ordination ought  to  deprive  the  army  of  its  political  character. 
I  believe  officers  in  actual  service  ought  not,  in  political  deli- 
cacy, to  offer  themselves  as  candidates  for  the  place  of  repre- 
sentative where  they  are  allowed  to  sit  in  the  legislature. 

Never,  except  in  cases  of  the  utmost  extremity,  ought  the 
citizens  of  a  republic  to  elect  an  officer  of  the  army,  in  service, 
as  their  chief  magistrate.  The  Americans  have  had  a  glo- 
rious exception  in  General  Washington  ;  but  the  exception 
cannot  invalidate  a  rule  so  sound  and  clear  in  itself,  and  so 
well  proved  by  all  history  and  our  own  times.  When  civil 
feud  distracts  the  country,  such  a  selection  may  become  neces- 
sary. So  are  many  evils  necessary  to  overcome  greater  ones. 
But  where  it  is  customary  to  select  candidates  for  chief 
magistracy  from  the  army,  we  must  not  look  or  hope  for 
liberty.1 


1  [Since  this  was  written,  two  men,  never  distinguished  in  civil  life,  have  been 
elected  presidents  of  the  United  States  on  account  of  their  reputation  as  military 
officers,  and  two  others  were  brought  into  notice,  although  insignificant  enough 
in  themselves,  by  their  participation  in  war.  With  a  great  army  in  a  country  this 
would  be  dangerous.  But  as  supplies,  recruiting,  and  much  else  must  precede 
the  subversion  of  the  national  liberties,  the  danger  from  military  officers  in  this 
country  is  not  very  imminent.  There  are  in  this  country  so  few  prominent  per- 
sons, and  of  these  the  real  statesmen  are  so  far  above  the  power  of  the  people  to 
estimate  them,  that  some  conspicuity  is  needed  in  the  head  or  the  figure-head  of 
a  party  of  a  sort  to  strike  the  popular  mind.  Our  problem  must  be  to  carry 
government  on  with  the  minimum  of  talent.  Add  to  this  that  politicians  have 
been  before  the  country  and  have  made  enemies.  A  new  man  comes  in  more 
easily.  Moreover,  the  people  justly  dread  the  schemes,  bargains,  mutual  in- 
surances and  assurances  of  old  foxy  politicians.] 


POLITICAL  ETHICS. 


459 


Lastly,  it  is  the  imperative  duty  of  the  soldier,  that  is,  of 
every  man  under  arms  regularly  embodied  in  a  corps,  to  show 
himself  superior  to  adversity,  to  show  his  courage  and  strength 
as  much  in  suffering  and,  in  performing  harassing  service  as 
in  fighting,  to  observe  the  strictest  discipline,  not  to  murmur 
for  want  of  pay,  dress,  or  food,  to  show  great  moral  strength 
and  alacrity  in  tiresome  sieges,  not  to  maraud  or  oppress,  to 
alleviate  as  much  as  in  him  lies  the  evils  of  war,  neither  to 
be  rash  nor  backward,  to  remember  the  great  cause  which  is 
at  stake  in  a  just  war,  and  that  the  success  of  war  depends 
mainly  upon  the  willing  and  perfect  performance  of  duty  by 
every  individual :  and  let  his  country  and  his  God  be  ever 
before  his  eyes. 


THE   END. 


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